UN Operations Research Articles

L'ONU au Cambodge. Les leçons de I'APRONUC (Note)

The UN operation in Cambodia was a major venture provided with extensive resources and entrusted to implement a highly ambitious program contained in the Paris Accords signed on October23, 1991. Today, official rhetoric speaks of a "model" when referring to what a more modest view would treat as an experience - one from which it is indispensable to draw all the lessons. The UN proved unable to carry out much of its mission. It jailed to disarm the rival troops. It jailed to neutralize the Communist party's omnipresent influence over existing administrative structures. It failed to repair or rebuild a minimum of infrastructure in such basic areas as health, education, and communications. It failed to reintegrate into society the 372,000 refugees who had come back from camps in Thailand. It failed to preserve the country's unity and territorial integrity. Yet it did score some successes. It laid the ground work for a pluralistic society. It repatriated the refugees. It organized elections that were free and fair enough to allow new, thoroughly legitimate institutions to come into being. A cautious assessment of this operation leads to a reflection on the conditions for success or failure of such a venture. Lessons are to be learned from each step : starting from the diplomatic moves behind the decision to carry out the operation and the mandate defining its scope ; and ending with the political, economic, and social repercussions due to thousands of soldiers and foreign civilian administrators passing through the country. Each phase of the flow of operations must also be questioned, from recruitment of personnel to assessment of the results obtained.

International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

State building refers to efforts to reconstruct, or in some cases to establish for the first time, an effective indigenous government in a state or territory where no such capacity exists or where the capacity has been seriously eroded. How effective the government needs to be for this purpose is a matter of some debate. In practical, if not tautological terms, it depends on the criteria that are employed to measure effectiveness, and analysts will differ as to the precise requirements. (1) There may be other objectives associated with state building distinct from effectiveness, and often today this is the case. Among these further aims are, notably, the establishment of the rule of law, democratic norms and institutions, and a free-market economy. Third-party state building, as opposed to indigenous state building, is a relatively recent practice in international relations. It has its earliest contemporary expression in efforts by colonial powers to strengthen the capacity of territories under their jurisdiction in anticipation of the eventual transfer of sovereignty to local authorities. (2) It also has parallels in the U.S.-led Allied occupation and reconstruction of postwar Germany and Japan. (3) Today third-party state building is undertaken as well in response to weak or so-called failed states and, more recently, as part of the international administration of war-torn or strife-ridden territories. Since 1995, there have been four such administrations: the United Nations' interim administrations of Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), Kosovo (UNMIK), and East Timor (UNTAET), and the ad hoc Peace Implementation Council's administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (By contrast, the current UN operation in Afghanistan [UNAMA] is an assistance mission, although state building is a significant aspect of that mission.) The distinctive feature of an international territorial administration is both the scope of its interest in the governmental functions of the relevant state or territory and its authority over these functions. Third parties have been active before in areas of governance thought historically to be the exclusive domain of domestic jurisdiction--for instance, as part of complex peacekeeping or peacebuilding arrangements that have granted the UN and its representatives intrusive powers, ranging from human rights monitoring and the supervision of elections to the demobilization of armed forces and the reorganization of police forces. (4) Donor states and international financial institutions (IFIs), too, have encroached on traditional sovereign competences through their use of conditioned aid in support of good governance. (5) Yet, arguably, not since the League of Nations' administration of the Saarland (1920-1935) have third parties, qua international agents, had the power and responsibility of today's international administrations in local executive, legislative, and judicial affairs. (6) By virtue of its broad scope and authority, international administration is also more political in character than many other field operations. Whether to hold elections, and on what basis; which currency to adopt; whether to consult with local interlocutors, and how widely; whether to promote the reintegration of ethnic communities or to accept de facto division; what role to give women in the reconstructed polity; which curriculum to teach in the schools; whether to allow public ownership of enterprises; what limits, if any, to place on the content of party manifestos--these are all fundamentally political issues. Historically, peace support and other field operations have eschewed overt political engagement; in the context of international administration, such engagement is unavoidable. International Authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina One can distinguish the various types of international administration on the basis of the degree of authority that international agents assume in each case. …

THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BURUNDI (ONUB)

(2004). THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BURUNDI (ONUB) African Security Review: Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 57-59.

The Defense Forces and the NGOs: A Cultural Collision or a Meeting of Minds?

Numerous conflicts since the end of the Cold War, in many parts of the world, have seen military and civilian assets deployed side by side as part of an overall UN-mandated solution. Though great cultural differences exist between the military and NGOs, a level of compromise has been demonstrated in an effort to provide solutions. The skills required to operate in alignment with the changing role of UN operations present a challenge to professional defense forces. The military officer must recognize this challenge, particularly in the area of humanitarian assistance operations, and move to meet it. To do this effectively, he/she must study the other players on stage. Ireland has international credibility, hard-won over the last fifty years of peacekeeping operations, but the Irish Defense Forces, accepting that peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions have changed, must also be cognizant of the dilemmas that confront both the military and NGOs in their uneasy alliance on shared turf. The military commander will, by virtue of training and education, understand the problems faced by the military in conventional operational situations. Understanding the problems that confront NGOs is more difficult for military officers, given the limited opportunities to interact with representatives of that world. This essay attempts to lay the groundwork for greater interaction by asking the question, How can the Irish Defense Forces interact to best effect with NGOs in humanitarian assistance operations? By understanding this question and all it implies, a policy of training that incorporating inter-agency cooperation might be initiated, to the benefit of all concerned.

EYEWITNESS - The Irish Company at Jadotville, Congo, 1961: Soldiers or Symbols?

The article examines an incident during the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) in which a company of Irish troops under siege at the isolated post of Jadotville was forced to surrender to the authorities of the secessionist province of Katanga. It looks at the circumstances leading up to the incident; the confusion surrounding the role of the UN force, and in particular, the problems arising from assigning military tasks to troops equipped only for peacekeeping duties. It argues that failure to learn the lessons of the incident led to many of the problems encountered by UN troops at Srebrenica and in Rwanda and Sierra Leone.

USAF Airlift into the Heart of Darkness, the Congo, 1960-1978: Implications for Modern Air Mobility Planners

Abstract : Airlift operations in Third World countries are always a challenge due to distances and lack of airfield facilities. USAF airlifters met that challenge three times in the Congo in 1960-64, 1964, and 1978. These operations serve as a blueprint for future air mobility contingencies. Since coalition operations are a vital part of U.S. strategy, comparing and contrasting Belgian Air Force operations in the Congo in conjunction with USAF operations are useful to anticipate the future. When the Congo gained independence in 1960 from Belgium, rioting and violence threatened white lives. The Belgian government tried to restore order and evacuate refugees. Belgian Air Force operations in July 1960 demonstrated improvisations to aircraft and a high operations tempo. But under pressure from the United Nations Security Council Belgium had to withdraw. The USAF entered the Congo with the goal of saving Americans and providing food to the newly independent state. On 14 July 1960 the USAF became the airlift arm of United Nations security force dispatched to the Congo from over 34 countries. The USAF continued to support the UN operation until 30 June 1964 when the last UN soldier went home. In the three years separating the start and conclusion of this massive undertaking, the USAF rotated troops and maintained the logistical lifeline the UN needed. However, the USAF conducted its most ambitious airlift in the Congo in November 1964. Internal revolts continued as rival groups sought to dominate the government. On August 4, 1964 the eastern city of Stanleyville was captured and American State Department personnel were seized. USAF C-130 aircraft flew Belgian Para-Commandos to the Congo and then on to a parachute assault on Stanleyville. A second jump took place 48 hours later. This operation foreshadowed future African adventures by the European powers.

UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage

In the five decades that followed the Korea operation, where for the first time the United Nations commander agreed, at the request of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to abide by the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Conventions, few UN operations lent themselves to the applicability of international humanitarian law

Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series, February 1st–29th 2000. Published March 30th 2000

In This Issue Senegal Time for Change? 13863 Sudan Riek Machar Resigns 13867 DR Congo UN Operations 13872 Nigeria Kaduna Explodes 13875 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 13879 Sport CAN 2000 13889ContentsContinental Alignments 13858Internal Developments 13860National Security 13869Military 13882Overseas Relations 13886Social and Cultural 13888Rates 13868Index 13890

The soldier and the task: Austria's experience of preparing peacekeepers

Different kinds of peacekeeping missions require different kinds of training and, correspondingly, different kinds of soldiers to carry out the mission. An empirical study of the experience of Austrian soldiers participating in UN operations before and during the deployment in the former Yugoslavia (IFOR) and on the Golan Heights (UNDOF) sheds light on the fact that IFOR soldiers show a stronger military orientation. Military aspects within their motives for applying for UN peacekeeping service are stronger than that among UNDOF soldiers. Furthermore, they show no real interest in the culture and language of the country or region where they are going to be deployed. But, on the other hand, they rate their own military skills (including use of weapons) very highly and want to be seen as ‘real soldiers’ or ‘warriors for peace’ rather than as ‘peacekeepers’. The results of the study suggest improvements in preparation and training for peace support operations.

NGOs and UN peacekeeping operations: Strange bedfellows

This article examines the increased interaction between international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and UN peacekeeping operations in complex emergencies and civil conflicts. The involvement of NGOs in civil conflicts and the increased delegation of service delivery from states and institutions to NGOs has become a prevalent aspect of peacekeeping and peacebuilding exercise in the 1990s. The article reviews a number of the reasons for this development and argues that the increased involvement of NGOs in conflict situations has not always facilitated the resolution of conflicts or the implementation of UN mandates. The authors argue that NGOs will need to reassess their practices if they are to play a constructive role in UN operations in the future.

Soviet and Russian peacekeeping 1948–1998: Historical overview and assessment

In recent years, peacekeeping has involved up to 11,000 Russian personnel at any one time, and thus represents a significant new chapter in Russia's military history. It also provides a valuable gauge of Moscow's foreign and security policy and of its military capabilities. This article provides descriptive accounts of each operation in which Soviet and Russian troops have been involved: 13 UN missions (excluding successor missions and airlift support to 3 other UN operations), the multinational force in Bosnia, and four regional missions in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Details of deployment, command and control, peacekeeping activities, performance, and associated political developments are provided. In addition, the article assesses Russian peacekeeping practice in the context of international standards, in terms of consent of the parties, impartiality, use of force, numerical preponderance, command, and so on.

A framework for success: Contextual factors in the UNTAES operation in Eastern Slavonia

This article assesses the importance of a set of political, diplomatic and military factors which provided the context for shaping the set‐up, course and outcome of the UN operation in Croatia's Eastern Slavonia. This operation has been generally regarded as a particularly successful one, thanks to specifically favourable circumstances and actions taken by the sides involved. The conceptual and practical dimensions of ‘success’ are examined in the operation, and it is argued that the context of the operation, in its overall dynamics, contributed decisively to a successful completion of the mandate.

Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador. Edited by Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 428p. $64.95 cloth, $24.95 paper. - Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-box. By Sorpong Peou. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 358p. $60.00. - Casualties of the New World

Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador. Edited by Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 428p. 65.00. - Volume 92 Issue 3

On creating a united nations sanctions agency

This article proposes the establishment of a United Nations Sanctions Agency (UNSA) under the auspices of, and reporting to, the UN Security Council. The proposal expands on recent calls made by then UN Secretary‐General Boutros Boutros‐Ghali for a ‘mechanism’ to better assist the organization in managing UN sanctions policy, operations, monitoring and enforcement. While many obstacles admittedly exist to creating a UN Sanctions Agency, and it is a contentious proposal, the writer argues that it is nevertheless important to international relations theory and practice, since UN sanctions appear to be increasing in frequency as they undergird many of the Security Council's contemporary enforcement actions. Moreover, in cases of economic sanctions, institutions appear to be one of the most powerful mechanisms for overcoming collective‐action problems.

India and UN peacekeeping operations

In the context of post‐Cold War security structures, India is undergoing a major re‐evaluation of both its regional and global roles. In the past, participation in UN peacekeeping operations represented a significant means by which India could demonstrate both its Third World credentials and its continuing commitment to the ideals and ethos of the United Nations and the Non‐Aligned Movement. Since achieving independence in 1947, India has continually participated in UN operations in different parts of the world, and in varying capacities. The Indian solidarist objectives, however, have been superceded by their wider global ambition for. recognition and influence on the world stage. Although this should not necessarily be construed as the primary determinant for their post‐Cold War participation in UN peacekeeping operations, there has been cognisance in Indian foreign policy‐making circles of the potential kudos to be gained from such missions. However, this is likely to be tempered by a more cost‐effective approach on a case‐by‐case basis in the light of the operational difficulties of post‐Cold War missions and the lack of progress towards expansion of the Security Council and India's claim to a permanent seat.

More honoured in the breech: Consent and impartiality in the Cambodian peacekeeping operation

The expansion of post‐Cold War peacekeeping has met with variable success. The UN's operation in Cambodia from 1991 to 1993 (UNTAC) was no exception and has generated considerable interest. Progress was uneven from the beginning and rife with problems which undermined the chances of a favourable outcome. The electoral centrepiece defined UNTAC's success, but to examine the operation merely from this perspective is limiting. This article argues that some analyses of the UNTAC experience over‐emphasize the significance of the technical aspects of the operation — logistics, communication, training, material deployment ‐ and instead seeks to refocus attention on the critical loss of consent from the two core actors, the Phnom Penh government and the Khmers Rouges, and to evaluate the origins of this loss which severely hampered UNTAC's ability to implement its broad and sophisticated mandate. It further argues that in the case of the former, culpability lies with external intervention from the US Mission; and that in the case of the latter, UNTAC failed to comprehend the significance of the Khmers Rouges’ complaints regarding biases which distorted the attempts to neutralize the political environment in Cambodia prior to the elections. There are consequently important conclusions regarding consent and impartiality to be drawn which have received limited attention thus far.

Quitting Western Sahara

The stalemate in Western Sahara was the second casualty of a chronic disability of United Nations peacekeeping historically, and particularly of more complex transition operations recently. A link has been missing between the consent of warring parties to negotiated settlements and their behaviour on the ground, between the political decisions of the Security Council and operational instructions in the field. The UN has not developed coherent and comprehensive diplomatic, military and political strategies that are both legitimate and effective. Nor has it managed to generate genuine political will throughout the course of a peace process. To do so requires something of a joint monitoring cell attached to operations and composed of the parties, the UN and regional organisations, and a contact group of UN member states that can provide confidence and leverage. Bridging the missing link in Western Sahara at this late stage will be a vital experiment for the next phase of UN operations generally.

The issue of the military: UN demobilization, disarmament and reintegration in Southern Africa

This article will analyse the United Nations’ experience of demilitarization in southern Africa with reference to peacekeeping missions and the transition from emergency to developmental contexts. Three UN peace‐support operations in southern Africa ‐ the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) ‐ will be examined to assess the international organization's role. The article focuses on the importance of developing a regional approach to demilitarization; the imperative of co‐operation both within the UN itself and the international donor and non‐governmental organization (NGO) community as a whole; and the need to develop a greater understanding of the efficacy of ‘targeting’ demilitarization programmes towards ex‐combatants.

The space of peace-maintenance

Since receiving the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1988, United Nations peacekeeping operations have expanded, changed in many ways and encountered new, unexpected and difficult problems. This detailed analysis reviews the history, changing nature and current problems of UN peace-making and peace-maintaining activities, using a number of examples. It emphasizes the complex and ever-changing ideas and manoeuvering within the UN, particularly the Security Council and the Secretariat, during three distinct eras of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-maintenance, distinguished by their diplomatic, military or political character, respectively. UN operations in the Congo, Namibia, Cambodia and Somalia receive special attention, and UN objectives and methods are contrasted with those of Russia in its ‘near abroad’. The article concludes with specific recommendations for UN action and a warning that political operations must receive widespread and concrete support from the international community.

The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War, by Steven R. Ratner

As the United Nations passes its fiftieth anniversary, it has undergone a sea change in its approach toward peacekeeping. Originally a stopgap measure to preserve a cease-fire, peacekeeping has, since the waning of the Cold War, become a means to implement an agreed political solution to conflict between antagonists. Placed inside war-torn states, UN peacekeepers have encountered manifold new challenges through oversight of elections, protection of human rights, and reconstructing of governmental administration. In this study, Steven R. Ratner offers a comprehensive framework for scholars, policy-makers, and all those seeking to understand this new peacekeeping. He sees the UN as an administrator, mediator, and guarantor of political settlements - roles that can conflict when peace accords unravel, as is all too common. He describes the numerous actors, inside and outside the UN, who are engaged in this process, often with competing interests. And in historical review, beginning with the League of Nations, he reveals many striking precedents long before the 1990s. In the central case-study, Ratner applies his thesis to the most ambitious UN operation completed, the Cambodia mission of 1991-93. After reconstructing the process leading to the massive UN role, he reviews and appraises its performance, offering a sophisticated critique demonstrating the dangers of quick 'success' or 'failure' verdicts. With the experiences of those operations in mind, he concludes with a set of compelling recommendations for the UN's members.