US Allies Research Articles

The US Congress and the Issue of Beginning the Iraq War: the Kurdish Factor in 2002-2003

The political discussions in the US Congress on the start of the war in Iraq and the fate of the Kurdish minority in this country are being explored. The arguments of supporters and opponents of the war in Iraq are analyzed through the prism of the Kurdish factor based on the transcripts of the US Congress, as well as materials from hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It emphasizes the insignificance of the Kurdish issue in the initial period of discussion (the discussion on giving the US President the right to start military operations in Iraq), and the growing interest of legislators in the fate of the Kurdish population in January-March 2003. It is concluded that for the supporters of the invasion the Kurdish factor became the main one and the stake was placed on the need to overthrow Saddam Hussein because of his cruel attitude towards his own people, and in the camp of the opponents of the war the stake is placed on the thesis that the fate of the Kurds was known in 1980s but no one then decided to provide them with military support. The problem of double standards in American foreign policy towards both the Kurds, US allies in the region, and Saddam Hussein was first identified by the US Congress in 2003.

Reasons for NATO’s and Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis; comparative analysis of realist and humanitarian perspectives

The Syrian crisis, which has been often described as a proxy war between NATO and Russia, has lasted for more than 10 years with no visible sign of an end. Most scholars explain the reasons behind NATO’s and Russian intervention with realistic motives. However, there are cases difficult to explain only from a realist perspective. For example, great power diplomatic efforts to remove chemical weapons and adopt sanctions at the cost of energy interests. These actions can be viewed as humanitarian involvement. The study argues that great powers’ motivation cannot be judged uniformly, but their actions should be evaluated separately, as some actions might be realist and some humanitarian, and some a mixture of both. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine the reasons behind great powers’ involvement in the Syrian crisis by examining key decisions each power took during the war, from both aspects: realist and humanitarian. The study begins by outlining the theoretical background behind both perspectives and establishing criteria for judging a decision as realist/ humanitarian. This has been applied in reviewing the context behind five key decisions NATO (the US and European allies) and Russia made during the crisis. The study finds that one time all parties acted in a realist fashion, which produced no significant outcome. Contrary to this, one time all parties acted on humanitarian motives, which resulted in a favorable outcome. In the case when two parties, the US and Russia, acted as a realist, and the EU as humanitarian power, the EU’s efforts were insufficient to produce a favorable outcome. In other cases, when two parties, the EU and the US, pursued humanitarian motives, and Russia realist, the result depended on whether Russia pursued them actively or non-actively. In the former case, the result was ineffective to prevent further atrocities, whereas in the latter favorable outcome was still possible.

Strategi Amerika Serikat dalam Membendung Kebangkitan Tiongkok di Asia Pasifik melalui Aliansi Pertahanan Quadrilateral Periode 2017-2020

This paper aims to find out the strategic role of the US Quadrilateral Security Alliance in reducing China's threats in the Asia Pacific during 2017-2020. The method used in this research is qualitative, with descriptive-analytical technique. This technique aims to provide a holistic understanding and description of a symptom or phenomenon. The findings of this study show that the rise of China in the economic and military sectors, as well as China's aggressiveness in expanding its territories, threatens the US hegemony in the Asia Pacific. Thus, to maintain its status quo, the US formed a Quad Alliance with Australia, Japan and India in 2007. However, this alliance was inactive since 2008 and reactivated in 2017 by President Donald Trump. The Quad Alliance is quite intense in conducting military expeditions in the Indian-Pacific Ocean. Based on the Balance of Threat theory by Stephen Walt (1985), the Quad Alliance is the US "Rebalancing Strategy" against China in the Asia Pacific, which aims to eliminate 4 main sources of threats, namely China's aggregate power, China's geographical proximity to the US alliance, China's military capabilities, and China's ambitions in the region. The dynamics of the Sino-US contestation are driven by the basic motive of Neorealism, that is protecting the national interests of the two countries, whether political, economic, or domination/influence.

The art of uncommitment: the costs of peacetime withdrawals from alliance commitments

Are there significant domestic political costs for leaders who disengage from long-standing alliances, costs that discourage such disengagement? Leaders of major powers occasionally look for ways to disengage in non-crisis situations from some long-term commitments to other countries following the legal procedures laid out in the alliance treaty or commitment. However, leaders interested in disengagement from alliances sometimes fear that they will pay domestic disengagement costs, for example, a decline in domestic public support, if they try to withdraw from alliances in that manner in practice. To examine if such fears are justified, we conducted two survey experiments among representative samples of the US public investigating the effects of a presidential decision to end an alliance commitment through the legally prescribed means. We find that disengagement costs exist in general and that some characteristics of the country in question can increase their size and make them more long-lasting. For example, withdrawal from alliances with countries perceived as similar on some key criteria to the United States and as loyal allies, or widespread opposition by experts to this withdrawal, will all increase the size of the disengagement costs and make them more long-lasting. Leaving an existing alliance in peacetime will frequently be a politically losing proposition for American leaders in many plausible situations—one possible reason for the endurance of some US alliances.

Under the Umbrella: Nuclear Crises, Extended Deterrence, and Public Opinion

How robust is public support for extended nuclear deterrence in patron and client states? Recent studies have improved scholarly understanding of US public opinion about nuclear weapon use against non-nuclear adversaries. Yet, there is limited knowledge of public attitudes regarding retaliation for nuclear strikes against US allies. We develop a theoretical typology of nuclear crises and investigate this phenomenon with a novel survey experiment ( n = 6,623). Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans viewed realistic emergency alert messages about a most-likely case for nuclear retaliation: a North Korean missile attack on a US ally protected by the nuclear umbrella. Support for nuclear retaliation is low in all three countries, with important cross-national differences. Favorability increases with North Korean nuclear first-use, but it remains limited nonetheless. Surprisingly, US “tripwire” troop casualties do not increase Americans’ demands for nuclear retaliation. These findings have important implications for the study of nuclear crises and practice of extended deterrence.

Demand for Military Expenditures and Security Alignment Choices in the Indo-Pacific

ABSTRACT We explore the possibilities and limitations of models of the demand for military expenditures, as against additional kinds of cross-country analyses, with an empirical focus on the Indo-Pacific region. Our research bridges a gap between the Defence Economics and International Relations literatures by developing testable security alignment hypotheses and by testing these hypotheses in three ways: with demand modelling on total expenditures, with analyses on estimated stocks of imported armaments, and with qualitative analyses of trends in defence cooperation between states. We find consistent evidence across research methods of an increase in threat perceptions towards China since around 2012 and of balancing behaviour by US allies and by two non-allies. As compared to standard demand modelling, our hypothesis-based mixed methods approach allows for a clearer treatment of samples with mixed and shifting security alignments and of states that stabilise or reduce expenditures in the face of rising threat perceptions.

Neither reckless nor free-riders: auditing the Baltics as US treaty allies

Is it strategically wise for the USA to stretch its protective umbrella over small nations in Eastern Europe? Prominent critics have faulted US allies for acting recklessly and free-riding on US security guarantees. The evidence presented vis-à-vis the Baltic States, however, challenges these assumptions. This study paints a picture of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as loyalty-obsessed small states that diligently seek to meet their patron’s behavioural expectations. By word and deed, they back US strategic goals. As such, they have taken on heavy war burdens in US-led campaigns and sided with Washington in its geopolitical struggle against China. What is more, they bring to the table distinctive capabilities in cyber and intelligence. In sum, this paper suggests that the Baltic States have continuously reimbursed the USA for its defence-cover services.

Adjustments and Constraints: Biden Administration’s Iran Policy

This article provides an overview of the recent US Iran policies by comparing the US Middle East strategy under the Biden administration to the Trump administration’s approach. Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign adopted various aggressive policies including withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement and escalating sanction measures against Iran. However, the campaign has proven a failure as it was impeded by Iran’s countermeasures and has damaged the US international reputations. The Biden administration has incentives to improve the US-Iran relations and restore the Iran nuclear deal. However, it faces constraints from both domestic politics and distrust of US alliances. Domestic hardliners have pressured the Biden administration to keep a tough stance on Iran and opposed the US to make concessions as it renegotiates the nuclear deal. Other related countries including the US allies are hesitant to comply with US. In terms of its Middle East strategy, Trump’s betrayal of the previous deal has brought credibility crisis to the US. Though the Iran nuclear talks have restarted, the future of Iran’s nuclear program remains bleak. Divergence is brewing among the US, Iran, and other related powers due to different national interests. Also, the newly elected Iranian presidency, led by ultra conservative leader Ebrahim Raisi’s, makes a new Iran nuclear deal more difficult to obtain. To revive the Iran nuclear agreement, this article suggests that the Biden administration ensure Iran’s interests through cooperation and pay more attention to the social development and people’s livelihood in Iran.

The Rise and Fall of South Korea’s 586 Generation: Implications for the US Alliance

The Rise and Fall of South Korea’s 586 Generation: Implications for the US Alliance

Bolstering the Alliance for a Trilateralism‐Based Security Strategy for South Korea in Times of US–China Rivalry*

As the strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, South Korea is facing growing pressure to chart an optimal diplomatic strategy to navigate the convoluted geopolitics and foster lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. At this crucial juncture, this study examines multi‐faceted, capacity‐building measures for peace aimed at precluding Sino–US friction in the East and South China Seas from spilling over into the Korean Peninsula. This article presents a road map to stimulate and reinvigorate security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan and economic cooperation among South Korea, China, and Japan in a virtuous cycle, and by extension to craft a dialogue channel among South Korea, the United States, and China. It also puts forward a three‐stage program for the evolution of the South Korea–US alliance whereby South Korea secures flexibility in its approach to China based on the robust trust of the alliance. This is to enable South Korea to assume a key role in connecting the three trilateral cooperation channels with the development of the Seoul–Washington alliance being a key driver to expand Seoul's diplomatic capacity. In the end, this study envisions a foreign policy model for South Korea that would allow the middle‐power country to punch above its weight by expanding the framework of cooperative security. It aims to ultimately pursue a multilateral, common security architecture in Northeast Asia, including China, which will serve as a multilayered catalyst to promote lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

A HUB-AND-SPOKES “PLUS” MODEL OF US ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC: TOWARDS A NEW “NETWORKED” DESIGN

A reassessment the nature of “alliances” and “alignments” since the end of the Cold War, both practically and conceptually, is long overdue. Treaty alliances have become partially obsolescent as new models of security cooperation, such as the ‘strategic partnership’, and other “minilateral” configurations, have emerged as preferred instruments of alignment. The evolving nature of alliance and alignment is nowhere better illustrated than in the metamorphosis of the venerable Hub-and-Spokes US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. This article captures the changes occurring in the US alliance system from both a macro-level (structural) standpoint, before proceeding to the micro-level to evaluate individual alliance/partnership dyads to illustrate the complexion of the hub-and-spokes “plus” configuration of today. It argues that we are witnessing is a “reshuffling of the deck” in terms of traditional treaty allies – with Japan and Australia now forming the “core” of the system, with South Korea effectively confined as a “single-issue” alliance focused on the peninsula, and with Thailand and the Philippines (arguably) becoming increasingly “peripheral”. But even as the original treaty-system contracts, Washington is seeking to “network” the original model through the acquisition of non-treaty strategic partnerships with key states such as India, Singapore, (and, more circumspectly – Taiwan), whilst also welcoming European engagement. This networking strategy is also designed to achieve second and third order effects through incentivisation of direct “spoke-to-spoke” security cooperation and through the concentration of allies/partners into minilateral formations. The resultant reconfiguration might be dubbed a Hub-and-Spokes “plus” model.

The limits of China’s engagement in the Mediterranean: Role conflict and emerging mistrust in Spain–China relations

ABSTRACT Spain has recently endorsed a more critical stance towards China. This article explains this posture through the application of role theory and the concept of (mis)trust. Role conflict has intensified from the interplay between China’s new roles of great power and economic and technological competitor, Spain’s higher expectations towards China, and Spain’s self-identified role, greatly influenced by its relations with its traditional European and US allies. This has generated mistrust, and Spanish authorities have shown greater concerns about Chinese behaviour. As a result, they have turned to a more conditional co-operation as evidenced by a series of recent foreign policy outcomes on the BRI, foreign investment, and 5 G networks.

Alliances and Nuclear Risk: Strengthening US Extended Deterrence

There is a fundamental tension between the Biden administration’s stated intent to strengthen US alliances while at the same time reducing the role of US nuclear weapons. The credibility of extended-deterrence commitments – which in times of great-power conflict lie at the heart of US alliances – hinges on US allies and adversaries believing that Washington would resort to nuclear weapons to defend the core interests of its allies. A no-first-use or sole-purpose declaration would undermine deterrence and alliances by qualifying US security guarantees. The Biden administration and US allies should focus on coupling allied security to the threat of US nuclear use, to risks of inadvertent escalation for adversaries, and to the value of limited nuclear use in addressing conventional military imbalances in the Indo-Pacific. Forward-basing US nuclear forces in the region, where they are currently absent, is key to achieving all three of these aims.

The Significance of Taiwan in the Modern US Military Policy towards China

The article is devoted to the US policy towards Taiwan in the context of the US-China confrontation. The attention is focused on the US-Taiwan relations under the Biden administration. At the beginning of the analysis, the political and legal foundations of the US policy towards Taipei are described, such as the Three Communiqués, the "Six guarantees" and the Taiwan Relations Act. This is followed by an analysis of the developments in bilateral relations that took place during the tenure of Joseph Biden, in particular N. Pelosi’s visit to the island. The article also considers the state of affairs in the field of military assistance to Taiwan at the present stage. The author gives prognosis in regard to the US allies and partners, primarily Japan and Australia, reaction to a possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The article concludes with an assumption regarding China's attitude towards a possible invasion and a forecast for the development of the situation.

Energy security issues in US and EU foreign policy: comparative analysis

Energy resources are becoming an increasingly politicized commodity, which at the same time retains special technical and economic characteristics, which complicates the work of the foreign policy leadership. The authors, using a comparative method, conduct a study of the relationship between energy and foreign policy in the EU and the USA through the prism of different cognitive structures used by subjects to assess the landscape of global energy. On this conceptual basis, the authors explore the evolution of the relationship between energy and foreign policy in the EU and the United States: to what extent energy is a useful tool of foreign policy, and, conversely, how deeply the goals of energy policy are embedded in foreign policy. By making such a comparison, the authors identify differences and potential similarities between the EU and the US in this area. Thus, comparing the approaches of the USA and the EU, one can see a tendency towards their convergence. Despite the significant difference in the energy landscape of the EU and the United States, Brussels and Washington agreed that they included a common vision of the global energy architecture in their foreign policy. The use of energy as a political tool, at least in rhetoric, was condemned by both sides. Nevertheless, at the national level, energy issues in the EU are often determined by the foreign policy considerations of a particular country. It is also worth remembering that LNG exports from the United States to Europe are considered to a certain extent as a means of increasing competition for Russian natural gas, as a way to provide US allies with an alternative and help them reduce dependence on Russia, sometimes even as an energy weapon, but in any case as a very effective foreign policy tool.

Перезагрузка курса на восстановление промышленного потенциала США

The article examines the effectiveness of the strategy for restoring the competitiveness of the manufacturing industry in the United States. The main vulnerabilities of the “produce more in America” policy, the course to restore and reformat broken supply chains are considered using the example of key manufacturing industries. It is stated that the policy of rehabilitation of the manufacturing industry pursued by Biden is not a unique phenomenon for the United States. It was adhered to, to a greater or lesser extent, by the Obama and Trump administrations. However, only the Biden administration ordered to put it at the center of the ideology of the American revival. It is noted in this article that structural reforms to transform the industrial sector, implemented with unprecedentedly high financial support from the federal authorities, are directed at creating new jobs, forming new industrial clusters and innovation centers. The main efforts are aimed at targeted manufacturing industries: pharmaceuticals, strategic metals and minerals, electric vehicles, and semiconductors. The use of nationally produced goods, reshoring and the formation of supply chains within the United States are proclaimed as the main preconditions for building a truly strong economy. The concept of “real energy independence” promoted by Biden, relies on renewable energy sources. A new impetus to the “greening” of the energy sector may be given to compensate companies investing in renewable energy sources for the costs associated with the forced replacement of foreign suppliers with national ones. Meanwhile, in effect, the attitude of Washington towards hydrocarbon energy remains fairly loyal, at least at the time of high fuel prices. In the domestic economic agenda, the priorities of industrial policy are being revived, aimed at achieving sole technological leadership. However, Washington’s achievements cannot be interpreted solely as the successes of Biden’s economic policy. An equally significant role was played by the expansion of domestic demand against the background of overcoming the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The vector of further development is determined by the slogan “surpass China and the rest of the world”. The White House is trying to persuade American companies to build new manufacturing facilities in the US in order to compete with Chinese suppliers. However, against the background of China’s obvious desire to develop its own research and production base, the opportunities for American diсtate are narrowing. Import substitution is a slow process – “money speaks louder than economic patriotism”. Only a small portion of the business returns to the country, because of global instability, China is considered by a large part of American investors as a fairly safe haven. Washington’s attempts to squeeze China out of the supply chains have only accelerated the implementation of Beijing’s programs aimed at achieving technological selfsufficiency and “de-Americanization”. In recent years, the epicenter of the policy of technological containment, pursued by the United States against China, has shifted towards Russia. Our country is accused by Washington of deliberately orchestrating disruptions in the supply chains in energy and agricultural commodities markets. The experience of anti-Chinese actions, accumulated in the competitive struggle against companies and state organizations, and coordinated with US allies, is being used now against Russian exporters.

Military-political consequences of the events in Afghanistan: trends and their consideration in diplomatic practice

The events taking place in the world as a result of the stampede of the United States from Afghanistan marked a radical change in the geopolitical and geostrategic picture of the world. As a result of these events, the United States of America in an instant turned into the ghost of a once powerful state, which has provided them with many allies and admirers until now. America came to the Middle East without understanding anything about its peculiarities, having squandered the lives of its own citizens and gigantic resources without any tactics and strategy. As a result, they suffered the greatest strategic blow in Afghanistan since the end of the Cold War. This also means the defeat of US allies, primarily NATO, who realized in mid-August 2021 that the US administration would not coordinate its actions with them on the issue of ending the Afghan mission. Thus, a serious problem for the United States after its strategic defeat in Afghanistan was the destruction of trust in Washington as an alliance partner and, as a result, the undermined prestige of the United States. The published article answers the question of what global consequences can be expected as a result of all this and how the impact of the Afghan catastrophe of the United States will manifest itself in the near and long term.

USA — China: Strategic balance

This article examines the current state of the US-China strategic balance — both military and economic aspects of the latter. This balance, however, is not changing in favor of the United States. Currently, China is the largest economy in the world, and economic ties with China are too important for US partners and allies to break off trade and economic ties with China to please Washington. More importantly, the rapid growth of China’s military-technical potential in recent years has led to radical changes in the balance of power in the western Pacific. Washington has lost its former absolute military superiority in the coastal areas of the PRC, and in the event of a large-scale armed US-Chinese conflict in the Taiwan area or in the South China Sea, American losses will be enormous, and the United States will not be able to achieve a decisive victory during this conflict. Under these conditions, the American ruling elite is united in the fact that without a system of anti-Chinese alliances, which should unite both the countries of the Indo-Pacific region and countries outside the ITR, China’s containment is impossible. The Biden administration continued Trump’s policy of building a “sanitary cordon” around China with the involvement of extra-regional actors in this construction. We are talking about the creation of a military-political alliance AUKUS, which includes Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The purpose of this alliance is to counter China in the disputed areas of the South China Sea. It is concluded that the formation of such a system of alliances is difficult to achieve — and it’s not just that the partners and allies of the United States are too interested in maintaining trade and economic ties with China to participate in the creation of an anti-Chinese “sanitary cordon”. China’s strategic isolation is impossible if Russia cannot be brought into the anti-Chinese system of alliances. At present, however, China has a solid rear in the form of a growing Russian-Chinese partnership and cooperation. The actions of the United States and its allies, which Moscow and Beijing view as threatening and provocative (NATO expansion to the East; American block-building in the ITR) could not but lead to a serious revision by the Russian and Chinese leadership of military cooperation between the two powers.

Anattempt to rebuild the world "in the American way"

Trump’s foreign policy was controversial, resulting in division into its supporters and adversaries both at national and international levels. Donald Trump managed to be flexible in relations with the Legislative, ignoring the democratic majority in the House of Representatives. However, it was possible only before the Covid-19 pandemic. Donald Trump’s foreign policy prioritized American capital that determined US relations with the EU, Canada, and Latin America. As for relations with Russia, they were defined by the Ukrainian crisis. Disarmament is still a cornerstone in Russian American relations. The US has complicated relations with countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf despite all efforts. The UN’s reform and the Security Council, where the three great powers primarily make decisions, are still questioned. The US divides Europe into three parts; Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia with Belarus. These Europes have different views on US foreign policy. Republican administration aimed at the expansion of the national power and provision of global leadership. However, the implementation methods were questionable and led to some unpleasant consequences for the US allies. Some of them decided to wait, some prepared for the worst, some tried to adapt to Trump’s policy since it reflected the long-term changes of the US standing in the world regardless of the party or the president. As a result, such policy led to the defeat of the Republicans and brought Joe Biden to power.

US POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE THEORY OF EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

The US policy towards North Korea is shaped by the nuclear non-proliferation policy and security guarantees provided to Japan and the Republic of Korea. These guarantees have a dual purpose. On the one hand, they are a tool to deter the DPRK from aggression against other countries in the region and, above all, US allies – Japan and South Korea. On the other hand, these guarantees are also an assurance of the latter's abandonment of the policy of acquiring a nuclear arsenal. The aim of the article is to analyze the foundations of Washington's policy towards Pyongyang and its influence on relations with allies through the prism of the theory of extended nuclear deterrence. It is stated that the effectiveness of deterrence consists of the conviction of the willingness to react with an adequate response. At the same time, the persuasiveness of extended deterrence is lower, as the protecting state must respond to threats from the ally that is to say outside its own national borders. There is controversy among scholars who reflect on the relevance of extended deterrence during the Cold War and in the modern security environment. It is noted that the emergence of new threats and an increasing number of conflicts, if any, change the nature of extended deterrence, but this does not diminish the importance of the "nuclear umbrella" of the United States for both the NPT and the security of the region. The author analyzes the reasons for the United States' security guarantees for South Korea and Japan. Particular attention is paid to the factor of North Korea's aggressive policy and its progress in the development of the nuclear missile program. With the reduction and withdrawal of US troops from Japan and South Korea, Pyongyang's destructive policies have exacerbated the American allies' sense of danger and provoked talks about developing their own nuclear programs. This scenario threatened the NPT regime and international stability, as well as US strategic interests in the region. Therefore, Washington is stepping up cooperation with its allies in the process of resolving the problem of North Korea's nuclear missile program and is officially reaffirming its unwavering security and defense commitments, which should restore trust between the parties and increase the role of extended deterrence in general.