Unitary Executive Research Articles

Two presidents are better than one: the case for a bipartisan executive branch

When delegates discussed the structure of the presidency at the Constitutional Convention in June 1787, serious objections to a unitary executive were raised. Edmund Randolph warned, for example, that a one-person presidency would become the “foetus of monarchy.” Controversy over the idea of a single president was predictable. Only recently had the framers freed themselves from the tyranny of King George III, and they were firmly committed to creating a new government that would not abuse its powers and oppress its citizens. It must have seemed preposterous to replace a hereditary monarch with an elected monarch.To be sure, the framers invoked important arguments for a unitary executive. While Congress would deliberate, the president would act with decisiveness and dispatch. A single president would bring order and energy to the national government. With the passage of time, however, it has become clear that the founding fathers misjudged the consequences of their choice:They did not anticipate the extent to which executive power would expand and give us an “imperial presidency” that dominates Congress and that too often exercises its authority in ways that are detrimental to the national interest. They did not predict the role that political parties would come to play and how battles to capture the White House would greatly aggravate partisan conflict. They did not recognize that single presidents would represent party ideology much more than the overall public good. And they misjudged the advantages and disadvantages of single versus multiple decision makers.Had the framers been able to predict the future, they would have been far less enamored with the idea of a unitary executive and far more receptive to the alternative proposals for a plural executive that they rejected. Like their counterparts in Europe, they might well have created an executive branch in which power is shared among multiple persons from multiple political parties.If the presidency is to fulfill the founding fathers’ vision and function more effectively, it needs to be reconceived. This need for constitutional change led me to the proposal for reform that I consider in this book — the replacement of the one-person, one-party presidency with a two-person, two-party presidency.A coalition presidency carries the potential for many important benefits — a balancing of power between the executive and legislative branches, a dampening of partisan conflict in Washington, an executive branch more representative of the entire electorate, real opportunities for third-party candidates to win election, and wiser presidential decision making.After more than two hundred years with the Constitution’s one-person presidency, it may seem preposterous to suggest a plural executive. But a coalition presidency would be far more faithful to the framers’ view of executive power. They wanted a president with limited authority who would serve as a co-equal with Congress. They also believed that power should be contained by dividing it and requiring it to be shared. A two-person presidency relies on the framers’ structural devices to promote their core values. And by correcting the dysfunction in Washington and making the executive branch operate more effectively, a two-person, bipartisan presidency can be justified even without reference to original intent.

The Originalism Blog: An Exchange with Professor Michael Ramsey on the Unitary Executive

The Originalism Blog: An Exchange with Professor Michael Ramsey on the Unitary Executive

An Open Letter (Blog Post) to Professor Saikrishna B. Prakash (and Professors Steven G. Calabresi, Akhil Reed Amar, and Other Defenders of the Unitary Executive Theory); a Reply to Professor Michael D. Ramsey; and an Exchange with Michael Stern

An Open Letter (Blog Post) to Professor Saikrishna B. Prakash (and Professors Steven G. Calabresi, Akhil Reed Amar, and Other Defenders of the Unitary Executive Theory); a Reply to Professor Michael D. Ramsey; and an Exchange with Michael Stern

The Harbinger of the Unitary Executive? An Analysis of Presidential Signing Statements from Truman to Carter

Contemporary scholarship has focused much attention on presidents' routine exploitation of signing statements since the 1980s to disallow provisions of bills passed by Congress. Much less is known about earlier post–World War II presidents' use of signing statements and what precedents they may have set for their successors. This study takes a sharp focus on the 934 signing statements issued from 1945 to 1980, from Presidents Harry Truman through Jimmy Carter. The analysis classifies these signing statements by policy area and by the type of comments the president made. The results accentuate how the resurgent Congress in the 1970s—including budget reform and challenges to presidential latitude in foreign policy through legislative vetoes—compelled Presidents Gerald Ford and Carter to increasingly use signing statements to nullify legislative provisos. The analysis emphasizes how cycles of congressional change affected earlier presidents' use of signing statements, laying a foundation for their successors' more broad manipulation of this rhetorical instrument to aggrandize executive prerogative.

Presidential Power in Historical Perspective: Reflections' on Calabresi and Yoo's the Unitary Executive

On February 6 and 7, 2009, more than three dozen of the nation’s most distinguished commentators on presidential power gathered in Philadelphia to explore themes raised by a book authored by Steven Calabresi and I co-authored reviewing the history of presidential practices with respect to the unitary executive. The conference honoring our book and the special journal issue bringing together the articles presented there provide a welcome opportunity both to look backwards on the history of our project and to look forwards at the questions yet to be answered.

The ticking bomb: Speed, liberalism and ressentiment against the future

This article uses the ‘Ticking Bomb Scenario’ as a starting point for a broader discussion of what I term the ‘liberal narrative of speed’, the argument within liberal thought (laid out by William Scheuerman) that the accelerating pace of events (and threats) in the world requires a transition of authority from slow-moving, democratic legislative bodies, to energetic, efficient and unitary executives. However, this article argues that the source of this transfer of power is not because of any structural misfit between democracy and acceleration (indeed, accelerative technologies can help make democratic deliberation more efficient and effective). Instead, through an investigation of the ontology of speed (grounded in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari and Henri Bergson) I argue that speed produces not a functional threat to democratic politics, but an existential one. Acceleration unsettles stable political identities, and produces a time of uncertainty, in which people are wary of engaging in democratic debate and compromise, preferring instead the certainty of unitary executive leadership. In this regards the anti-democratic tendency of acceleration is to be located in the way in which it inculcates a sense of ressentiment against a future that is contingent and uncertainty.

Befuddling Executive Power with Executive Unilateralism in the Unitary Executive

Previous studies dwell on either how the U.S. Constitution supposedly envisions the conduct of policymaking between the president and Congress, or why the executive branch persistently outmaneuvers Congress. Yet insufficient attention is paid to the fact that the unitary executive is for the purpose of exacting collective decision-making between the two branches of government. This paper is a preliminary endeavor to put American presidency in perspective. In outlining the constitutional foundation of the unitary executive theory, I trace the sources of executive power in the context of separation of powers, and checks and balances as its functional mechanism. Then, I look into the evolving conduct of modern presidents to explore how executive power is often befuddled with executive unilateralism ever since America was built on the principle of presidentialism. By illuminating how some entrepreneurial presidents managed to expand their claims on prerogative powers, I argue that the precedents set by their predecessors in combination with their use of rhetoric unwittingly enable them to justify executive unilateralism at times. I conclude by stipulating whether Barack Obama can overcome the presidency of George W. Bush, by constructing his own version of the unitary executive yet refraining from the entrapment of executive unilateralism.

The Unitary Executive and the Jurisprudence of Carl Schmitt: Theoretical Implications for the 'War on Terrorism'

The Global War on Terrorism has occasioned a new challenge to constitutionalism and the rule of law. This challenge comes in the form of both astonishing theoretical justifications for the expansion of presidential authority at the expense of traditionally established legal constraints and unprecedented international and domestic policy formulation. These policy formulations have generated intensive controversy over their merits, legality, and political viability. Among the most prominent include legislation allowing considerable leeway in interrogation techniques by American servicemen abroad, the practice of extraordinary rendition, the recently revealed National Security Agency (NSA) eavesdropping program, the PATRIOT ACT, extensive usage of signing statements, among numerous others. Many of these initiatives seek to effectively liberate the President from governmental review and thereby place him above the reach of the law. Such thinking about the nature of executive power comes under the general framework of the “Unitary Executive Theory (UET). This theory has been promulgated by the Bush Administration as the proper method for combating terrorism and other imminent security threats facing the United States of America. Tracing the philosophical basis for such reasoning about the relationship of Executive authority to the rule of law unveils a prominent jurist, who, writing during the tumultuous Weimar Era in Germany back in the 1920's sought to justify Nazi authoritarianism at the expense of constitutional procedures. A severe political emergency facing the very security of the nation could not be handled by appeal to legal or political approvals. Rather, Carl Schmitt argues, a sovereign entity, presumably the President, must be vested authority to circumvent the law in order to effectively deal with the threats at hand. This institution of the “state of exception leaves the executive operating without any constraints from any judicial or legislative body, creating a considerable amount of independence- and potential abuse in the exercise of political power. The political thought expounded by Carl Schmitt strikingly parallels the ideas behind the UET. In the following essay, I seek to critically weave together the jurisprudence of Carl Schmitt with the underlying logic of the Bush Administration policy platform in our post-9/11 world.

Presidential Politics Meets Regulatory Complexity: An Empirical Study of EPA's Hazardous Air Pollutant Rules Under Clinton and Bush II

With the growing centralization of power in the Executive Branch, just how deeply do Presidential politics trickle down into the hundreds of rules promulgated annually by the agencies, particularly highly complex and technical rules? There is strong evidence that at least in the case of highly controversial rules, Presidents are heavily involved. Yet for the rest, the evidence of meaningful political oversight is slim to nonexistent. In this study we examine whether Presidential Administrations make a significant difference in how the EPA responds to and interacts with stakeholders in the course of developing publicly important rules that regulate air toxic emissions. We hypothesize that rules that are highly complex and technical, but are also publicly significant, will tend in the aggregate to fall under the political radar and be relatively impervious to changes in Presidential Administration. Indeed, the influence of industry in this informationally intensive and thus largely politically insulated area may be even greater under more liberal administrations because the public interest groups may tend to be more complacent in overseeing and challenging agency action. Our results generally support these predictions. Based on docketed information, the Clinton Administration entertained more than twice the number of informal contacts, including meetings, with industry than the Bush II Administration. It also weakened rules, presumably in response to industry comments, more often than the Bush II administration. However, there was some evidence that Presidential politics mattered. The Bush II Administration rejected comments to strengthen a rule nearly twice as often as the Clinton Administration. And while the Clinton Administration did appear more receptive to industry than Bush II, it was also more receptive to informal communications with all types of stakeholders, including public interest groups. Thus, the Clinton EPA’s large number of contacts with industry may simply be a procedural preference for more contact with all stakeholders. In general, our results suggest that further empirical study of the infiltration of Presidential politics into the daily rulemaking work of agencies is warranted. There is large gap between the abstract theory of the Unitary Executive and its practical implications for the bulk of the rules promulgated by the agency.

The Constitution of the United States of America: a contextual analysis

INTRODUCTION 1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE US CONSTITUTION From the Revolution to the Bill of Rights The Early National Period The Crisis over Slavery and the Civil War The Late Nineteenth Century and the Growth of the Modern State The New Deal Crisis and the New Constitutional Regime From the Reagan Revolution to the Present Conclusion Further Reading 2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH Congress: Its Basic Structure and Roles The American Party System Political Parties and the Written Constitution Conduct of Elections Legislative Districting and Gerrymandering Candidate Selection and Gerrymandering Campaign Financing Constitutional Politics within Congress Conclusion Further Reading 3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH The President as Party Leader The President's Role in Legislation The Unitary Executive and the Modern Administrative State The Unitary Executive in Foreign Affairs Conclusion Further Reading 4. THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH Judicial Selection Judicial Review and Judicial Supremacy Political Constraints on the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Doctrinal Constraints on the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Standing Conclusion Further Reading 5. FEDERALISM AND THE REACH OF NATIONAL POWER State Governments and the US Constitution The Emergence of (Nearly) Plenary National Power The So-Called 'Federalism Revolution' of the 1990s and Beyond Federalism and the Spending Power Conclusion Further Reading 6. THE SUBSTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION The Starting Point Pragmatic and Realist Critiques The New Deal Reconstruction The Emergence of Modern Liberalism: Autonomy and Accommodation Lawyers and Rights Litigation: The Development of Support Structures Political Parties and Social Movements From Congress to the Courts: The Venues for Rights Protection The 'Backlash' Thesis Constitutional Rights in the Twenty-First Century Further Reading 7. THE PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE Formal Amendments Substance Constitutional Interpretation as a Mechanism of Constitutional Change Interpretive Methods: An Introduction Conclusion Constitutional Moments and Constitutional Change Constitutional Moments Concluding Thoughts Further Reading

The Rhetorical Presidency Meets the Unitary Executive: Implications for Presidential Rhetoric on Public Policy

Abstract Communication scholars interested in presidential rhetoric on public policy are very familiar with the rhetorical presidency, but there is another paradigm worth our consideration: the unitary executive. This model emphasizes the institutional reasons why presidents might not use public discourse to promote theirpolicies, relying instead on the expanding powers of the executive branch. Although there is relatively little discussion of one model within scholarship dedicated to the other, this essay argues for the benefits of considering both models simultaneously. As changes occur within the executive office’s capacity for creating and enforcing public policy, so too must our critical orientation to the study of presidential rhetoric.

The Rhetorical Presidency Meets the Unitary Executive: Implications for Presidential Rhetoric on Public Policy

Communication scholars interested in presidential rhetoric on public policy are very familiar with the rhetorical presidency, but there is another paradigm worth our consideration: the unitary executive. This model emphasizes the institutional reasons why presidents might not use public discourse to promote their policies, relying instead on the expanding powers of the executive branch. Although there is relatively little discussion of one model within scholarship dedicated to the other, this essay argues for the benefits of considering both models simultaneously. As changes occur within the executive office's capacity for creating and enforcing public policy, so too must our critical orientation to the study of presidential rhetoric.

The Administrative Presidency, Unilateral Power, and the Unitary Executive Theory

This essay examines a major change that has occurred in recent years with regard to the relationship between the president and the bureaucracy. It is a change that relies on a greater use of the president's unilateral powers to influence the bureaucracy. It is based on a theory of presidential power that is striking in its scope and implications: the unitary executive theory. In many respects, the theory fundamentally changes the nature of presidential–bureaucratic relations, yet it has received scant attention in scholarly journals. Examination of its potential impact is long overdue.

The unitary executive: presidential power from Washington to Bush

This book is the first to undertake a detailed historical and legal examination of presidential power and the theory of the unitary executive. This theory, that the Constitution gives the president the power to remove and control all policy-making subordinates in the executive branch, has been the subject of heated debate since the Reagan years. To determine whether the Constitution creates a strongly unitary executive, Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo look at the actual practice of all forty-three presidential administrations, from George Washington to George W. Bush. They argue that all forty-three presidents have been committed proponents of the theory of the unitary executive, and they explore the meaning and implications of this finding.

Government and Science: The Unitary Executive versus Freedom of Scientific Inquiry

President Barack Obama pledged in his inaugural address restore science its rightful place and promised that federal policy would be informed by most complete, accurate, and honest scientific information. (1) The president joined a chorus of condemnation against the Bush administration's war on science, ranging from former surgeon generals, senior agency scientists, and the Union of Concerned Scientists the General Accountability Office and Congress. Showing respect for science is not only crucial affirming democratic ideals of openness and freedom of inquiry. It is also essential the long-term well-being of society, which benefits from scientific research and innovation. During the Bush administration, once-strong, independent agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Institutes of Health came under political influence perhaps more than at any other time in history, threatening the effectiveness and credibility of the executive Consider three examples: In 2006, the GAO revealed that the Bush administration had spent over $1.6 billion in a two-year span on public relations, including payments columnists, media firms, and networks editorialize in favor of the administration's policies. (2) The Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and the FDA distributed prepackaged news clips promote Medicare reform and antidrug messages and warn consumers not buy prescription drugs from Canada. Other reports placed the government in a favorable light on issues ranging from childhood obesity and drunk driving preservation of the environment. The GAO found that federal agencies violated a congressional ban on covert propaganda. (3) Also in 2006, a DHHS appropriations act required that scientific information shall be transmitted [to Congress] uncensored and without delay. (4) But in his statement, President Bush affirmed his power to withhold information that could impair the workings of the executive branch. The American Bar Association called this--and the other 750-plus presidential signing statements declaring an intent not enforce legislation (including a torture ban, protection of whistleblowers, and the independence of an Institute of Education Sciences)--contrary the rule of law and our constitutional system. (5) In 2004 and 2005, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) reported that the Bush administration systematically distorted scientific fact in the service of policy goals on the environment, health, and biomedical research. (6) Illustrations included the FDA delaying approval of emergency contraceptives against the advice of staff scientists and two independent advisory panels, the DHHS obscuring scientific evaluation of abstinence-only education and pressuring scientists promote abstinence, the CDC altering its Web site raise doubts about the effectiveness of condoms in preventing HIV transmission, and the EPA undermining climate change science by suppressing reports and publicly misrepresenting scientific consensus. Health officials even concealed scientific evidence that social and racial disparities affect health care. In some instances, one might give a nod the government's benign intentions (antidrug messages on television, for example), but does beneficence justify deceit? In other instances, the government's suppression or disregard of science seemed coldly calculated buttress its political ideology or favor special interests. Above all, transparency and honesty are essential in setting and enforcing health policy. The public expects the state listen carefully, be objective, and promote the common good. Constitutional Freedoms of Scientists President Bush justified political control over science on a theory of a unitary executive, according which the president holds a tight grip on federal policy. …

The New Unitary Executive and Democratic Theory: The Problem of Alexander Hamilton

Central to the recent argument from the “unitary executive” is the claim that the unitary executive is consistent with the text and history of the Constitution. But because this veracity and importance of this claim is contested, unitarians also argue that the unitary executive is consistent with democratic theory. This article examines that argument by addressing a question in the political thought of Alexander Hamilton. Although Hamilton was an important defender of an energetic executive, and is associated with an expansive interpretation of executive power, he wrote inThe Federalistthat the president and Senate would share the removal power. In contrast with existing scholarship, which either overlooks Hamilton's statement on removals or dismisses it as a careless error, this article argues that Hamilton's statement limiting presidential removals illuminates his larger argument about executive energy. By showing how “duration” would check “unity,” this article clarifies Hamilton's political thought and offers an important critique of the modern argument from the unitary executive.

Independent Agencies and the Unitary Executive Debate: An Empirical Critique

The unitary executive theory - that the Constitution gives the President complete control over the executive branch - questions the constitutionality of independent agencies. The debate surrounding this theory involves competing policy arguments. Unitarians tend to see independent agencies as partisan tools of congressional aggrandizement which sap executive energy and diminish democratic accountability. Non-unitarians see independence as enabling professionalized bureaucratic decision-making or furthering deliberative democratic goals. We test these claims using the results from a unique, comprehensive database of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) voting. We find neither lock-step partisanship or vise-like Chair (or proxy presidential) control. Decision making at the FCC occurs largely by consensus with unanimous orders constituting over 91% of the 8252 in our database. When predicting the likelihood to dissent, however, commissioner's individual tendency to dissent (as measured by examining conditional probabilities derived from logistic regressions) has a greater effect than party affiliation. We interpret this finding as showing that commissioners pursue individual agendas, not the President's or Congress's as an institution. The unitarians, therefore, underestimate the extent to which independent agencies frustrate democratic accountability. Most significant, micro-institutional features determine agency outcomes and mediate any congressional or executive influence. In particular, the way commissioners are chosen and the organizational structures in which they operate strongly affect partisanship, i.e., party-line voting. The FCC produced more partisan outcomes when, in the late 1990s, the commissioner nomination and confirmation process became more partisan. When the FCC changed in 1982 from a seven to five-commissioner body, there was a decrease in commissioners' tendency to dissent

'Overly Deferential to Executive Power:' Partisanship and Evasiveness in Justice Samuel Alito's Confirmation Hearing

In all President George W. Bush made three nominations to the Supreme Court: John Roberts, Harriet Miers, and Samuel Alito. I suggest that a key factor in the selection of each of these nominees was their stance on the issue of executive authority and the war on terrorism. While evidence suggests that on a number of issues Miers was a very different nominee, or at least a potentially very different nominee, from Roberts and Alito, I submit that on the issue of executive authority all three were seen by the Bush administration as reliable votes for the New Paradigm or Unitary Executive theory of government. In the following paper I conduct a content analysis of Alito's senate confirmation hearing. Did the Senate make the issue a priority? Was the issue treated in a partisan fashion? Was the nominee forthcoming or evasive in his responses on the topic? In order to answer these queries, I employ a content analysis of the questioning behavior of the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Recent news accounts of warrantless wiretapping and torture increased the issue's value as senators used executive-authority exchanges to signal constituents and score points with their colleagues. I find that of the substantive issues discussed, executive authority matters were addressed as much as abortion and both outpaced all other substantive issues that were raised. Furthermore, executive authority issues were treated in a partisan fashion with Democrats far more likely to raise the issue than Republicans and far more likely to be skeptical and critical in their remarks then their GOP colleagues who were almost always positive and supportive of the Bush administration and the nominee. Ultimately, my results provide support for recent studies that suggest senators engage in strategic and partisan behavior in the confirmation process.

Dangerous Supplements, Inventive Dissent, and Military Critiques of the Bush Administration's Unitary Executive Theories

Given the growing resonance of presidential rhetorics that are filled with tales of “unitary executive” power, wartime necessities, and unlawful combatants, critics of the administration need to find novel ways of dissenting. In recent years, several generals and other soldiers have assiduously avoided using frontal assault strategies in their critiques of Bush administration policies. Instead, they have used dangerous supplements, strategies of mythic reappropriation, where detractors have claimed that the Vulcans of the Bush administration have betrayed their masculine duties. Several case analyses of military tribunal debates and the generals' ouster of Donald Rumsfeld show us both the rewards and costs that have attended the embrace of some of these martial rhetorics.

Amicus Brief of J. Gregory Sidak in Association of American Physicians & Surgeons v. Hillary Rodham Clinton

This amicus brief addresses the question: Does the Recommendation Clause of the Constitution bar application of the Federal Advisory Committee Act to President Bill Clinton's Task Force on National Health Care Reform? The appellants assert that the Task Force consists wholly of federal officers or employees, and that the Task Force is not an advisory committee because Ms. Hillary Rodham Clinton, while the only person arguably a private citizen on the Task Force, nonetheless should be deemed to be an officer or employee of the federal government. This brief is an effort to supply the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit with a fuller understanding of the original meaning of the Recommendation Clause than can be drawn from either the decision below or the brief of the Department of Justice. This provision in section 3 of Article II, heretofore virtually ignored by courts and constitutional litigants, is the basis for the district court's holding that applying the Federal Advisory Committee Act to certain meetings of the President's Task Force on National Health Care Reform would be unconstitutional. The same provision also drives the appellants' arguments that application of the Act to any meetings of the Task Force would be unconstitutional. Neither the district court nor the Department of Justice, however, has provided any analysis of the history, text, or structure of that provision. In 1989, I published what was evidently the first extended analysis of the Recommendation Clause. My research revealed that the original meaning of the Recommendation Clause does not support either the district court's holding on constitutional grounds or the Justice Department's arguments before the D.C. Circuit.The Recommendation Clause does not shield the Task Force from the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Task Force lacks the distinguishing features that motivated the Framers to vest plenary powers of recommendation in the unitary Executive. If the Task Force were to exercise the President's plenary powers of recommendation, it would undermine the separation of powers by diminishing the political accountability of both the executive and legislative branches.The interpretations of the Recommendation Clause upon which the district court and the Department of Justice respectively rely are inconsistent with the history and text of the Clause. Nor is either interpretation plausible on structural grounds, for each would undermine the unitary Executive by diffusing accountability for presidential recommendations to Congress. Although the President may enlist private citizens and employees of Congress into the process of making recommendations for legislation, he may not, given legislation to the contrary, invoke the plenary powers associated with the Recommendation Clause to envelop that undertaking in a shroud of secrecy. To do so would violate the principle of the separation of powers by pluralizing the unitary Executive. The result being proposed in this case would doubly insult the Framers' design: Not only would we gravitate toward the parliamentary model of government that the Framers so decisively rejected, but we would do so in a manner that would diminish individual liberty by blurring the line that separates the public and private spheres.The judgment below should be affirmed to the extent that it holds that the preliminary injunction may issue requiring the President's Health Care Task Force to comply in all respects with the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The judgment below should be reversed to the extent that it holds that issuance of such a preliminary injunction against the Task Force would impermissibly encroach upon the President's duties and prerogatives under the Recommendation Clause and thus violate the principle of the separation of powers.