Abstract
Deflationists have argued that truth is an ontologically thin property which has only an expressive function to perform, that is, it makes possible to express semantic generalizations like 'All the the- orems are true', 'Everything Peter said is true', etc. Some of the deflationists have also argued that although truth is ontologically thin, it suffices in conjunctions with other facts not involving truth to explain all the facts about truth. The purpose of this paper is to show that in the case of arith- metic, it is difficult to combine the expressive with the explanatory function of truth if the latter is understood in a deflationist way. We will make our point by investigating several logical sys- tems: first-order logic, full second-order logic, and existential second-order (! 1 1 -) logic.
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