Underreaction Hypothesis Research Articles

U.S. industry-level returns and oil prices

This paper empirically investigates and provides further support for the oil price effect documented in Driesprong et al. (2008) in the U.S. industry-level returns. We find that oil price predictability is concentrated in a relatively small number of industry-level returns, the relevant measure for a study of the oil effect is percentage change in oil spot prices, and changes in oil futures prices have virtually no prediction power for industry-level returns. With percentage changes in oil spot prices as the predictor, approximately one fifth of industry returns are oil-predictable. We detect a two trading weeks delay in reaction to oil price changes which is consistent with the Hong and Stein (1996) underreaction hypothesis. These results are robust to various alternative specifications, and are shown to be unrelated to time-varying risk premia. Moreover, we demonstrate that trading strategies based on the oil effect generate superior gains in comparison with buy-and-hold strategy in the presence of reasonable trading costs.

U.S. Industry-Level Returns and Oil Prices

This paper empirically investigates and provides further support for the oil price effect documented in Driesprong et al. (2008) in the U.S. industry-level returns. We find that oil price predictability is concentrated in a relatively small number of industry-level returns, the relevant measure for a study of the oil effect is percentage change in oil spot prices, and changes in oil futures prices have virtually no prediction power for industry-level returns. With percentage changes in oil spot prices as the predictor, approximately one fifth of industry returns are oil-predictable. We detect a two trading weeks delay in reaction to oil price changes which is consistent with the Hong and Stein (1996) underreaction hypothesis. These results are robust to various alternative specifications, and are shown to be unrelated to time-varying risk premia. Moreover, we demonstrate that trading strategies based on the oil effect generate superior gains in comparison with buy-and-hold strategy in the presence of reasonable trading costs.

Is the market underreacting or overreacting to open market share repurchases? A UK perspective

Using UK open market repurchases, we reject the market underreaction hypothesis and the market overreaction hypothesis proposed by Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), respectively. The evidence suggests that the UK market reacts slowly to actual repurchases made by value firms. UK repurchases on average do not suffer from share undervaluation prior to the announcement. Value firms perform just as well as glamour firms during the authorisation period but outperform glamour firms significantly 2 years following the announcement. It turns out that value firms repurchase over 6% more shares than glamour firms during the authorisation period.

The Oil Shock to Chinese Stock Market After Year 2003 Underreacting, Herding, or Both

This paper reinvestigates the predictability of equity market index returns of Chinese Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite index (SSEC) using the changes in oil prices. We find significant oil effect on the predictability of SSEC returns after the year 2003. The effect can neither be explained by efficient market hypothesis nor be explained by information underreaction hypothesis, which presents a Chinese oil puzzle.

Is the Mean Return of Hotel Real Estate Stocks Apt to Overreact to Past Performance?

This study examines the return patterns of hotel real estate stocks in the U.S. during the period from 1990 to 2007.We find that the magnitude and persistence of future mean returns of hotel real estate stocks can be predicted based on past returns, past earnings surprise, trading volume, firm size, and holding period. The empirical evidence found from this paper confirms that short-horizon contrarian profits can be partially explained by the lead-lag effects, while in the intermediate-term price momentum profits and long-term contrarian profits can be partially attributed to the firms’ overreaction to past price changes. Our results support the contrarian/overreaction hypothesis, and they are inconsistent with the Fama-French risk-based hypothesis or the underreaction hypothesis. The study also confirms the earning underreaction hypothesis and finds the high volume stocks tend to earn high momentum profits in the intermediate-term. The study finds that the earning momentum effect for hotel stocks is more short-lived and smaller in magnitude than the market average. Price momentum portfolios (or contrarian portfolios) of big hotel firms underperform small hotel firms and the hotel price momentum portfolio (or contrarian portfolios) significantly underperform the overall market over the intermediate-term (or the long-term). These findings imply that the U.S. hotel industry, particularly the big hotel firms, have experienced relatively conservative growth in the sample period. It suggests that a conservative hotel growth strategy accompanied by an internal-oriented financing policy is proper in a period of prosperity.

Information Uncertainty and Analyst Forecast Behavior*

AbstractPrior literature observes that information uncertainty exacerbates investor underreaction behavior. In this paper, I investigate whether, as professional investment intermediaries, sell‐side analysts suffer more behavioral biases in cases of greater information uncertainty. I show that greater information uncertainty predicts more positive (negative) forecast errors and subsequent forecast revisions following good (bad) news, which corroborates previous findings on the post‐analyst‐revision drift. The opposite effects of information uncertainty on forecast errors and subsequent forecast revisions following good versus bad news support the analyst underreaction hypothesis and are inconsistent with analyst forecast rationality or optimism suggested in prior literature.

Do Stock Prices Underreact to Seo Announcements? Evidence from Seo Valuation

This paper examines whether the market underreacts to the negative information implicit in the SEO (seasoned equity offerings) announcements. While rational and mispricing theories both predict SEO's, in the aggregate, should earn low returns in the long run, they offer sharply different predictions for the cross-sectional relationship between pre-SEO valuation and long-run returns. We find that SEOs that are more overvalued (relative to their non-issuing industry peers) prior to the announcement day experience the same rate of decline in market value as SEOs that are less overvalued but experience a significantly larger decline over the subsequent five years. These results are consistent with the underreaction hypothesis and inconsistent with solely risk-based explanations. Our cross-sectional findings are robust to controlling for capital investments, expected growth rates, accruals, leverage, percentage shares issued in the SEO, pre-SEO price run-up, and B/M ratios. Additional tests indicate that overvalued SEOs earn lower returns around future quarterly earnings announcements and do not exhibit superior ex-post operating performance. We argue that both risk and mispricing theories are needed to fully understand the evolution of SEO fundamentals and stock prices over time.

Information Uncertainty and Analyst Forecast Behavior

Prior literature observes that information uncertainty exacerbates investor underreaction behavior. In this paper, I investigate whether, as professional investment intermediaries, sell-side analysts suffer more behavioral biases in cases of greater information uncertainty. I show that greater information uncertainty predicts more positive (negative) forecast errors and subsequent forecast revisions following good (bad) news, which corroborates previous findings on the post-analyst-revision drift. The opposite effects of information uncertainty on forecast errors and subsequent forecast revisions following good vs. bad news support the analyst underreaction hypothesis and are inconsistent with analyst forecast rationality or optimism suggested in prior literature.

Market Underreaction to Large Stock Price Declines: The Case of ADRs

This paper examines a sample of ADR stocks that experienced significant stock price declines of more than -15% during a specific month, and finds no evidence of a reversal pattern over the long run. The results are consistent with the predictions of the underreaction hypothesis and the existence of a "momentum" effect in stock prices. The underreaction hypothesis is also supported when ADRs are examined across industries, and for a sample of emerging market ADRs.

Long‐Run Performance following Private Placements of Equity

Public firms that place equity privately experience positive announcements effects, with negative post‐announcement stock‐price performance. This finding is inconsistent with the underreaction hypothesis. Instead, it suggests that investors are overoptimistic about the prospects of firms issuing equity, regardless of the method of issuance. Further, in contrast to public offerings, private issues follow periods of relatively poor operating performance. Thus, investor overoptimism at the time of private issues is not due to the behavioral tendency to overweight recent experience at the expense of long‐term averages.

Long-run Performance Following Private Placements of Equity

Public firms that place equity privately experience positive announcements effects, with negative post-announcement stock-price performance. This finding is inconsistent with the underreaction hypothesis. Instead, it suggests that investors are overoptimistic about the prospects of firms issuing equity, regardless of the method of issuance. Further, in contrast to public offerings, private issues follow periods of relatively poor operating performance. Thus, investor overoptimism at the time of private issues is not due to the behavioral tendency to overweight recent experience at the expense of long-term averages.

The underreaction hypothesis and the new issue puzzle: evidence from Japan

The underreaction hypothesis and the new issue puzzle: evidence from Japan

The Underreaction Hypothesis and the New Issue Puzzle: Evidence from Japan

This article investigates the long-term equity performance of Japanese firms issuing convertible debt and equity. We find that issuing firms perform poorly (except for equity rights issues) compared to nonissuing firms even though the stockprice reaction to convertible debt and equity issues is not negative for Japanese firms. This underperformance is strongest for firms issuing public convertible debt. In contrast to the United States, poor performance is not concentrated in smaller firms and in firms with a high market-to-book ratio. Simple behavioral explanations advanced for the new issue puzzle in the United States do not seem consistent with the Japanese experience.

The Underreaction Hypothesis and the New Issue Puzzle: Evidence from Japan

This paper investigates the long-term performance of Japanese firms issuing convertible debt and equity. We examine a wide range of types of issues: private issues, public issues, offshore issues, and rights issues. We find the issuing firms perform poorly (except for equity rights issues) even though the stock-price reaction to convertible debt and equity issue announcements is not significantly negative for Japanese firms. This underperformance is strongest for firms issuing public convertible debt in Japan. Though in the U.S. underperformance appears to be concentrated in the smaller firms and in the firms with a high market-to-book ratio, this is not the case in Japan. Simple behavioral explanations for the underperformance of U.S. equity issuing firms do not seem consistent with the Japanese experience, but both countries fit a story where investors and managers are too optimistic about the investment opportunities of some firms.