US Allies Research Articles

Beyond hedging: China’s strategic ‘outbidding’ strategy in the semi-hierarchical Gulf region

The prevailing analytical approach within international relations scholarship has primarily framed China’s growing involvement in the Gulf region through a hedging strategy. Although this framework offers explanatory value, it misses the impact of China’s search for international hierarchy and Sino-US rivalry for subordinates in shaping China’s strategic policy choices in the Gulf. This article, anchored in hierarchy studies in international relations, posits that the intensifying global competition between the United States and China for influence over subordinate states has driven China to pursue an ‘outbidding’ strategy. In applying this approach, China provides Gulf states with more appealing economic, military, and technological incentives than the United States. Since Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in 2013, China has considerably expanded its regional influence by investing heavily in this strategy. However, the long-term effectiveness of this strategy hinges on overcoming two key constraints inherent to the semi-hierarchical order of the Gulf: the distinct strategic considerations of US allies and non-allies and the balancing dilemma that China confronts. This article substantiates its claims by analyzing official statements, policy documents, and academic literature on China’s Gulf policy.

Logic (or Illogic?) of Japan’s Aversion to TPNW and Charting a Path Forward

ABSTRACT Japan, the only country to have experienced atomic bombs during wartime, is the only one among the US allies to have positively evaluated the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) at the highest political level, with Prime Minister Kishida saying that as “a very important treaty that can serve an exit as we seek to realize a world without nuclear weapons”. Yet Japan has distanced itself from the TPNW, not participating even as an observer in the TPNW’s Meeting of States Parties. This paper attempts to explain Japan’s stance toward the TPNW process, before and after the formation of the treaty, based on a hypothesis that Japan’s nuclear policy is formed by a balancing act between two factors: humanitarian and security concerns. It then attempts to chart a path forward for any possible engagement between Japan and the TPNW. It argues that a substance-over-formality approach, not sticking to the TPNW formalities but in a framework separate from the TPNW, may open a window of opportunity for cooperation. Japan can also flexibly consider security benefits in engaging with the TPNW and comprehensively calculate possible security benefits and drawbacks without a predetermined conclusion. Since the NPT may not be sustainable unless there is a significant progress in nuclear disarmament, which itself is unlikely, like it or not, the TPNW cannot be ignored indefinitely and the time may come in the not-too-distant future when Japan will eventually have to consider engagement with the TPNW.

A word from . . . Wendell Griffen: Hateful faith lessons from Gaza

The narrative of 1 Kings 21 offers expository and hermeneutical parallels between the narrative about Naboth’s state-contrived murder and land theft and the overt actions by the modern state of Israel. No religious figures in Jezreel stood up for Naboth; similarly, religious leaders have by and large been silent about Israel’s actions in Gaza after the October 7 attack. In God’s name and for the peace of Gaza, religious leaders must not be silent, but must denounce and condemn what is being conducted by the Israeli–US alliance against Gazans. I offer nine positions regarding US action in this ongoing and worsening state-sponsored injustice and call on prophetic people to take up these positions.

US Diplomatic Visits and Allies’ Military Spending

Abstract This article develops and tests two competing arguments regarding how a patron’s diplomatic visits influence the military spending of protégés. One argument posits that a patron’s visits will decrease allies’ defense spending by producing reassurance (reassurance hypothesis). Another perspective contends that such visits will increase allies’ burden sharing by fostering allied partnerships (partnership hypothesis). I test these hypotheses by analyzing US presidential visits to allies and the annual percentage changes in allies’ military spending from 1950 to 2007. I find evidence supporting the reassurance hypothesis, indicating that diplomatic visits by US presidents are associated with lower military expenditures by allies the following year. Furthermore, I find that the negative effect is primarily observed when visits are made in the first 3 years of a presidential term, while visits in the final year of a presidency do not result in significant changes in allied burden sharing. The findings highlight the role of a patron’s travel diplomacy in providing reassurance in military alliances, as well as its unintended consequence for protégés’ foreign policy: reduced alliance contribution.

US Critical Mineral Policies and Alliance Strategies in an Age of Geopolitical Rivalry

We examine the geoeconomic strategies of the US regarding critical minerals through the lens of geopolitical rivalry with China. Chinese companies, mostly state-owned enterprises, play a prominent role in the extraction and processing of minerals critical to the energy transition. Drawing on the balance of power theory, we argue that the US, the incumbent hegemon, can employ both domestic policies and alliance-building strategies to counterbalance China’s dominance in critical mineral sectors. Empirically, we first assess the nature of US domestic policies with respect to promoting domestic critical mineral production and restricting foreign investment in the extractive sectors through investment screening measures, and then assess the degree to which the US has relied on Five Eyes alliance partners to achieve common strategic goals. We find evidence that the US uses a multifaceted geoeconomic approach involving domestic policies and alliance strategies to counterbalance China’s dominant position in critical mineral supply chains.

Plan B?: Reconsidering Australian Security in the event of a post US alliance era

ABSTRACT The rise of China combined with a growing “America First” approach to US foreign policy has generated a debate in Australia about the status of the alliance with the United States. This article contributes to this debate by exploring what a Plan B, for Australian security outside the alliance, might look like. It assesses existing scholarship on the subject, highlighting how recent arguments that Australia can “go it alone” are fundamentally flawed as they fail to address requirements to protect the economic and human security of Australians. The article goes on to examine why it is still necessary to consider a Plan B, and what Australia’s core national interests are. It emphasises the importance of protecting the lives and livelihoods of Australians, as opposed to the pure focus on the territorial defence of Australia that has marked out much of the existing literature. This leads the article to conclude that, outside the US alliance, Australia would need to rely on a more holistic concept of security, and less on a military approach. It concludes by putting forward suggestions for how Australia could provide itself with security outside the US alliance, primarily through building resilience and adopting a form of neutrality.

Walking on eggshells: politicizing Sino-ROK semiconductor technological ties in the shadow of Sino-US rivalry

The United States has tightened its technical embargo against China since the Sino-US rivalry began in the mid-2010s, especially in the semiconductor sector. It also has repercussions for China’s relations with US allies such as South Korea (or the Republic of Korea, ROK). As China’s technical growth is securitized, Sino-ROK collaboration in semiconductor technology becomes politicized, according to a securitization-politicization nexus derived from securitization theory. Under the pressure from Washington, even Korean semiconductor businesses may be forced to ‘choose sides’. However, Seoul’s pragmatic approach to Beijing prevents the politicization of Sino-ROK technological ties. While demanding security guarantees from Washington, Seoul is unwilling to enhance ties with the US at the price of those with China. Among three scenarios figured out in this paper, South Korea is likely to consolidate its ties with China in semiconductor industry in some form of ‘smart’ collaboration Ceteris paribus, and this is also in the interest of Beijing.

The NEO-RT trial: A phase 3 randomized trial of neoadjuvant chemotherapy, excision and observation versus chemoradiotherapy for early rectal cancer, CCTG CO.32.

TPS3646 Background: There is significant interest in organ-sparing management of rectal cancer. Data from the National Cancer Database suggest that in 2020 only 20% of US patients with stage I rectal cancer are managed non-operatively. The phase II CCTG CO.28/NEO trial previously reported high rates of tumor downstaging, organ preservation and excellent rectal function among patients with T1-T3abN0 rectal adenocarcinoma treated with 3 months of FOLFOX/CAPOX followed by Transanal Endoscopic Surgery (TES). The phase III CO.32/NEO-RT trial (NCT06205485) will compare two organ sparing strategies for patients with stage I rectal cancer. Methods: Eligible patients with clinical stage T1/2 N0 adenocarcinoma with preserved mismatch repair (MMR) will be randomized 1:1 to ARM A, 3 months of FOLFOX or CAPOX versus ARM B, chemoradiation (54 Gy) followed by tumor restaging within 16 weeks of start of therapy. Patients with histological high grade, mucinous or deficient MMR and those that can be treated with tumor excision alone are excluded. The primary endpoint is tumor downstaging to clinical Complete Response (cCR) by pelvic MRI, endoscopy and digital rectal exam. Subsequent TES is recommended for all patients with tumor response and may be done within 24 weeks of treatment begin, followed by 5 years (y) of observation with serial MRI (q6m x 2y then annually) and endoscopy (q4m x 2y, then q6m during year 3, then annually). The co-primary endpoint is Quality Of Life (QOL) measured by the Low Anterior Resection Score (LARS). In a non-inferiority comparison between treatment arms, if the cCR is assumed to be 45% in ARM B and if there is no true difference between ARMS A and B, then 250 patients are required to be 80% sure that the upper limit of a one-sided 90% confidence interval will exclude a difference in favor of chemoradiation of more than 14%. Results: The approved CCTG CO.32 trial is expected to open February, 2024 at Canadian CCTG and US Alliance, ECOG-ACRIN, NRG, and SWOG NCTN sites with an estimated accrual duration of 4 years. Conclusions: The results of this study will have a major impact on the treatment of patients with stage I rectal cancer. Both arms offer the potential of organ preservation and results will inform whether induction chemotherapy is non-inferior to ChemoRT and compare patient QOL and functional outcomes. Clinical trial information: NCT06205485 .

Democratic Ties That Bind? US–China Conflict and Foreign Policy Opinion in Japan and Korea

AbstractWhile the Biden administration has framed US–China relations as part of a broader contest between democracy and autocracy, the potential international repercussions of this stance remain unclear. How will other democracies and, in particular, the citizens of key democratic US allies respond to a world characterized by increasing rivalry between dictatorships and democracies? We seek to answer this question through survey experiments in Japan and South Korea. We randomly assign information to respondents, highlighting the differences in democracy and human rights practices in the US–China relationship. Despite prior research and recent US policy documents suggesting that increasing tension over democracy and human rights in US–China relations will lead to democratic US allies moving even closer to the United States, our findings diverge from this expectation. When provided with information about this tension, the level of support for more cooperation with Washington decreases in both Japan and Korea. Our findings point to the need to revisit an assumption in much of the academic literature: Given a choice between cooperation with authoritarian and democratic countries in conflict, democracies—and their publics—will gravitate toward the latter.

Forever Bound? Japan’s Road to Self-defence and the US Alliance

Faced with an ever more contested security environment, Japan is shifting towards a forward-leaning denial strategy whereby it seeks ‘primary responsibility’ for disrupting and defeating invasions ‘much earlier and at a further distance’ by 2032. In pursuing greater operational and war-fighting readiness, Japan is investing not only in capable air and missile defences, counter-strike missiles, and adequate air and land platforms, but also in appropriate strategic enablers and a broader defence-industrial and technological base. While Japan’s ten-year defence plan looks promising, the country’s traditional weaknesses and long-standing dependencies will not be easily overcome. In particular, the complexity of East Asia’s precision-strike context will sustain, if not deepen, Japan’s reliance on the United States for its C4ISR infrastructure and other strategic enablers, as well as for its defence-industrial and technological base. Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, an increasingly capable Japan is also increasingly bound to its US ally.

Myeloablative vs nonmyeloablative consolidation for primary central nervous system lymphoma: results of Alliance 51101

AbstractAlthough it is evident that standard-dose whole-brain radiotherapy as consolidation is associated with significant neurotoxicity, the optimal consolidative strategy for primary central nervous system lymphoma (PCNSL) is not defined. We performed a randomized phase 2 clinical trial via the US Alliance cancer cooperative group to compare myeloablative consolidation supported by autologous stem cell transplantation with nonmyeloablative consolidation after induction therapy for PCNSL. To our knowledge, this is the first randomized trial to be initiated that eliminates whole-brain radiotherapy as a consolidative approach in newly diagnosed PCNSL. Patients aged 18 to 75 years were randomly assigned in a 1:1 manner to induction therapy (methotrexate, temozolomide, rituximab, and cytarabine) followed by consolidation with either thiotepa plus carmustine and autologous stem cell rescue vs induction followed by nonmyeloablative, infusional etoposide plus cytarabine. The primary end point was progression-free survival (PFS). A total of 113 patients were randomized, and 108 (54 in each arm) were evaluable. More patients in the nonmyeloablative arm experienced progressive disease or death during induction (28% vs 11%; P = .05). Thirty-six patients received autologous stem cell transplant, and 34 received nonmyeloablative consolidation. The estimated 2-year PFS was higher in the myeloablative vs nonmyeloablative arm (73% vs 51%; P = .02). However, a planned secondary analysis, landmarked at start of the consolidation, revealed that the estimated 2-year PFS in those who completed consolidation therapy was not significantly different between the arms (86% vs 71%; P = .21). Both consolidative strategies yielded encouraging efficacy and similar toxicity profiles. This trial was registered at www.clininicals.gov as #NCT01511562.

Pragmatic Deviation of Grice’s Cooperative Principle in Trump’s Political Interview With the CNN News Channel

The present paper aims to investigate pragmatic deviation from Grice’s (1975, 1989) cooperative principle and conversational maxims in the previous United States president, Donald Trump’s political interview with CNN News Channel. The paper follows a qualitative approach in gathering and examining the data. An oral document that was captured from YouTube is followed in the current paper as instrumentation. This document, which is chosen purposefully, is an interview that was broadcast on CNN News Channel between Trump and reporter Cooper in 2016 before the election which Trump won. A discourse analysis method is utilized to study the coded transcript. Findings show that Trump deviates from Grice’s cooperative principle and conversational maxims. Also, the researchers argue that the reasons behind such deviation are (1) hiding the truth that could damage Trump’s image before the audience, (2) trivializing other’s claims to make the audience feel that these claims are silly, (3) refusing to share his own plans with others, (4) withholding his opinion about the US allies so as to keep strong relationships with them, (5) influencing the audience’s thinking about him by distorting the facts, (6) showing himself as the best candidate and should be elected as the US president.

Credibility in Crises: How Patrons Reassure Their Allies

Abstracts How do citizens of US allies assess different reassurance strategies? This article investigates the effects of US reassurance policies on public opinion in allied states. We design and conduct a survey experiment in five Central–Eastern European states—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania—in March 2022. Set against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this experiment asked respondents to evaluate four types of reassurance strategies, each a critical tool in US crisis response policy: military deployments, diplomatic summitry, economic sanctions, and public reaffirmations of security guarantees. The international security literature typically values capabilities for their deterrence and reassurance benefits, while largely dismissing public reaffirmations as “cheap talk” and economic sanctions as being ineffective. Yet we find preferences for the use of economic sanctions and public statements as reassurance strategies during crises, in part because these approaches help states manage escalation risks.

The Implications of Great Power Politics in the Decade Long Syrian Civil War

This research analyzes the implications US and Russian involvement has had as two great powers in the Syrian civil war for international relations in the Middle East as well as for the relations between Washington and Moscow. Using a structural realist approach, this study suggests that the actions of both the US and Russia have mostly been defined by geopolitical status-quo concerns. As a result, they have preferred that their great power play be contained in Syria. As key findings, this study puts forward that the US-Russia showdown in Syria has prolonged the destruction and shaken US alliances in the region while allowing Iran as a key US adversary in the region to extend its influence deep into the region under cover of Russia. Furthermore, contrary to their broader escalatory security policies, Russia and the US have adopted containment approaches and avoided direct confrontation using Cold War tools.

The ambivalence of the implementation of the US arctic policy: integrating and disintegration factors of the allies

The Arctic region is gaining increasing strategic importance due to its economic potential, resource richness, and shifting geopolitical landscape. The United States has recognized this significance and has established alliances and partnerships with various countries in the region to enhance its positions and interests. However, concerns exist regarding the limited understanding of the complex dynamics and evolving relationships among the US Arctic allies. The lack of comprehensive analysis and up-to-date information hinders the understanding of their strategic documents, military exercises, and interactions with global players like China and Russia. To address these concerns, our objective was to identify, analyze, and assess the factors that strengthen or weaken the interaction between US allies and partners in the Arctic region. We conducted an analysis of national Arctic strategies, reports, publications, and expert opinions from Western Arctic Council countries such as the USA, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. We also examined the reports and structures of the US defense services, interstate organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), as well as insights from leading experts on Arctic affairs in allied countries. The study revealed several factors that contribute to the strengthening of the US allies in the Arctic. These include active military cooperation within the North Atlantic Alliance, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and the development of Arctic infrastructure to enhance regional security and defense capabilities. However, we also identified factors that weaken engagement among the US allies. These include differences in strategic goals, competing territorial claims, domestic political considerations, and varying relationships with other Arctic stakeholders like Russia and China. These factors can lead to tensions and challenges, which undermine collective action and impede the achievement of common goals.

CHALLENGES TO THE US ASIA PIVOT STRATEGY

The US introduced the Asia Pivot Strategy / Rebalance Asia policy in 2011 which was also known as Asia Pivot Strategy which focuses on the maintaining equilibrium in Asia particularly in Asia Pacific region. The main architect of the policy were the Hillary Clinton and Curt Campbell. The policy is designed to contain the China in the region, and in this policy they have designed to forge close links with the US allies in the region, and the role of India has been highlighted to be the key player in its policy. The Asia Pivot Strategy is accompanied by the US Strategic Guidance Programme of 2012 which focuses on the allies concerns regarding the US commitment in the region. The policy since its implementation has faced various challenges such as the difference among the US allies on the historical issues of Japan-South Korea relations as well as the concerns over the US commitments and their reservations on the Chinese military build-up and the assertive role it has posed in the South China Sea, as well as the growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean Region under the Strings of Pearl, and the impact of the OBOR over the US Asia Pivot Strategy.

From Counterterrorism to Deterrence: The Evolution of Canada’s and Italy’s Defense Postures

How do US democratic allies perceive and adapt to the multiple challenges associated with the rise of multipolarity and the return of major war in Europe? This article examines how two US allies—Canada and Italy—have adapted their defense postures from the professed beginning of the shift in the balance of power in 2008 to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. More specifically, it provides a comparison of three major dimensions of defense postures: threat perceptions, patterns of foreign military deployments, and military expenditures. This article argues that both allies have undertaken a shift from liberal interventionism towards a defense posture increasingly geared towards deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. However, the shift did not occur analogously and simultaneously, as the two allies’ adjustment was shaped by differing levels of domestic inter-party contestation. This article highlights the extent to which US allies’ international security adaptation follows political-party threat perceptions more than the traditional left-right dichotomy. Shared inter-party threat perceptions of great power revisionism are found to shape the degree of defense policy adaptation toward great power competition.

Ukraine vs Gaza

Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, and Israel’s ruthless response, dislodged Ukraine from the top slot on the global security agenda. While the outcome of the Russia–Ukraine war remains unclear, the Gaza war has fuelled geopolitical trends that compromise Kyiv’s position and with which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy must contend if Ukraine is to survive. The most important linkage is that the United States is security guarantor and armourer for both Ukraine and Israel. Ukraine must now compete for military assistance and attention with the formidable Israeli lobby. Zelenskyy will also need to outpace two trends running against Ukraine, likely reinforced by the Gaza war: the increasing inclination of some US allies to de-link their security strategies from those of the United States, and the normalisation of authoritarian power projection, including that of Iran. Generating mass among international actors deeply divided on international security policy would exhaust a great power. It is even more to expect of Ukraine.

East Asia’s Alliance Dilemma: Public Perceptions of the Competing Risks of Extended Nuclear Deterrence

ABSTRACT Against the backdrop of a rapidly changing security environment in East Asia, regional actors have seen a surge in “nuclear anxiety”. Worries among citizens of US allies and partners about rising nuclear threats and nuclear proliferation risks critically shape US foreign policy in East Asia. This paper thus asks: What drives nuclear anxiety in East Asia? And how can the United States most effectively resolve it? We situate nuclear anxiety in the dynamics of abandonment and entrapment that exist between allied states, as well as in the unique regional security structure, or the hub-and-spoke system in East Asia. To better understand the implications of nuclear anxiety on regional nuclear policy, we analyze the results of an original survey conducted in June 2023 across Washington’s five allies and partners in East Asia: Australia, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The survey results suggest the presence of the dynamics of both nuclear entrapment and abandonment among these regional actors, as well as mixed interests in indigenous nuclear programs. In addition, we demonstrate how citizens of East Asia evaluate possible policy options that could help Washington mitigate regional nuclear anxiety.

“Зеленый курс” администрации Дж. Байдена: амбиции и реалии

The ambitious “green” industrial policy program promoted by the Biden administration is designed to consolidate the US claims to its leading role in shaping the global climate change agenda. The package of legislative acts approved by the White House provides for unprecedented allocations to address priorities for decarbonizing the American economy. Pumping up targeted manufacturing industries with federal subsidies and tax incentives has generally had a positive impact on economic growth, employment, labor productivity and innovation activity. After the adoption of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA), the process of transforming alternative energy into the fastest growing and relatively affordable source of electricity attractive for private investment accelerated. Large-scale investments of public and private funds in renewable energy sources, electric transport and batteries have stimulated the use of national resources. At the same time, the task set by the White House to achieve sole global leadership and weaken the dependence of national industry on supplies of raw materials, components and finished products from “unfriendly” countries still looks elusive. The most significant obstacle to meeting Washington’s overstated ambitions in terms of increasing the chances of American companies competing with China is the continuing lag in building up the production base of “green” energy. The US dependence on supplies of the “green triad” – solar panels, lithium-ion batteries and electric vehicles remains high. Washington’s aggressive protectionist actions have failed to prevent Chinese companies from developing alternative energy sources, as well as the new energy vehicle industry (NEVs). The confrontation with China distracts the material resources of the United States from the tasks related to the implementation of the “new green deal”, creates obstacles to the scaling of “green” technologies. If the Biden administration or his successor as US president act even more aggressively, it will make it more difficult to achieve Washington’s climate goals, may involve some US allies in a “subsidy war” and may even serve as a trigger for a new escalation of international tensions.