Presidential Politics Meets Regulatory Complexity: An Empirical Study of EPA's Hazardous Air Pollutant Rules Under Clinton and Bush II

Abstract

With the growing centralization of power in the Executive Branch, just how deeply do Presidential politics trickle down into the hundreds of rules promulgated annually by the agencies, particularly highly complex and technical rules? There is strong evidence that at least in the case of highly controversial rules, Presidents are heavily involved. Yet for the rest, the evidence of meaningful political oversight is slim to nonexistent. In this study we examine whether Presidential Administrations make a significant difference in how the EPA responds to and interacts with stakeholders in the course of developing publicly important rules that regulate air toxic emissions. We hypothesize that rules that are highly complex and technical, but are also publicly significant, will tend in the aggregate to fall under the political radar and be relatively impervious to changes in Presidential Administration. Indeed, the influence of industry in this informationally intensive and thus largely politically insulated area may be even greater under more liberal administrations because the public interest groups may tend to be more complacent in overseeing and challenging agency action. Our results generally support these predictions. Based on docketed information, the Clinton Administration entertained more than twice the number of informal contacts, including meetings, with industry than the Bush II Administration. It also weakened rules, presumably in response to industry comments, more often than the Bush II administration. However, there was some evidence that Presidential politics mattered. The Bush II Administration rejected comments to strengthen a rule nearly twice as often as the Clinton Administration. And while the Clinton Administration did appear more receptive to industry than Bush II, it was also more receptive to informal communications with all types of stakeholders, including public interest groups. Thus, the Clinton EPA’s large number of contacts with industry may simply be a procedural preference for more contact with all stakeholders. In general, our results suggest that further empirical study of the infiltration of Presidential politics into the daily rulemaking work of agencies is warranted. There is large gap between the abstract theory of the Unitary Executive and its practical implications for the bulk of the rules promulgated by the agency.