Abstract
PurposeResearch was conducted to investigate whether, and how, political accountability might stabilise when agents are faced with profound changes in external structures such as competition laws and austerity policies.Design/methodology/approachWe performed a field study from 2007 to 2015 in a regional hub in Finland and worked with data from document analysis, interviews and meeting observations. We have used embedded research design, where we apply methodological bracketing as well as composite sequence analysis for field research.FindingsAccountability declined when irresistible external structures were the dominant influence on the unreflective actions of agents-in-focus. With time, however, the agents started acting critically by drawing on structures that could facilitate strategic actions to stabilise political accountability.Research limitations/implicationsThe field research and interpretation of the data were limited to the organisation analysed; however, the theoretical arguments allow for analytical generalisations.Practical implicationsThe research demonstrates how public officials and political decision-makers can eventually adopt a strategic approach when faced with irresistible change in external structures.Social implicationsThe research demonstrates how public officials and political decision-makers can eventually adopt a strategic approach when faced with irresistible changes in external structures.Originality/valueThe study locates political accountability in the context of strong structuration theory and discusses how it is redefined by external structures.
Highlights
Political accountability – that is, accountability among public officials and political decisionmakers – is attracting increasing attention in public sector accounting research (Fowler and Cordery, 2015; Hyndman et al, 2008; Nyland and Pettersen, 2015; Sinclair, 1995)
The second argument is that when external structures change and internal structures are forced to adapt to the changes of external structures, the strong structuration outcome leads to unstable political accountability
Argument 1 If external structures change but internal structures are free to remain the same as before, the strong structuration outcome entails no change or a purely ceremonial change of political accountability Argument 2 If external structures change and internal ones are forced to adapt to the change in external structure, the strong structuration outcome leads to unstable political accountability
Summary
Political accountability – that is, accountability among public officials and political decisionmakers – is attracting increasing attention in public sector accounting research (Fowler and Cordery, 2015; Hyndman et al, 2008; Nyland and Pettersen, 2015; Sinclair, 1995). The field study used an embedded research design (Yin, 2018) that includes methodological bracketing (Stones, 2005) and composite sequence analysis (Miles et al, 2014; Greenhalgh and Stones, 2010) to identify and analyse the structures that influenced what active agents did in designing and implementing competitive tendering and explaining their actions in relation to political accountability. Public officials and political decision-makers must take on the role of active agents (Coad and Herbert, 2009) by constantly monitoring the position–practices and changes in their external structures and by updating their internal structures both in general and in particular (Mutiganda, 2016) such that their actions conform to political accountability expectations and the continuous obligation of fulfilling their duty (Adsera et al, 2003; Scarparo, 2008). By analysing the relationships between different sequences, networks and sub-networks, we aggregated from an agent-in-focus to agents-in-focus and investigated the evolution of political accountability in the continuous process of structuration and change
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