UN Mission Research Articles

Peace by Pieces? Local Mediation and Sustainable Peace in the Central African Republic

The Central African Republic (CAR) has earned an undesirable reputation as one of the most troubled spots on earth. Many international and regional mediation efforts have attempted to resolve the conflict in CAR. Less discussed, however, are a multiplicity of local mediation efforts aiming to bring about tangible immediate change. This report focuses on these local efforts, looking at who is involved, the nature of the deals, and their prospects. It also asks whether these constitute new approaches to conflict resolution and discusses the links (or lack thereof) between the various mediation tracks in CAR. Lastly, it addresses the role that the UN, particularly the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSCA), ought to play in supporting or conducting these efforts. Based on this assessment, it offers several recommendations to the UN mission, the UN Secretariat, and the Security Council: - Explicitly make mediation support a priority: The Security Council should mandate MINUSCA to direct all the necessary resources to support local and national mediation initiatives. - Develop a mission–wide mediation support strategy: MINUSCA should adopt a whole-of-mission approach that explicitly connects support for local and national mediation initiatives. - Better leverage existing MINUSCA assets: UN leadership should leverage MINUSCA’s countrywide presence, military, and logistical capabilities in support of local mediation. - Build up appropriate human resources and skills: MINUSCA should be provided enhanced mediation expertise, mediation training for relevant staff, and increased resources for analysis. - Urge the government of CAR to take the lead in mediation and reconciliation efforts: The Security Council should encourage the government of CAR to shoulder its responsibilities. - Compel armed groups to shoulder responsibility: The Security Council should effectively implement sanctions and possibly impose new ones against armed group leaders responsible for fomenting violence. IPI would like to thank the governments of Finland and Norway for making this publication possible.

Human Rights Violations in Post-Conflict Areas as a Threat to Peace and Security: UN Mission in Kosovo

Human Rights Violations in Post Conflict Areas as a Threat to Peace and Security: a Mission in Kosovo

Beyond the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial

After a period of declining contributions, there are signs of a renewed UK interest in UN peacekeeping missions. In this article, Jonathan Marley examines the factors that are driving the UK’s current approach. While London may be seeking a greater role in UN missions, to act effectively it will need to signal its intent to international partners and update its practices.

An Unfinished Justice: How International Community Traded Justice for the Stability in Kosovo

Although, there is a considerable literature which analyzes the UN Mission in Kosovo from different perspectives, limited attention has been given to the mission’s contribution in confronting with war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo committed by the Milosevic regime against Kosovo Albanians during the 1998-1999. This article intends to provide a comprehensive analysis of international justice mechanisms – UNMIK and the ICTY – in dealing with the past injustices in Kosovo by identifying their flaws and shortcomings, as well as exploring factors that impacted their performance and effectiveness. By using the existing literature, international organizations’ reports, governmental documents, and media articles, the article argues that international community failed to deal with transitional justice issues in Kosovo – fighting impunity and delivering justice to victims as well as strengthening the rule of law and achieving reconciliation between the communities. In its endeavors to documenting the past crimes, international mechanisms relied mainly on retributive justice whilst ignoring restorative and reparation measures under justifications to preserving peace and stability in Kosovo. Regretfully, seventeen years after the war, justice in Kosovo remains an “unfinished business,” with a potential of negative implications to peace and reconciliation amongst the ethnic groups.

Al-Shabaab, Social Identity Group, Human (In)Security, and Counterterrorism

ABSTRACTThis article examines the link between human security, social identity, and al-Shabaab. The first section explores how social identity group theory can help explain al-Shabaab's recruitment. The second part focuses on the counterterrorism campaign against al-Shabaab, which involves decapitation, aggressive peacekeeping through a proxy in the shape of the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the role of a domestic de-radicalization program. The article concludes that al-Shabaab's allure is in decline and the group is facing internal turmoil, which makes its overtures toward the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant very dangerous, as al-Shabaab could act as an effective conduit between the Arabian Peninsula and Africa.

Reevaluating Peacekeeping Effectiveness: Does Gender Neutrality Inhibit Progress?

ABSTRACTSince the adoption of UNSCR 1325, more female peacekeepers are participating in peacekeeping missions than ever before. Nevertheless, the current literature on peacekeeping effectiveness is largely gender neutral, discounting the unique role female peacekeepers may play in peacekeeping operations. This article addresses this missing piece in the literature by assessing how female peacekeepers and locals view the role of women in peacekeeping operations. Using interviews and focus groups conducted with peacekeepers in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and original surveys conducted in Liberian communities, it finds that there is an “access gap” that prevents female peacekeepers from fully contributing to the mission’s operations and therefore prevents the peacekeeping mission from reaching its full potential. The findings have broader implications for how to improve peacekeeping missions’ effectiveness moving forward.

Al-Shabaab, Social Identity Group, Human (In)Security & U.S. Counterterrorism

This paper examines the link between human security, social identity and al-Shabaab and U.S. counterterrorism towards the Somali-based group. The aim is to show how al-Shabaab feeds on the anger of marginalized individuals which is then infused with al-Shabaab interpretation of Islam as a way to recruit disgruntled individuals. Nevertheless, it appears that Al-Shabaab’s allure is in decline, leading to the author to look at the U.S. counterterrorism campaign against al-Shabaab, which involves decapitation, aggressive peacekeeping through a proxy in the shape of the African Union Mission in Somalia, and domestic de-radicalisation program.

SUDAN: Darfur UN Mission Chief Summoned

Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural SeriesVolume 53, Issue 6 p. 21051B-21052A National Security SUDAN: Darfur UN Mission Chief Summoned First published: 18 July 2016 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2016.07131.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume53, Issue6July 2016Pages 21051B-21052A RelatedInformation

Jubaland: Somalia’s new security dilemma and state-building efforts

The creation of a buffer state aimed at providing a political and security zone is normally the initiative of powerful states within the region it is being established. Globalization has, however, placed buffer states at the centre of the new security dilemma creating national and transnational security risks that adversely impact on the capacity of neighbouring states to effectively perform their basic functions. The establishment of Somalia’s newest semi-autonomous region Jubaland, perceived as Kenya’s buffer zone, has created a new security dilemma for Somalia. This article examines the relationship between the creation of Jubaland and the national and transnational security risks it poses for Somalia’s state capacity building efforts. The mutually related national and transnational security risks examined emanate from the adverse effects of Somali clan/militia conflicts and Kenya Defence Forces operations in Jubaland as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia. These security risks have adversely impacted on state capacity and state autonomy hence hindering the ability of the collapsed Somali state to re-build itself and effectively provide political-military security.

Beyond the Shoe: Rethinking Khrushchev at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly

History tends to remember Soviet participation at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA, September 1960–April 1961) because of Nikita Khrushchev’s shoe. On October 13, 1960, the Soviet leader allegedly banged his shoe against his desk in the General Assembly hall to protest a speech he did not like.1 The incident is among the most well known in the history of the Cold War. However, despite the interest it has generated, Khrushchev’s conduct was the least important aspect of Soviet relations with the UN in 1960–61. This article reassesses Soviet participation at the Fifteenth Session of the GA in light of its medium- and long-term consequences for UN structure, practices, and vision. It also brings the issue of Moscow’s relations with UN members from the Third World, until now overlooked in the existing literature, into the story of this UN session. ... The Congo crisis was the key event that soured Soviet-UN relations in the second half of 1960. The USSR had been deeply involved in Congo since the early stages of the crisis, which was caused by foreign intervention and the attempted secession of a Congolese province in July 1960. Baffled by the West’s superior influence on the UN operation set up in Congo to address the crisis, the USSR attempted to change the balance of forces by trying to attract the support of the non-aligned bloc and reform the whole UN organization. The Fifteenth Session of the GA, which Khrushchev decided to attend in person, was meant to be the decisive moment. According to most of the existing literature, the plan did not succeed, and Khrushchev was reduced to banging his shoe in frustration. This view argues that the Afro-Asian countries remained indifferent to Khrushchev’s grievances and calls for reform, and thus did not support Soviet proposals to radically redesign the UN structure, notably by eliminating the post of Secretary-General (SG), and to change the way the UN mission operated in Congo, reducing Western influence.2 In his recent book on the USSR and the UN, Ilya V. Gaiduk writes that “Khrushchev’s plans to get rid of [UN Secretary-General Dag] Hammarskjöld and to change the UN policy in the Congo and elsewhere, while gaining the newly independent countries’ sympathies for Moscow’s position, failed abjectly.”3 Lise Namikas supports a more balanced view in her book on the Congo crisis. She maintains that the United States largely succeeded in using the UN “to achieve its own goals in the Congo,” but she concedes that the UN operation in Congo “allowed a degree of influence that Moscow lacked in Africa previously, and for that Khrushchev should be given credit.”4

Target Gutahuka: The UN’s Strategic Information Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo

This paper examines the nature and impacts of two information intervention radio programmes broadcast on Radio Okapi—the radio service of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. A matched randomization technique was used to assign Rwandan Hutus and Congolese autochthons in South Kivu to listen to either of the two programmes within their naturalistic contexts for 13 months. At the end of the treatment, participants’ perceptions of barriers to peace; descriptive and prescriptive interventions; victimhood and villainity; opportunities for personal development and civic engagement; and knowledge of repatriation processes were assessed in 16 focus groups across four contexts. The study concludes that international media intervention programmes that provide robust information and a platform for objective analyses within a multiple narrative and participatory framework can enhance greater engagement with nascent democratic reforms, positive perception of long term opportunities for personal development and empathy with the ethnic Other.

Albanian peacekeepers: exploring the inward-looking utility of international peacekeeping

ABSTRACTThis article provides the first comprehensive account of Albania’s contribution to international peacekeeping and explores its inward-looking rationales for providing peacekeepers. Specifically, we examine why Albania has energetically supported NATO- and EU-led military and crisis management operations and less so UN peacekeeping missions. We find that Albania’s contribution to peacekeeping operations has been primarily shaped by its inward-looking interests for accelerating membership in NATO, fostering integration in the EU, as well as reducing domestic and regional insecurities. Pinpointing accurately the motivations among troop-contributing states helps recover the true hierarchical order of rationales and explain why, in some cases, the performance and impact of peacekeeping operations for some contributing states is secondary. Overall, disentangling the inward-looking utility of peacekeeping by a small state such as Albania provides useful insights for understanding how regional integration dynamics affect peacekeeping.

Human Rights–Based Policing to Foster Demilitarization

In January 2016, news reports indicated that the terrorist group Al Shabab had attacked the military base housing Kenyan Defense Forces, which were in Kismayu as part of the African Union's Mission...

Minimizing civilian harm in populated areas: Lessons from examining ISAF and AMISOM policies

AbstractBoth the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's security assistance mission to Afghanistan – have recognized the importance of reducing civilian harm, and adopted policies and practices that restrict the use of certain weapons in populated areas. ISAF commanders issued a number of tactical directives that restricted the use of certain air-delivered weapons, and AMISOM developed an indirect fire policy limiting the use of artillery and other indirect fire munitions in populated areas. This article examines both ISAF and AMISOM policies and practices to reduce civilian harm in populated areas and explores how these policies strengthened adherence to international humanitarian law and illustrated new ways in which armed actors can take feasible precautions and prioritize civilian protection.

Fragmented Peacekeeping: The African Union in Somalia

From uncertain beginnings, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has grown, over almost ten years, into the regional organisation's largest peace-support operation. Bolstered by a multilayered mission architecture through which the UN and bilateral donors provide financial, logistical and technical support, it has achieved important gains against the jihadi Islamist organisation Al-Shabaab. The apparent viability of these partnerships has seen AMISOM hailed as a successful model of collaboration between regional and international structures. Peter Albrecht and Cathy Haenlein examine a less-studied dimension of this model, namely the intersection of these arrangements with the structural fragmentation that has increasingly come to define the mission.

Building a more competent security sector: The case of UNMIL and the Liberian National Police

ABSTRACTIncreasingly UN peacekeeping missions are helping to implement security sector reforms (SSR), including gender reforms, targeted at the local police of host countries. This study uses the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Liberian National Police (LNP) as a way to explore whether SSR may have helped improve individual officers' professional and gender competencies. Conducting a novel lab-in-the-field experiment, we test the individual competencies of 612 LNP officers, also analysing possible determinants of these competencies. We find that most officers have knowledge about statutory crimes and evidence gathering, most officers participate in group activities, almost half are aware of gendered crimes and that male and female officers are equally competent. However, our results suggest that the reforms are at the nascent stages of working, and that more focus should be put into basic training and gender mainstreaming in the Liberian National Police, especially as new recruits are added.

Why Germany Won’t Be Dropping Bombs on Syria, Iraq or Mali

Following the Paris terrorist attacks of November 2015, Germany's Angela Merkel promised “to give France every support” in its war against jihadi terrorist groups, affirming that the “the Islamic State must be fought militarily.” After considerable debate, the Bundestag approved the deployment of German forces to the Middle East, Mali, and elsewhere, leading some to claim that Germany has set aside its reservations regarding the utility of force. A closer look at German contributions to UN and NATO missions from the 1990s through 2016 reveals, however, that Germany continues to draw a red line in terms of coercive airpower and direct combat operations. This reluctance stems from its interpretation of the past, demonstrating that constructivist approaches to strategic culture remain valid.

Contact Dilemma: The Malady of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Troops

The collapse of Somali Government in the early 1990s left the state in the hands of predatory war lords who wrecked the country into havoc. The country has remained in a state of violent conflict for nearly over two decades. Intervention of United Nations Operations in Somalia failed to meet its objectives leaving the vulnerable population at the mercy of warlords when it finally withdrew its troops from the war torn nation. Despite the efforts of AMISOM troops to degrade the capability of Al Shabaab, little has been achieved. The militant group seems to be attacking the troops with vigour and renewed strength. With new barbaric counterinsurgency tactics, the terror group is regaining holds in the previously liberated regions. The soldiers tend to flee when they get engagements with Al Shabaab. They are unable to hold and suppress the firepower during contact. Consequently, the soldiers go into a flight mode turning their defensive position into a rout. This act is proving to be catastrophic to the mission since it occasions fatalities to the troops. Some who miss in action get lost into the hostile enemy territory. It is in this context that the study reports ways in which this malady can be curbed through the lens of contact dilemma.

Four Conflicts : Four Mandates Comparative Analysis of the Conflicts and Mandates of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Western Sahara, Angola, Namibia and Central African Republic

During the 20th century, the United Nations led several peacekeeping missions into Africa, where civil wars and armed conflicts among states have followed each other. These conflicts differed in many aspects from each other, and the UN tried to give several answers to heal the conflicts. This essay attempts to present and compare these conflicts and the UN missions through the case of three states and a colony, Angola, Namibia, the Central African Republic, and Western Sahara.

The African Union's role in peacekeeping: building on lessons learned from security operations

Introduction 1. Conceptual Framework and Some Background Issues 2. The Rise of African Union Regionalism 3. The African Peace and Security Architecture 4. The African Mission in Burundi 5. The African Union Mission in Somalia 6. The African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Conclusions: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why?