US-Japan Alliance Research Articles

Breaking the Mould: Japan´ s Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism to Modest Minilateralism

The strengthening of the US-Japan alliance under the KoizumiAbe governments has prompted a neorealist argument that Japan is aligning even more closely with the United States in order to balance China. (1) In practice, Japan's strategy for dealing with Chinese power is more complex than simply bandwagoning with the United States, which has been the foundation of its security policy for more than five decades. (2) The shift in Japanese strategy became evident under the Abe administration. Key differences can be discerned in the responses of the governments of Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe to China's rise. Although Prime Minister Abe sought to go even further than Prime Minister Koizumi in strengthening security ties with the United States, (3) the Koizumi administration gave sole priority to the United States, while the Abe administration adopted a dual-track approach, combining enhanced bilateralism with enhanced regionalism. A stronger US-Japan alliance was complemented by the buildup of much broader and deeper security ties with other countries in the Asia Pacific, with the aim of constructing a containment coalition against the growth of Chinese power. (4) The Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with Australia in March 2007 was an important element of Japan's more complex balancing strategy. It should not be viewed in isolation but in concert with other similar initiatives taking place at the same time: parallel overtures to India and the promotion of concepts of security trilateralism (Japan-India-US/Japan-Australia-US) and quadrilateralism (Japan-US-Australia-India), backed by the overt rhetoric of shared values and references to partnerships based on common security interests. These manifestations of Prime Minister Abe's assertive diplomacy and his desire for closer security relations with like-minded states are quite distinct from the multilateral initiatives that have been an enduring feature of Japan's regional policy in the finance, trade and diplomatic spheres. In dealing with China, the Abe government did not just turn to multilateral initiatives as a means of shaping Japan's security environment in Asia. (5) In fact, the burgeoning security ties with countries outside the US-Japan alliance exemplified a minilateral rather than a multilateralist approach, which sought to formalize and regularize security relations among a small number of regional partners and establish a new grouping with a closed rather than open membership. (6) In this respect, the revamping of security ties with other Asia-Pacific states by the Abe government marked a subtle shift from exclusive bilateralism to modest minilateralism. (7) The new approach also had divergent implications for Japan's security relationship with the United States. On the one hand, it reinforced the US alliance where the United States was also an invited player in minilateral frameworks. The Australia-Japan Security Declaration, for example, foreshadowed stronger Japan-Australia-US trilateral security cooperation in the future. On the other hand, the Abe administration's willingness to sign a security declaration with Australia and overt security approaches to India appeared to reflect a desire to take independent steps to shore up Japan's security and exercise more autonomous influence over strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation In March 2007, Japan took the unprecedented step of signing a security declaration with a third country outside the framework of its bilateral alliance with the United States. It was the first security agreement Japan had signed since the 1960 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and signalled a clear departure from Japan's exclusive security bilateralism centring on the United States. The declaration affirmed the existence of a Japan-Australia strategic partnership and committed each nation to close security consultation, enhanced cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, transnational crime, disarmament and peace keeping operations, and the provision of international public goods such as maritime security, and humanitarian and disaster relief. …

The United States, Japan, and the European Union: comparing political economy approaches to China

This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US–Japan and US–EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US–Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe.

Not quite the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’: Japan's security, the US–Japan alliance and the ‘war on terror’ in East Asia

Japan, in responding to US expectations for support in the ‘war on terror’, has displayed a degree of strategic convergence on global security objectives, thus prompting policy-makers and observers to dub it the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’. This article argues, however, that Japan is far from assuming this role. For Japan, the ‘war on terror’ serves more as a political pretext for legitimating long-planned changes in military security policy that are often only marginally related to the US's anti-terrorism agenda. Instead, Japan has focused much more on using the terror threat rationale as a means to push forward its response to the regional and traditional security challenges of North Korea and China, even if at times it attempts to depict both as ‘new security challenges’ or as involving elements of counterterrorism. The final conclusion is that US military hegemony may be weakened by Japan's and the Asia-Pacific's potential divergence from the US global security agenda.

Japan's New Security Agenda

New Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe has only been in office since late September, but already the outlines of his administration are becoming clearer, both in expected and unexpected directions. Abe’s administration is proving to be conservative and revisionist, and even more so than that of his predecessor Junichirō Koizumi. Abe has certainly moved to improve ties with China and South Korea—Beijing and Seoul the October destinations for his first overseas visits within two weeks of taking power—and thereby to limit the damage wrought by Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine and bilateral wrangling over Japan’s colonial history. However, the general thrust of Abe’s diplomacy is built upon much of the legacy left by Koizumi, and is attempting to shift it on to a yet more pro-active and assertive path.

Japan, ASEAN, and the Construction of an East Asian Community

In his 2006 New Year message, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pledged to improve relations with neighbouring countries. Underlying this message is perhaps the understanding that its relations with its neighbours, particularly its near neighbours — China and Korea — have been less than ideal. However, Prime Minister Koizumi also made it clear that Japan's foreign relations would remain based on the Japan-US alliance. This perhaps reiterated what his Foreign Minister Mr Taro Azo said not long after he was appointed foreign minister that in Japan's foreign relations, it is "US first, Asia second". No one doubts the importance of the Japan-US relationship, just as no one would underestimate the importance of getting Sino-US relations right if the stability of the region is to be assured. However, while China has been working hard to maintain a proactive and responsible regional policy in Asia, Japanese policy towards Asia has at best been unclear and uncertain, and at worst raised serious questions about Japan's perception of itself and its relations with the rest of Asia. One wonders if Japan, though geographically located in East Asia, considers itself politically and psychologically East Asian. This article focuses on Japan's relations with Southeast Asia and ASEAN, and examines how Japan's ambivalent attitude towards the East Asian region may impact the construction of an East Asian Community which ASEAN purports to be in the driving seat.

Japanese Feminism and Commercialized Sex: The Union of Militarism and Prohibitionism

This essay examines the relationship between US policy toward commercialized sex, known as the 'American Plan', and postwar Japan's prohibitionism in the context of changes in the global management of commercialized sex over the course of the 20th century, and reconsiders the meaning of prohibitionism for feminism. It draws on the existing literature on prostitution from Japan and abroad, the publications of the International Abolitionist Federation (IAF), and the records of local governments, among other sources. In the first section of this essay, it examines the details of the American Plan, which constitutes the United States's first clear institutionalization of prohibitionism during World War I. In the following two sections, it turns to the influence of the American Plan on the reorganization of the Japanese prostitution system during the Occupation era, and the participation of Japanese feminists in that process. Finally, the essay concludes by problematizing the affinities between the system of prostitution prevention and the US-Japan security alliance.

Unequal allies?: United States security and alliance policy toward Japan, 1945-1960

Table of Contents for Unequal Allies? Abbreviations Introduction 1. Neither Victors nor Vanquished: Establishing the US-Japan Alliance, 1945-50 2. Negotiating the Peace and Security Treaties, 1950-51 3. Foreign and Domestic Pressures: China Policy and the Administrative Agreement, 1951-52 4. Strategic Goals versus Local Interests: Okinawa, Nuclear Weapons, and the Article III Territories, 1953-60 5. The Lucky Dragon Incident of 1954: A Failure of Crisis Management? 6. Rearmament, Security, and Domestic Policies, 1953-60 Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

Japan's Deteriorating ties with China: The Koizumi Factor

In April 2005, anti-Japanese protests erupted in many cities in China and marked the lowest point in Sino-Japanese relations in more than 30 years. That these protests took place during the tenure of the Koizumi Administration should come as no surprise. Indeed, the policies and personality of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro have both contributed to this abysmal state of relations between the two neighbours. The Koizumi Administration has abandoned the low-posture, post-war framework of appeasing Beijing which had the following features: no explicit mentioning of Taiwan as falling within the ambit of the US-Japan Alliance, repeated offering of apologies over its past invasion of the Chinese Mainland and extending generous Official Development Assistance (ODA) in lieu of reparations. This article traces the growing assertiveness of the Koizumi Administration towards China. While the deterioration of bilateral ties is the responsibility and fault of both parties, Prime Minister Koizumi himself is a key problem — not a problem-solver in this worsening of Sino-Japanese relations. A main reason for the rising friction between Beijing and Tokyo is the fundamental shift in the political economy of East Asia: China's rise coupled with Japan's stagnation. The angst of being overshadowed by China's phenomenal economic growth and the fear that this growth will translate into greater Chinese political influence [End Page 275] and military power in East Asia have made many Japanese elites wary, if not hostile, to China. Notwithstanding such sentiments within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the rightwing mass media, the Japanese Prime Minister's personality is crucial in bilateral ties: a more reconciliatory Prime Minister will help mitigate bilateral differences, while a more assertive and combative one will make matters worse. Had Koizumi not adamantly insisted on making annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (the symbol of Japanese militarism towards the Chinese and Koreans), then the burden of history which bedevils Sino-Japanese relations could have been lightened by half. The following areas of the Koizumi Administration's assertiveness towards China are examined: the decision to end ODA, the issue of an apology over Imperial Japan's invasion of the Chinese Mainland and the unprecedented and explicit mentioning of Taiwan as a common strategic objective for the US-Japan Alliance. It then examines the absence of politicians in the present Koizumi cabinet who are reputedly friendly towards China. The main conclusion is that the departure of Koizumi as Prime Minister will not necessarily lead to an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. Indeed, Koizumi's successor might be even more assertive and prickly towards China. Ending ODA to China In March 2005, Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka officially announced that as of fiscal 2008 when Beijing hosts the Olympic Games, Japan would cease extending new yen loans to China.1 The ostensible reason (tatemae) is that Japanese funds are no longer needed given China's rapid economic growth. The real reason (honne) for ending ODA is the rise of negative sentiment in Japan towards China, stemming in part from the frustration generated by the phenomenon of "China rising, Japan stagnating".2 Many Japanese believe that Japan must stand up to China to avoid being displaced by an ascendant country. [End Page 276] In recent years, Japanese ODA has become less important to China's economic development. By 2004, Japan's cumulative ODA to China was 3.3 trillion yen (USD31.5 billion), a fraction of China's cumulative foreign direct investment of USD563 billion.3 Many Japanese, who are unhappy that Beijing has increased its military budget by more than 10 per cent annually and even offered aid to neighbouring countries, feel that Beijing does not appreciate Tokyo's generous ODA which has been used mainly to help improve the Mainland's infrastructure. They are angered by virulent anti-Japanese nationalism in China as evidenced by the abusive behaviour of Chinese soccer hooligans towards the Japanese national team during...

Japan's Deteriorating Ties with China: The Koizumi Factor

In April 2005, anti-Japanese protests erupted in many cities in China and marked the lowest point in Sino-Japanese relations in more than 30 years. That these protests took place during the tenure of the Koizumi Administration should come as no surprise. Indeed, the policies and personality of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro have both contributed to this abysmal state of relations between the two neighbours. The Koizumi Administration has abandoned the low-posture, post-war framework of appeasing Beijing which had the following features: no explicit mentioning of Taiwan as falling within the ambit of the US-Japan Alliance, repeated offering of apologies over its past invasion of the Chinese Mainland and extending generous Official Development Assistance (ODA) in lieu of reparations. This article traces the growing assertiveness of the Koizumi Administration towards China. While the deterioration of bilateral ties is the responsibility and fault of both parties, Prime Minister Koizumi himself is a key problem — not a problem-solver in this worsening of Sino-Japanese relations. A main reason for the rising friction between Beijing and Tokyo is the fundamental shift in the political economy of East Asia: China's rise coupled with Japan's stagnation. The angst of being overshadowed by China's phenomenal economic growth and the fear that this growth will translate into greater Chinese political influence [End Page 275] and military power in East Asia have made many Japanese elites wary, if not hostile, to China. Notwithstanding such sentiments within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the rightwing mass media, the Japanese Prime Minister's personality is crucial in bilateral ties: a more reconciliatory Prime Minister will help mitigate bilateral differences, while a more assertive and combative one will make matters worse. Had Koizumi not adamantly insisted on making annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (the symbol of Japanese militarism towards the Chinese and Koreans), then the burden of history which bedevils Sino-Japanese relations could have been lightened by half. The following areas of the Koizumi Administration's assertiveness towards China are examined: the decision to end ODA, the issue of an apology over Imperial Japan's invasion of the Chinese Mainland and the unprecedented and explicit mentioning of Taiwan as a common strategic objective for the US-Japan Alliance. It then examines the absence of politicians in the present Koizumi cabinet who are reputedly friendly towards China. The main conclusion is that the departure of Koizumi as Prime Minister will not necessarily lead to an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. Indeed, Koizumi's successor might be even more assertive and prickly towards China. Ending ODA to China In March 2005, Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka officially announced that as of fiscal 2008 when Beijing hosts the Olympic Games, Japan would cease extending new yen loans to China.1 The ostensible reason (tatemae) is that Japanese funds are no longer needed given China's rapid economic growth. The real reason (honne) for ending ODA is the rise of negative sentiment in Japan towards China, stemming in part from the frustration generated by the phenomenon of "China rising, Japan stagnating".2 Many Japanese believe that Japan must stand up to China to avoid being displaced by an ascendant country. [End Page 276] In recent years, Japanese ODA has become less important to China's economic development. By 2004, Japan's cumulative ODA to China was 3.3 trillion yen (USD31.5 billion), a fraction of China's cumulative foreign direct investment of USD563 billion.3 Many Japanese, who are unhappy that Beijing has increased its military budget by more than 10 per cent annually and even offered aid to neighbouring countries, feel that Beijing does not appreciate Tokyo's generous ODA which has been used mainly to help improve the Mainland's infrastructure. They are angered by virulent anti-Japanese nationalism in China as evidenced by the abusive behaviour of Chinese soccer hooligans towards the Japanese national team during...

US security strategy in Asia and the prospects for an Asian regional security regime

The US–Japan alliance serves as the cornerstone of US security strategy in East Asia. The Bush administration remains supportive of efforts by Japan to become a more “normal” nation and is expected, during its second term, to continue to encourage Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security (while refraining from open pressure or from meddling in the debate over constitutional revision). The Pentagon's ongoing Global Force Review will likely result in some modest adjustments in the US military footprint in Japan, but with no lessening of Washington's overall commitment or ability to respond to regional crises. Meanwhile, Washington will continue to support institutionalized multilateral mechanisms (including sub-regional efforts that do not include the US) as useful means to promote regional security and coordinate counter-terrorism efforts, while relying on ad hoc coalitions (or unilateral actions if necessary) to address specific threats to its own security or to the security of its allies.

Keeping the Old While Adding the New?

Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.–Japan Relations in the New Asia–Pacific. Edited by Ellis S. Krauss, T. J. Pempel. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 448 pp., $65.00 cloth (ISBN: 0-8047-4909-4), $27.95 paper (ISBN: 0-8047-4910-8). The central argument of Beyond Bilateralism , made in T. J. Pempel's Introduction, is that US–Japan relations have been changed fundamentally as a result of three developments: geopolitical changes resulting from the end of the Cold War system, the growth of international flows of private capital, and the proliferation and evolution of multilateral governmental organizations. Indeed, Pempel argues that the joint effects of these three developments have not only changed the relationships between the two countries, they have also transformed the forums in which they pursue and arrive at policy preferences and the implications of their bilateral relations for the Asian region and, indeed, the world as a whole. In short, what was usually thought to be a quintessentially bilateral relationship has become a far more complex, multilevel one. These themes are explored in various ways in the eleven chapters that form the substantive core of Beyond Bilateralism . These contributions look at US grand strategy in Asia (John Ikenberry), US–Japan military security relations (Christopher Hughes and Akiko Fukushima), the US–Japan alliance in light of the development of China (Mike Mochizuki), the two powers' relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Andrew MacIntyre), their role in Asian capital flows and financial markets (Natasha Hamilton-Hart), the rivalry in Asia between US and Japanese manufacturers (Walter Hatch), cooperation and competition in …

Reorganization of US Forces in Japan and the Japan-US Alliance

Reorganization of US Forces in Japan and the Japan-US Alliance

Forging a strengthened US–Japan alliance

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Forging a strengthened US–Japan alliance

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Japan's shifting security trajectory and policy system

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Introduction

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Japan's shifting security trajectory and policy system

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Introduction

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Japan's post-war security trajectory and policy system

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Japan's national security policy and capabilities

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally