Unreflective Action Research Articles

Gender equality in higher music education: Consecrated and peripheral positions

Studies have shown that gender inequality in higher music education is maintained through unreflective actions. Efforts to address the issue have been made and gender-equality programmes have been instigated in several European countries. This study takes a sociological approach to music education, with the goal of revealing constructions of gender inequality in four higher music education institutions in northern, eastern, and central Europe. The aim is to illuminate obstacles to gender-equal education within the field of higher music education. Data was collected through interviews with both students and teachers, with the analysis taking a two-stage structure. The analysis was first performed thematically, and then driven by Connell’s gender theory and Bourdieu’s field theory. The findings are presented as: The objectified body, A natural state of mind, Claming space and Changes in sight. The findings show that gender equality activities seem to increase awareness among both students and staff, but they also show that such awareness does not necessarily lead to changes in practice.

Professionalization for Education for Sustainable Development through Action Research using the Example of a University Course

The interdisciplinary character as well as the current and future relevance of the sustainability debate with all its inherent dilemmas and uncertainties, can provide fertile ground for educational innovation. Against this background, a team at the University of Klagenfurt, together with FORUM Umweltbildung and colleagues at teacher training colleges in Austria, designed the four-semester in-service course "BINE - Education for Sustainable Development - Innovations in Education". The aim of BINE is that the participants deal with the topics of sustainable development (SD) and education for sustainable development (ESD) as a learning community. An important element of this is the systematic reflection of innovations in their own practice within the framework of an action research study. The action research process provides a learning basis to promote the concepts of ESD as well as research and implementation skills of the participants. While sustainability topics are used as a vehicle for emancipatory education on the one hand, they are intended to trigger concrete sustainable social development processes on the other. This implies a great challenge, but also holds considerable potential for educational processes. With regard to sustainable development, education in the context of ESD means addressing questions in concrete fields of action about how the future can be shaped sustainably. This includes precise observation, analysis, evaluation and cooperative design of a concrete situation. Reflective action competence - and not blind action or unreflective action patterns - is a main goal of learning (Rauch & Pfaffenwimmer 2020).

When is a Techno-Fix Legitimate? The Case of Viticultural Climate Resilience

Climate change is an existential risk reinforced by ordinary actions in affluent societies—often silently present in comfortable and enjoyable habits. This silence is sometimes broken, presenting itself as a nagging reminder of how our habits fuel a catastrophe. As a case in point, global warming has created a state of urgency among wine makers in Spain, as the alcohol level has risen to a point where it jeopardises wine quality and thereby Spanish viticulture. Efforts are currently being made to solve this problem technologically by developing (non-GMO) strains of yeast that produce less alcohol. If successful, this could help save Spanish viticulture. This kind of technological solution is routinely criticised for offering simplistic “techno-fix” solutions to solve complex societal problems. However, it is not clear what features are criticised by the notion of techno-fix and hence how to avoid this criticism. In our interpretation, the techno-fix notion is not exclusively used as a dismissive term. The notion points to a general virtue of engineering: to create technological solutions that work silently in the background. This asset of technological solutions might sometimes be problematic and sometimes not. Hence, it needs to be analysed case-by-case by paying attention to the moral relevance of the hidden implications of the technology and of the unreflective actions and habits that they facilitate. Such moral analysis will in turn inform strategies for foregrounding this technology to counteract silencing. We discuss what this means in the case of modifying yeast as a viticultural climate resilience strategy.

Restraint practice in the somatic acute care hospital: Aparticipant observation study.

We aimed to describe daily restraint practices and the factors which influence their use, from an outsider's perspective. A reduction in restraint use is recommended in health care. However, somatic acute care hospital settings currently lack effective reduction strategies. Thus far, hospital restraint practice is described in terms of quantitative assessments and the 'insider' view of healthcare professionals. However, as factors such as routine or personal beliefs seem to play a relevant role in restraint use, these approaches might be incomplete and biased. A qualitative observation study design was employed. Fieldwork with unstructured participant observation was conducted at a department of geriatrics and a department of intensive care in Switzerland between November 2019 and January 2020. Data were recorded as field notes. The analysis was conducted iteratively in two coding cycles using descriptive coding followed by pattern coding. We adhered to the Standards for Reporting Qualitative Research (SRQR). A total of 67hours of observation were conducted. We found that daily restraint practice can be described in three categories: the context in which restraints are used, the decision-making process on the use and continued use of restraints, and the avoidance of restraint use. Most processes and decisions seem to take place unconsciously, and their standardisation is weak. The lack of standardisation favours intuitive and unreflective action, which is prompted by what is also known as heuristic decision-making. To transform daily restraint practice, a technical solution that leads restraint management in line with ethical and legal requirements might be useful. The outsider perspective has allowed daily restraint practice to be described independently of existing routines, departmental cultures and personal attitudes. This is important to comprehensively describe restrictive practices, which is a prerequisite for the development of effective restraint reduction strategies.

Understanding political accountability in a strong structuration framework

PurposeResearch was conducted to investigate whether, and how, political accountability might stabilise when agents are faced with profound changes in external structures such as competition laws and austerity policies.Design/methodology/approachWe performed a field study from 2007 to 2015 in a regional hub in Finland and worked with data from document analysis, interviews and meeting observations. We have used embedded research design, where we apply methodological bracketing as well as composite sequence analysis for field research.FindingsAccountability declined when irresistible external structures were the dominant influence on the unreflective actions of agents-in-focus. With time, however, the agents started acting critically by drawing on structures that could facilitate strategic actions to stabilise political accountability.Research limitations/implicationsThe field research and interpretation of the data were limited to the organisation analysed; however, the theoretical arguments allow for analytical generalisations.Practical implicationsThe research demonstrates how public officials and political decision-makers can eventually adopt a strategic approach when faced with irresistible change in external structures.Social implicationsThe research demonstrates how public officials and political decision-makers can eventually adopt a strategic approach when faced with irresistible changes in external structures.Originality/valueThe study locates political accountability in the context of strong structuration theory and discusses how it is redefined by external structures.

Reflective Situated Normativity

Situated normativity is the ability of skilled individuals to distinguish better from worse, adequate from inadequate, appropriate from inappropriate, or correct from incorrect in the context of a particular situation. Situated normativity consists in a situated appreciation expressed in normative behaviour, and can be experienced as a bodily affective tension that motivates a skilled individual to act on particular possibilities for action offered by a concrete situation. The concept of situated normativity has so far primarily been discussed in the context of skilled unreflective action. In this paper, we aim to explore and sketch the role of the concept of situated normativity in characterising more reflective forms of normativity. The goal of the paper is two-fold: first, by showing more reflective forms of normativity to be continuous with unreflective situated normativity, we bring these reflective forms into the reach of embodied accounts of cognition; and second, by extending the concept of situated normativity, new light is thrown on questions regarding reflective forms of cognition. We show that sociomaterial aspects of situations are crucial for understanding more reflective forms of normativity. We also shed light on the important question of how explicit rules can compel people to behave in particular ways.

Inhibited Intentionality: On Possible Self-Understanding in Cases of Weak Agency.

The paper addresses the question of how to approach consciousness in unreflective actions. Unreflective actions differ from reflective, conscious actions in that the intentional description under which the agent knows what she is doing is not available or present to the agent at the moment of acting. Yet, unreflective actions belong to the field in which an agent experiences herself as capable of acting. Some unreflective actions, however, narrow this field and can be characterized by intentionality being inhibited. By studying inhibited intentionality in unreflective actions, the aim of the paper is to show how weaker forms of action urge us to expand our overall understanding of action. If we expand the field of actions such that it encompasses also some of the involuntary aspects of action, we are able to understand how unreflective actions can remain actions and do not fall under the scope of automatic behavior. With the notion of weak agency, the paper thus addresses one aspect of unreflective action, namely, “inhibited intentionality” in which an agent feels a diminished sense of authorship in relation to her possibility for self-understanding. The notion of weak agency clarifies how agency itself remains intact but can involve a process of appropriation of one’s actions as one’s own. With a diachronic account of consciousness in unreflective action, the paper accounts for possible self-understanding in cases where none seems available at the moment of action.

Knowing what you are doing: Action‐demonstratives in unreflective action

AbstractAlmost everything that we do, we do by doing other things. Even actions we perform without deliberation or conscious planning are composed of ‘smaller’, subsidiary actions. But how should we think of such subsidiary actions? Are they fully‐fledged intentional actions (in the sense of things that we do for reasons) in their own right? In this paper I defend an affirmative answer to this question, against a recently influential form of scepticism. Drawing on a distinctive kind of ‘action‐demonstrative’ representation, I show that the sceptic's arguments do not go through.

The problem and the productivity of ignorance: Public health campaigns on antibiotic stewardship

This article offers a critical account of efforts to engage people with the issue of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). It analyses how public health workers encourage what they understand as responsible antibiotic use or antibiotic stewardship, and how their efforts are shaped by different theories of ‘behaviour’ or social action. Discourse analysis of all major UK campaigns and their evaluations over the last two decades reveals how different versions of the citizen jostle for attention in a public health that draws on sociology, psychology, and increasingly behavioural economics. Rejecting an explanation which focuses solely on the appeal of emotion in new forms of governance, I deploy theories of expert and lay ignorance to show how public health is pushed towards new approaches as it struggles with an apparently recalcitrant public in the case of AMR. Here ignorance is both problematic and productive, prompting a shift to campaigns based on unreflective action, that are accompanied by decisions to work with potential misunderstandings about antibiotics and their effects. I suggest the term ‘shrug’ as a provocative counterpart to the ‘nudge’ of behavioural economics, drawing attention to the ways in which behavioural interventions may be linked to strategic retreats from engagement, when policy makers feel unable to affect or predict the understanding and views of non-experts. The article thus contributes to sociological and political critique of narrow forms of behavioural thinking and their effects on relations between governments and their citizens.

What are skills, and what does disrupt skillful performance? The theoretical background of a portable dynamic EEG study on choking effect

What are skills, and what does disrupt skillful performance? The theoretical background of a portable dynamic EEG study on choking effect

Conceptuality of Unreflective Actions in Flow: McDowell-Dryfus Debate

AbstractThe objective of this paper is to supplement Gottlieb’s challenge to Dryfus who claims that concepts are not operative in expert’s unreflective actions. First, concepts that an agent develops over time with practice, starting from the stage of novelty, become deeply rooted and persist through his expertise stage, according to common sense. It is unlikely that such rooted concepts become inoperative just when it is time for the agent to put them to use during the time that he is in the zone (i.e., in flow). Second, an expert's inability to remember reasons behind his actions while he is in the zone is insufficient to prove that concepts are inoperative when he is acting in the zone. For an agent to not remember reasons as such could more likely be a consequence of the adequacy of his minimized reflections on his maximized (i.e. expert level) concepts, while he is in such a state. Moreover, not recalling every reason behind every step of an agent’s actions in the zone could be a consequence of his maximum concentration on successful processing and coordination of the task at hand, as opposed to committing his finite mental capacities to memorizing the reasons behind his step-by-step actions when he is performing an expert level action in the zone. Third, I point out to the prevalence of examples when experts or observers provide testimony about use of concepts to strategize or review actions before, during, and after their ‘in the zone’ actions (e.g., review of video replays of a game or a tournament on sports channels), which supports the operations and conceptuality of unreflective actions in flow.

Strengths and weaknesses of reflection as a guide to action: pressure assails performance in multiple ways

The current status of Beilock and Carr's (2001) "execution focus" theory of choking under pressure in performance of a sensorimotor skill is reviewed and assessed, mainly from the perspective of cognitive psychology, and put into the context of a wider range of issues, attempting to take philosophical analysis into account. These issues include other kinds of skills, pre-performance practice, post-performance evaluation and repair, and integrating new and creative achievements into repertoires of heavily practiced routines. The focus is on variation in the demand for reflection versus automaticity across the full gamut of learning and experience, not just game-time performance. Though automaticity remains important and there are many circumstances in which being "in the zone" is good whereas “execution focus” can do harm, it appears that reflective action deserves just as much a place at the performance table as does unreflective action.

Unreflective actions? complex motor skill acquisition to enhance spatial cognition

Cognitive science has recently moved toward action-integrated paradigms to account for some of its most remarkable findings. This novel approach has opened up new venues for the sport sciences. In particular, a large body of literature has investigated the relationship between complex motor practice and cognition, which in the sports domain has mostly concerned the effect of imagery and other forms of mental practice on motor skill acquisition and emotional control. Yet recent evidence indicates that this relationship is bidirectional: motor experience also influences higher cognition, with a broad range of cognitive abilities being impacted in various ways. In this paper, I review the latest research exploring the effect of complex motor practice on spatial cognition. After emphasizing the versatility of processes that are recruited in the acquisition of complex motor skills, I present further experimental evidence to suggest that the process of acquiring new motor skills triggers specific adaptions in the brain, which in turn can be critical in numerous aspects of daily life. Finally, I propose a mechanistic explanation to account for motor-induced improvements, within an embodied framework of cognition.

Rationalizing flow: agency in skilled unreflective action

In recent work, Peter Railton, Julia Annas, and David Velleman aim to reconcile the phenomenon of “flow”—broadly understood as describing the “unreflective” aspect of skilled action—with one or another familiar conception of agency. While there are important differences between their arguments, Railton, Annas, and Velleman all make, or are committed to, at least one similar pivotal claim. Each argues, directly or indirectly, that agents who perform skilled unreflective actions can, in principle, accurately answer “Anscombean” questions—”what” and “why” questions— about what they do. I argue against this claim and explore the ramifications for theories of skilled action and agency.

Pre-Reflective Ethical Know-How

In recent years there has been growing attention paid to a kind of human action or activity which does not issue from a process of reflection and deliberation and which is described as, e.g., ‘engaged coping’, ‘unreflective action’, and ‘flow’. Hubert Dreyfus, one of its key proponents, has developed a phenomenology of expertise which he has applied to ethics in order to account for ‘everyday ongoing ethical coping’ or ‘ethical expertise’. This article addresses the shortcomings of this approach by examining the pre-reflective ethical know-how individuals first develop and on which all later forms of ethical expertise are dependent. In the first section an account is given of the ‘ethical second nature’ which every individual develops from childhood onwards and which forms the basis of pre-reflective ethical know-how. The acquisition of an ethical second nature early on opens up the very domain of ‘the ethical’ for us in the first place and is constitutive of our sensitivity to it. The second section turns to pre-reflective ethical know-how and whether it is conceptual in nature. Just as sensorimotor understanding forms the basis of our reflective perceptual concepts, pre-reflective ethical know-how is similarly proto-conceptual and is the source of our reflective ethical and moral concepts. Finally, the third section examines the process whereby ethical second nature and pre-reflective ethical know-how are actually acquired, namely, through immersion in an ‘ethical world’. This world consists of both the web of ethical meanings and significances which has evolved in a particular society or community as well as its members whose actions and interactions continually reproduce that web.

Dealing with Context through Action-Oriented Predictive Processing

Dealing with Context through Action-Oriented Predictive Processing

UNREFLECTIVE ACTION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM SPEED

AbstractHubert Dreyfus has defended a novel view of agency, most notably in his debate with John McDowell. Dreyfus argues that expert actions are primarily unreflective and do not involve conceptual activity. In unreflective action, embodied know‐how plays the role reflection and conceptuality play in the actions of novices. Dreyfus employs two arguments to support his conclusion: the argument from speed and the phenomenological argument. I argue that Dreyfus's argumentative strategies are not successful, since he relies on a dubious assumption about concepts and reflection. I suggest that Dreyfus is committed to a minimal view of conceptuality in action.

Geography and ethics

Discussions of ethics in recent human geography have been strongly inflected by readings of so-called ‘Continental Philosophy’. The ascendancy of this style of theorizing is marked by a tendency to stake ethical claims on ontological assertions, which effectively close down serious consideration of the problem of normativity in social science. Recent work on practical reason emerging from so-called ‘Analytical’ philosophy presents a series of challenges to how geographers approach the relationships between space, ethics, and power. This work revolves around attempts to displace long-standing dualisms between naturalism and normativity, by blurring boundaries between forms of action and knowledge which belong to a ‘space of causality’ and those that are placed in a ‘space of reasons’. The relevance of this blurring to geography is illustrated by reference to recent debates about the relationships between rationality and habit in unreflective action. Ongoing developments in this tradition of philosophy provide resources for strengthening a nascent strand of work on the geographies of practical reason that is evident in work on ethnomethodology, behaviour change, and geographies of action.

McDowell and Dreyfus on Unreflective Action

Within philosophy there is not yet an integrative account of unreflective skillful action. As a starting point, contributions would be required from philosophers from both the analytic and continental traditions. Starting from the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, shared Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian common ground is identified. McDowell and Dreyfus agree about the importance of embodied skills, situation-specific discernment and responsiveness to relevant affordances. This sheds light on the embodied and situated nature of adequate unreflective action and provides a starting point for the development of an account that does justice to insights from both philosophical traditions.

Situated Normativity: The Normative Aspect of Embodied Cognition in Unreflective Action

In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein's examples of craftsmen (tailors and architects) absorbed in action to introduce situated normativity. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective skillful action. I develop Wittgenstein's insight that a peculiar type of affective behaviour, ‘directed discontent’, is essential for getting things right without reflection. Directed discontent is a reaction of appreciation in action and is introduced as a paradigmatic expression of situated normativity. In the second part I discuss Wittgenstein's ideas on the normativity of what he calls ‘blind’ rule-following and the ‘bedrock’ of immediate action. What matters for understanding the normativity of (even ‘blind’) rule-following, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. In the third part I further investigate the complex relationships between unreflective skillful action, perception, emotion, and normativity. Part of this entails an account of the link between normativity at the level of the expert's socio-cultural practice and the individual's situated and lived normativity.