Tripartite Game Model Research Articles

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Policy Simulation: Strategic Governance in the Redevelopment of the Urban Village in Guangzhou

The scarcity of land drives urban village redevelopment projects, which involve interest redistribution among stakeholders with distinct demands. This paper utilizes evolutionary game theory and simulation methods, constructing a tripartite game model under the institutional arrangement of bottom-up with private developer funding. This study identifies the stable strategies and evolutionary trends of the tripartite interactions under four distinct scenarios and validates these strategies through simulations. The redevelopment of XC village validates the assumptions of the model and theoretical analysis, suggesting that when private developers adopt forced demolition strategies, although villagers ultimately choose to sign the contract of property exchange, it can easily lead to social conflicts. These research findings can enlighten the government to form a tripartite alliance to smooth urban village redevelopment.

Public participation in Governance of E-waste recycling: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

The surge in informal E-waste recycling has led to significant resource wastage and environmental hazards. The current government-centered governance system faces substantial obstacles to effective implementation due to information gaps and operational challenges. This study adopts the concept of social governance by incorporating public participation into the traditional government-led e-waste recycling system. Utilizing the bounded rationality of evolutionary game theory, this research constructs a tripartite game model involving the government, recyclers, and the public. It analyzes the behavioral strategy choices of each participant and the mechanisms of mutual influence under different scenarios. The main findings are: (1) Solely relying on public power is insufficient for effectively governing informal recyclers. (2) Reasonable and moderate incentives can promote public participation, serving as an effective supplementary tool for government regulation. (3) Increasing public exposure to the informal dismantling behaviors of recyclers is crucial for enhancing governance effectiveness. Specific measures can include establishing complaint departments for related incidents and creating media channels. These findings underscore the importance of integrating public participation into e-waste governance to address the limitations of a purely government-centered approach.

Driving factors on corporate green investments behaviors: From the strategic intersection of governments regulation and public participation

As the global community confronts the challenges of climate change, businesses face increasing pressure to adopt sustainable practices. This study develops a tripartite game model to investigate the impact of green investments on corporate performance, considering the dynamic interplay between governments regulations and public participation in shaping strategic initiatives. First, the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) is identified by solving replicator dynamic equations and performing stability analysis of equilibrium points. Next, the practicability and rationality of the evolutionary game model are assessed by analyzing ESSs under various corporate green investment scenarios. Finally, a case-based example is provided to validate the theoretical findings and support the following arguments: there are eight equilibrium points and four potential ESSs in the game model; the selection of each ESS is primarily determined by the trade-off between costs and revenues for each stakeholder; increased governmental regulatory costs prompt a strategic shift, incentivizing corporations to enhance green investments; while rising penalties drive a preference for green options; and corporations recognizing compensatory responsibilities are steered towards sustainable pathways.

Driven by the policy or bent by the market? Cracking the digital transformation code of farmer cooperatives

The digital transformation of farmer cooperatives significantly promotes the digital rural strategy. However, due to funding and scale constraints, the digital transformation of farmer cooperatives requires government and market participation. To explore the roles of the government and market in the digital transformation of farmer cooperatives, this study constructs a tripartite game model involving farmer cooperatives, consumers, and the government, analyzing stakeholders' decisions and effects. The research results show that, first, under certain conditions, the strategies of the government, farmer cooperatives, and consumers can lead the system to evolve into stable states of (1,0,0) or (1,1,1). Second, critical parameters influencing the digital transformation of farmer cooperatives exist, with discernible thresholds. In the context of this study, the digital subsidy coefficient and the degree of propaganda for consumption upgrade should range between 0.4 and 0.45 and between 0.45 and 0.5, respectively. Consumers' high-quality consumption preferences should be between 0.5 and 0.6, whereas high-quality consumption utility should be between 75 % and 80 % of the existing level. Third, in the short term, the digital transformation of farmer cooperatives requires policy-driven initiatives; in the long term, market-bent initiatives become essential.

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Product Quality Supervision in Live-Streaming E-Commerce

With the rapid development of information technology, live-streaming e-commerce has risen rapidly as a new business model. However, product quality problems that exist in the development of live-streaming e-commerce continue to emerge. The influence of strategic interactions between social media influencers, live-streaming e-commerce platforms, and consumers on product quality deserves to be studied. Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite game model of “social media influencers–the live-streaming e-commerce platform–consumers” and analyzes the dynamic evolution process of the strategy selection among subjects and influencing factors by using evolutionary game theory. This study shows that products with high functional value are more likely to stimulate consumer rights protection behavior, prompting social media influencers to shift from lax to strict quality control. But when the emotional value is high, consumers are more inclined to give up on defending their rights, which leads to the maintenance of lax quality control, and the platform supervision will be weakened accordingly. Moreover, less quality differences motivate social media influencers to choose lax quality control. An increase in quality differences will promote a shift from an equilibrium strategy to strict quality control. However, if the penalty of the platforms is not strong enough, this strategic shift will not happen. In addition, a high percentage of platform commissions can encourage influencers to implement strict quality control, while platforms can maintain weak supervision. This study’s findings provide valuable guidance for understanding and managing product quality issues in live-streaming e-commerce. In the future, the government will be considered a new player in the game in studying the impact of its policies on product quality in live-streaming e-commerce.

Evaluating Stakeholders’ Decisions in A Blockchain-Based Recycling Construction Waste Project: A Hybrid Evolutionary Game and System Dynamics Approach

To promote efficient construction waste recycling and reuse, a novel waste management approach based on blockchain technology was introduced to the industry. However, adopting blockchain platforms in construction waste recycling and reuse may impact the behavioral strategies of stakeholders and impede the prediction of the specific impacts of stakeholders’ decisions. Accordingly, this study addresses two primary questions: (1) What are the collaborative framework and the behavioral evolution trends of multiple stakeholders within the context of blockchain? (2) How can the behavioral strategies of multiple stakeholders be systematically coordinated to achieve efficient construction waste recycling and reuse driven by blockchain? To answer these questions, a tripartite game model combined with system dynamics was constructed. In this model, we aimed to elucidate the internal organizational framework, analyze the dynamic evolution process, and assess the influence of decisions made by multiple stakeholders at the individual level. It also offers corresponding policy recommendations for efficient construction waste recycling and reuse driven by blockchain at the system level. This study offers three innovations. First, it considers the decision-making of multiple stakeholders as an interdependent and coevolutionary process to overcome the defects of analyzing only one type of participant. Second, in contrast to the static analysis method, it employs a dynamic system approach to deeply analyze the evolving structures of blockchain-based projects. Third, it provides a theoretical framework for the practical implementation of blockchain-driven platforms in managing construction waste recycling and reuse, thus fostering effective policy development and management practices. This framework aims to promote sustainable development in construction waste recycling and reuse projects in China as well as globally.

How to promote the application of green pesticides by farmers? Evolutionary game analysis based on “government–farmer–consumer”

Green pesticide use, as a key means to reduce pesticide use, plays a crucial role in promoting environmental and food safety. However, the effectiveness of green pesticide use policies in China falls short of expectations. Existing research mainly examines the policy promotion issues of green pesticide use from a static and single-agent perspective. However, green pesticide use behavior is a dynamic process influenced by multiple factors, including the government, farmers, and consumers. This paper builds an evolutionary tripartite game model of the government, farmers, and consumers from the perspective of dynamic strategy evolution and explores the evolutionary conditions that affect the stability of the tripartite game strategy during green pesticide application. The results show that 1) through different partnership models, the government, farmers, and consumers can evolve to a stable state. 2) Keeping the government’s regulatory intensity in the market for green agricultural products within a reasonable range will help farmers apply green pesticides. 3) Users’ preference for high-quality vegetables will increase the market selling price of green products. 4) Maintaining the government’s ecological subsidies for green pesticides will help stimulate farmers’ enthusiasm for using green pesticides. Therefore, the government should appropriately strengthen ecological subsidies and market supervision, guide consumers’ green consumption behavior, and encourage farmers to use green pesticides.

An evolutionary game and system dynamics approach for the production and consumption of carbon-labeled products-based on a media monitoring perspective

Carbon label is acknowledged as an effective way to combat the problem of global warming. As a powerful way to encourage individuals to adjust their consumption patterns and to promote the development of green consumption, carbon-labeled products are widely developed in China. To reveal the production and consumption process of carbon-labeled products, the present study constructs a tripartite game model consisting of the government, carbon-labeled products manufacturers and consumers based on a media monitoring perspective. The evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) is firstly determined by solving the replication dynamic equations and stability analysis of the equilibrium point, followed by the strategy analysis and sensitivity analysis through numerical simulation. The results show that media supervision can effectively complement and constrain government supervision. In addition, it can promote enterprises to standardize production and enhance consumers' trust and willingness to buy carbon-labeled products. The introduction of media supervision can well realize the ideal equilibrium of "effective government supervision, enterprise compliance and consumer support for purchase".

Decoupling representation contrastive learning for carbon emission prediction and analysis based on time series

Carbon emissions have become particularly urgent with the acceleration of industrialization. Currently, AI-based carbon emission modeling provides essential support for solving the problem of predicting, managing, and optimizing carbon emissions. However, there are still challenges in accurately predicting carbon dioxide emissions and establishing an appropriate carbon emission regulatory model to manage carbon dioxide emissions effectively. Firstly, this paper introduces a framework for learning seasonal and trend representations called DeTF (Decoupling representation for Time and Frequency domain of time series). The framework is designed for time series data of CO2 emissions used for power generation from 1973 to 2023. Secondly, we use various data enhancement techniques to improve the robustness of the learned representations. Finally, the prediction results establish a tripartite evolutionary game relationship between the state, regulatory agencies, and enterprises. We use MSE and MAE as evaluation metrics, and our model overall outperforms current state-of-the-art end-to-end algorithms. It outperforms the best performing end-to-end prediction method by 27.08% (MSE) in the prediction results. Besides, the time series prediction results are innovatively combined with the tripartite game model to analyze the main factors determining the optimal strategy.

Evolutionary Tripartite Game Model in the Coal Mine Risk-Hazard Double Pre-Control and Management in China

The classification, investigation, and management of the safety risk (namely, risk-hazard double pre-control management mechanism) in coal mines were introduced into a behavioral evolution game to assess the decision-making processes of coal mine workers, regulators, and supervisors. A tripartite game tree and a revenue perception matrix were constructed, and the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) achieved by the evolutionary system under different conditions was obtained according to the replication dynamic equation (RD). The numerical simulation of the evolution game was conducted in MATLAB, which verified the influence of various parameters on the behaviors adopted by all parties. The results show: (1) When the safety, regulatory, and supervisory costs are high, the average expected value of mine workers, regulators, and supervisors to choose safety behaviors is low, so they adopt an unsafe behavior. By contrast, reducing costs can encourage the adoption of safety behaviors. (2) When the punishment for accident losses caused by unsafe behavior and the lack of regulations and supervision is higher than 50% of the initial state, the actors in the tripartite game are more inclined to avoid risks when facing cost losses in the short term, which can lead them to choose a safety behavior. (3) When the actors in the tripartite game face different accident probabilities and accident loss, with the severity of the accident increasing to 80% of the initial state, mine workers and regulators gradually adopt safety and regulation behaviors, and supervisors quickly adopt supervision methods.

Research on Green Design Strategy of Electrical and Electronic Manufacturing Enterprises Based on the Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Green design emphasizes the environmental attributes of the product life cycle, which can prevent environmental pollution at the source and reduce resource consumption. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a tripartite game model between “government-electrical and electronic manufacturing companies-consumers”, explores the influence of participants’ strategic choices and parameters on the evolutionary behavior of the three parties in different situations, and uses Matlab software to conduct numerical simulation analysis. Simulation analysis is the process of simulating real-world events and system behavior through computer models to assess, validate, and predict their performance and response. The research results show that the strategic choices of the three parties influence each other and government supervision and green consumption are conducive to incentivizing manufacturing companies to carry out green design. Consumer green preferences, environmental tax rates, corporate recycling revenue, and increases in consumer recycling revenue are all conducive to product design. Compared to environmental taxes, corporate subsidy policies have a greater impact on the behavior of the government, manufacturing companies, and consumers. Compared to consumer subsidies, corporate subsidy policies have a more significant effect on the behavior of governments and manufacturing companies, while for consumers, the opposite is true.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low-Carbon Incentive Behaviour of Power Battery Recycling Based on Prospect Theory

Power batteries, the core component of the rapidly evolving electric vehicle industry, have increasingly become a focal point of attention. Recycling power batteries can mitigate environmental pollution and utilize resources efficiently, which is crucial for fostering a low-carbon economy and achieving sustainable development. Utilizing prospect theory, this study proposes a tripartite game model for low-carbon innovation in power battery recycling, involving government agencies, power battery manufacturers, and recycling enterprises. This paper initially identifies the evolutionary stability strategy, subsequently simulates the evolutionary process through parameter assignment, and explores parameter sensitivity along with comparative effects. This study indicates the following: (i) Government incentives are pivotal in motivating manufacturers and recyclers towards low-carbon innovation. (ii) Reducing technology costs and enhancing spillovers significantly boost low-carbon innovation’s appeal. (iii) Moderate carbon taxes can encourage businesses to engage in low-carbon innovation, while excessively high taxes may increase operating costs and hinder investment in innovation. Lastly, policy recommendations are made in order to support environmental preservation and the industry’s sustainable growth in the power battery recycling sector.

Game evolution analysis of BIM application willingness of prefabricated construction parties

PurposeTo further promote application of BIM technology in construction of prefabricated buildings, influencing factors and evolution laws of willingness to apply BIM technology are explored from the perspective of willingness of participants.Design/methodology/approachIn this paper, a tripartite game model involving the design firm, component manufacturer and construction firm is constructed and a system dynamics method is used to explore the influencing factors and game evolution path of three parties' application of BIM technology, from three perspectives, cost, benefit and risk.FindingsThe government should formulate measures for promoting the application of BIM according to different BIM application willingness of the parties. When pursuing deeper BIM application, the design firm should pay attention to reducing the speculative benefits of the component manufacturer and the construction firm. The design firm and the component manufacturer should pay attention to balancing the cost and benefit of the design firm while enhancing collaborative efforts. When the component manufacturer and the construction firm cooperate closely, it is necessary to pay attention to balanced distribution of interests of both parties and lower the risk of BIM application.Originality/valueThis study fills a research gap by comprehensively investigating the influencing factors and game evolution paths of willingness of the three parties to apply BIM technology to prefabricated buildings. The research helps to effectively improve the building quality and construction efficiency, and is expected to contribute to the sustainability of built environment in the context of circular economy in China.

Strategies for Controlling Negative Content on Social Media: A Game Theoretical Perspective

With the increase of social network users, using social media platforms has become an indispensable part of every individual's life, but the explosive growth in the amount of information has also increased the difficulty of governing detrimental content on social media platforms. Maintaining a good network environment requires not only proper guidance from the government but also the joint efforts of social media platforms and online users. This paper innovatively divides network users into information producers and information consumers and establishes a tripartite game model with social media platforms. This paper aimed to find out the important factors that are affecting the dissemination of detrimental information by analyzing the changes in equilibrium. The paper suggests that the government can directly influence the operation of social media platforms by adopting different policies, and it is important to grasp the strictness of the policies. Secondly, ordinary social media users are a force to be reckoned with in the process of governing negative information. Finally, what kind of content an information producer publishes depends not only on the revenue but also on the risk he will face. Based on the above findings, this paper offers suggestions on the governance of bad information from the perspectives of the government and the three game players.

Strategic interaction among stakeholders on low-carbon buildings: A tripartite evolutionary game based on prospect theory.

Low-carbon buildings (LCBs) are still in the early stages of development in China. The promotion and implementation of associated policies are not yet fully matured. Meanwhile, their status as public goods exacerbates the uncertainty and complexity regarding anticipated gains and potential losses. Few studies have explored the impact of perception parameters on the decision-making processes of LCBs' stakeholders. Thus, combined with prospect theory, this paper establishes a tripartite game model composed of governments, developers, and consumers to explore their interactions and influences in different stages. Real-life scenarios are further utilized to validate the effectiveness of the model in predicting the behaviors under respective preferences. The results show that the increase in subsidy and penalty intensity instead diminishes the enthusiasm for LCBs. More specifically, the existing subsidy policies offer limited incentives to consumers. With the addition of the perception parameter, there exist differences in the sensitivity of consumers and developers towards risk levels and potential losses. The findings also highlight the importance of consumers in the LCBs market. Future policies should encourage developers and consumers to jointly promote the LCBs implementation.

Research on the evolutionary game of multi-agent collaborative supervision of enterprise green behavior driven by big data

Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a tripartite game model—involving the government, enterprises, and environmental protection social organizations—to explore an effective path for the collaborative supervision of corporate green behavior by multiple agents in the context of modern digital technology. The impacts of participating agent strategies are analyzed numerically, and the key factors affecting the ideal state are explored and simulated. The main conclusions and insights are as follows: 1) An increase in government information disclosure can effectively constrain enterprises’ behavior, by confronting them with the prospect of loss of reputation. However, if the enterprises’ loss of reputation is excessive, they will feel over-regulated, which is not conducive their carrying out green innovation. Information disclosure does, however, have a role to play in transmitting environmental information to the public and environmental protection social organizations in a timely manner to reduce the information gap and promote the formation of multi-dimensional common governance. 2) By using big data, the government can not only save on government costs, but also more accurately identify and monitor in real time enterprises that are causing pollution and that are not using green technology. This can notably promote the evolution of all parties to an ideal state and improve the effectiveness of regulation. 3) When environmental social organizations provide enterprises with the necessary resource supports, this can significantly promote improvements in the enterprises’ level of enterprises’ green technology innovation. 4) Increased willingness on the part of the public to supervise can enhance the interaction between the public and environmental social organizations, prompting those organizations to actively carry out environmental protection activities and increase their popularity among the public, which will have a positive effect on how the system involving government, enterprises, and environmental protection social organizations evolves.

Blockchain-driven incentive mechanism for agricultural water-saving: A tripartite game model

Implementing water-saving agriculture is an important measure to alleviate water resource shortage, improve agricultural ecological environment, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. However, both water-saving service companies (WSSCs) and farmers often lack the motivation to adopt water-saving practices due to the high implementation costs involved. To overcome this shortcoming, this study aims to design a blockchain-driven incentive mechanism based on the evolutionary game theory, in which the government, WSSCs and farmers are game subjects and the idea of cooperative incentive for the government is introduced. Through analyzing the complex interactions among various stakeholders and agricultural water-saving incentives, some findings of this study are obtained. Firstly, the usage of blockchain technology (BT) in the incentive mechanism for agricultural water-saving is reflected in supervision and additional default costs, which promote the sustainable cooperation among government, WSSCs and farmers in varying degrees. Secondly, the additional default costs brought by the usage of BT have a deterrent effect on WSSCs and farmers, which makes them to actively implement water-saving practices. Thirdly, the additional default cost brought by BT has become the main basis for the government to choose BT supervision. As the additional default cost increases, the government are not more inclined to use BT. It provides valuable insights into motivating diverse stakeholders to actively participate in water-saving practices, promoting sustainable water resources management in agriculture.

Evolution of housing energy-efficient retrofitting game: A perspective of heterogeneous expectations on retrofit effects

Energy-efficient retrofitting (EER) of existing residential buildings holds significant potential for addressing environment and energy related issues. However, this potential remains largely untapped due to low EER rates and unsatisfactory EER effects. The widespread EER promotion and its benefits for sustainable development are hindered by the inactive participating of homeowners and (or) contractors and the lack of government supervision. To address these challenges, this study develops a tripartite game model for the government, the contractor, and the homeowner by concentrating on their expected EER effects. The strategy interactions among these stakeholders and their dynamic evolution were explored, and the stable strategy states and their formation conditions were identified. It was found that (1) positive engagement of the tripartite stakeholders in housing EER can be a stable strategy in reality; (2) EER effects plays a significant impact on the strategy stability; (3) governments’ incentives are necessary in approaching the ideal EER strategy equilibrium point, with a more pronounced influence on contractors compared to homeowners. In line with the findings, policy implications were provided to enhance the adoption of housing EER. This study contributes to a better understanding of large-scale EER promotion and provides a solid foundation for the development of a sustainable EER market involving multiple stakeholders.

Research on the behavioral choices of merchants, logistics enterprises and consumers participating in the recycling of excessive packaging for e-tailing goods

The resource and environmental problems caused by excessive packaging of e-tailing goods have attracted widespread attention, and its management has become an urgent task. To this end, we establish a tripartite game model of merchants, logistics enterprises and consumers to analyze the dynamic evolution process of behavioral choices. The results show that (1) the stage of environmental pollution positively promotes the behavioral choices of merchants, logistics enterprises and consumers. (2) Cost expenditures have a greater impact on the evolutionary path of merchants than the benefits generated by excessive packaging of e-tailing goods. (3) Penalties from online platforms have a greater impact on merchants’ evolutionary paths than rewards. This study provides a new perspective for the study of recycling of excessive packaging of e-tailing goods, and the conclusions of the study can provide a reference for governments to formulate effective policies on the management of excessive packaging of goods.

Optimizing Green Strategy for Retired Electric Vehicle Battery Recycling: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach

As the global new energy vehicle (NEV) industry rapidly expands, the disposal and recycling of end-of-life (EOL) power batteries have become imperative. Efficient closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management, supported by well-designed regulations and strategic investments, plays a crucial role in sustainable waste power battery recycling. In this study, an evolutionary game theory (EGT) methodology is used to construct a tripartite game model to investigate the interactions among manufacturers, recyclers, and the government to study the decision-making dynamics of green investments. In addition, numerical simulations are performed to evaluate the sensitivity of the relevant parameters on the stability of the evolution of the system. The results reveal that government green subsidies can stimulate early period investments in advanced recycling technologies. However, as the battery recycling industry matures, a ‘free-rider’ behavior emerges among enterprises, which can be mitigated through the imposition of a carbon tax. Eventually, as the industry reaches maturity, manufacturers and recyclers autonomously invest for enhanced profitability. This research provides valuable insights for government policy formulation, facilitating the formal recycling of retired batteries and fostering sustainability in the NEV sector.