United States Secretary Research Articles

Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Role of Third Party Mediators

'A momentous turning point in the history of southern Africa.'1 Those were the words used by the United States secretary of state, George Shultz, to describe the two peace accords signed in New York on 22 December 1988 by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. The culmination of over ten years of American-mediated peace negotiations, the accords set the stage for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.2 This paper asks whether the accords do indeed constitute a 'momentous turning point' in regional security relations in southern Africa. Specifically, is the era of destabilization by South Africa ending and one of mutual accommodation and cooperation beginning? Or, to put the same question in theoretical terms, are we witnessing the emergence of a regional security regime in southern Africa? The answer to these questions partly turns upon the definition of key terms and concepts in the literature on regime theory. Therefore the first section of this paper defines the concept of security regime, advances a minimum criterion for one to exist, and discusses the conditions under which one is likely to emerge. The second section then reviews the history of security relations in the southern African complex. This review demonstrates that there are certainly explicit and tacit rules of interstate behaviour

Book Reviews : BALANCE OF POWER: International Politics as the Ultimate Global Game Chris Crawford Publisher: Microsoft Press, 16011 N.E. 36th St., Box 97017, Redmond, WA 98073-9717 Year of Publication: 1986 Price: $10.95 Length: 306 pages

This book describes the development of the program for BALANCE OF POWER, a geopolitical simulation, and explores strategies for playing the game. Players may choose to play the role of president of the United States or general secretary of the Soviet Union. The goal of the game is to enhance your prestige through insurgencies, coups, Finlandization, and staged cnses. Developing the ability to gauge the opponent's reaction to your actions accurately and learning to differentiate between the expression of vital interests and bluffs are critical to success in the game.

Subnational Activity and Foreign Economic Policy Making in Canada and the United States: Perspectives on Agriculture

Politicians in Ottawa have frequently pointed to the nature of Canadian federalism as an impediment to coherent and coordinated economic policy making in Canada. In doing so, they have sometimes been tempted to compare their own situation with that of their counterparts in the United States. The agriculture sector illustrates this point in a particularly clear fashion. On a number of occasions when he was minister of agriculture in the 1970s, Eugene Whelan explained his inability to develop a national agri-food policy for Canada by reference to the limitations of his jurisdiction as opposed to that of the United States secretary of agriculture. In his typically blunt fashion, Mr Whelan informed his audience that governors in the United States 'do not have nearly the authority our provinces do in Canada' and that when the secretary of agriculture makes a decision he does not discuss it with the state directors of agriculture, but 'informs them of the decision he has made.'1 Few analysts would disagree that the administration of agricultural policy has evolved differently in Canada than in the United States; one need only note the range of marketing boards under the jurisdiction of the Canadian provinces. This conventional emphasis on differences, however, has tended to obscure the fact that the United States states have followed the lead of the Canadian provinces

Trade versus Aid in ASEAN-Australian Economic Relations

Judging from the amount of attention they receive from diplomats and politicians, possible changes in the protection policies of the in dustrialized countries are seen by governments of the less developed countries (LDCs) as being of major economic importance for them. For example, at the July 1984 meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Jakarta, considerable effort was expended in criticizing the protectionist policies of the United States, the EEC, Japan, Australia, and others. The United States Secre tary of State responded by saying that the LDCs tend to be even more protectionist than the rich countries, but the impression remained that the industrialized countries' protection is not only very harmful to the economic interests of LDCs. but also directed in a discriminatory manner against LDC exports, vis-a-vis the exports of richer countries. Systematic studies of the economic gains that LDCs could expect to receive from reduced protection in the rich countries (or, conversely, of the cost to the LDCs of increased protection in the rich countries) have been very rare, but information of this sort is important for the negotiating strategies of LDC governments. In negotiations between governments and groups of governments, bargains are constantly being ^nck which amount to trading off changes in particular industrial countries' protection of some commodities against changes in foreign aid, changes in LDC protection, and so forth. Nego tiators for the LDCs need some conception of the relative economic values to their countries of the policy adjustments being discussed, but. although there is no shortage of strong opinions about the issues involved, economic analysis lags far behind the practical information require ments of policy-makers. The general climate of opinion seems to be that the potential gains to the LDCs from reduced rich country protection tend to be more important than the gains which might be received from adjustments in foreign aid. Even groups whose primary concern is with the foreign aid of the ricn countries reflect this presumption. For example, the report of a distinguished committee appointed by the Australian Government to review Australia's foreign aid programme (the Jackson Committee) comments (p. 12) that:

The Legality of the use of Armed Force by Israel in Lebanon—June 1982

The Government of the United States cannot be expected to suffer the indefinite continuance of existing lawless conditions along its border, which expose its citizens to maltreatment at the hands of ruffianly elements of the Mexican population, which their Government seems unable to control. …No violation of the national sovereignty of Mexico was intended by this expedition [into Mexico by United States troops to hunt down bandits]. It was despatched upon the hot trail of the bandits in question with the sole object of punishing them …, and of preventing future activities of a similar nature upon our frontier…United States Secretary of State Lansing, 26 August 1919The entrance of Israeli forces into Lebanon in June 1982 (“Operation Peace for Galilee”) raises far-reaching legal issues that transcend this particular occurrence. One of the issues raised in this context is the legality of the use of armed force by a State to counter terrorists directing their attacks against its citizens from the territory of another State. Israel considered the action it took against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon to be legitimate self-defence, directed not against the territorial integrity of Lebanon, but rather against the armed PLO terrorists operating from it against Israel. Others viewed Israel's actions as aggression, and Israel as an invader violating Lebanon's sovereignty. This invasion, it was asserted, was contrary to international law.

Canada’s Role in the Development of the Law of Armed Conflict

Perhaps the most important contribution made by Canada to the development of armed conflict law, and one that is possibly equal in significance to that made by any other country, was not in fact made by Canada as such, but rather in response to Canadian actions. During the 1837 rebellion, Canadian forces had seized an American vessel, The Caroline, which had been used to support the rebels, and tipped it over Niagara Falls. In response to United States protests, the Canadian authorities justified their action on the ground of self-defence. In negotiations with the British, who then governed Canada, Daniel Webster, United States Secretary of State, propounded a formulation of the plea of self-defence which has stood the test of time. In his words, preventive action in foreign territory is only justified in the case of “an instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defence, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.” This concept of the right is so universally accepted today that it was adopted in its Judgment by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg when rejecting Germany’s explanations of the invasions of Denmark and Norway.

Interpreting dynamics of aquatic resources: A perspective for resource managers

Since the presentation of the Leopold Report (Leopold et al. 1963) to the United States Secretary of the Interior, recommendations in the document for managing natural park resources on the ecosystem level have been included in the management policies of the National Park Service. In many instances, however, management programs have continued to focus on individual resource problems, without apparent concern for the ecological consequences on ecosystems. Without knowledge of the interrelationships of ecosystem components, solving one problem may result in other resource problems. Graphic approaches are presented as potential tools to view these complex interrelationships relative to the needs of the resource manager. Interpreting the dynamics of aquatic systems is emphasized.

The Jewish Factor in US Politics

In his UN speech of October 1971, United States Secretary of State William Rogers spoke of the relationship between an interim agreement on the Suez Canal and an over-all Middle East settlement, and voiced the necessity for allowing Egyptian personnel to cross the occupied east bank of the Suez Canal to operate the reopened wateway. To Israeli ears, the Rogers statement sounded suspiciously like the start of a major policy rift between Washington and Tel Aviv. One Israeli observer was quoted as saying: If and when begin to feel some real pressure from the US, then we'll start mobilizing the American Jewish community against Washington's Middle East policies.' From past experience, remarked a US official in Washington, we have learned to expect a pattern. First there is a request from Jewish leaders in the US for an appointment with the President or the Secretary of State. Then start getting bales of mail. This is accompanied by a spate of speeches in Congress. Then a few journalists will burst forth in full throat. 2 These statements contribute to the widespread belief that American policy towards the Middle East is shaped to an exceptional extent by the American Jewish community. For the most part, such beliefs underestimate the crucial role played in US policy-making by such American governmental agencies as the State Department, Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House National Security Council. But the influence of the American Jewish community cannot be dismissed as insignificant. The community has been highly successful in exerting its influence upon the political platforms of the major political parties, especially the Democrats; it has a powerful and active base in Congress for continuous pressure on behalf of Israel, and its views are

The Derangement of MIRV

It has thus far proved a considerable strain to fit the lethal power of nuclear weapons into some reasonable conception of political serviceability. Of the ratiocinations most generally advanced, two, the primordial fear of being defenceless before a surprise attack and the conviction that as the bombs' effects are made more ghastly their employment will be less likely, have made most of the running in the nuclear arms race. One is as pervasive as the other is fundamental. No country willingly stays long in a position where no risks need attend the opponent who would lay it waste; no country yields to the superpowers' conviction that if the risks are then made big rather than small, the odds are that one will take no risks at all. Even in a crisis where the alternatives to nuclear war might look bad but not, it has been noted, as bad as a nuclear war. Which ratiocination prevails is as much as anything a question of personal style. Robert McNamara, the former United States secretary of defense, once he had laid to rest the fear of a preemptive blow, chose to justify the expanding size of the nuclear establishment over which he presided on the grounds that the weapons' very destructiveness would determine their unemployment. His successors are fonder of the more atavistic view: they maintain and sustain an arsenal of a size and variety to ward off most, if not all, imaginable contingencies on the grounds that one side might yet achieve the capability to threaten or to launch with impunity a first strike such as would leave the recipient with no adequate response. They equally hold that much as the employment of nuclear weapons clearly could not be a rational act, rationality cannot be vouchsafed.

OVERCOMING WORLD HUNGER

This book is edited by Clifford M. Hardin, United States Secretary of Agriculture. Its four chapters were originally designed as background material for partakers in the 34th American Assembly which met late in 1968. The hope is held out that world famine is not inevitable, and that the world's inhabitants of the coming century can be fed, perhaps even better than any previous generation. The emphasis is on population control and increased food production. Future food needs up to the year 2000 are estimated. Adjusting the proportions of the dietary mix can greatly extend food supplies. Example: Seven times as many people can be fed on crops consumed directly as on crops converted to meat, milk, and eggs. Recent advances in agricultural technology are described-the fruitage of years of technological and educational aid rendered by various foundations, agencies of the United States government, other national agencies, and the United Nations. The need is expressed for the use of new high-yield grains (rice, wheat, corn), extensive use of fertilizers and pesticides, improved methods of farming, and for more modern agricultural scientists with practical experience to educate youth of the developing countries in sound agricultural practices. Policies and programs for limiting population growth and increasing food supplies are discussed, along with the part the United States should play in providing such assistance. The book has an index but no bibliography. MERVYN G. HARDINGE

The Korean Special Mission to the United States of America in 1883

The Korean Special Mission to the United States of America in 1883 Gary D. Walter The purpose of this study is to present an analysis of the first visit of Koreans to the western hemisphere. This event came about as a result of the first United States-Korean Treaty, arranged by the Chinese Viceroy of Chihli, Li Hung-chang, and the United States Navy Commodore. Robert W. Shufeldt, in 1882 and ratified in 1883In accordance with the treaty, Lucius II. Foote was appointed Minister to Korea and a Special Mission of friendship was sent to the United States by the King of Korea. The members of the Special Mission present an opportunity to study the final years of the Yi Dynasty in Korea and the changes which were taking place. The study of the Mission will show the background of Korean-American relations and the political scene in Korea with an attempt to show the effect of the visit to the west on the individuals as well as on the country of Korea. Korean-American Relations Before the Ratification of the 1882 Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation United States interest in Korea in the nineteenth century was mainly for the protection of United States ships and mariners as they sailed in Korean waters. The potential for trade in Korea was also thought to be sufficient to make commerce worthwhile-particularly since the United States' merchants had realized a profit with China, and even more so with Japan, where the United States played a most important role in opening the country for trade. More important than potential trade, United States commercial interests felt it necessary to make some formal arrangements for the safe return of shipwrecked mariners in distress in Korean waters as they plied between China and Japan. The fact that custom provided for the safe, and usually 90\Walter comfortable conduct of the shipwrecked crews to China, even as shown by the return of the crew of the USS Surprise in June of 1866, and numerous prior cases involving ships and crews of many nations, did not deter the demand for a formal arrangement, especially when in August of 1866 the crew of the USS General Sherman was murdered and the ship itself burned in the Taedong River at Pyongyang. United States commercial interests did not care that the Koreans distinguished between shipwrecked sailors and would-be traders, the one being thrown on the mercies of the Koreans by fate, the other entering restricted areas at their own risk. In 1868, George F. Seward, United States Consul-General at Shanghai wrote to his uucle, United States Secretary of State William II. Seward: I propose...to proceed to Corea in order to ask an officiai explantion of the Sherman Affair, and to negotiate, if possible, a treaty of amity and commerce similar to those with China and Japan, and such other lesser treaty as may be expedient and attainable without exercise or show of force.1 Six months later he wrote: The first object of a mission would be to procure information of the loss or destruction of the American schooner General Sherman, and in case the wrongful treatment of the crew proves correct, indemnity or satisfaction therefore...All other efforts to procure information have hitherto resulted not altogether satisfactorily , and there seems no way to procure information except by direct communication with the Corean government. The second object is to obtain a treaty. I have hesitated to say that there is an adequate object to render it perfectly desirable to procure a general commercial treaty. But all my reflections lead me to believe that it will be well for us to make the attempt. In the third place, whether a general treaty is desirable or not, there can, in my opinion, be no question of the need of one that shall provide for the safety of seamen and others wrecked or driven on the Corean coast. Indeed we 1. Letter, George F, Seward to William H. Seward, April 24, 1868, General Records of the Department of State, Despatches from United States Consuls in Shanghai, 1847-1906, Washington National Archives, 1949. Korean Mission 1883\91 can hardly consent...

Matías Romero and Congressional Opposition to Seward's Policy Toward the French Intervention in Mexico

During the period of the French intervention in Mexico (1862-1867), the United States Secretary of State, William H. Seward, pursued a policy which historians have aptly termed “ cautious moderation ” and “ masterly inactivity.” Caught between the fear of French recognition of the Confederacy, or even a French-Confederate alliance, and outright war with France, Seward steered a middle course. The French government was informed that the United States disapproved of intervention in Mexico and that a monarchy established by external force held no promise of permanency. But this was done in such a way as to avoid the active antagonism of France toward a Union plagued by civil war. Although at no time was the Monroe doctrine invoked prior to 1865, these mild but consistent protests paved the way for a firmer policy toward France.

Central Treaty Organization

The Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) met in Karachi, Pakistan, on April 30 and May 1, 1963, for its eleventh session, under the chairmanship of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan. The session was attended by the foreign ministers of the other three CENTO countries—Mr. Abbas Aram (Iran), Mr. Feridun Cemal Erkin (Turkey), and Lord Home (United Kingdom)—and by Mr. Dean Rusk, United States Secretary of State, who took part as an observer in accordance with normal practice, since the United States was not a full member of the Organization. The Council session had been preceded by the thirteenth meeting of the CENTO military committee held in Ankara on April 27–28, 1963.

Israel D. Andrews and the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854: A Reappraisal

IN THE DEAD OF NIGHT, in the last five minutes of the 5th of June, and the first five minutes of the 6th day of the month aforesaid William L. Marcy, United States Secretary of State, and Lord Elgin, Governor General of Canada, put their names to the Reciprocity Treaty of 18547 This midnight ceremony is of importance in British North American history, for it marks the culmination of the provinces' first effort at guiding their own economic policy? The treaty has been studied in detail and depth, aand yet one key character in this eight-year drama has been neglected. This man is Israel D. Andrews. To be sure hardly an account of the treaty fails to mention his name, but the references remain tantilizingly vague? On the two occasions when Andrews' activities have been discussed his strange financial manoeuvrings have held the limelight, leading inevitably to uncomplimentary conclusions. 5 The mystery is unnecessary, and much of the contumely unjusti-

Carl Schurz: Journalist and Liberal Propagandist

Carl Schurz came from Germany to become a leading American editor, a United States senator and Secretary of the Interior. In post-Civil War years he was a liberal spokesman—a role he had played earlier in Germany during the revolution of 1848.

Waterlogging and Salinity in West Pakistan: An Analysis of the Revelle Report (Review Article)

In 1961 during the state visit by President Mohammad Ayub Khan to the United States, the two Presidents discussed the problem of waterlogging and salinity and its implications for economic development in Pakistan. As a result of this meeting, a Panel of U.S. experts was assembled to study the problem. This Panel was composed of specialists in agriculture, hydrology, engineering and social sciences; its chairman was Dr. Roger Revelle, Science Adviser to the United States Secretary of the Interior. The Panel's Report1 was submitted to the President of Pakistan in September 1962, with the comment that it should be considered as being still in preliminary draft form and subject to continuing revisions as comments from other experts in the field are received. The present article is based on this preliminary version of the Revelle Report. While there may be changes in detail, we have assumed that the broad conclusions embodied in the Report will remain unchanged.

Organization of American States

The press announced that the Inter-American Economic and Social Council met in Punta del Este, Uruguay, under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS) from August 5 to 17, 1961. A draft act embodying the principles of the “Alliance for Progress” plan for the economic development of Latin America envisaged by the United States was put before the meeting by the delegates of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and the United States, according to press reports. Mr. Douglas Dillon, United States Secretary of the Treasury, promised that his government would provide active assistance in the form of development loans running up to 50 years, but Mr. Dillon made it clear that the development scheme depended on the local programs for social and economic advancement. It was noted that aside from the United States offers, some European and odier countries had indicated that they would take part in development programs in the area.

Central Treaty Organization

The ninth session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was held in Ankara, Turkey, April 27–28, 1961, under the chairmanship of Mr. Selim Sarper, Foreign Minister of Turkey. The session opened with a speech by General Gursel, the Turkish head of state, in which he said that the alliance had achieved successful results in the fields of security, economic development, and cultural activities. According to the press, there was a controversy as to the primary role of the alliance, with Mr. Hussein Ghods Nakhai, the Iranian Foreign Minister, referring to CENTO as an economic and defensive organization, in that order, while Mr. Manzoor Quadir, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, emphasized the defense aspect of the organization by stating that CENTO had to concern itself with developing the military as well as the economic strength of the area. Mr. M. O. A. Baig, retiring Secretary-General of the organization, was said to have asserted in his report to the session that only the presence of the United States gave meaning and validity to any “free world” defense alliance, CENTO included, even though the United States was not a full member of the organization. United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in addressing the session, pledged the continued cooperation of his country for the mutual security of the area.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its eleventh annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 16 to 18, 1960. The main topic of discussion at the meeting was the announcement by United States Secretary of State Christian Herter of what he reportedly termed a new concept for the operation of medium-range ballistic missiles. The United States plan included: 1) a proposal that NATO discuss a multilateral system for the political control of the weapons; 2) an offer to place five ballistic missile submarines armed with 80 Polaris missiles under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), by the end of 1963; and 3) a suggestion that the other members of the alliance contribute approximately 100 more medium-range ballistic missiles by purchasing them in the United States. The press reported that Lord Home, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, welcomed the United States proposal and said that NATO should examine the possibility of a medium-range ballistic missile force under multilateral control, a suggestion in which M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, concurred. The West German Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Strauss, told the Ministers, the press announced, that concrete decisions on the United States proposal should be taken in the near future, and that plans for NATO control of the Polaris missile force should be pushed through by military and political authorities early in the spring of 1961. The Council of Ministers decided to pass on to its Permanent Comand other related materials, according to the press.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its spring ministerial meeting in Oslo, Norway, from May 8 to 10, 1961, under the chairmanship of the new Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Dirk U. Stikker. United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced to the assembled Ministers of the fifteen-member alliance that his government was prepared, in pursuance of the plan announced to the NATO Council by his predecessor, Mr. Christian A. Herter, to commit five Polaris nuclear missile submarines to forces assigned to NATO. The Herter plan had been contingent upon agreement by the European members to purchase an additional 100 nuclear missiles for NATO, but according to the press, this part of the proposal was understood to have been abandoned because of European objections to the cost of such an undertaking. The submarines were to be assigned to the command of Vice-Admiral George W. Anderson, who held the dual role of Commander of the United States Sixth Fleet, based in Naples, and of the NATO Strike Force South, it was also made known. Ultimate control of the eighty Polaris nuclear warheads would, however, revert to the President of the United States. A plan for the Permanent Council of the treaty powers to review the alliance's total military situation as a matter of high urgency was tied to Secretary Rusk's announcement on the Polaris submarines. The United States Secretary of State, in addressing the Council, gave his government's views on the situation in Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and South Vietnam and stated that the United States would consider it a violation of the legal situation in Berlin if the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty with East Germany. Should the Soviet Union proceed to sign such a peace treaty the allies would insist on continued Western rights of access to West Berlin and would make it clear that they were prepared to resist encroachment on their position, Mr. Rusk declared.