Forces Treaty Research Articles

United States Responses to the Soviet Suppression of Rebellions in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia

Under Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson, the United States refrained from intervening during the three major Cold War crises in the Soviet bloc in 1953, 1956, and 1968. The uprisings in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary came at a contentious stage of the Cold War. In 1968 East–West relations were again groping towards détente and, the Czechoslovak Communist Party unleashed an ambitious reform agenda under Alexander Dubček. On 20 August, a massive military invasion by Warsaw Pact forces squashed the reform spirit. All three challenges to Soviet control on the periphery of its Cold War empire followed power struggles in the Kremlin and intimations of a slackening of the reigns of control in Moscow. Eastern Europe was terra incognita for most Americans, and the United States had never pursued an active policy in Eastern Europe. All three crisis scenarios were overshadowed by crises in other parts of the world—part of larger arcs of crises the superpowers were confronting simultaneously. The three crises also coincided, domestically, with intense presidential election politics. Washington ultimately respected the Yalta arrangements and tolerated the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Next to grudging respect for the Yalta outcomes, the ultimate spectre of mutual destruction in a nuclear war “compelled” the superpowers towards co-existence and, ultimately, in 1989, the satellite states had to liberate themselves.

Limiting hydrochemical factors for sustainability of water resources: The Cisjordanian experience

In Cisjordan, surface- and groundwater flow are either towards the Jordan Valley–Dead Sea–Arava Valley (the Rift) or the Mediterranean Sea. Due to upstream exploitation by riparians to the Jordan River, the historical annual flow, which fluctuated between 250 and 1100 Mm 3, has declined to a mere 100–200 Mm 3. The remaining flow south of Lake Kinneret is highly polluted and heavily loaded with salts. Lake Kinneret (Sea of Galilee) is one of the major water resources in the area. Annually, between 200 and 700 Mm 3 reach the Lake as surface and groundwater flow. The relatively high salinity of the Lake is caused by thermomineral water discharging from springs and seepages located onshore and on the bottom of the Lake. The main factors causing deterioration of the groundwater quality in the Rift are of geogenic character. These are different types of brines, whose outflow and penetration into freshwater aquifers was triggered by overpumpage. Contemporary encroachment of seawater caused by intensive water exploitation in the Coastal Plain is manageable and reversible. However, due to lack of hydrogeological evidence, no such statement can be made about the circulation of seawater beneath the Coastal Plain and into the deep-seated Yarkon–Taninim aquifer or the upflow of brines in the Rift. The flow regimes of the different brine bodies could not be elucidated. Whether each such brine-body flows by its particular hydrological regime or whether the movement of the different bodies is intradependent or interdependent with the regional movement of fresh groundwater, remain open questions. Therefore, sustainable development of groundwater resources is clearly dependent on the elucidation of the relationship between changes in the pressure of the brine with depth and its relationship to the overlying freshwater. The average total annual recharge of all water sources in Cisjordan is 1820 Mm 3, which means that the total production of water must be managed within the limits of this annual volume. During drought years, total groundwater extraction exceeds the safe yield, causing drastic lowering of water levels and upflow of saline waters from greater depths. Because of the structural complexity of aquifers and hydrochemical variability of the numerous groundwater bodies, new hydrochemical methods have been developed for the identification of groundwater bodies and for the elucidation of their origins. These methods combine macrochemical, microchemical, and isotopic evidences. By combining distribution patterns of rare earths, yttrium and stable isotopes, a complete picture of catchment lithology and the altitude and latitude of precipitation could be obtained. The area west of the Jordan River is characterized by the occurrence of transboundary surface- and groundwater basins in which fresh and saline water and brines flow across political borders between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It is very difficult to assess separately the annual safe yield of water resources for each of the two national entities. Neither country may dispose independently of its waters and is usually at the mercy of the other riparian. There is as yet no general multilateral international treaty in force allocating the water resources of international watercourses. At present there are two rules for the management of the waters of an international drainage basin—the rule of Equitable Distribution, and the obligation Not to Cause Significant Harm. The rules of equitable distribution have tended to focus on the issue of quantities of water rather than on quality of water, which is really relevant to the issue of equitable distribution. Future negotiations on the uses of the basin will need to deal with issues of characteristic salinities and geochemical features and on their impact on equitable sharing of water resources.

The Chinese nuclear tests, 1964–1996

A combination of intellectual rigor, technical sophistication, hard work, and intelligence gathering brought China into the world’s nuclear club in record-shattering time.

Strategic rivalry in the Asia–Pacific theater: a new nuclear arms race?

Abstract While the progress to date on denuclearizing North Korea is encouraging, proclaiming the end of nuclear threats in Northeast Asia is premature. First, North Korea has lately been having second thoughts with regard to full disclosure of its nuclear holdings. Second, and more seriously, the deterioration of Russo-American relations over nuclear issues is not confined to a strictly European agenda. Issues arising out of the Bush administration's nuclear strategy that seem to expand the parameters for first-strike use by America, the future of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, and missile defenses in Asia in the context of revivified U.S. alliances in Asia have all appeared on the agenda and could lead to negative consequences for Asian security. Two potential consequences in particular could emerge. One could be a nuclear arms race between Moscow and Washington, while another could see further movement toward the consolidation of a genuine Sino-Russian bloc in opposition to what Mo...

Intelligence within BAOR and NATO's Northern Army Group

During the Cold War the UK's principal military role was its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) through the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), together with wartime command of NATO's Northern Army Group. The possibility of a surprise attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces ensured that great importance was attached to intelligence, warning and rapid mobilisation. As yet we know very little about the intelligence dimension of BAOR and its interface with NATO allies. This article attempts to address these neglected issues, ending with the impact of the 1973 Yom Kippur War upon NATO thinking about warning and surprise in the mid-1970s. It concludes that the arrangements made by Whitehall for support to BAOR from national assets during crisis or transition to war were – at best – improbable. Accordingly, over the years, BAOR developed its own unique assets in the realm of both intelligence collection and special operations in order to prepare for the possible outbreak of conflict.

A Turkish Nuclear Turnaround

T HE PROBABILITY THAT STATES or terrorist groups will detonate elaborate or crude nuclear devices increases with the spread of the materials and technology used in the manufacture of these weapons. Before it is too late, every nation must start thinking about effective ways to get rid of their existing nuclear arsenals. To that end, Turkish officials should seriously consider returning the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that have been deployed in Turkey since the 1960s as part of NATO's nuclear posture. Turkish officials still believe these weapons have a deterrent value because the Middle East and the adjacent regions are far from being peaceful or stable due to the chaos in Iraq and the interminable Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Added to these concerns are the unknowns about Iran's nuclear capabilities and intentions, as well as Russia's negative stance regarding the implementation of the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that nuclear weapons have become inappropriate in the face of the new threats posed to the free world by terrorist organizations. The sui generis conditions of the superpower rivalry during the Cold War period cannot and therefore should not be used as a pretext for keeping the existing

In Search of Coherence in EU Foreign Policy

While attributing the main tasks relating to CFSP to various institutions, the EU Treaty mirrors the traditional EU structure, which does not appear to be able to provide the coherence and efficiency needed in the foreign policy field. The Constitutional Treaty attempted to achieve coherence by introducing important changes, including an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs (the “double-hatting” solution). After the CT ratification failures, however, thought must be directed at finding steps that lead towards the CT solutions but are at the same time compatible with the TEU. While double-hatting is difficult to reconcile with some of the TEU's provisions, other measures and devices could to some extent anticipate the CT's perspective without contravening the treaties in force.

The Proliferation of Bits: Conflicts of Treaties, Proceedings and Awards

The considerable number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in force has given rise to conflicts when, in relation to the same subject matter, a right of action exits for a given investor (or related investors) under different BITs. In fact, two recent international disputes, the CME v. Czech Republic and Lauder v. Czech Republic arbitrations, have attracted widespread attention as the first example in which this situation has arisen. The same acts by the Czech Republic were subject to two separate arbitrations conducted concurrently. The two cases, however, underwent conflicting procedures, were dealt with under conflicting governing treaty provisions and resulted in seemingly conflicting awards. This situation has highlighted the risks inherent in the current international investment regime of intricate, non-coordinated networks of BITs. The fundamental risk is that this glaring inconsistency could potentially bring a backlash against international investment. On the other hand, the speedy completion of all litigation in the Czech cases (including full payment by the State concerned), notwithstanding these complexities, indicates that international commercial arbitration (rather than institutional frameworks providing for remedies such as consolidation of proceedings) may effectively resolve disputes, with full respect given to substantive law and due process. The CME/Lauder v. Czech Republic arbitrations were possibly the first publicly known disputes under a BIT decided through international commercial arbitration proceedings in accordance with the UNCITRAL rules instead of within the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The national courts of the country where the award was rendered, Sweden, had to rule on the challenge, brought in accordance with the local arbitration statute, by the losing State, in which the Czech Republic argued to set aside the awards based on the alleged conflict of the two proceedings and resulting awards. This Essay considers the implications of these proceedings and subsequent judicial rulings.

ОТ мрака «нормализации» к миражу демократизации: к вопросу о «бархатном» разводе Чехов и Словаков

The subject of the considerations is the Czechoslovak „Velvet Revolution” and in particular its influence on the decomposition of Czechoslovak statehood. In the very title, the adjective „velvet” does not relate to the „revolution” but to a (civilized) „divorce” of the Czechs from the Slovaks. The influence the opposition exerted on the establishment of two separate states is assessed as the events of the „Velvet Revolution” were supposed to solve one of the most acute problems of the 75-year-old organism. Since the „Prague Spring” of 1968 and „socialism with a human face” there have existed realistic proposals on how to normalize the coexistence of the Czechs and theSlovaks within a single state – the „Spring” was to bring the elements of market economy and independence as well as to redefine the issues of a federation state. The events of the last 25 years in Czechoslovakia are analyzed from this perspective: the activity of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia prior to the invasion of the Warsaw Pact forces, maintenance of „Charter 77”, later (Czechoslovak) Democratic Initiative and the Club for Socialist Reconstruction (as well as the Civic Forum) until the collapse of 1993, which was opposed by both Havel and Czarnogursky until the very end.

Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe by David J. s> Betz (review)

548 SEER, 83, 3, 2005 Betz, DavidJ. Civil-Militay Relations inRussiaandEastern Europe. RoutledgeCurzon ContemporaryRussia and EasternEurope Series, 2. RoutledgeCurzon , London and New York, 2004. ix + 203 pp. Notes. Select bibliography.Index. [65.00. ONE of the difficultieswith the subjectof civil-militaryrelations,asDavid Betz mentions in this book, is that what it contains depends to a very large extent on the particular civil society and the military establishment with which it concernsitself.The liberalWesterndiscourse,at leastin the decade before the recentoperationsinAfghanistanand Iraq,seemed to be principallyconcerned with ensuring that the ethnic, gender and disability balance in the armed forcesreflectedthatin society at large.In Centraland EasternEuropeand the formerSoviet Union, in contrast,the questionsweremuch more fundamental. What was the military'sfunction? How much discussion should there be in public about issues of national security?How could governments and voters ensure that money allocated from meagre national budgets for defence was being spent effectively? Approached for advice and assistance,the West, and NATO in particular, insistedthat therewere no rightanswersto these questions.But they did offer two main types of supportfor newly democratic countries that wished to reengineer Warsaw Pact forces into national armed services. One, which culminated in NATO membership for several countries, was assistancewith the designof structuresto manage, forexample, policyplanning,procurement and budgeting business process skillswhich had been entirely lacking in many East European ministries before I989, not just in the ministries of defence. The other was to develop programmes of military-to-military contacts, exercises and trainingcourses, often based on existingprogrammes into which newcomerscould be assimilated. But thejamboree of internationaldefence (andlatersecuritysector)reform initiativesbarely touched civil society. The effect of this Betz makes clear in this admirable exposition of the defence transformationprocesses in Poland, Hungary, Ukraine and Russia between i 989 and 200I. Societies for which defence matters were a deliberately closed book had to develop almost overnight a coherent new version of the military'splace in society, as well as structuresand institutionsto monitor their work. The false starts,the power struggles, the interplay of strategic policy development with day-to-day decisions, which Betz explains in meticulous but very readable detail, are a salutaryreminder of how much those with a more settled military tradition takefor grantedin the fieldof civil-militaryrelations. On one level, it makesfor depressingreading.As Betz remindshis readers, none of the four countries whose experience he analyses has solved all the problems. One, Russia, has arguably yet to acknowledge that the question remainsto be addressed.But, illuminatedby extensive quotationsfrommany of the protagonists,as an epitome of the politicalprocessesat play in a crucial (though not strictly speaking revolutionary)phase in European history, the subjectmatter could not be bettered. Betz's treatmentof the subjectis also of an extremely high standard. Whilst bowing to the demands of the theoreticians , he lays out with exquisite accuracy the twists and turns of the REVIEWS 549 transformationprocess in his chosen countries,which have been well chosen to illustrate the variety of approaches and experiences common to several more countries at that time. The reader is able to read across the chronicle and see the effectof each decision, largeor small,in the widerframework. Betz is also correct in emphasizing the value of interviews and personal comment in evaluating the process in each country. The fundamentalpolicy documents and institutionswhose various incarnationshe charts,quotes and footnotes extensively -which future historiansand analystswill find a very valuable resource - are often so bland that only their rapid creation from tabulaerasaeis remarkable. What is utterly invaluable is the way Betz accompanies this blandness with the trenchant views of those who were instrumentalin theircreation- views about content and function, and what the realissueswere. Insightslikethese are often lost to posterity,or ignoredby foreignresearcherspreoccupiedwith formand processratherthan power and substance. For this very reason Betz's book should be required reading for political scientists. Apart from occasional lapses in orthography,my only criticismis that the book does not cover as much as it could. Fuller treatment of two areas in particularwould have made Betz'streatmentexemplaryratherthan outstanding . First,given the degree of ignoranceof militarymattersin the 'civil'halfof the equation, I would have welcomed a discussionof the role (orfailure)of the media in enhancing mutualunderstanding. Secondly, as evidenced by the Russian military'sweak grasp of the new political processes...

The Decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada)

SummaryIn the spring of 1999, the NATO allies conducted a bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for several weeks. The campaign was a response to the failure of negotiations at Rambouillet, France, relating to a situation in Kosovo that United Nations agencies had characterized as a “humanitarian crisis.” In late April, only a few days after filing an Optional Clause declaration under the Statute of the International Court of Justice accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the court subject to reservations, Yugoslavia initiated proceedings in the court against ten NATO allies, including Canada. The application was accompanied by a request for the indication of “provisional measures” pursuant to the statute, enjoining the NATO allies from continuing the use of force against Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia relied upon its new declaration and upon the compromissary clause of the Genocide Convention as grounds of jurisdiction. In June 1999, the court refused the request for provisional measures on the ground that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction. Canada and other remaining respondents filed preliminary objections on jurisdiction and admissibility. The objections on jurisdiction were based on the grounds that had been advanced at the provisional measures stage and largely endorsed by the court: first, that Yugoslavia was not then a member of the United Nations and was therefore not entitled to make an Optional Clause declaration; second, that the declaration was limited to future disputes; and, third, that the subject matter of the dispute was not covered by the Genocide Convention, which could therefore not be invoked to establish jurisdiction.Following oral hearings in April 2004, the court ruled in a judgment of 15 December 2004 that it lacked jurisdiction. The ruling was based exclusively on the fact that Yugoslavia lacked United Nations membership and standing in the court in 1999. The judgment concludes that the exception in Article 35(2) of the statute relating to “treaties in force” does not entitle a non-member of the United Nations to appear before the court in a matter related to the Genocide Convention, which the Court interprets as applying only to treaties in existence before 1945. This reasoning came as a surprise, since the court had assiduously avoided the issue of UN membership both in its provisional measures ruling and in its decisions in closely related proceedings taken by Bosnia and Croatia against Yugoslavia pursuant to the Genocide Convention. It remains to be seen how the judgment will be reconciled with rulings already made on jurisdiction in the proceedings taken by Bosnia, where jurisdiction has already been confirmed and where hearings on the merits are scheduled for 2006.

Fire Brigade or Tocsin? NATO's ACE Mobile Force, Flexible Response and the Cold War

During the Cold War, NATO planners created the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) to implement proto-flexible response strategies. Originally conceived as a means to plug gaps in the NATO Central Region "Shield" forces with portable tactical nuclear weapons, ACE Mobile Force evolved into a signalling device intended to forestall an escalatory situation with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces on NATO's northern and southern flanks. The story of ACE Mobile Force is a lens from which to view the implementation of Flexible Response, particularly in the mature period of the 1970s and 1980s.

The Struggle Against the Bomb. Volume 3. Towards Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present (review)

Reviewed by: The Struggle Against the Bomb. Volume 3. Towards Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present Joseph P. Harahan The Struggle Against the Bomb. Volume 3. Towards Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present. By Lawrence S. Wittner. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8047-4862-4. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 657. $75.00. In the third volume of his encyclopedic The Struggle Against the Bomb, Lawrence Wittner presents a comprehensive, chronological narrative of the global antinuclear peace movement. Starting in 1971 and ending in 2002, Wittner narrates the ebb and flow of national and international peace organization across Europe, the Soviet Union, North America, South America, Asia, and Australia. He documents and analyses a range of public activities: massed marches, petition drives, blockades of missile sites, antinuclear films, television documentaries, conferences, meetings, and public opinion polls. Wittner asserts that the cumulative effect of these global antinuclear activities, which continued year after year at differing levels of intensity, caused the international system to consider, discuss, negotiate, ratify, and implement a series of dramatic arms reduction treaties and agreements in the 1990s: Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Conventional Arms Reduction Treaty in Europe (CFE), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Treaty. These major treaties, he argues, were never achieved easily; national and international military industrial complexes were powerful, entrenched, and influential. In recent years, he writes that the United States revived the nuclear arms race precisely at a time when the public antinuclear movement was at a low point. [End Page 1322] Lawrence Wittner in this volume, indeed in the previous two, rejects the idea that nuclear weapons should constitute any part of any country's national security strategy. However, nuclear weapons were and are a part of many countries' national security strategies. That is not an idea, but historical reality. During the Cold War, military commanders, national leaders, political parties, and large sections of the public endorsed the fusing of nuclear weapons and modern weapons systems—bombers, missiles, submarines—into nuclear deterrence forces. This broad, entrenched consensus, especially in the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union, made it extremely difficult for the antinuclear movement to influence changes in national security strategy. Wittner has written a comprehensive history of one element forcing change; however, it was not the only one. Others, sustained diplomacy on nuclear arms reductions over twenty years, critical national leadership, especially by Mikhail Gorbachev, George H. W. Bush, and James A. Baker, and the acceptance of new methods of verification, on-site inspections, along with satellite and technical intelligence, all played a role in shaping the contemporary world of controlling and reducing nuclear weapons. Joseph P. Harahan Defense Threat Reduction Agency Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. Copyright © 2004 Society for Military History

Commentary: ICSID Proceedings in the Absence of a Bilateral Investment Treaty

THE ARGUMENT you just heard was couched in terms of the substantive obligations imposed by the bilateral investment treaty in force between the State of Abyssinia and the United States. The question that I have been asked to address in my commentary is this: what if there were no BIT? How would the applicable law, and the applicable arguments, be different if this were an ICSID arbitration founded solely on the consent to ICSID arbitration in Abyssinia's municipal investment legislation and the investor's consent to submit the case to arbitration under the ICSID Convention? Before I begin, I should note that the comments that I'm about to give are in my capacity as a private citizen, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government or the US State Department. In fact, the US Government has never had occasion to develop any such views by participating in...

México y la extradición de nacionales

Los argumentos en contra de la extradición defienden la visión de que los nacionales estarán en desventaja en tribunales extranjeros o que otros sistemas jurídicos no aseguran que exista un juicio justo. Los países del common law están más dispuestos a extraditar a sus nacionales, mientras que los países del civil law sólo admitirán la extradición de sus nacionales en circunstancias excepcionales. Desde 1995 la política mexicana ha sido profundamente revisada, y el principio de aut dedere aut judicare en el tratado en vigor ha favorecido el castigo de presuntos criminales aunque no sean extraditados. La Suprema Corte de Justicia de México ha fallado para resolver una contradicción entre tribunales de menor jerarquía respecto de la facultad del Ejecutivo de extraditar a nacionales mexicanos. La solución, que el autor explica, es que el Código Penal mexicano no impide al Ejecutivo extraditar nacionales, sino que se aplica el artículo 9.1 del tratado en vigor.

Challenges to Disarmament Regimes: The Case of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

A disarmament treaty is an agent of change in the international security environment in its own right. Disarmament requires the total elimination of the weaponry under consideration. At minimum, the agreement could therefore be expected to remove the threat posed by that weaponry from the overall threat equation. Unfortunately, the effect of a disarmament treaty on the external security of a state is not as straightforward: the security bene® ts obtained under the treaty must be evaluated relative to the possible security losses in other domains. The research into disarmament dynamics and their impact on security is constrained by the fact that only four disarmament treaties exist: the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1997 Anti-personnel Mines (APM) Treaty. They cover different weapon categories and, because of the compartmentalisation of analysis, few connections between them have ever been made. Furthermore, the four treaties vary in scope, participation and enforceability. The INF Treaty was negotiated between two states, the United States and the USSR, and is applicable only to a wellcircumscribed territory. It calls for veri® cation and on-site inspections, which

Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces

This article provides a brief overview of current debates in Russia on nuclear weapons before examining several factors that suggest that Moscow's interest in arms control arrangements affecting its NSNF is likely to be limited. Indeed, while Moscow has maintained its demands since the 1950s that all US nuclear forces in Europe be removed, its willingness to retain existing arms control limits such as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and less formal obligations such as the 1991-2 unilaterial commitments on NSNF may be in decline. Moreover, Russia's implementation of the latter commitments remains unclear. The prospects for Moscow's endorsing new negotiated constraints on Russian NSNF therefore appears doubtful.

The Interpretation of “Treaties in Force” in Article 35(2) of the Statute of the ICJ

Every member State of the United Nations is a party to the Statute (the Statute) of the International Court of Justice (the Court or ICJ).1 In addition, a non-member State may also become a party to the Statute.2 The Court is open to the States parties to the Statute.3 As to those States that are not parties to the Statute, Article 35(2) of the Statute provides:The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other states shall, subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security Council, but in no case shall such conditions place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court.

A proposal for a South Asian intermediate nuclear forces treaty

This article proposes that the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty be applied as a model for a missile‐ban treaty between India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan are developing and deploying missiles whose use could be devastating on the densely populated subcontinent. Moreover, missile limits are more amenable to verification than are agreements to reduce or eliminate warheads of mass destruction. Key problems for a South Asian INF treaty include the status of China, the mechanics of verification, and the potential for using space‐launch vehicles as offensive weapons. Above all, both India and Pakistan must perceive such a missile agreement as enhancing their national security.

The Effect of the Independence of Quebec upon Treaties and Agreements with the United States of America

Introduction Following the very close results of the 1995 Referendum on Quebec's independence, and with the expectation of another referendum to be held within the next few years, a practical and informed consideration of the effect that independence would have on the 272 bilateral treaties and other international agreements between Canada and the United States of America and the many multilateral conventions binding the two countries is necessary and desirable. (1) Those supporting independence have been asserting the view that an independent Quebec certainly would succeed, as a matter of international law, more or less automatically to such agreements. Such a view, however, fails to reflect how difficult it is for new states to cope with hundreds, even thousands, of treaties to which their predecessor states were parties. (2) Those offering assurances of certain mistakenly rely upon inapposite international law principles of state in respect of treaties and misapprehension of United States practice in this regard. In fact, an independent Quebec would face a clean slate as regards all Canadian treaties and other international agreements; that is, the continuation of such instruments in force in respect of an independent Quebec would be an issue in virtually each case, and hence subject to discussion at the political level with the other State Party or States Parties (and, in many cases, to legislative action). Specifically, such important agreements as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), (3) the Agreement Concerning Automotive Products (Auto Pact), (4) the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994 GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), (5) the United States-Canada Tax Treaty, (6) the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) Agreement, (7) and the Boundary Waters Treaty, (8) to note only the most prominent, all would require political negotiations and action in order for them to be applied to an independent Quebec. Moreover, of those six agreements two might well require United States Senate advice and consent to ratification (the United States-Canada Tax Treaty and the Boundary Waters Treaty), two definitely would require approval of both Houses of Congress (NAFTA and the Auto Pact), and one definitely would require an affirmative vote of an international organization (WTO and GATT). The Applicable International Law Principles The customary international law principle as regards of States to treaties that is applicable to an independent Quebec is that When part of a state becomes a new state, the new state does not succeed to the international agreements to which the predecessor state was party, unless, expressly or by implication, it accepts such agreements and the other party or parties thereto agree or acquiesce. (9) The applicability of this principle to an independent Quebec is underscored by supporting authoritative commentary to the effect that this clean-slate theory applies both to newly independent states and to a state separated from another by secession or other circumstances. (10) Thus treaties and other international agreements apply in respect of the new State only if there is mutual agreement. Some have argued that a presumption of succession would be applied to treaties between a sovereign Quebec and the United States. That position, insofar as it would be relevant to an independent Quebec, appears to be derived from Article 34(1) of the Vienna Convention On Succession Of States In Respect Of Treaties, which provides that, in principle, When a part... of the territory of a State separate[s] to form [a] State [], whether or not the predecessor State continues to exist... any treaty in force at the date of the of States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State continues in force in respect of [the] successor State so formed. …