Democracy and the Individual

Abstract

The mere combination of the names of John Dewey and Friedrich Nietzsche in the title of an essay might offend some readers. Many of the scholars of American pragmatism I have met view Nietzsche as just one more of those Continental, postmodern philosophers whose work, while perhaps stylish and currently en vogue, contributes little of value to philosophy because the issues with which they concern themselves in no way connect with the lives of the most people. The reaction of many scholars of Continental philosophy I know to American pragmatism has been to dismiss it as concerned only with utility narrowly conceived, e.g., with the usefulness of an idea for making money, ensuring that parking places are available at work, securing good health care, etc.1 I do not want to suggest that members of the two philosophical camps are always or necessarily antagonistic toward one other-certainly there are some who find the intersection of Continental philosophy and American pragmatism to be fruitful.2 Nonetheless, the relationship between scholars of American pragmatism and Continental philosophy is often cool, if not, at times, openly hostile. Thus to claim, as I will here, that Dewey and Nietzsche have much in common and, furthermore, that the work of Dewey continues and perhaps even improves upon that of Nietzsche probably seems at best provocative, at worst ridiculous.3 After all, the principal aim of Dewey's work seems to be to support and promote everything Nietzsche abhorred: a humanistic, liberal democracy that has the goal of helping humans find ways to eliminate suffering in their lives. As an acquaintance at a recent meeting of the APA remarked, connecting Nietzsche and American pragmatist William James might be plausible, but not Nietzsche and Dewey. A friend and Nietzsche scholar even went so far as to claim that Dewey's pragmatist is Nietzsche's Indeed, with only a glance, Dewey's program of pragmatic democracy does appear much like that of the described by Nietzsche in Beyond Good And Evil and the last, or ultimate, man described by Zarathustra: These falsely so-called spirits--being eloquent and prolifically scribbling slaves of the democratic taste and its modern ideas; they are all human beings without solitude.... What they would like to strive for with all their powers is the universal green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and an easier life for everyone. . .4 The earth has become small, and upon it hops the Ultimate Man, who makes everything small. ... We have discovered happiness, say the Ultimate Men and blink. They have left the places where living was hard: for one needs warmth.... They still quarrel, but they soon make up otherwise indigestion would result.5 The levelers and last men are primarily characterized by their inability to overcome themselves. They shun the danger, pain and turmoil of the sacrifice of themselves that is necessary for the birth of the Ubermensch. They are not strong enough to produce greatness out of themselves, and so they make out of their weakness and call rest, peace, and security humanity's ultimate happiness.6 If it is true that Dewey's pragmatism excludes self-transformation and extols the virtues of uninterrupted calmness and security, then Dewey indeed offers the democratic ideals of the last man. However, as we will see, Dewey's pragmatist is much closer to Nietzsche's free spirit than to the last man, and Dewey's promotion of democracy need not obscure this connection. The democracy that Nietzsche rejects is not the same democracy that Dewey endorses.7 Dewey's democratic pragmatism is characterized by what Dewey calls reconstruction, and reconstruction, particularly as applied to the self, is a type of selftransformation remarkably similar to the selfovercoming described by Nietzsche.8 My exploration of the connections between Nietzsche and Dewey will be composed of the following four parts. …