Evolution of housing energy-efficient retrofitting game: A perspective of heterogeneous expectations on retrofit effects

Abstract

Energy-efficient retrofitting (EER) of existing residential buildings holds significant potential for addressing environment and energy related issues. However, this potential remains largely untapped due to low EER rates and unsatisfactory EER effects. The widespread EER promotion and its benefits for sustainable development are hindered by the inactive participating of homeowners and (or) contractors and the lack of government supervision. To address these challenges, this study develops a tripartite game model for the government, the contractor, and the homeowner by concentrating on their expected EER effects. The strategy interactions among these stakeholders and their dynamic evolution were explored, and the stable strategy states and their formation conditions were identified. It was found that (1) positive engagement of the tripartite stakeholders in housing EER can be a stable strategy in reality; (2) EER effects plays a significant impact on the strategy stability; (3) governments’ incentives are necessary in approaching the ideal EER strategy equilibrium point, with a more pronounced influence on contractors compared to homeowners. In line with the findings, policy implications were provided to enhance the adoption of housing EER. This study contributes to a better understanding of large-scale EER promotion and provides a solid foundation for the development of a sustainable EER market involving multiple stakeholders.