Ultimate Happiness Research Articles

Albertus Magnus über die felicitas contemplativa als die Erfüllung eines natürlichen Strebens nach Wissen

One of Albert the Great’s dearest concerns throughout his career was the question of the good; the good which humans naturally desire and which culminates in ultimate happiness. In his earliest work, tellingly entitled De natura boni, Albert’s interest principally concerns epistemological and practical questions: How can we know wherein the good consists? How can we acquire it? Under what circumstances may we lose it and what is necessary to reacquire it? In this initial context, Albert relies on the Augustinian conception that the desired good lies in the “Good of all goods” (De trin. VII.3) and that its attainment in this contingent world takes place almost exclusively through moral conduct. With the inception of appropriating Aristotle’s complete Nicomachean Ethics, however, Albert’s conception of the good undergoes a fundamental shift. Based on an intellectualist anthropology according to which the human being is “solely intellect”, Albert advances the intellectual virtues as necessary condition for a...

THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION: GOAL AND JOURNEY

AbstractThis article explores resources within the Christian theological tradition that recognize happiness in earthly life while also preparing Christians for ultimate happiness through union with God. Two resources explored in the article are the appreciation of happiness in Jesus's ministry and its engagement with Greek philosophy. After exploring these resources, the article turns to Aelred of Rievaulx, the great medieval theologian, to investigate how moral virtue, transcendent happiness, and earthly pleasure are harmonious parts of a holistic Christian vision of happiness. Finally, after examining Aelred's contribution, the article considers how this integrated view of happiness can help us to think through the problems of happiness in our lives today.

Reading Androgynous Leadership in Fairy Tales

This paper examines the concept of androgynous leadership, regarding fairy tales and a modern cultural product that has links with traditional fairy tales. ‘Androgynous leadership’ has been defined in diverse and often conflicting ways. In this paper; it is basically seen as being the inner ability for one to understand diverse (often conflicting) desires and aspects within oneself, to make a balance among them, and to achieve inner peace and integrity, although that peace and integrity is understood as a fluctuating and ongoing process rather than a permanent and fixed state. This concept of androgyny is a recurring motif that can be discovered in fairy tales, which are the oldest forms of stories in history. This paper focuses on ‘The Goose Girl’ and ‘Brother and Sister’, two of the older and simpler fairy tales from the Grimm collection, and on the film Shrek. The main character in ‘The Goose Girl’ shows a correspondence between her femininity and masculinity, and the importance of balancing femininity and masculinity for a person’s ultimate happiness. In ‘Brother and Sister’, the sister and the brother illustrate cooperation between the Freudian concepts of the id and the ego, as well as the development of the super-ego. Shrek is full of images and motifs of androgyny in terms of plot, characters, images, and settings.

Humanoid robots as “The Cultural Other”: are we able to love our creations?

Robot enthusiasts envision robots will become a “race unto themselves” as they cohabit with the humankind one day. Profound questions arise surrounding one of the major areas of research in the contemporary world—that concerning artificial intelligence. Fascination and anxiety that androids impose upon us hinges on how we come to conceive of the “Cultural Other.” Applying the notion of the “other” in multicultural research process, we will explore how the “Other” has been used to illustrate values and theories about robots, as a mirror for the self. In this paper, we focus on the social, cultural, and religious implications of humans’ attitudes toward relationships between humans with robots. Six major views on humanoid robots are proposed: (1) robots as the “Frightening Other,” (2) robots as the “Subhuman Other,” (3) robots as the “Human Substitute,” (4) robots as the “Sentient Other,” (5) robots as the “Divine Other,” and (6) robots as the “Co-evolutionary Path to Immortality.” The likely and preferable scenario is the last one, which is compatible with an optimistic posthuman world in our evolutionary future. We imagine whether humans will meet the challenge of loving all living and non-living beings (including mechanical entities) might be the key to the co-evolution of both species and the ultimate happiness.

Thomas Aquinas and his criticism of Avempace's theory of the intellect

The article deals with Aquinas' relation to Avempace's theory of intellect, especially with his criticism of the conception of agent intellect as presented by Avempace. The author examines the parts of Aquinas' works where he rejects Avempace's theory of coniunctio as a union with the divine realm and Avempace's identification of imagination with intellect. The criticism is founded on the background of Aquinas' discussion with Averroism. The second part of the article deals with Aquinas' criticism of Avempace's theory of speculative sciences, which consist of he problem whether the ultimate happiness of man is to understand the separate substances. Aquinas criticizes the theory according to which through the pursuit of the speculative sciences man comes to the understanding of separate substances from the sensible things. Aquinas is very sceptical of this opinion and he strictly follows Aristotle's emphasis on senses and phantasms. The only things a human being can know in the speculative sciences are those that are grounded within the range of naturally known principles. The author shows the metaphysical presuppositions of Aquinas and Avempace which are momentous for the understanding of the different interpretations of Aristotle.

Gadamer's Praise of Theory: Aristotle's Friend and the Reciprocity Between Theory and Practice

Gadamer's rethinking of the interconnection of theory and practice can lead to a resolution of the debate in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship regarding the priority of theory or practice in Aristotle's Ethics. This is especially true in light of Aristotle's treatment of friendship which, as I will try to show, provides support for Gadamer's claim. In Aristotle's notion of friendship, theory and practice come together, and the activity of friendship is for Aristotle the highest expression of human life precisely because true friendship requires the unity of theory and practice. I argue that Aristotle's sense of eωρια, contemplation, his sense of ultimate happiness that is constituted by the life of theory, is conceived by Aristotle in a thoroughly practical and political sense. Specifically I claim that the practice of theory is the politics of friendship.

On Bad Actions, Good Intentions, and Loving God: Three Much-Misunderstood Issues About the Happy Life that St. Thomas Aquinas Clarifies For Us

Romanus Cessario, O.P. On Bad Actions, Good Intentions, and Loving God: Three MuchMisunderstood Issues About the Happy Life that St.Thomas Aquinas Clarifies For Us INTRODUCTION: "HEAVEN ON EARTH, HEAVEN IN FAITH" The expression, "Heaven on earth, Heaven in faith" comes from the pen of Blessed Elizabeth of theTrinity (1880-1906). The words describe the overall theme ofa ten-day retreat diat she composed shortly before her death for die benefit ofher younger sister, Marguerite, known as Guite (1883-?), who was a housewife and mother of two children.1 It might seem odd to begin a talk about Aquinas's teaching on the happy life by turning back to a cloistered nun ofCarmel who died an early deatii at the beginning ofthe present century. Still, Elizabeth oftheTrinity, I believe, illumines what Christians believe about the ultimate happiness of the human person . That is, she reminds us about our true goal or end. Her message is simple: Heaven is our goal. For Elizabeth, a woman who dedicated her adult life to prayer and sacrifice in union with Christ, the happy life is one that rests only in God. Logos 1:2 1997 On Bad Actions, Good Intentions, and Loving Godjgj In my view, Elizabeth's spiritual writings can help our contemporaries better realize what makes for a happy human life. And they must understand tiiis. For without taking account of what makes us happy, no one is able to provide a compelling account of the Christian moral life. Again, Elizabeth's message is a simple one: God makes us happy. But there's more. The Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is enormously generous to his adopted children. To die extent that the Christian believer lives the truth here and now, he or she does not have to wait until deatii in order to experience die happiness of God. Rather, through faith, heaven begins right here on earth. We see, then, that Elizabeth's final retreat prepares us for the already and die not-yet: "Heaven on Earth, Heaven in Faith." Since God's own knowledge about himself grounds die truth about the moral life, moral theology is an exercise closely associated widi the tiieological virtue offaith. I sometimes tell my students that the study ofmoral theology enables one to discover "how God knows the world to be." Of course, I mean by "world" die properly human world of our beliefs and desires, our intentions and actions. You may recognize a particularly Dominican emphasis in this way of expressing what moral theology is about. We are looking for the truth about God's creative knowledge ofdie world. For, as the English DominicanThomas Gilby once said, "the ratio which measures moral action is the manifestation of God's mind in revelation , the Logos, not just a rule that can be discovered by rational reflection on experience."2 Good moral theology, then, describes a happy life tiiat God himselfmakes happy, and so a life that conforms fully to the requirements ofthe Gospel. This explains why Aquinas refers to the "nova lex Evangelo"—the new law ofthe Gospel, a term that Luther, we are told, avoided.3 We can express Aquinas's position another way. Moral theology defines the "truth oflife." Since truth is known only by the intellect , the moral theologian should be less occupied widi discerning, let alone looking for ways to enforce, the dictates ofthe divine will, 102 Logos and more concerned to discover the rule and measure for human actions that have their origin in the divine intelligence.4 Our own experience affirms this: die truth persuades; tiireats paralyze. Studying the history oftheology reveals, moreover, that voluntarist ethics are notoriously unsuccessful. Much, for instance, that Luther objected to in late medieval scholasticism stems from the truncated andiropology of the nominalist theologians. To the extent, however, that the divine rule and measure (regula et mensura ), which is properly associated with the Eternal Logos, governs human actions, our lives reflect the truth or rectitude that is common in all the virtues and to which die Gospel commits us. The question ofhow one achieves this rectitude oflife—rechtfertigung or justification—should not be confused widi what actually constitutes this state as one...

Democracy and the Individual

The mere combination of the names of John Dewey and Friedrich Nietzsche in the title of an essay might offend some readers. Many of the scholars of American pragmatism I have met view Nietzsche as just one more of those Continental, postmodern philosophers whose work, while perhaps stylish and currently en vogue, contributes little of value to philosophy because the issues with which they concern themselves in no way connect with the lives of the most people. The reaction of many scholars of Continental philosophy I know to American pragmatism has been to dismiss it as concerned only with utility narrowly conceived, e.g., with the usefulness of an idea for making money, ensuring that parking places are available at work, securing good health care, etc.1 I do not want to suggest that members of the two philosophical camps are always or necessarily antagonistic toward one other-certainly there are some who find the intersection of Continental philosophy and American pragmatism to be fruitful.2 Nonetheless, the relationship between scholars of American pragmatism and Continental philosophy is often cool, if not, at times, openly hostile. Thus to claim, as I will here, that Dewey and Nietzsche have much in common and, furthermore, that the work of Dewey continues and perhaps even improves upon that of Nietzsche probably seems at best provocative, at worst ridiculous.3 After all, the principal aim of Dewey's work seems to be to support and promote everything Nietzsche abhorred: a humanistic, liberal democracy that has the goal of helping humans find ways to eliminate suffering in their lives. As an acquaintance at a recent meeting of the APA remarked, connecting Nietzsche and American pragmatist William James might be plausible, but not Nietzsche and Dewey. A friend and Nietzsche scholar even went so far as to claim that Dewey's pragmatist is Nietzsche's Indeed, with only a glance, Dewey's program of pragmatic democracy does appear much like that of the described by Nietzsche in Beyond Good And Evil and the last, or ultimate, man described by Zarathustra: These falsely so-called spirits--being eloquent and prolifically scribbling slaves of the democratic taste and its modern ideas; they are all human beings without solitude.... What they would like to strive for with all their powers is the universal green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and an easier life for everyone. . .4 The earth has become small, and upon it hops the Ultimate Man, who makes everything small. ... We have discovered happiness, say the Ultimate Men and blink. They have left the places where living was hard: for one needs warmth.... They still quarrel, but they soon make up otherwise indigestion would result.5 The levelers and last men are primarily characterized by their inability to overcome themselves. They shun the danger, pain and turmoil of the sacrifice of themselves that is necessary for the birth of the Ubermensch. They are not strong enough to produce greatness out of themselves, and so they make out of their weakness and call rest, peace, and security humanity's ultimate happiness.6 If it is true that Dewey's pragmatism excludes self-transformation and extols the virtues of uninterrupted calmness and security, then Dewey indeed offers the democratic ideals of the last man. However, as we will see, Dewey's pragmatist is much closer to Nietzsche's free spirit than to the last man, and Dewey's promotion of democracy need not obscure this connection. The democracy that Nietzsche rejects is not the same democracy that Dewey endorses.7 Dewey's democratic pragmatism is characterized by what Dewey calls reconstruction, and reconstruction, particularly as applied to the self, is a type of selftransformation remarkably similar to the selfovercoming described by Nietzsche.8 My exploration of the connections between Nietzsche and Dewey will be composed of the following four parts. …

Descent to the Cave

Considerable controversy in recent decades has centered on the question of why the philosopher in Plato's Republic would condescend to participate in politics. The traditional view is that philosophers rule from a general obligation to the city in which they live, a specific duty to the kallipolis which educated them or an acknowledgement of “the rule of reason as the primary and natural imperative.” However, if the ultimate happiness of the philosopher consists in a contemplative life divorced from politics, then the justice of the city which demands that philosophers rule conflicts with the psychic harmony of the individual philosopher. The analogy between justice in the state and in the individual soul breaks down as justice in the state demands functions of the philosopher for which he has no inclination or expertise. The just rule of reason is possible for individuals but impossible for states, unless philosophers can be required to meet their obligation to rule.

The Gulag Archipelago: From Inferno to Paradiso

The Gulag Archipelago: From Inferno to Paradiso

The University and the City

T IS a peculiar honor for one who was born in the country, who has a haunting memory of the boundless prairies and the virgin fields he plowed (his Horace strapped to the beam to read at the furrow's end while the cranes of Ibycus went cronking overhead), who is such a devotee of the open road rather than the city street that the New York Sun once called him a pulverulent vagrant with a penchant for schoolhouses -it is an honor as well as an embarrassment, having still what the psychologists call the rural complex, to speak in the city; but less difficult because the memory of James Whitcomb Riley still keeps this city of hundreds of thousands near the country. I was one time introduced at Chicago as a son of Illinois, and wishing to show them my interest in agricultural affairs I told them a story that Mr. Wiley, of the Department of Agriculture, had told me: that in one of the semiarid regions they planted onions and potatoes in alternate rows, and the onions, Samson onions, were so strong that they brought water to the eyes of the potatoes and irrigated the land about. I was referred to later as a gentleman from New York. But my roots are still out here on the prairies, in the Valley of Democracy, as Meredith Nicholson called it, taking the title which I gave himand which he admits. I have not come as the prophet Jonah to cry against the city. I have come to speak of the city's crowning glory, remembering that the apocalyptic vision of the place of ultimate happiness is pictured in the Book of Revelation not as a southern orange grove in winter, nor as a seaside resort or mountain retreat in summer, but as a city-a city, to be sure, of spotless cleanliness and extraordinary beauty,

Some Literary Aspects of the Absence of Tragedy in the Classical Sanskrit Drama

EVERYONE who is acquainted with Sanskrit dramatic literature is aware that one of the most striking characteristics of the so-called classical drama is the absence of a tragic ending. The discovery of the manuscripts of the thirteen plays attributed to Bhdsa proves that this was not true of the older dramas, as some of them are real tragedies. But this fact only makes more puzzling and more interesting the problem of the consistercy with which the later dramatists avoided the tragic ending. In a number of the later plays there are many distressing occurrences during the progress of the action, but there is never any tragedy in the sense of calamity which remains at the close of the last act. There are near approaches to this but the tragic outcome is always prevented by the timiely assistance of a friend or the intervention of the gods. As Dr. Lindenau has pointed out in his Bhdsa-Studien,1 there must have been known to Bhdsa a form of the Ndtya-Sastra older than the recension we have. In this older form the strict rules concerning the happy ending were probably lacking. In the Bhdrata known to us, however, and in other dramaturgical works, the rules on this point of avoiding an unhappy ending are very definite and they were very strictly followed by the classical dramatists. The text-books of dramaturgy, as we have them, in giving the different conclusions which a play might have, seem to make no provision for anything opposed to the ultimate happiness of the hero and heroine,2 and it is distinctly stated that the death of the hero or principal person should not occur anywhere in the play.3