Blockchain-driven incentive mechanism for agricultural water-saving: A tripartite game model

Abstract

Implementing water-saving agriculture is an important measure to alleviate water resource shortage, improve agricultural ecological environment, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. However, both water-saving service companies (WSSCs) and farmers often lack the motivation to adopt water-saving practices due to the high implementation costs involved. To overcome this shortcoming, this study aims to design a blockchain-driven incentive mechanism based on the evolutionary game theory, in which the government, WSSCs and farmers are game subjects and the idea of cooperative incentive for the government is introduced. Through analyzing the complex interactions among various stakeholders and agricultural water-saving incentives, some findings of this study are obtained. Firstly, the usage of blockchain technology (BT) in the incentive mechanism for agricultural water-saving is reflected in supervision and additional default costs, which promote the sustainable cooperation among government, WSSCs and farmers in varying degrees. Secondly, the additional default costs brought by the usage of BT have a deterrent effect on WSSCs and farmers, which makes them to actively implement water-saving practices. Thirdly, the additional default cost brought by BT has become the main basis for the government to choose BT supervision. As the additional default cost increases, the government are not more inclined to use BT. It provides valuable insights into motivating diverse stakeholders to actively participate in water-saving practices, promoting sustainable water resources management in agriculture.