Use Of Such Weapons Research Articles

India and Space Weaponization: Why Space Debris Trumps Kinetic Energy Antisatellite Weapons as the Principal Threat to Satellites

Since China tested a Kinetic-Energy Anti-Satellite (KE-ASAT) weapon in 2007, evidence has surfaced that India may have initiated a similar program. This article makes an anticipatory policy intervention against the development of KE-ASAT weapons. It presents data to show that space debris, and not KE-ASAT weapons, pose the highest risk for the safe operation of Indian satellites. It models a KE-ASAT weapons exchange between India and China in three different scenarios to demonstrate that use of such weapons even on a limited scale would produce an exponential increase in space debris. The latter would threaten the safe operation of satellites for all countries concerned. These data suggest that the concept of deterrence as understood in conventional and nuclear spheres is not easily transportable to the domain of space weapons, which threaten the physical destruction of satellites. If weaponization of space becomes inevitable, policy makers would be better off investing in weapons that disable but do not physically destroy satellites.

Stopping killer robots

Autonomous weapons are robotic systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. Advances in computer technology, artificial intelligence, and robotics may lead to a vast expansion in the development and use of such weapons in the near future. Public opinion runs strongly against killer robots. But many of the same claims that propelled the Cold War are being recycled to justify the pursuit of a nascent robotic arms race. Autonomous weapons could be militarily potent and therefore pose a great threat. For this reason, substantial pressure from civil society will be needed before major powers will seriously consider their prohibition. However, demands for human control and responsibility and the protection of human dignity and sovereignty fit naturally into the traditional law of war and imply strict limits on autonomy in weapon systems. Opponents of autonomous weapons should point out the terrible threat they pose to global peace and security, as well as their offensiveness to principles of humanity and to public conscience.

Is the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Illegal in International Law?

Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons illegal in international law? This question has generated a lot of attention and has somewhat divided the international community. Some States are blatantly opposed to the legality of a blind weapon which cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, while others are against the prohibition of the threat or use of such weapons in all circumstances. This paper shall attempt to discuss the above question by first defining nuclear weapons, secondly examining the effect of nuclear weapons on human beings and the environment using Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a case study and finally by discussing the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The Effects and Defects of Nuclear Cosmogeny

Joseph Masco suggests that nuclear weapons have become the icon of American technological superiority in the post-World War II era, and that their manufacture has transformed our worldview. Insofar as this is true, the production, testing, and use of such weapons has exposed the United States of America's experiment in freedom and equality to some of its most brilliant and most tarnished moments. The five volumes considered in this review explore some of the reflections from that patina and uncover many layers of tarnish that accompanied the transformation of the United States into a nuclear super-power.

Medical Implications of Enhanced Radiation Weapons

During the 1960s through 1980s the United States and several other nations developed, and even considered deploying, enhanced-radiation warheads (ERWs). The main effect of ERWs (sometimes called "neutron bombs"), as compared to other types of nuclear weapons, is to enhance radiation casualties while reducing blast and thermal damage to the infrastructure. Five nations were reported to have developed and tested ERWs during this period, but since the termination of the "Cold War" there have been no threats of development, deployment, or use of such weapons. However, if the technology of a quarter of a century ago has been developed, maintained, or even advanced since then, it is conceivable that the grim possibility of future ERW use exists. The type of destruction, initial triage of casualties, distribution of patterns of injury, and medical management of ERWs will be shown to significantly differ from that of fission weapons. Emergency response planners and medical personnel, civilian or military, must be aware of these differences to reduce the horrible consequences of ERW usage and appropriately treat casualties.

Banning Obsolete Weapons or Reshaping Perceptions of Military Utility: Discursive Dynamics in Weapons Prohibitions

The paper focuses on the argumentative process through which new international norms prohibiting the use of weapons causing severe civilian harm emerge. It examines the debate surrounding the use and usefulness of landmines and cluster munitions and traces the process through which NGOs change conceptions of military utility and effectiveness of certain weapons by highlighting their humanitarian problems and questioning their military value. By challenging military thinking on these issues, NGOs redefine the terms of the debate – from a commonplace practice, the use of such weapons becomes controversial and military decisions need to be justified. The argument-counterargument dynamic shifts the burden of proof of the necessity and safety of the weapons to the users. The process witnesses the ability of NGOs to influence debates on military issues despite their disadvantaged position in hard security issue areas. It also challenges realist assumptions that only weapons that are obsolete or low-cost force equalizers for weak actors can be banned. To the contrary, the paper shows that in the case of landmines and cluster munitions, defining the military (in)effectiveness of the weapons is part and parcel of the struggle for their prohibition.

Ophthalmic injuries from a TASER

The TASER (TASER International) is an energy-conducting weapon, that is becoming more frequently used by law enforcement officials to subdue combative individuals. Though generally regarded as a safe alternative, the use of such weapons has been reported to cause serious injuries. We describe a case in which ocular injuries were sustained by impalement with a TASER dart. Emergency physicians should be aware of the potential for serious ophthalmic injuries from TASERs and how such injuries should be managed.

THE USE OF WHITE PHOSPHORUS AND THE LAW OF WAR

AbstractThe controversy surrounding recent uses of white phosphorus (WP) to ‘flush-out’ suspected insurgents or in attacks against military targets in open ground has led to a renewed media interest in the legal status of WP-based munitions. An inherent public dislike for weapons that cause death or injury by fire is very natural, so one is entitled to ask whether humanity should not prevail when it comes to anti-personnel uses of such weapons. In the absence of a specific treaty dealing with the use of WP, this article, written jointly by a retired military lawyer and a scientist interested in the law, examines the use of such weapons in practice as well as the relevant legal and scientific background before attempting to reach conclusions about their legality. This involves a consideration of the reasons for the development of WP-based munitions, of their usual military uses and of some unconventional uses of such weapons. There follows an examination of the basic principles of customary international law as well as the treaty provisions dealing with incendiary weapons. Furthermore, because of the various harmful physiological interactions of WP, it was necessary to look closely at the legal provisions on poison, gas and chemical weapons. That demanded an interpretation of multiple aspects of the Chemical Weapons Convention before the legal status of WP could be fully determined. The convention is constructed in such a way that what at first sight appears to be a chemical weapon may not be as a matter of law unless it is consciously applied in a prohibited manner.

Disarming Rogues: Deterring First-Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The United States and its allies invaded Iraq in 2003 with the declared intention of removing Saddam Hussein's regime. Although it was determined after the war that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), removing a regime believed to be in possession of WMD raises the possibility that the post-9/11 US security policy is more willing than previously believed to tolerate the risk of precipitating a WMD exchange. In future crises, policymakers may conclude the risk of WMD use during a preemptive attack or disarming strike is lower than the risk of a terrorist attack utilizing such weapons. This article will examine the potential for intra-conflict deterrence when a state confronts an enemy that possesses WMD--most likely chemical weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW). It will contend that, despite creating an increased risk of a WMD attack, the invading state can take steps to reduce the likelihood of being met by a WMD response. It begins by exploring the relevant literature on deterrence and intra-war negotiation in an effort to develop a framework for deterrence while at the same time restraining conflict below a desired threshold. The case study of the 1991 Persian Gulf War is then analyzed in an attempt to draw lessons on whether, and if possible how, intra-conflict deterrence might work and implications for developing a theoretical understanding of likely deterrence scenarios. Finally, the article will consider lessons applicable to future conflict capable o flowering the likelihood of the use of such weapons. The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS)-reiterating what was first enunciated in the 2002 NSS--declares that the United States is willing to preempt threats and accept risk in disarming the possessors of WMD: The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction--and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. (1) This declared policy has been followed by several efforts designed to aid the United States in responding to such threats. The George W. Bush Administration has affected a shift in nuclear policy by creating the New Triad of nuclear and nonnuclear strike forces, active and passive defenses, and revitalized defense infrastructure capabilities. It also developed several new diplomatic initiatives--the Proliferation Security Initiative, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, negotiated disarmament of Libya, and a flexible approach to India's nuclear program--all designed to counter the actions of authoritarian states possessing WMD. Yet, despite these initiatives, the most attention has centered on the declared policies of preemption, regime change, and forceful disarmament. Deterring first-use of WMD is one of the most challenging issues facing nations interested in confronting states that possess such a capability. There are a number of states that now possess, or claim to possess, an assortment of WMD--nuclear, CW, and BW. With the possible exception of North Korea, the United States has an inferred policy of taking action against such states prior to the completion of nuclear weapon programs. A number of these states also happen to be located in areas of conflict involving the US military. Building a theoretical understanding of the strategies most likely to deter first-use would be of obvious benefit to America's foreign policy objectives and global stability. There are few examples of the United States taking military action against states possessing WMD. The 2003 war in Iraq presents an opportunity to examine US strategy related to possible WMD use by a regime that is aware it is being targeted. …

Who will assist the victims of use of nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical weapons – and how?

AbstractIt is uncertain who will assist the victims of use of nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical weapons if an international response is required, and how this assistance can be provided without undue risk to those providing it. The use of such weapons or any other release of the materials of which they are composed cannot be considered as presenting a uniform risk. There are a variety of risks, each with its own implications for getting help to the people affected and for the health and security of those bringing that help. The political implications are serious and complex. This brief review shows the difficulties inherent in assisting the victims or potential victims of use of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons.

Species Protection, the Changing Informal Economy, and the Politics of Access to the Bushmeat Trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Our understanding of the linkages between the bushmeat trade and the wider informal economy is limited. This lack of knowledge is particularly problematic for conservation under conditions of political instability, when the informal economy can be highly dynamic and impacts on wildlife populations can be severe. To explore these interlinked processes, we conducted a study of the bushmeat trade in Garamba National Park, Democratic Republic of Congo, through a combination of market surveys, semistructured interviews, and direct observation. We focused on the sale of protected and unprotected species in urban and rural markets, and the bushmeat commodity chains that supplied these markets, under conditions of political stability and armed conflict. During peacetime, protected species from the park (predominantly elephant and buffalo) rarely appeared in the rural markets, but they comprised more than half of all bushmeat sales in the urban markets. This pattern reflected differences in the rural and urban commodity chains. Automatic weapons were urban trade. The use of such weapons was discouraged by the traditional chiefs, who administered the village markets. During wartime, the sales of protected species in the urban markets increased fivefold because the military officers fled, leaving behind an open-access system that led to a massive increase in the exploitation of protected species. In contrast, the rural markets remained relatively stable because of the continued authority of the village chiefs. Our results indicate that sociopolitical factors can be an important determinant of species offtake and, therefore, that knowledge of the bushmeat commodity chain can be vital to controlling theprocesses that drive species extraction. In addition, our findings suggest that traditional authorities can be potentially valuable partners for bushmeat management.

Understanding technologies of terror

The variety of weapons of mass destruction are intended to create the maximum possible fear, death, destruction, and general terror in the target region or nation, particularly with new and creative ways of using them. An understanding of how these weapons work, the ways they may be used, and the scope of their destruction can contribute to effectively combating their effects. This article examines these weapons—nuclear, electromagnetic pulse, radiological, chemical and biological technologies—as well as policy approaches to defending against them. The development of national programs directed toward the understanding, potential use, and response to weapons of mass destruction by the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union are reviewed and compared, as are the international agreements that have thus far addressed the possible use of such weapons.

Chemical and Biological Warfare: Should Rapid Detection Techniques Be Researched To Dissuade Usage? A Review

Chemistry, microbiology and genetic engineering have opened new doorways for the human race to propel itself to a better future. However, there is a darker side to Bioengineering. One element of this is the manufacture and proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. It is clearly in the interest of humankind to prevent the future use of such weapons of mass destruction. Though many agents have been proposed as potential biological and chemical weapons, the feasibility of these weapons is a matter of conjecture. The unpredictable and indiscriminate devastation caused by natural epidemics and hazardous chemicals during wartime without medical treatment should warn humans of the dangers of employing them as weapons. This study argues rapid detection techniques may dissuade future use. Many agents are far less toxic to treatment. A quick response time to most attacks will decrease the chances of serious health issues. The agent will be less effective and discourage the attacker from using the weapon. Fortunately, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention (CWCIBWC) allows defensive work in the area of biological and chemical weapons. Consequently, the review will discuss history, delivery/dispersal systems and specific agents of the warfare. The study presents current developments in biosensors for toxic materials of defense interest. It concludes with future directions for biosensor development.

Medical Ethics and Non-Lethal Weapons

On October 23, 2002, over 700 people attended the musical Nord-Ost in a Moscow theater with the clunky Soviet-era name House of Culture of the State Ball-Bearing Plant Number 1. During act two 40 Chechen terrorists demanding Russian withdrawal from Chechnya stormed the building, taking patrons and performers hostage. The terrorists made it clear in a videotape that they would die rather than surrender. Conditions over the next several days were miserable as the hostages, including dozens of children, were deprived of food and water. The terrorists spread explosives throughout the building to ensure catastrophe if they were attacked. On the morning of October 26, Russian commandos piped an anesthetic gas called fentanyl through a hole in the wall, hoping to incapacitate the hostage-takers. The action succeeded in putting many of the terrorists to sleep and disrupting the rest. All of the Chechans were killed, some shot at point-blank range. Although dozens of ambulances were standing by and hospital emergency rooms were at the ready, the medical personnel were unprepared for the problems they actually faced, not injuries due to bullets or shrapnel but unconscious men, women and children. Authorities had not told them what type of gas had been used, though it is a familiar agent in operating rooms and its effects could have been managed. As it was, 128 people died of the combined effects of the fentanyl and dehydration. In response, President Vladimir Putin declared a national day of mourning and decided to step up Russia’s grip on the Muslim province. In 2004 hundreds more Russians were killed in multiple suicide attacks, including two downed passenger aircraft, as part of the continuing Chechen resistance. In Washington, the same day as the unfolding tragedy in Moscow, the National Academy of Sciences released a report on the prospects for effective military use of “non-lethal weapons,” including fentanyl. The Academy’s committee concluded that the Chemical Weapons Convention was ambiguous enough to permit the use of some non-lethal chemical weapons. Among the recommendations of the report, entitled “An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology,” was that the Pentagon’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate should establish “centers of excellence” in the weapons’ development (http://www.mindfully.org/ Reform/2002/Non-Lethal-Weapons-AssessmentNAS4nov02.htm). Proponents of “non-lethal” weapons (NLWs) claim that they will obviate the need to kill or maim. These weapons are actively being sought by all branches of the U.S. military and come in a dazzling variety, from “incapacitants” or chemicals that put people to sleep, acoustic and light-pulsing devices that disrupt cognitive and neural processes; odors so disgusting they sicken; sudden colored fog that creates panic; optical equipment that causes temporary blindness; and mechanisms that stimulate nerve endings as though they are fire, among dozens of others. A striking fact about this list is that so many are related to the human brain and nervous system. Growing concerns about terrorism have fed interest in NLWs. The modern nation-state’s typical arsenal is designed for cold war-style fighting between peers. The use of such weapons in the places terrorists like to operate often results in high levels of non-combatant casualties that may be politically as well as morally unacceptable. Hence NLWs seems to advance one of Augustine’s requirements for just war: that only as much force be used as is necessary for the task. A year after the tragedy Robin Coupland of the International Committee of the Red Cross published a commentary in The Lancet in which he raised a number of questions for the medical community about their relationship to so-called non-lethal weapons, including whether health professionals should be trained to take care of people exposed to them and whether they should they allow themselves to be part of developing weapons that require medical and scientific expertise. Coupland noted that one medical research group suggested that international standards of conduct with regard to such weapons be developed (Coupland 2003). To

The Legality of the Use of Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons under International Law

In its 1996 advisory opinion regarding the legality of the use of nuclear weapons and the threat thereof, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) stated that, although the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the Court was unable to render an opinion on small nuclear weapons, since the Court had no information under which circumstances the use of such low-yield nuclear weapons was envisaged nor whether the use of small nuclear weapons would bear the risk of an escalation of the conflict in question to an all-out nuclear war. With recent developments, both of a technological as well as of a political nature, this situation has changed. The author examines the legality under International Law of the use of such weapons, specifically with regard to International Humanitarian Law, the effect of the environment and the special obligations the United States has agreed to unter the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Future considerations for the medical management of nerve-agent intoxication.

The use of chemical warfare agents against civilians and unprotected troops in international conflicts or by terrorists against civilians is considered to be a real threat, particularly following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 against the World Trade Center in New York and against the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Over the past 10 years, terrorists have been planning to use or have used chemical warfare agents on several occasions around the world, and the attacks in 2001 illustrate their willingness to use any means of warfare to cause death and destruction among civilians. In spite of new international treaties with strong verification measures and with an aim to prohibit and prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, nevertheless, some countries and terrorist groups have been able to develop, produce, and use such weapons, particularly nerve agents, in domestic terrorist attacks or during warfare in international conflicts. This article reviews current medical therapy for nerve-agent intoxication and discusses possible future improvement of medical therapies. Present medical counter-measures against nerve agents are not sufficiently effective particularly in protecting the brain. Therefore, new and more effective countermeasures must be developed to enable better medical treatment of civilians and military personnel following exposure to nerve agents. Therefore, it is important with an enhanced effort by all countries, to improve and increase research in medical countermeasures, in the development of protective equipment, and in carrying out regular training of medical and emergency personnel as well as of military nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) units. Only then will nations be able to reduce the risk from and prevent the use of such weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Threat credibility and weapons of mass destruction

Individual or collective preparedness for an attack involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) must be based on an analysis of the threat. In threat assessment one takes many factors into account, including the physical and psychological parameters of the attacker. Although the potential devastation caused by WMD is significant, there are many limitations to the effective use of such weapons. Casualty rates will likely be measured in the thousands rather than millions because of factors that will be discussed. The psychological ramifications, it should be noted, the permutations of which have not yet been defined, will be much longer lasting. In this paper the author discusses these and other characteristics of the current threat.

Up in Smoke: Political Realities and Chemical Weapons Use Allegations during Mozambique's Civil War

Against the backdrop of Mozambique's prolonged and bloody civil conflict, waged in South Africa's backyard at the twilight of the Cold War, allegations were raised in the midst of delicate peace talks that RENAMO troops used chemical weapons (CW) in January 1992 against FRELIMO forces. An official, but flawed and inconclusive, UN inquiry into the CW allegations raises questions of policy, law, technical competence and political influence, casting doubt on the credibility of such investigative procedures and the efficacy of treaties designed to thwart the use of such weapons.

The Poison Weapons Taboo: Biology, Culture, and Policy

Although the threat of chemical and biological warfare has grown, the actual use of poisons as weapons of war or terrorism remains rare. The reason rests in part on a long-standing taboo about poison weapons. This article explores possible biological and cultural explanations for the taboo; surveys the use of poisons by other species, by tribal groups, and by ancient societies; and considers the importance of snakes in developing attitudes about poisons. Reluctance to use poison weapons may have had its origin in the linkage of medicine, poisons, and mysticism common in societies everywhere. Whatever the reasons, however, antipathy to poison weapons is deep-seated, and most nations have embraced the norm that deems these weapons morally repugnant. Policies should be sought that enhance this attitude and therefore make the use of such weapons less likely.

Senate committee hears solutions to proliferation of weapons of terror

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, security at sites where weapons of mass destruction are stored has become very lax, making diversion of these weapons to rogue nations and terrorist groups of increasing concern to the U.S. Of particular interest are security and accountability at the former Soviet Union's chemical and biological arsenals, and the effectiveness of arms control accords and nonproliferation regimes in forestalling use of such weapons. These concerns were heightened by five-month study by the Democratic staff of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Information from this study was revealed at recent hearings chaired by Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), the panel's ranking minority member. The activities of Japan's Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth)—a religious cult that preached Armageddon between the U.S. and Japan—were spotlighted as, in the words of Kyle B. Olson, a case study in the potential of modern terror. Olson is senior staff member at Tasc Corp.'s Arms ...