The dominant narrative present in much of current psychological research and teaching is that which sees empirical science in general as a very special program of activity, having as its goal what Richard Rorty has called “Redemptive Truth”. That is “..a set of beliefs which would end, once and for all, the process of reflection on what to do with ourselves” (2000 p2); a belief that there is “..something behind the appearance, the one true description of what is going on, the final secret”(2000 p.2), fulfilling the need that religion and philosophy have attempted to satisfy. Because they carry humanity’s hopes for the future on their shoulders, scientists see themselves as special people, carefully trained and who go about their tasks in equally special ways. Care must be taken with measures, observations must be objective and correct procedures must be followed in order to avoid the observer contaminating the observed and to guarantee that results are fit for consideration. Whilst the empirical science orientation is clearly strongest in experimental psychology or laboratory research, the hegemony that these areas exercise over the rest of the discipline is very great - including over social psychology. Qualitative research approaches are required to show that those who carry out open interviews have been correctly trained, that the subject matter has been correctly registered and that proper methods of analysis used. Qualitative methods have to be “triangulated” in order to demonstrate the validity of conclusions. Those who advance beyond the laboratory or interview room and go into the ‘field’ are required to treat the ‘field’ in a similar manner. The ‘field’ is seen as a place where psychologists go to gather ‘data’ which they bring back for analyses. The growing use of terms such as ‘ethnography’ in social psychology is much more a consequence of this pressure than it is of a sudden interest in anthropology; after all, it is not very easy to give a scientific spin to activities like “hanging about in cafes”, “walking aimlessly around streets”, “overhearing conversations”, “chatting to people in queues”. Key to this initial conception of “field” is the idea of difference, not just as a place but, following the transference of Malinowski’s long conversation with the Trobriand Islands between 1914 and 1918 to Park’s Chicago in 1925, as an analytic process in which the other is regarded as a stranger, or is “strangerized”. We use terms like “distance”, “separation” and, of course, “objectivity”, lots of “objectivity”. However, when ordinary people – and that includes psychologists when they are not being psychologists – meet other people for the first time they normally try to get to know them, to come closer to them. They seek in other words to de-strangerize the other, to bring people together. Now the need for some kind of collective judgment about the validity of what is being discussed in social psychology or any other field of activity, academic or otherwise, is not, in itself, problematic.
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