Upward Accountability Research Articles

EXPECTATIONS AND CAPACITY OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN NGOs IN THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

SUMMARYThere are many obstacles to promoting learning as an outcome of performance measurement in non‐governmental organizations (NGO) social service providers, especially in less developed countries. Building upon a conceptualization of accountability as a multifaceted set of relationships through which funders, or principals, and non‐profit providers, or agents, jointly shape organizational learning, and performance, this study expands our understanding of how accountability mechanisms affect learning within service providers. This paper explores the role that funders play in shaping performance measurement, or monitoring, practices within NGOs serving disadvantaged children in developing countries. We examined the experience of service providers in Egypt and Colombia to assess how the barriers to use of performance data and learning may be addressed. We conducted interviews using the same protocols with program managers in six non‐profit providers in each country that provide services to children, and we also interviewed major donors in the arena of children's services in the USA. We probed the NGO managers' experiences with performance measurement to identify obstacles and potential solutions to improve the use of the data to promote learning. Our findings support previous research about the potential for upward accountability mechanisms to influence internal learning. We suggest that funders should be held accountable for how the incentives and disincentives they provide to grantees affect their internal learning about how to improve their services. This notion of ‘reverse accountability’ means that funders need to be strategic and intentional when they design reporting mechanisms that affect the learning behaviours within their grantees. In line with our call for reverse accountability, we offer a model demonstrating our notion of the two‐way flow of accountability and we offer recommendations to help improve the performance reporting environment for NGOs who are addressing complex problems with less than adequate capacity. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Grassroots Development and Upwards Accountabilities: Tensions in the Reconstruction of Aceh's Fishing Industry

This article explores the tensions between aid funding and grassroots development goals in the context of post-disaster fisheries reconstruction in Aceh, Indonesia. We argue that both short- and long-term grassroots goals are distorted by upward accountability requirements which lead to unsatisfactory aid outcomes. Our analysis employs the concept of aid webs and draws on fifty-one formal interviews with stakeholders in Aceh in 2007/2008. The findings initially concentrate on the impacts of upward accountability on project cycles, with a particular focus on the problematic incorporation of private boat-building contractors and commercial values during the implementation phase. We then discuss the more subtle, long-term impacts of upward accountability on the professionalization of community institutions — in this case, the Panglima Laot Lhok. We conclude with a few observations about the hybrid institutions — combining elements of local and development cultures — that are produced within the current political economy of aid.

Economic Freedom and Political Control in Post-Mao China: A Perspective of Upward Accountability and Asymmetric Decentralization

With post-Mao China as a case study, this article aims to examine the political economy of asymmetric decentralization in relation to development at the national, regional (inter-local) and local levels. Economically, sub-national governments have been granted greater autonomy with huge decentralized fiscal and administrative powers and competencies. Politically, however, China is still a state under Communist Party domination. Local officials are not elected locally but are assigned by the party. This phenomenon of ‘economic decentralization to the local’ along with ‘political centralization under the party’ is described as ‘asymmetric decentralization’. The mechanism behind asymmetric decentralization is upward accountability—the greater the economic growth, the better chances there are for local leaders to receive political promotions, administrative power and many tangible and intangible perks. The article further discusses six Janus-faced consequences of asymmetric decentralization, which can be grouped into three pairs of administrative levels: (1) at the national level—positive for relative national economic stability but negative for uneven development across the country; (2) at the regional (inter-local) level—bad for inter-local fragmentation but good for cross-regional cadre transfer; and (3) at the local level—where local policy innovation is a strength but local unsustainable development is a weakness. These consequences, which look contradictory or incompatible on the surface, can be better understood through the analytic framework of ‘asymmetric decentralization with upward accountability’.

Land conflicts, rural finance and capacity of the Chinese state

AbstractThis article evaluates the capacity of the Chinese state in maintaining stability by examining the merits and limitations of its responses to the dominant form of rural unrest in recent years: conflicts over land. The current response of the Chinese state that focusses on upward accountability of state agents is misguided. We argue that the ultimate solution hinges upon the success of the Chinese state in strengthening its capacity in engaging society and capability to reformulate a new fiscal order that provides adequate resources for effective governance at rural grass roots. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Constraints to strengthening public sector accountability through civil society: the case of Morocco

This paper discusses the extent to which civil society contributes to strengthening public sector accountability in Morocco. The main argument in this paper is that despite a few recent encouraging examples, civil society's role in strengthening public sector accountability remains limited at both the national and local levels. This is due to three main reasons. The first relates to certain characteristics of the Moroccan governance system, including the dominance of upward accountability mechanisms, given the unique position of the King. The second set of reasons refers to certain internal features of the Moroccan civil society. The third reason can be found in civil society's position with regard to its external environment, i.e., the nature of its relationships with the public sector in the form of both local governments and ministerial public administrations.

Accountable Corporate Parenting

• Summary: This article explores some complex issues involved in promoting accountability in local authority public services. In the UK, a gap in accountability for services for Looked After children was identified by the High Court. We offer an analysis of policy initiatives developed in response. Citizen review, another approach to strengthening accountability in widespread use in the USA, is described and appraised. • Findings: Accountability in services for Looked After children in the UK has been substantially improved by recent developments in law and policy. However, it is argued that the continuing absence of external review and reliance on upward accountability still leaves a flawed structure. The paucity of quality evaluation of citizen participation in US is noted, but we identify its potential to promote both outward accountability and diversity in accountability and review. • Application: The article is a contribution to the ongoing analysis of accountability in public services, and promotes more inclusive practice in reviewing service provision. Its focus is on Looked After children, but some of the principles discussed are capable of application to other vulnerable groups and communities.

Towards better outcomes for children globally: alternative perspectives on international development

Contrary to prevailing wisdom, international development does not either succeed or fail. It does both. With reference to case study material gleaned from working with both grant‐makers and international civil society organisations, this article critiques both the assumptions and organisation of development. Development initiatives create small islands of beneficial change for children but in general suffer from donor‐led managerial approaches, the dominance of upward accountability to Northern agencies, poor relationships and the tendency to both generalise and simplify. Globally, governments and civil society are failing to protect millions of vulnerable children and promote their participation in decision‐making. But better outcomes for children are possible. This article articulates the problems but also demonstrates how: (1) partnerships could be reoriented so that power relations are continually challenged; (2) planning mechanisms could be more focused and efficient; and (3) innovation, learning and reflective action could be promoted so that practice is appropriate to the context and therefore promotes better outcomes for children.

Governance and management of small forest tenures in British Columbia

The growing number of small tenures in British Columbia creates new demands on local organizations to manage public forest lands. To deal with these demands, small tenure holders must develop governance practices that address both accountability and participation. Local participation is especially important for Community Forest Agreement (CFA) holders to ensure that community members are actively involved in decision-making processes. Both cfas and Woodlot licensees have upward accountability to the B.C. Ministry of Forests and Range. Holders of CFAs also have downward accountability to members of the local community. Community forests in the province have adopted various legal structures. Private corporations owned by local government are popular vehicles to hold CFAs and have commercial advantages, but their structure is less accountable than others. Although it is important to separate the political decisions of community forest governance from the technical decisions of management, both are needed. Experience with small tenures in other countries suggests that scope exists for sustainable, commercial forest management based on a substantial degree of local autonomy, if accompanied by technical support and oversight from governments, as well as training, extension, and services from voluntary associations of local tenure holders. Further study of options and experience with local forest governance and management will be helpful for small tenures in British Columbia.

How does accountability affect mission? The case of a nonprofit serving immigrants and refugees

AbstractThis article examines accountability processes in a nonprofit organization serving immigrants and refugees, with special attention to their impacts on mission‐based activities. The research finds that upward accountability requirements of donors do not necessarily yield improved mission achievement, and practitioners thus have to navigate a complex environment of pressures. We identify a series of strategies that nonprofit executives and staff use to manage the tensions between upward accountability and mission: a prioritization of lateral accountability, staff empowerment through organizational slack, and a tight coupling of evaluation with job tasks. The findings suggest that funders and nonprofits might gain more from investing in internal grantee capacities for lateral communication and coordination than by soliciting more detailed reporting

Decentralized Corruption or Corrupt Decentralization? Community Monitoring of Poverty-Alleviation Schemes in Eastern India

Democratic decentralization and community participation often stand at the center of an agenda of “good governance” that aims to reduce corruption and increase the state’s accountability to its citizens. However, this paper suggests based on empirical studies on the Employment Assurance Scheme in rural West Bengal that the strength of upward accountability (especially to political parties) is as crucial as downward accountability to communities. When these vertical accountabilities are weak, horizontal accountability structures between local civil society and officials can mutate into networks of corruption in which “community” actors become accomplices or primary agents.

Decentralising Water Resource Management in Brazil

Recent studies of decentralisation of natural-resource management have advanced two related claims: participation of municipalities encourages downward accountability to local populations and single-issue decentralisation encourages upward accountability to higher levels of government. This contribution examines a case at the intersection of these arguments: participation of municipalities in single-issue decentralisation. Evidence from Brazil's water-resource decentralisation indicates that participation of municipalities is not the best indicator of downward accountability; rather, the nature of social and business groups, and mechanisms that encourage their participation, better predict downward accountability. New territories of single-issue decentralisation may have unintended positive effects on downward accountability.

Bewitched or Bewildered? 'Facts' and 'Values' in Audit Commission Texts

The Audit Commission undertakes audits and inspections in relation to local government, housing, social services, education and the health service, and in effect presides over the local governance of welfare. It legitimates its work by reference to a peculiar fact-value nexus which has bewitched many proponents of welfare economics and evidence-based practice and bewildered many councillors and professionals, suggesting that the nexus itself needs to be dissected and deciphered. The focus of this article is on the Commission's work in the sphere of local government in general and social services in particular. A critical appraisal of 'facts' is undertaken in relation to costs, charges, outcomes and performances, whilst a critical appraisal of 'values' is undertaken in relation to economics, politics, ethics and evaluations. It is suggested that there are good reasons for being bewitched and bewildered by the work of the Audit Commission, since it combines quasi-scientific researches with socio-political reforms and operates in the name of both upward accountability to the government and downward accountability to the people, offering a synthesis of virtues and values which is simultaneously irresistible and impossible.

The Communist Legacy in Post-Mao Economic Growth

Previous articleNext article No AccessThe Communist Legacy in Post-Mao Economic GrowthLance L. P. GoreLance L. P. Gore Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The China Journal Volume 41Jan., 1999 Published on behalf of the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2667586 Views: 342Total views on this site Citations: 14Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright The China JournalPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Bin Xu Historically Remaining Issues: The Shanghai–Xinjiang Zhiqing Migration Program and the Tangled Legacies of the Mao Era in China, 1980–2017, Modern China 48, no.44 (Apr 2021): 721–753.https://doi.org/10.1177/00977004211003280Jing Li What causes China's property boom?, Property Management 31, no.11 (Feb 2013): 4–21.https://doi.org/10.1108/02637471311295388Wooyeal Paik, Myungsik Ham From Autonomous Areas to Non- Autonomous Areas, Modern China 38, no.11 (Jan 2012): 110–133.https://doi.org/10.1177/0097700411424566Shiuh-Shen Chien Economic Freedom and Political Control in Post-Mao China: A Perspective of Upward Accountability and Asymmetric Decentralization, Asian Journal of Political Science 18, no.11 (Apr 2010): 69–89.https://doi.org/10.1080/02185371003669379Khan-Pyo Lee In Search for Consolidation: The Political Economy of Industrial Restructuring in China's Automobile Industry, International Area Review 12, no.22 (Sep 2009): 151–175.https://doi.org/10.1177/223386590901200208Shiuh-Shen Chien LOCAL RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION IN CHINA: A TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURING PROCESS PERSPECTIVE, Pacific Economic Review 13, no.44 (Oct 2008): 492–517.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2008.00414.xShiuh-Shen Chien, Ian Gordon Territorial Competition in China and the West, Regional Studies 42, no.11 (Feb 2008): 31–49.https://doi.org/10.1080/00343400701543249Shiuh-Shen Chien The Isomorphism of Local Development Policy: A Case Study of the Formation and Transformation of National Development Zones in Post-Mao Jiangsu, China, Urban Studies 45, no.22 (Feb 2008): 273–294.https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098007085963Shiuh-Shen Chien Institutional Innovations, Asymmetric Decentralization, and Local Economic Development: A Case Study of Kunshan, in Post-Mao China, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 25, no.22 (Apr 2007): 269–290.https://doi.org/10.1068/c0558Elaine Jeffreys Governing buyers of sex in the People's Republic of China, Economy and Society 35, no.44 (Nov 2006): 571–593.https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140600960823Alexei Shevchenko Bringing the party back in: the CCP and the trajectory of market transition in China, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37, no.22 (Jun 2004): 161–185.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2004.03.002 Jae Ho Chung The Political Economy of Industrial Restructuring in China: The Case of Civil Aviation, The China Journal 50 (Oct 2015): 61–82.https://doi.org/10.2307/3182246Randall Peerenboom China's Long March toward Rule of Law, 2 (Jul 2009).https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493737Paul Bowles, Xiao-yuan Dong Globalisation, ‘Chinese Walls’ and Industrial Labour, IDS Bulletin 30, no.44 (Oct 1999): 94–105.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.1999.mp30004011.x

Effects of upward accountability and rating purpose on peer‐rater inflation and delay: a field experiment

Procedural influences on peer-rater distortion and delay were investigated in a field experiment. Employees (N=123) of a business information firm were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (upward accountability versus no accountability) by 2 (administrative purpose versus research purpose) experimental design. Results revealed evidence for an accountability by purpose interaction on rater delay. Specifically, raters delayed rating their peers when the purpose was research-only and they had to explain their ratings to a supervisor. When the rating purpose was administrative, no differences in delay due to accountability were obtained. We found no effects for upward accountability and rating purpose on peer-rater inflation. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Effects of upward accountability and rating purpose on peer-rater inflation and delay: a field experiment

Procedural influences on peer-rater distortion and delay were investigated in a field experiment. Employees (N=123) of a business information firm were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (upward accountability versus no accountability) by 2 (administrative purpose versus research purpose) experimental design. Results revealed evidence for an accountability by purpose interaction on rater delay. Specifically, raters delayed rating their peers when the purpose was research-only and they had to explain their ratings to a supervisor. When the rating purpose was administrative, no differences in delay due to accountability were obtained. We found no effects for upward accountability and rating purpose on peer-rater inflation. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Upward accountability

Upward accountability