UN Personnel Research Articles

Gender in Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations: Sexual Violence in Conflict

Sexual violence, abuse and mass rapes became a method of warfare long ago. Women and children are the most vulnerable category of the population becoming victims of crimes of all parties to the armed conflict. In most cases, their security and protection is the task of UN peacekeeping missions and regional organizations in peacekeeping. However, the reverse side of the Peacekeeping Operations "medal" is commitment of acts of violence by the peacekeepers. This situation undermines credibility of the UN and evokes a negative attitude of the civilians to UN personnel and members of the military contingent of operation. This article describes the problem of committment of sexual harassment and abuse by the peacekeepers, UN activities to resolve the situation, as well as issues regarding prevention, investigation and punishment for such crimes at the present stage. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n24p483

Exclusion from Refugee Status: The Purposes and Principles of the United Nations and Article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention

Article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention provides that an individual is to be excluded from the benefits afforded by refugee status if ‘there are serious reasons for considering that ... he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’. This phrase has proven difficult to interpret, not least because of the differing views on its meaning at the time of drafting, and the lack of another body of law to which article 1F(c) can attach. Accordingly, different states have found that different acts fall within the provision. This assessment is largely carried out on a case-by-case basis and in an unstructured manner. This article explores the acts that have been held to fall within article 1F(c) - primarily human rights violations, terrorism, and attacks on UN personnel - and critiques some of the thorny legal issues to which these acts have given rise. It then offers a framework for assessing whether a particular act falls within article 1F(c). 1. In TR odu CTI on The need to protect individuals fleeing from persecution and grant them the protec tions afforded by refugee status has to be balanced against excluding those who are ‘undeserving’ of that protection. This is done most authoritatively in article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Article 1A sets out the notion of a refugee while article 1F provides that refugee status and the benefits that follow from it shall not apply to certain individuals. An individual is excluded if ‘there are serious reasons for considering that’ (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity; (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to admission as a refugee; or (c) ‘he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’.

A Retrospective 05 Years Analysis of Operated Surgical Patients in Bangladesh Level II Hospital, UNMIL

Introduction: There is a paucity of published data on the type of surgical conditions that affect the UN personnel of different countries setup and the spectrum of surgical operations performed for these patients. Such information are necessary for assessing the impact of surgical conditions, both elective and emergency, on the health of UN peacekeepers from different races and nationalities and for setting priority to improve the surgical care. Objectives: To ascertain highest possible standard of surgical care to be ensured in an international arena for optimal outcome. Materials and methods: Five years retrospective study was carried out in Bangladesh level II hospital (BANMED), UNMIL located at Suakoko district of Liberia from April 2007 to April 2012 comprising of all major and minor surgical cases with different types of dressings done. Results: A total 83 major, 567 minor and 3924 dressings were done. The majority of operations were emergency cases of which 73.49% were of major and 78.30% were minor surgery. While 26.50% of major and 21.69% of minor surgery were elective cases. All were male patients in cases of major operations and 93.29% for minor cases as most of the peacekeepers were male personnel. The most frequent cases were acute appendicitis, inguinal hernia and polytrauma cases. Highest number of patients was 28 (33.73%) from 26-30 years age group. There were 3 minor postoperative complications with nil mortality rates. Conclusion: The surgical unit of a level-II hospital has to work in an adverse situation of a conflict area with various limitations. So it is very important to provide highest possible standard of surgical care to be ensured in terms of staff, equipments, logistic support and with a motivated surgical team in an international arena for optimal outcome. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/jafmc.v9i1.18720 Journal of Armed Forces Medical College Bangladesh Vol.9(1) 2013: 14-19

United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War

Does United Nations peacekeeping protect civilians in civil war? Civilian protection is a primary purpose of UN peacekeeping, yet there is little systematic evidence for whether peacekeeping prevents civilian deaths. We propose that UN peacekeeping can protect civilians if missions are adequately composed of military troops and police in large numbers. Using unique monthly data on the number and type of UN personnel contributed to peacekeeping operations, along with monthly data on civilian deaths from 1991 to 2008 in armed conflicts in Africa, we find that as the UN commits more military and police forces to a peacekeeping mission, fewer civilians are targeted with violence. The effect is substantial—the analyses show that, on average, deploying several thousand troops and several hundred police dramatically reduces civilian killings. We conclude that although the UN is often criticized for its failures, UN peacekeeping is an effective mechanism of civilian protection.

The role of education in peacebuilding: an analysis of five change theories in Sierra Leone

This paper raises a number of critical questions regarding the contribution of education to peacebuilding. Despite recent calls for greater collaboration between the two fields, there is still a lack of clarity regarding the change theories through which education may contribute to peacebuilding processes. This paper outlines developments over the past decade in the field of education and conflict, before identifying five rationales for the ways in which education contributes to peacebuilding. The second half of the paper examines the translation of these rationales into practice. Sierra Leone is often regarded as a success story of UN peacebuilding and, 10 years post-agreement, offers the opportunity to examine a broad range of programming. Using data gathered during a two-week field study (17–28 January, 2011), the paper reflects on five education programmes that operated in Sierra Leone in the post-conflict period. Semi-structured interviews were held with project personnel and beneficiaries, educational officials, students and graduates, community leaders and UN personnel to assess views on the contribution of education to peacebuilding, the rationales informing projects and challenges to implementation. A number of critical questions are raised regarding the lessons learned by the international community, its tendency to pursue its own agendas and its commitment to conflict transformation through peacebuilding.

United Nations Intervention and Violence Against Civilians in Civil War

Does United Nations peacekeeping protect civilians in civil war? Civilian protection is a primary purpose of UN peacekeeping, yet there is little systematic evidence for whether peacekeeping prevents civilian deaths. We propose that UN peacekeeping can protect civilians if missions are adequately composed of military troops and police in large numbers. Using unique monthly data on the number and type of UN personnel contributed to peacekeeping operations, along with monthly data on civilian deaths from 1991 to 2008 in armed conflicts in Africa, we find that as the UN commits more military and police forces to a peacekeeping mission, fewer civilians are targeted with violence. The effect is substantial - the analyses show that, on average, deploying several thousand troops and several hundred police dramatically reduces civilian killings. We conclude that although the UN is often criticized for its failures, UN peacekeeping is an effective mechanism of civilian protection.

Floating Down the River of History: Ban Ki-moon and Peacekeeping, 2007–2011

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO PEACEKEEPING UNDER BAN KJ-MOON? WHEN BAN bid for a second term as Secretary-General of United Nations in June 2011, performance of peace operations on his watch was important part of public case for his reelection. In previous six months, UN missions had overseen unexpectedly smooth independence referendum in South Sudan, guided Haiti through controversial elections, and weathered four months of postelectoral violence in Cote d'lvoire. (1) Ban had taken a tough stance against defeated Ivorian incumbent Laurent Gbagbo, whose supporters menaced UN personnel. In April, UN helicopters attacked Gbagbo's forces, acting on directions from Security Council to protect civilians from heavy-weapons fire. Gbagbo was taken into custody by his opponents, and Ban described events in Cote d'lvoire as a milestone for international community's commitment to democracy. (2) He avoided triumphalism, recognizing that thousands of civilian lives had been lost in crisis. Nonetheless, Secretary-General clearly perceived Ivorian episode as important moment in defining his leadership. So too did his staff. Since taking office in 2007, Ban had often been lambasted inside and outside UN Secretariat as inept leader, but officials now declared a new respect for his political judgment and courage. (3) Having made his pitch for another term, Ban won support of Security Council and General Assembly within weeks. Asked by a South Korean news agency to comment, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy praised Ban's in-depth knowledge of peacekeeping coupled with his outstanding negotiation skills, adding that the Secretary-General's personal dedication to peacekeeping has been invaluable in assisting to maintain peace and security in so many countries and giving people a fighting chance in some of world's most dangerous and inhospitable places. (4) Under circumstances, Le Roy could be forgiven for offering Ban Ki-moon particularly fulsome praise. But were his words justified by Secretary-General's performance? Ban's leadership of UN peace operations had received relatively little attention prior to Ivorian crisis. While there are a number of widely read accounts of how Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan shaped peacekeeping, there is as yet no equivalent account of Ban's stewardship. (5) While he has been subject of much press coverage since 2007, it has tended to focus on his climate change diplomacy (usually treated as a good thing) and managerial style (frequently described as a bad thing). (6) This inattention to Ban's oversight of peace operations is striking because number of military and police personnel involved has hit record highs during his tenure, approaching 100,000. (7) The cost of peace operations has hovered between $7 billion and $8 billion. In May 2011, Le Roy warned that UN faced an unprecedented number of demands which have dramatically increased. (8) There is a need for a more rigorous reckoning of how Ban has dealt with these challenges, looking beyond specific episodes such as success in Cote d'Ivoire to explore his attitude toward peacekeeping as a whole. In this article, I do not aim to offer a final verdict on Ban's guidance of peacekeeping throughout his first term. Instead, I offer initial assessment of whether Secretary-General has demonstrated a consistent vision of peacekeeping during his time in office, and how this has manifested itself in terms of both reforms to UN bureaucracy and organization's reaction to individual crises. This is not to claim that Ban could shape peacekeeping to his will. To focus on any Secretary-General's vision of peacekeeping is problematic insomuch as UN operations are shaped by Security Council, troop contributors, and power brokers in field. Clarifying division of labor between these actors--and carving out autonomous role for Secretary-General amid them--has been a long-standing headache within UN. …

Improving UN Intelligence through Civil–Military Collaboration: Lessons from the Joint Mission Analysis Centres

Fearing a loss of sovereignty, UN member states have historically been hesitant to provide the UN with an intelligence-collection mandate. The increased size, length and complexity of peacekeeping operations, compounded by severe security threats to UN personnel, make a stronger UN intelligence capability in the field increasingly necessary. The article examines the contribution of the UN's Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) to UN intelligence capabilities and concludes that, in larger missions in particular, the multidisciplinary JMAC structure has delivered valuable intelligence to senior mission management. Nevertheless, in all missions improved information-sharing procedures are necessary to ensure that the JMAC is able to fulfil its intelligence mandate.

EUFOR in Chad and CAR

The European Union has begun its most ambitious military operation to date, a peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic. EUFOR has a mandate to protect refugees, internally displaced persons and UN personnel, and to facilitate the delivery of aid. Apart from the logistical and military challenges involved, its commander faces sensitive political tasks.

Hostis Humani Generis

Previous articleNext article No AccessHostis Humani GenerisJody GreeneJody Greene Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Critical Inquiry Volume 34, Number 4Summer 2008 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/592540 Views: 216Total views on this site Citations: 7Citations are reported from Crossref © 2008 by The University of Chicago. 0093-1896/08/3404-0003$10.00. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Ayodele Akenroye, Kamari Maxine Clarke Deconstructing the Complexities of Violence, (Aug 2022): 78–112.https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009110693.005Laura McHale More on the Neuroscience of Words, (Jan 2022): 85–96.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7037-4_9Alexandra Ganser Cultural Constructions of Piracy During the Crisis Over Slavery, (Aug 2020): 173–252.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43623-0_4Christian Olsson , Critical Military Studies 5, no.44 ( 2019): 359.https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2019.1622261Damien Rogers , ( 2018): 1.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60994-2_1Amedeo Policante The new pirate wars: the world market as imperial formation, Global Discourse 3, no.11 (Mar 2013): 52–71.https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2013.804760 백준걸 Piratical Ahab: Moby-Dick, English & American Cultural Studies 11, no.11 (Apr 2011): 129–159.https://doi.org/10.15839/eacs.11.1.201104.129

EU Prepares for Hard-core Chad Mission

The EU has set in motion plans to send a peacekeeping force to Chad along its troubled border with Sudan, prompting international aid and humanitarian groups to call for clear rules of engagement that focus on civilian protection and human rights and the effective implementation of a ban on using children as soldiers in the region’s various conflicts. “EU soldiers must have the right to fire if they are under attack or if civilians are attacked as well,” Alain Deletroz, vice president for policy in Europe at the International Crisis Group, recently told reporters in Brussels. “The rules of engagement must be clear and robust. It would be pointless without it.” As expected during their 23–24 July meeting in Brussels, foreign ministers from the bloc’s twenty-seven member states gave the green light to the EU Military Staff (EUMS) to begin defining a crisis management concept. The concept will be premised on the deployment of several thousand European troops and police officers to Chad and possibly the northern region of the Central African Republic (CAR). EU military planners aim to finalize the concept in the coming weeks, an EU diplomat told ISN Security Watch on 23 July after the ministers’ decision. The mission’s purpose would be to protect civilian populations in Chad and contain the chaos in adjacent Sudan and its war-torn western province of Darfur, where strife has displaced hundreds of thousands of people in the last four years. Many Darfurians now live in refugee camps in dire conditions just across the borders in Chad and northern CAR. Their numbers are swollen by displaced Chadians fleeing a conflict between rebel groups and the central government of President Idriss Deby. The EU soldiers would also protect UN and humanitarian personnel working in the region. The size of the EU’s mission is still uncertain, but initial indications have been that it could involve as many as 3,000 troops, though a smaller number is more likely, said the EU diplomat. “The numbers are somewhat up the air at this point, but one shouldn’t forget that Artemis was run with considerably less than 3,000 soldiers,” said the diplomat, referring to the EU’s short-term peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Artemis’ three-month deployment of 1,400 troops in June 2003 to Bunia in eastern DRC was the EU’s first autonomous mission to deploy outside Europe and a test case of its ability to run a hard-core security mission. While Artemis also had to deal with instability in Bunia, it was focused on a small area and a relatively restricted conflict scenario. By contrast, the peacekeeping challenge in Chad is more complex and dangerous, according to aid officials familiar with the setting and conditions of the region. Nearly a quarter of a million refugees from

An Assessment of UN Efforts to Address Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel

In dealing with the sexual exploitation of women and girls by UN and other personnel operating in post-conflict situations there is a limited amount the UN can do without the cooperation of troop contributing states. Anyone employed by, or affiliated with the UN must be held accountable and, when the circumstances so warrant, prosecuted. This article is a legal analysis and discussion of these problems against the background of the report by the Secretary-General's adviser on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers (the Zeid Report), and the UN investigation into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by MONUC personnel in the Congo.

III. The Optional Protocol to the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel

1. The adoption of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (‘the Convention’)1 was a response to rising casualties among UN peacekeepers and other personnel as a result of their increasing deployment to dangerous situations following the end of the Cold War. It requires States parties to: prohibit attacks on UN personnel and others associated with UN operations; prosecute or extradite perpetrators of such acts; take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety of such personnel; and promptly release any who are captured or detained.

The Security Council in the Face of Genocide

The genocide in Rwanda will define for our generation the failure to intervene in the face of mass human rights abuses. The UN Security Council (the Council) was intimately involved in this terrible event, with the decisions it took from October 1993, when a peacekeeping mission was created for Rwanda, having a decisive effect on what happened. This article details the crucial meetings held by the Council in secret and informal sessions and describes how a serious assessment of the situation in Rwanda was simply missing. It shows how the peacekeepers of the Council`s mission to Rwanda were abandoned during the genocide and how the efforts of these UN personnel to ease the suffering of the Rwandan people were ignored by the Great Powers.

PEACEKEEPERS AS PERPETRATORS OF ABUSE

I am afraid there is clear evidence that acts of gross misconduct have taken place. This is a shameful thing for the United Nations to have to say, and I am absolutely outraged by it. —Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General Despite promulgating a comprehensive set of guidelines to deter UN personnel from committing acts of sexual misconduct, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse have become widespread within United Nations peacekeeping missions. The policy of zero-tolerance for peacekeeper misconduct has not been matched by strong disciplinary measures, and crimes are often ignored and rarely punished: absentee fathers, rapists and murderers simply disappear back in their home countries. In countries where women and children rarely have the same economic resources, political rights and authority or control over their environment—or their bodies—they easily become prey for those in perceived positions of power and authority. By failing to hold those responsible to account, the UN may in fact be fuelling even greater discrimination and violence against women and children. In order to ensure those who are mandated to protect to do not become perpetrators of abuse, the UN must take a stronger stand against those who commit acts of sexual misconduct, and must ensure that victims see that their abuser is brought to justice and that reparation is offered. A recent report submitted by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse makes a comprehensive set of recommendations to prevent, detect, and respond to these allegations. The aim of this essay is to highlight some of the main points of the Special Envoy's report, and to examine the practical challenges the UN and troop/police contributing countries will face when attempting to implement these recommendations.

A Week in Jenin: Assessing Mental Health Needs Amid the Ruins

In the days after the Israelis ended their siege on 18––19 April 2002, a veritable army of visitors descended on Jenin refugee camp——journalists, human right activists, NGO representatives, international aid workers, parliamentarians, UN personnel, solidarity delegations——for visits of varying length and objectives not always clear to the residents. My own mandate was very specific: As a psychologist who had worked in Palestine for a number of years, I was to help put together a preliminary evaluation of mental health needs and mobilizable human resources, mainly through "debriefing" sessions both with residents most directly affected by the events (e.g., the newly homeless and internally displaced) and with local personnel (e.g., medical and paramedical teams, teachers, youth workers). I was part of a team that included representatives of UNICEF and the Jerusalem Coalition for Psychology (Palestinian Counseling Center, Women's Center for Legal and Social Counseling, Spafford) sent to help UNRWA and local NGOs working in the psychosocial field.

Humanitarianism in Crisis

THE HUMANITARIAN WORLD emerged from the 1990S both sad dened and chastened. Again and again nonprofit and UN personnel had been overwhelmed by the magnitude of particular crises-as when 2 million people crossed from Rwanda into Zaire in 1994, or when 8oo,ooo Kosovar Albanians were forcibly deported from the province by Serb forces in the spring of 1999. Even more unnerving was the sense that, often despite the relief groups' own best efforts, the moral dilemmas attendant on their actions had only grown more acute over the course of the decade. Even so, humanitarians did not give up. Nongovernmental organizations (NGos) and UN agencies multiplied their efforts to refine their operations in light of the lessons of Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Still, by the beginning of the twenty first century, experienced relief workers had come to accept the new conventional wisdom that there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems. From this simple truth, however, diametrically opposing conclusions can be drawn about what humanitarian action should involve. Many persistent advocates of humanitarianism, including UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, see it as one of a number of pillars supporting a promising new liberal world order. Such an order, they seem to believe, can be constructed to fill the vacuum created by globalization's undermining of the idea of state sovereignty. It will also be built on

Genocide: A Case for the Responsibility of the Bystander

In this article, the case of Bosnia is used to raise important theoretical and practical questions concerning the role of third parties in preventing and punishing genocide. After the massacre at Srebrenica, a UN-declared `safe area', the debate over complicity in genocide on the part of UN personnel has gained particular urgency, and much of the discussion here is related to that debate. The article also draws attention to the role of intellectuals in preparing for genocide by way of ideological hate speech, a role of crucial importance in top-down orchestrated genocidal campaigns such as those seen in Rwanda and Bosnia. On the basis of the empirical material presented, it is argued that considerable responsibility resides with knowledgeable third-party bystanders to unfolding acts of genocide. The article also tries to distinguish between different kinds of bystanders, and it attempts to define and discuss what it means - and what it should imply - to be a contemporary bystander to genocidal warfare.

With unamet in East Timor: A historian's personal view

Written by a historian who served with the UN's Political Affairs Office in East Timor during the turbulent months in mid 1999, this article provides an insider's view on the terror of the militia violence but goes beyond that to explain why many of those who worked with the UN mission were less worried about the militia than about being party to a failed and perhaps shameful process—failed for the people of East Timor and shameful for the United Nations. The article offers intimate details on the internal decision-making process at the United Nations concerning the “popular consultation” and the introduction of a peacekeeping force, and then about whether or not to evacuate UN personnel and their East Timorese associates as the violence escalated. The author concludes that the UN effort was not the “fiasco” that some feared it would be. On the contrary, the Unamet mission managed to avoid the pitfalls of other UN interventions (in Rwanda, for example) and go on to establish some important precedents that will allow the United Nations to work more effectively in the years ahead.

The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in Codification and Implementation.

Table of Treaties. Table of Cases. Introduction: Aim and Plan of the Present Enquiry in Light of the Complexity of International Criminal Law. Part 1: Developments in Codification. I. Aggression, Threat of Aggression, Intervention and Colonial Domination. II. Serious Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. III. Mercenary Activity, Terrorism, Crimes against UN Personnel, Drug-Trafficking and Wilful and Severe Damage to the Natural Environment. Part 2: Developments in Implementation. IV. Advent of Normative Hierarchy in International Law and Its Relation to Individual Criminal Responsibility. V. Implementation of International Criminal Law Through Municipal Jurisdiction. VI. Implementation of International Criminal Law through International Criminal Tribunals. Part 3: Future Prospects. VII. The Emergence of a System of International Criminal Law. Annex 1: 1991 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Annex 2: 1993 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Annex 3: 1994 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Annex 4: 1994 ILC Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court. Annex 5: 1995 UN General Assembly Resolution A/50/46 Creating a Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. Annex 6: 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Bibliography. Index.