Truth Of Proposition Research Articles

Processing of Counterfactual Conditional Sentences with Differential Propositional Truth-Value in Mandarin Chinese: Evidence from ERP

Although many studies document the role of propositional truth-value in human psychological reading behavior, there is a relative paucity of research examining the role of differential propositional truth-value in processing Chinese counterfactual conditionals. This study is to investigate the role of differential propositional value in processing Chinese counterfactual conditionals by means of ERPs (event-related potentials). The study is based on comprehending two types of Chinese counterfactual conditionals, which is propositional truth value introduced by two different markers of conditional conjunctions in the protasis and apodosis, such as true counterfactual conditional markers jiaru (if) & jiu (so) in the sentence wo xiang yu jiaru you tui jiu keyi zai shuixia zhixi (I think if fish had legs so they could stifle under water), and false counterfactual conditional markers ruguo (if) & namo (then) in the sentence wo xiang gou ruguo you lin namo keyi zai shuixia huxi (I think if dogs had scales, then they could breathe under water). Two counterfactual propositional values (i.e. true and false propositional values) are constructed through manipulating sentence counterfactuality between the true and false counterfactual conditional markers in the protasis and the apodosis. Twenty-four full-time Chinese college students participated in the ERP study. The results demonstrated that processing the true counterfactual propositional sentences with conditional markers jiaru (if) & jiu (so) elicited the N400 effect relative to false propositional sentences with conditional markers ruguo (if) & namo (then). Moreover, the counterfactual sentences with true propositional conditions varied from the elicitation of the N400 effect in the protasis and absence of the N400 effect in the apodosis, showing that semantic roles may gradually disappear under the impact of truth value of propositional counterfactual condition, and/or the roles of semantic anomaly was eliminated in the accumulated sentence processing. While for the false counterfactual conditional sentences, elicitations of P300 in the protasis and robust N400 effect in the apodosis were shown, indicating the increasing semantic role in the processing. Interestingly, there was the absence of the P600 effect for processing sentences with syntactic violation, suggesting little extra syntactic cost in processing sentences with false propositional condition.

Algebraic Structure of Ancient Mesopotamian Omens

In this paper, it is shown that we can reconstruct an intuition of Boolean algebra in Mesopotamian divination with different omen series organized as catalogues. Each separate omen was formulated as a conditional statement “if a sign p, then an event q” so that it has only the positive truth value in the Boolean algebra. This means that omen catalogues can be considered as a dataset containing some logical axioms (only true propositions). It is the earliest form of binary thinking which was logically correct.

AN ASSERTIVE SPEECH ACTS ANALYSIS ON MEI LEE’S UTTERANCES IN TURNING RED MOVIE

This research examines Mei Lee's assertive speech acts in the Turning Red movie with the aim of identifying and categorizing them. It utilizes a qualitative descriptive method to analyse these speech acts and complements the analysis with a simple quantitative approach for numerical representation. The findings of the research reveal 53 assertive speech acts utterances by Mei in the movie, which are classified into seven types: stating, claiming, reporting, reminding, admitting, predicting, and explaining. Among these, stating is the most frequently used 19 data, followed by claiming 13 data, while explaining and admitting each occur 6 data. Predicting and reporting both appear 4 data. The dominant speech act in this study is stating, which serves the function of explaining or describing something. This followed by claiming, which asserts truths in situations where some may argue otherwise. Explaining provides clarification to enhance understanding, while suggesting recognizes the truth of specific propositions or statements. Predicting makes future-oriented statements with evidence, and reporting conveys information about events. Reminding reaffirms information to listeners who may have previously known but possibly forgotten it. Notably, the speech act of suggesting, which typically provides ideas to the listener, was not found in Mei's utterances in the Turning Red movie.

On the structural properties of paradoxes: the distinction between formal language and natural language that comes with the use of the liar paradox

This study delves into the intriguing realm of paradoxes that have long fascinated philosophers and logicians throughout history. It begins by discussing the nature and purpose of paradoxes, ranging from their role in entertainment to their capacity to reveal flaws within logical systems. This work emphasizes the challenge paradoxes pose to the completeness of systems and the subsequent development of axiomatic systems that aim to eliminate paradoxes. Rather than providing definitive solutions to paradoxes, the primary aim of this study is to defend the idea that systems containing paradoxes can coexist with completeness. The focus is on categorizing paradoxes, with special attention given to the group known as liar paradoxes, including Russell’s famous variation. The text demonstrates how these paradoxes are intrinsically linked to the principle of non-contradiction and argues that the truth and contradiction of propositions are both the cause and consequence of these paradoxes, presenting a dilemma within the system. The work introduces the concept of Aristotelian Sets (A-Sets) and Empty Sets as potential solutions to these paradoxes. It explores the idea that these sets, when carefully defined, can provide a meaningful representation of individual substances and predicates without violating the principle of non-contradiction. By proposing the inclusion of non-existents within a naive set theory and introducing A-Sets, this work seeks to contribute to the ongoing discourse surrounding paradoxes and their resolution. Ultimately, this study offers a fresh perspective on the handling of paradoxes, emphasizing the importance of reevaluating the foundations of formal and natural languages in the pursuit of a more comprehensive understanding of logic and philosophy.

A logical challenge to correlationism: the Church–Fitch paradox in Husserl’s account of fulfilment, truth, and meaning

Husserl’s theory of fulfilment conceives of empty acts, such as symbolic thought, and fulfilling acts, such as sensory perceptions, in a strict parallel. This parallelism is the basis for Husserl’s semantics, epistemology, and conception of truth. It also entails that any true proposition can be known in principle, which Church and Fitch have shown to explode into the claim that every proposition is actually known. I assess this logical challenge and discuss a recent response by James Kinkaid. While Kinkaid’s proposal saves one direction of the parallel for semantics, it gives up the parallelism for truth. I spell out a different response which meshes naturally with Husserl’s account of meaning. If the parallelism is restricted to a class of basic propositions, the truth of non-basic propositions can be defined inductively, without leading to the paradox. I then discuss objections that have been raised against a similar proposal by Dummett. The result is that exegetically plausible and popular interpretations of Husserl’s correlationism are indeed challenged by Church and Fitch. But when taking into account the ‘logical adumbration’ of propositional blindspots, truth and possible fulfilment can be connected without paradox.

Perceptual axioms are irreconcilable with Euclidean geometry.

There are different definitions of axioms, but the one that seems to have general approval is that axioms are statements whose truths are universally accepted but cannot be proven; they are the foundation from which further propositional truths are derived. Previous attempts, led by David Hilbert, to show that all of mathematics can be built into an axiomatic system that is complete and consistent failed when Kurt Gödel proved that there will always be statements which are known to be true but can never be proven within the same axiomatic system. But Gödel and his followers took no account of brain mechanisms that generate and mediate logic. In this largely theoretical paper, but backed by previous experiments and our new ones reported below, we show that in the case of so-called 'optical illusions', there exists a significant and irreconcilable difference between their visual perception and their description according to Euclidean geometry; when participants are asked to adjust, from an initial randomised state, the perceptual geometric axioms to conform to the Euclidean description, the two never match, although the degree of mismatch varies between individuals. These results provide evidence that perceptual axioms, or statements known to be perceptually true, cannot be described mathematically. Thus, the logic of the visual perceptual system is irreconcilable with the cognitive (mathematical) system and cannot be updated even when knowledge of the difference between the two is available. Hence, no one brain reality is more 'objective' than any other.

A quasi-deflationary solution to the problems of mixed inferences and mixed compounds

ABSTRACT Truth pluralism is the view that there is more than one truth property. The strong version of it (i.e. strong pluralism) further contends that no truth property is shared by all true propositions. In this paper, I help strong pluralism solve two pressing problems concerning mixed discourse: the problem of mixed inferences (PI) and the problem of mixed compounds (PC). According to PI, strong pluralism is incompatible with the truth-preservation notion of validity; according to PC, strong pluralists cannot find any appropriate truth property for mixed compound propositions, whose atomic constituents are from different domains of discourse. I argue that the strong pluralist is motivated to take the truth predicate in truth-involving universal statements to be deflationary to avoid the two pressing problems. Such a move entails that the truth predicate in the platitude of validity (V) does not denote any substantive truth property. Instead, it is merely an expressive device to help people generalize instances of (V) to (V). Analogous stories hold for the truth predicate in the platitudes of compound (e.g. conjunction). The upshot is that, the strong pluralist can solve PI and PC by further conceding that mixed compounds are true/false in a deflationary way.

Towards the systematisation of African ways of knowing: neocolonial hegemony, theory development and cognitive imperialism in African studies

ABSTRACT This study proposes African ways of knowing as viable alternatives to Western theories, and demonstrates how Indigenous African epistemologies can be systematised for critical analysis of cultural productions. It builds on the argument that knowledge production in and about Africa should begin to utilise local frameworks to reflect African cultural specificities and instantiate how self-generational concepts from African cultures can be intellectualised. The study adopts Yorùbá Ọmọlúwàbí, Xhosa/Zulu Ubuntu/Hunhui and Shona Ukama, converts them to canons and uses them as models to validate empirical reality, propositional truth and epistemological premises of home-grown African theories. It discusses theory development and interrogates how these Indigenous epistemes can be structured and turned to theories using evidential, coherential, aesthetic and diachronic theoretical virtues. It also identifies the validity of these theories in cultural praxis, worldviews, proverbs of matrixes under study and generates five premises for the local frameworks, arguing that home-grown African theories can be adopted to remind and reawaken Africans to their cultural history and values.

QUESTIONS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE AGE OF GENERATIVE AI

ABSTRACTHistory theory does not have a mature theory of questions. This reflects both historical and philosophical assumptions. As Holly Case has argued in The Age of Questions (2018), the big questions of the nineteenth century and their proposed final solutions arguably primed the murderous logic of genocide in the first half of the twentieth century. On her account, questions have become tamed as technical tools in historical monographs and reviews like this one. This picture of the twentieth century, though, runs up against R. G. Collingwood's historiographical logic of questions and the rise of erotetic logics in computer science. Computational erotetic logics have shaped the creation of large language models such as the GPT series and focused our attention on expressivity, effectivity, and classification in the relation of questions and answers. Collingwood's logic is different, using the relation of questions to questions to point to presuppositions. This metaphysical view of erotetic logic is timely, for it reminds why it might be so hard for historians to cut through with true propositions in an age of AI. Collingwood reminds us that a focus on truth‐evaluable answers to questions does not explain why those questions were asked in the first place. Chasing chains of questions back to presuppositions, Collingwood argues that tackling what is assumed and what is lived with can help historians to change an unthinking world. In our age, this includes the idea of a shift from historians being the users of large language models to historians being the designers of new forms of relationship between people and information.

Truthmaking. Are Facts Still Really Indispensable?

Abstract In recent years there has been a lot of skepticism about the existence of facts. It seems that one of the last places for their application is in truthmaking theory. In this paper I discuss two approaches to the use of facts in truthmaking. The first, categorial, holds that facts are entities that belong to one of three ontological categories (true propositions, truth of propositions, instantiations of universals). The second, deflationary, holds that a fact is merely a functional concept denoting any entity that performs a truthmaking function. I argue that in the face of significant criticism of categorial facts as truthmakers, a defender of facts may resort to the deflationary concept. Nevertheless, even in this case we can do without facts as truthmakers.

Roderick Chisholm on Reliabilism: Implications for Epistemic Indubitability

This paper aims at examining the pitfalls of Roderick Chisholm’s concept of reliabilism and its implications for epistemic indubility. Chisholm posits that justified belief depends on what is practically true and right for the knower to believe. He maintains that epistemic justification depends on evidence internally available to the knower and anchored his argument on the fact that we rarely have direct access to the truth of propositions, that is, to reality. Every conclusion about the epistemic status of a belief in this perspective involves a conclusion about the “legitimacy” of its source. Our paper argues that this premium Chisholm’s reliabilism places on the knowing subject’s ability to acquire knowledge through the right kind of source undermines our quest for epistemic indubitability hence, among the purposes of this study are: to examine how the reliability of a belief is dependent on the authenticity of its process of realization. It investigates what constitutes the criteria for a reliable belief and tries to resolve whether reliability is conferred on beliefs by our mere confessions. We find that a reliable belief may not after all be error free. Also that reliability invokes the skeptical question of the reliability of human knowledge. Our research which adopts the analytical method of enquiry concludes by underscoring the fact that Chisholm’s reliabilism turns the indubitable knowledge quest of philosophy into doubtful probabilities and further into full blown skepticism.

Quineanism, Noneism and Metaphysical Equivalence

In this paper we propose and defend the Synonymy account, a novel account of metaphysical equivalence which draws on the idea (Rayo in The Construction of Logical Space, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) that part of what it is to formulate a theory is to lay down a theoretical hypothesis concerning logical space. Roughly, two theories are synonymous—and so, in our view, equivalent—just in case (i) they take the same propositions to stand in the same entailment relations, and (ii) they are committed to the truth of the same propositions. Furthermore, we put our proposal to work by showing that it affords a better and more nuanced understanding of the debate between Quineans and noneists. Finally we show how the Synonymy account fares better than some of its competitors, specifically, McSweeney’s (Philosophical Perspectives 30(1):270–293, 2016) epistemic account and Miller’s (Philosophical Quarterly 67(269):772–793, 2017) hyperintensional account.

NON-FACTIVE KOLMOGOROV CONDITIONALIZATION

Abstract Kolmogorov conditionalization is a strategy for updating credences based on propositions that have initial probability 0. I explore the connection between Kolmogorov conditionalization and Dutch books. Previous discussions of the connection rely crucially upon a factivity assumption: they assume that the agent updates credences based on true propositions. The factivity assumption discounts cases of misplaced certainty, i.e., cases where the agent invests credence 1 in a falsehood. Yet misplaced certainty arises routinely in scientific and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory. I prove a non-factive Dutch book theorem and converse Dutch book theorem for Kolmogorov conditionalization. The theorems do not rely upon the factivity assumption, so they establish that Kolmogorov conditionalization has unique pragmatic virtues that persist even in cases of misplaced certainty.

Is there room for conjectures in mathematics? The role of dynamic geometry environments

Proof, as a central and integral part of mathematics, is an essential component of mathematical education and is considered as the basic procedure for revealing the truth of mathematical propositions and for teaching productive reasoning as part of human civilization. Is there therefore room for conjectures in mathematics? In this paper after discussing at a theoretical level the concepts of proof and conjecture, both in a paper-and-pencil environment and in a dynamic geometry environment (DGE) as well as how school practice affects them, we fully explain a task involving various mathematical disciplines, which we tackle using elementary mathematics, in a mathematics education context. On the occasion of the Greek educational system we refer to some parameters of the teaching of geometry in school and we propose an activity, within a DGE, that could enable students to be guided in the formulation and exploration of conjectures. Finally, we discuss the teaching implications of this activity and make some suggestions.

Procedural Semantics and its Relevance to Paradox

Two semantic paradoxes, the Liar and Curry’s paradox, are analysed using a newly developed conception of procedural semantics (semantics according to which the truth of propositions is determined algorithmically), whose main characteristic is its departure from methodological realism. Rather than determining pre-existing facts, procedures are constitutive of them. Of this semantics, two versions are considered: closed (where the halting of procedures is presumed) and open (without this presumption). To this end, a procedural approach to deductive reasoning is developed, based on the idea of simulation. As is shown, closed semantics supports classical logic, but cannot in any straightforward way accommodate the concept of truth. In open semantics, where paradoxical propositions naturally ‘belong’, they cease to be paradoxical; yet, it is concluded that the natural choice—for logicians and common people alike—is to stick to closed semantics, pragmatically circumventing problematic utterances.

Frege's two notions of "extension"

Our goal is to answer a question proposed by Richard Heck in the paper “Formal Arithmetic Before Grundgesetze”. Heck inquires as to the reasons why it took almost eight years for Frege to honor his promises of concluding his project of grounding mathematics in logic. Although Heck gave some answers, we think that a more adequate philosophical discussion can still be offered. This paper will try to fill in that gap by presenting what we understand was the central problem faced by Frege on Gl: the lack of a standard criterion to fix the meaning of identity propositions of mathematics. In our account, the German philosopher finally decided to fill in this gap by providing a new construal of “extension”, one which included some important refinements on his previous account of that notion. The new concept thus construed allowed Frege to unify his treatment of identity propositions by including in his system a universal criterion for deciding the truth of any identity proposition supported by his famous basic law V. So, our claim will be that Frege’s resistance and doubts about the inclusion of axiom V as a logical law in his system were the primary cause of that delay.

‘Noticeably Better / Visibly Shaken’: The Use of Four Adverbs of High Perceivability with Meanings of Attitude

This paper is a study of the use of four adverbs of high perceivability, manifestly, noticeably, patently and visibly (MNP&V), with expressions loaded with evaluative meanings belonging to the Appraisal category of Attitude. The paper starts with a characterization of MNP&V in terms of their meanings of manner and evidentiality and also as devices of Engagement within the Appraisal framework. Next, an analysis is carried out of the occurrences of the adverbs in the British National Corpus, in terms of the Attitude meanings present in the linguistic units of which MNP&V are constituents. The results show that these stretches of language often express Attitude, and that the distribution of the subtypes of Attitude varies across the individual adverbs. All the adverbs except noticeably are strongly associated with negative evaluation, which shows their frequent use for justifying high commitment to the truth of an undesirable proposition on the grounds that this truth is highly perceivable.

ФИКЦИОНАЛИЗМ, НЕУСТРАНИМОСТЬ И ЦИКАДЫ: КРИТИКА НЕУСТРАНИМОСТИ МАТЕМАТИКИ И ЕЕ ЗНАЧЕНИЕ ДЛЯ ОНТОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО СТАТУСА АБСТРАКТНЫХ ОБЪЕКТОВ

The paper deals with fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics, namely, the claim that we can use mathematical theories and, at the same time, believe that they are false because mathematical objects do not exist. Mathematical objects (numbers, sets, and functions) are non-spatiotemporal, nor mental platon-ic entities that are causally isolated from us. This raises two questions. The first is known as Benacerraf’s problem: how can we think of the truth of mathematical propositions? The second is the problem of ap-plicability of mathematics. It becomes a problematic field for nominalists who refuse to rationally believe in the existence of such entities. Namely, if one believes that mathematical objects do not exist, why does mathematics-based empirical science work? As a response to this question, the well-known and widely discussed «indispensability argument»emerges, postulating ontological commitments to mathematical objects on the basis that they are indispensable to our best scientific theories. According to this argument, realists about science must also accept Platonism about mathematical entities. Hartry Field disproves this argument and demonstrates the dispensability of mathematics by proposing his «science without num-bers». Field replaces the criterion of truth with the criterion of conservatism and argues that the applica-bility of mathematics should be explained by whether a particular theory is conservative or not. We then consider the «enhanced»indispensability argument (Baker) based on the explanatory role of mathematics. In the final section, we describe the «new»fictionalist account (Balaguer). The new fictionalist strategies allow us to accept the ontological thesis of nominalism without assertingthe indispensability of mathe-matics. We agree that the explanatory power of mathematics is an argument in favor of the indispensable role of mathematical objects in the natural sciences. Nevertheless, the appeal to indispensability is mis-guided. We do nothave to rationally believe in the existence of those entities that are indispensable to science. We can rather consider these entities as useful (in explanation) heuristic fictions and, at the same time, believe that they do not exist and that mathematical propositions are false.

Выбор значения категории одушевлённости для сочетания «юридическое лицо» в деловом медиадискурсе

The purpose of the research is to determine the relationship between the meaning of the animacy category of the collocation «юридическое лицо» (“juridical person”) and the types of actual knowledge in business media discourse. Scientific novelty of the work lies in studying the relationship between the meaning of animacy as a grammatical category manifested in inflection and syntactic agreement and cognitive categories, namely, types of knowledge that are actualised in a particular context. The meaning of the animacy category is independently determined by the speaker for the non-prototypical cases of a native speaker’s idea of animate or inanimate objects and, therefore, does not always rely on obvious criteria. The relationship between the meaning of animacy chosen by the speaker in the usage and code knowledge or specific knowledge is considered. At the same time, code knowledge is understood as the knowledge about the meaning of a word, specific knowledge is understood as the knowledge about the truth of a certain proposition and the rules for filling in its terms. As a result, the relationship between the meaning of the animacy category of the collocation «юридическое лицо» and the types of knowledge has been determined: inanimacy indicators are found in the contexts that realise code knowledge, animacy indicators are peculiar to the cases of specific knowledge actualisation. Cases of variation have also been noted.

Dasgupta's Detonation

Dasgupta's Detonation