Floating Down the River of History: Ban Ki-moon and Peacekeeping, 2007–2011

Abstract

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO PEACEKEEPING UNDER BAN KJ-MOON? WHEN BAN bid for a second term as Secretary-General of United Nations in June 2011, performance of peace operations on his watch was important part of public case for his reelection. In previous six months, UN missions had overseen unexpectedly smooth independence referendum in South Sudan, guided Haiti through controversial elections, and weathered four months of postelectoral violence in Cote d'lvoire. (1) Ban had taken a tough stance against defeated Ivorian incumbent Laurent Gbagbo, whose supporters menaced UN personnel. In April, UN helicopters attacked Gbagbo's forces, acting on directions from Security Council to protect civilians from heavy-weapons fire. Gbagbo was taken into custody by his opponents, and Ban described events in Cote d'lvoire as a milestone for international community's commitment to democracy. (2) He avoided triumphalism, recognizing that thousands of civilian lives had been lost in crisis. Nonetheless, Secretary-General clearly perceived Ivorian episode as important moment in defining his leadership. So too did his staff. Since taking office in 2007, Ban had often been lambasted inside and outside UN Secretariat as inept leader, but officials now declared a new respect for his political judgment and courage. (3) Having made his pitch for another term, Ban won support of Security Council and General Assembly within weeks. Asked by a South Korean news agency to comment, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy praised Ban's in-depth knowledge of peacekeeping coupled with his outstanding negotiation skills, adding that the Secretary-General's personal dedication to peacekeeping has been invaluable in assisting to maintain peace and security in so many countries and giving people a fighting chance in some of world's most dangerous and inhospitable places. (4) Under circumstances, Le Roy could be forgiven for offering Ban Ki-moon particularly fulsome praise. But were his words justified by Secretary-General's performance? Ban's leadership of UN peace operations had received relatively little attention prior to Ivorian crisis. While there are a number of widely read accounts of how Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan shaped peacekeeping, there is as yet no equivalent account of Ban's stewardship. (5) While he has been subject of much press coverage since 2007, it has tended to focus on his climate change diplomacy (usually treated as a good thing) and managerial style (frequently described as a bad thing). (6) This inattention to Ban's oversight of peace operations is striking because number of military and police personnel involved has hit record highs during his tenure, approaching 100,000. (7) The cost of peace operations has hovered between $7 billion and $8 billion. In May 2011, Le Roy warned that UN faced an unprecedented number of demands which have dramatically increased. (8) There is a need for a more rigorous reckoning of how Ban has dealt with these challenges, looking beyond specific episodes such as success in Cote d'Ivoire to explore his attitude toward peacekeeping as a whole. In this article, I do not aim to offer a final verdict on Ban's guidance of peacekeeping throughout his first term. Instead, I offer initial assessment of whether Secretary-General has demonstrated a consistent vision of peacekeeping during his time in office, and how this has manifested itself in terms of both reforms to UN bureaucracy and organization's reaction to individual crises. This is not to claim that Ban could shape peacekeeping to his will. To focus on any Secretary-General's vision of peacekeeping is problematic insomuch as UN operations are shaped by Security Council, troop contributors, and power brokers in field. Clarifying division of labor between these actors--and carving out autonomous role for Secretary-General amid them--has been a long-standing headache within UN. …