Types Of Reciprocity Research Articles

Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments

Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism-costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks.

The development of intention-based sociomoral judgment and distribution behavior from a third-party stance

The current study investigated children’s intention-based sociomoral judgments and distribution behavior from a third-party stance. An actor puppet showed either positive or negative intention toward a target puppet, which had previously performed a prosocial or antisocial action toward others (i.e., children witnessed various types of indirect reciprocity). Children (3- and 5-year-olds) were asked to make sociomoral judgments and to distribute resources to the actor puppet. Results showed that 5-year-olds were more likely than 3-year-olds to be influenced by intention when they made their judgment and distributed resources. The target’s previous actions affected only 5-year-olds’ intent-based social preference. These results suggest that children’s judgments about intent-based indirect reciprocity develop from ages 3 to 5 years.

Morality, sharing and change among the Ngaju people in Central Kalimantan

The article discusses the morality of sharing and how morality and values go hand in hand with certain forms of transfers among the Ngaju people in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. More precisely it examines interaction between a climate change mitigation project and the Ngaju Dayaks. Ngaju Dayaks living along the Kahayan River have practiced hunting, and gathering different forest products and shifting cultivation for centuries. Hunted game brought back to their community was shared with people nearby as well as some other forest products or rice harvest to the family or close kin. Ngaju also engaged in both market and non-market exchange. Earlier anthropological discussions on sharing treated sharing as a type of reciprocity, but more recently anthropologists have debated whether sharing is a transactional form in its own right or a part of reciprocal transactions. Sharing suggests and supports the values of autonomy and non-accumulation of wealth, while exchange creates dependencies and thus hierarchical relations. This article shows that sharing may acceptably turn into exchange in certain circumstances, which makes it a much more complicated and conflated concept than the idea of sharing as a completely separate transaction would suggest.

Reciprocal Tariff Reductions Under Asymmetric Bargaining Power

AbstractIncreasing heterogeneity of participants that form the basis of WTO trade negotiations has raised concerns about unfair treatment of weak countries due to their lack of bargaining power. The WTO responds to these concerns by arguing that the institutional design with its specific rules such as the principle of reciprocity serves to reduce inequalities in bargaining power by giving smaller (weaker) countries more voice. A recent study has challenged this result for a particular type of reciprocity, namely the volume approach. Given the wide discretion of how reciprocal concessions are conducted, I give a more complete picture of how different kinds of reciprocity affect the bargaining outcome of asymmetric countries. It turns out that, while the volume approach amplifies the negative effects of power asymmetries, a tariff formula approach has the ability to reverse this effect. For low symmetries, the Swiss formula does the best job, whereas for larger power differences, a linear formula is best suited to reduce the impact of power asymmetries.

Disrespect in Online Deliberation: Inducing Factors and Democratic Potentials

Los investigadores en el campo de la deliberacion conciben el respeto como un componente clave de intercambio democratico de razones. Sin embargo, en los debates publicos prolifera el irrespeto, especialmente cuando son observadas las discusiones online contemporaneas. El presente articulo pretende investigar los factores que promueven el irrespeto en debates online. Tambien tiene como objetivo analizar si la existencia de algunas declaraciones irrespetuosas pueden contribuir a la deliberacion. Finalmente, algunos tipos de irrespetopueden ser utiles para el debate publico, en ciertas ocasiones, en la medida en que pueden inducir reciprocidad y generar movilizacion discursiva. Por ende, este estudio analiza 1.281 comentarios sobre el matrimonio gay en Brasil, que fueron publicados en YouTube y en paginas web de noticias. El analisis revela: (1) la relacion entre la falta de respeto es un tipo especifico de reciprocidad; (2) una asociacion entre el irrespeto y el anonimato: (3) una correlacion entre el irrespeto y la utilizacion de marcos religiosos. Estos resultados sugieren: (1) la importancia de disgregar las variables normalmente asociadas a una “buena deliberacion”; (2) la relacion entre reciprocidad y respeto; (3) la proteccion ofrecida por el anonimato para expresiones de ira; y (4) la tension, propuesta primero por Papacharissi (2004), entre la cortesia y la incivilidad.

Disrespect in Online Deliberation: Inducing Factors and Democratic Potentials

Deliberative scholars conceive of respect as a key component of a democratic exchange of reasons. However, disrespect abounds in public debates, especially if one looks at contemporary online discussions. This article seeks to investigate the factors that foster disrespect in online debates. It also aims at analyzing if the existence of some disrespectful utterances can contribute to deliberation. After all, some types of disrespect may be useful to public debate on certain occasions, in the extent to which they may induce reciprocity and engender discursive mobilization. In order to do so, the article analyzes 1,281 comments about same-sex marriage in Brazil, which were posted in Youtube and in news websites. The analysis points to: (1) a relationship between disrespect and one specific type of reciprocity; (2) a strong association between disrespect and anonymity; and (3) a correlation between disrespect and the use of religious frames. These results suggest: (1) the importance to disaggregate variables usually associated to "good deliberation"; (2) the relation between reciprocity and respect; (3) the protection anonymity offers to expressions of anger; and (4) the tension, first pointed by Papacharissi (2004) between politeness and incivility.

Social-Aware Video Multicast Based on Device-to-Device Communications

To meet the explosive demand on delivering high-definition video steams over cellular networks, we design a So cial-aware video multi Cast (SoCast) system leveraging device-to-device (D2D) communications. One salient feature of SoCast is to stimulate effective cooperation among mobile users (clients), by making use of two types of important social ties, i.e., social trust and social reciprocity. By using SoCast, clients form groups to obtain missing packets from other clients and restore incomplete video frames, according to the unique video encoding structure. In return, the user perception of the mobile video quality can be substantially improved. Specifically, we first cast the problem of social ties based group formation among clients for cooperative video multicast as a coalitional game, and then devise a distributed algorithm to obtain the core solution (group formation) for the formulated coalitional game. Further, a resource allocation scheme is proposed for the base station to handle D2D radio resource requests from client groups. Extensive numerical studies using real video traces corroborate the significant gain using SoCast.

Propensity for reciprocity among frontline employees

Purpose This paper aims to examine how other-regarding personality traits relate to reciprocity among frontline employees (FLEs). Design/methodology/approach Other-regarding personality variables were used to model the propensity for reciprocity and actual reciprocal behaviors with coworkers. Surveys of 276 FLEs were examined via structural equations modeling. Findings Other-regarding personality traits proved to be antecedents of reciprocity. Cynicism was particularly interesting in that it was positively related to reciprocity contrary to findings in other research. Research limitations/implications Among the interesting findings relating personality to reciprocity are a more affective type of reciprocity based on empathy and altruism, and a more calculative type based on cynicism related to Machiavellianism. Practical implications Managers can use the effects of personality traits on reciprocity and cooperation to hire and place FLEs in ways that provide superior service and increased profits. Social implications This paper indicates that certain individuals who might not typically be thought of as cooperative can in fact reciprocate. Specific ideas about cynicism and Machiavellian reciprocity in FLEs are discussed. Originality/value The findings will aid researchers and managers in understanding personality and FLEs cooperation. The findings on cynicism are particularly valuable in that they contradict some earlier research and commonly held managerial ideas.

Exploring commitment in peer-to-peer exchanges: the case of timebanks

ABSTRACTDespite the growing trend of peer-to-peer (P2P) exchanges, there is a lack of studies that examine the determinants of the relationship between exchanging partners and the role of commitment in particular. This is especially necessary as P2P exchanges enact a different type of reciprocity from that of ‘business-to-consumers’. Thus, exploring P2P exchanges allows a better understanding of the drivers of commitment and the relationship of commitment with reciprocity. This qualitative and exploratory study examines the case of timebanks (TBs). Drawing from 40 in-depth interviews with TB managers and users along with participant observation, this study finds that commitment is a complex and multidimensional construct that may vary drastically depending on the distinct foci of commitment, the dual roles that users perform (as providers or as recipients), the type of exchange system and the notion of reciprocity underlying the exchange system.

Product development as reading and writing doings within sociotechnical practices: the reciprocity between engineers and artefacts

This ethnographic study aims at understanding how product development of wind turbine controls unfolds as ongoing engineer-artefact reciprocity. We adopt a Deweyan constructionist and Science-Technology-Society approach to contribute to product development and sociomaterial studies by emphasising the role of reciprocity between engineers' experience and artefacts through reading and writing doings. Reading doings involve texts such as specifications, minutes, sketches and components. Writing doings create/modify the same type of texts. In one project, convergent reciprocity enabled the development. Another project's development was blocked, restarted and completed internally at the producer. Enablers included repositioning of working practices, application of various artefacts/tools, heterogeneous engineers and creation of common ground. Constraints involved lack of openness, too malleable artefacts, no common ground and radical change of the development trajectory. The engineers' learning depends on these constraints and enablers. Three types of reciprocity occur: convergent, faded away and blocked.

Reciprocity, fairness and learning in medium access control games

In wireless communication systems users compete for communication opportunities through a medium access control protocol. Previous research has shown that selfish behavior in medium access games could lead to inefficient and unfair resource allocation. We introduce a new notion of reciprocity in a medium access game and derive the corresponding Nash equilibrium. Further, using mechanism design we show that this type of reciprocity can remove unfair/inefficient equilibrium solutions.The best response learning method for the reciprocity game framework is studied. It demonstrates that the game converges to the unique and stable Nash equilibrium if the nodes have low collision costs or high psychological sensitivity. For symmetric games the converged Nash equilibrium turns out to be the fair strategy.

Two distinct neural mechanisms underlying indirect reciprocity

Cooperation is a hallmark of human society. Humans often cooperate with strangers even if they will not meet each other again. This so-called indirect reciprocity enables large-scale cooperation among nonkin and can occur based on a reputation mechanism or as a succession of pay-it-forward behavior. Here, we provide the functional and anatomical neural evidence for two distinct mechanisms governing the two types of indirect reciprocity. Cooperation occurring as reputation-based reciprocity specifically recruited the precuneus, a region associated with self-centered cognition. During such cooperative behavior, the precuneus was functionally connected with the caudate, a region linking rewards to behavior. Furthermore, the precuneus of a cooperative subject had a strong resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) with the caudate and a large gray matter volume. In contrast, pay-it-forward reciprocity recruited the anterior insula (AI), a brain region associated with affective empathy. The AI was functionally connected with the caudate during cooperation occurring as pay-it-forward reciprocity, and its gray matter volume and rsFC with the caudate predicted the tendency of such cooperation. The revealed difference is consistent with the existing results of evolutionary game theory: although reputation-based indirect reciprocity robustly evolves as a self-interested behavior in theory, pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity does not on its own. The present study provides neural mechanisms underlying indirect reciprocity and suggests that pay-it-forward reciprocity may not occur as myopic profit maximization but elicit emotional rewards.

Hidden patterns of reciprocity

Reciprocity can help the evolution of cooperation. To model both types of reciprocity, we need the concept of strategy. In the case of direct reciprocity there are four second-order action rules (Simple Tit-for-tat, Contrite Tit-for-tat, Pavlov, and Grim Trigger), which are able to promote cooperation. In the case of indirect reciprocity the key component of cooperation is the assessment rule. There are, again, four elementary second-order assessment rules (Image Scoring, Simple Standing, Stern Judging, and Shunning). The eight concepts can be formalized in an ontologically thin way we need only an action predicate and a value function, two agent concepts, and the constant of goodness. The formalism helps us to discover that the action and assessment rules can be paired, and that they show the same patterns. The logic of these patterns can be interpreted with the concept of punishment that has an inherent paradoxical nature.

Reciprocal Journalism

Reciprocity, a defining feature of social life, has long been considered a key component in the formation and perpetuation of vibrant communities. In recent years, scholars have applied the concept to understanding the social dynamics of online communities and social media. Yet, the function of and potential for reciprocity in (digital) journalism has yet to be examined. Drawing on a structural theory of reciprocity, this essay introduces the idea of reciprocal journalism: a way of imagining how journalists might develop more mutually beneficial relationships with audiences across three forms of exchange—direct, indirect, and sustained types of reciprocity. The perspective of reciprocal journalism highlights the shortcomings of most contemporary approaches to audience engagement and participatory journalism. It situates journalists as community-builders who, particularly in online spaces, might more readily catalyze patterns of reciprocal exchange—directly with readers, indirectly among community members, and repeatedly over time—that, in turn, may contribute to the development of greater trust, connectedness, and social capital. For scholars, reciprocal journalism provides a new analytical framework for evaluating the journalist–audience relationship, suggesting a set of diagnostic questions for studying the exchange of benefits as journalists and audiences increasingly engage one another in networked environments. We introduce this concept in the context of community journalism but also discuss its relevance for journalism broadly.

Experimental comparison of direct, general, and indirect reciprocity

In this paper, we examine reciprocity in an experiment using a sequential dictator game where the first round recipient becomes the second round dictator. The experiment is designed to study whether reciprocity can be observed when efficiency gains or strategic motivations are not present, i.e. when sending money in the first round is due to certain types of distributional preferences. We ask how second round dictators response to first round dictators’ kind or unkind actions. We separate between three types of reciprocity. Direct reciprocity occurs when the second round dictator responses directly to the first round dictator. A second round dictator shows indirect reciprocity when s/he is aware of the first round play, has not taken part in it, but yet reacts to the first round dictator's action. In generalized reciprocity, the second round dictator has taken part in the first round play but responses to someone else than the first round dictator. Our results show evidence of strong reciprocity in all three cases. Further, in the experiment, direct and generalized reciprocity are equally intense. An unexpected result is that intentions do not seem to play a role in our setting. Further, we found no evidence for social influence affecting individual behaviour.

No contract or unfair contract: What's better?

We investigate the welfare implications of unfair incentive contracts in comparison with interactions without contracts. Reciprocal people should cooperate conditionally in the latter situation but punish unfairness by non-cooperation. We confirm that some people do cooperate conditionally in a sequential prisoner's dilemma. Furthermore, some subjects do not cooperate if they face an unfair incentive contract in a similar context. However, there is no correlation between these two types of reciprocity. At an aggregate level, all contracts – no matter how fair they are – improve welfare even if agents are conditionally cooperative.

The relative prevalence of direct, indirect and generalized reciprocity in macaque grooming exchanges

Reciprocation is thought to favour altruism among nonrelatives. Three types of reciprocity have been proposed: direct, indirect and generalized. All three are theoretically possible, but their role in real biological systems is unclear. We concurrently examined the occurrence of direct, indirect and generalized reciprocity during grooming exchanges in longtailed macaques, Macaca fascicularis. The occurrence of the grooming monkey A gave B predicted the latency and occurrence of the grooming B gave back to A (direct reciprocity), the latency of the grooming A received from C (indirect reciprocity), but not the grooming B gave C (generalized reciprocity). The duration of the grooming monkey A gave B predicted the latency and occurrence of the grooming B gave back to A (direct reciprocity) but not the grooming A received from C (indirect reciprocity) or the grooming B gave C generalized reciprocity). Finally, monkeys directed overall more of their grooming to those individuals that overall groomed them more (direct reciprocity), but not to those that groomed other individuals more (indirect reciprocity); nor did monkeys that received overall more grooming groom others more (generalized reciprocity). Overall, we found strong evidence for direct reciprocity, limited support for indirect reciprocity and no evidence for generalized reciprocity. Our results support the view that direct reciprocity plays a crucial role in the life of primates and suggest indirect and generalized reciprocity are rare or absent in nonhuman animals. We argue that direct reciprocity may be driven by a system of partner-specific emotional bookkeeping of past social interactions that does not require complex cognitive capacities.

THE EVOLUTION OF GENERALIZED RECIPROCITY ON SOCIAL INTERACTION NETWORKS

Generalized reciprocity (help anyone, if helped by someone) is a minimal strategy capable of supporting cooperation between unrelated individuals. Its simplicity makes it an attractive model to explain the evolution of reciprocal altruism in animals that lack the information or cognitive skills needed for other types of reciprocity. Yet, generalized reciprocity is anonymous and thus defenseless against exploitation by defectors. Recognizing that animals hardly ever interact randomly, we investigate whether social network structure can mitigate this vulnerability. Our results show that heterogeneous interaction patterns strongly support the evolution of generalized reciprocity. The future probability of being rewarded for an altruistic act is inversely proportional to the average connectivity of the social network when cooperators are rare. Accordingly, sparse networks are conducive to the invasion of reciprocal altruism. Moreover, the evolutionary stability of cooperation is enhanced by a modular network structure. Communities of reciprocal altruists are protected against exploitation, because modularity increases the mean access time, that is, the average number of steps that it takes for a random walk on the network to reach a defector. Sparseness and community structure are characteristic properties of vertebrate social interaction patterns, as illustrated by network data from natural populations ranging from fish to primates.

Clustering in Large Networks Does Not Promote Upstream Reciprocity

Upstream reciprocity (also called generalized reciprocity) is a putative mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations with which players help others when they are helped by somebody else. It is a type of indirect reciprocity. Although upstream reciprocity is often observed in experiments, most theories suggest that it is operative only when players form short cycles such as triangles, implying a small population size, or when it is combined with other mechanisms that promote cooperation on their own. An expectation is that real social networks, which are known to be full of triangles and other short cycles, may accommodate upstream reciprocity. In this study, I extend the upstream reciprocity game proposed for a directed cycle by Boyd and Richerson to the case of general networks. The model is not evolutionary and concerns the conditions under which the unanimity of cooperative players is a Nash equilibrium. I show that an abundance of triangles or other short cycles in a network does little to promote upstream reciprocity. Cooperation is less likely for a larger population size even if triangles are abundant in the network. In addition, in contrast to the results for evolutionary social dilemma games on networks, scale-free networks lead to less cooperation than networks with a homogeneous degree distribution.

The Role of Reciprocity in Clarifying the Performance Payoff of Relational Behavior

The authors theorize that the inconsistencies in prior research regarding the relational behavior–performance relationship arise from the type of reciprocity the firm internalizes. The results of a longitudinal study of 284 buyer–supplier relationships indicate that relational behavior enhances financial performance when what is exchanged does not need to be directly comparable with what was received (i.e., heteromorphic equivalence reciprocity) or can be returned over a longer time horizon (i.e., long-term immediacy reciprocity). Moreover, relational behavior diminishes financial performance when what is exchanged must be directly comparable in form (i.e., homeomorphic equivalence reciprocity) or returned over a short time horizon (i.e., short-term immediacy reciprocity). The authors further conclude that a longitudinal interaction effect model provides a more accurate understanding of the relational behavior–performance relationship when compared with a cross-sectional interaction effect model, because it minimizes the unobserved heterogeneity effect, thus strengthening causal inference.