Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), creator of pragmatism, was a polymath. His contributions include such diverse areas of research as meteorology, experimental psychology, geodesics, astronomy, mathematical economy, philosophy of mathematics, theory of gravity, linguistics, history and philosophy of science, and the history and philosophy of logic (Fisch 1986: 376). In spite of the breadth of his academic purview, many Peirce scholars compress his work into the field of logic, which, for Peirce, was semiotic (Houser 1997: 1). There is some merit to this approach, since, according to Peirce, logic in its various forms includes all of the disciplines with which he was involved. Along with Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and David Hilbert, Peirce is considered one of the founders of modern logic (Lukasiewicz 1970: 111; Barwise and Etchemendy 1995: 211; Quine 1995: 23; Hintikka and Hilpinen 1997: ix). Independently of Frege, he developed the concepts of quantification and quantifying logic (Hintikka and Hilpinen 1997: ix; Quine 1985: 767, 1995: 31; Putnam 1982: 297). He was author of the terms ‘First Order Logic’ (Putnam 1988: 28), and ‘Trivalent Logic’ (Fisch and Turquette 1966; Lane 2001). He also anticipated Henry She¤er’s ‘Stroke Function’ by more than 30 years (W 4: 218–221; Houser 1997: 3); worked with what later came to be known as Claude Shannon’s correspondence between truth functions and electrical circuitry (W 5: 421–422; Gardner 1982); and developed a logical notation using topological forms (existential graphs) that anticipated hybrid systems of notation based on graphs, diagrams, and frames (Roberts 1973; Shin 1994, 2002; Barwise and Etchemendy 1995; Allwein and Barwise 1996; Hammer 1994, 1995). As if this were not enough, one of his most original contributions consists of his development of a logic of discovery based on the concept of abductive inference, as outlined by various scholars (Bernstein 1980;