Translation Proviso Research Articles

Jürgen Habermas’s Translation of the Human Being as Created in the Image of God: Perspectives from Joseph Ratzinger and Alasdair MacIntyre

This paper considers Habermas’s translation proviso, which requires religious concepts to be translated into secular language when in the public sphere. Translation, for Habermas, protects the state from religious interference and elicits essential aspects of pre-rational thought—that is, religious and metaphysical thought, which post-metaphysics cannot generate for itself, e.g., social solidarity. The task undertaken by Habermas’s translation proviso is illustrated through his own work of translation: that of the translation of the biblical image of humanity as created in the image of God into the identical dignity of each human being. To provide context to and to highlight the difficulties involved in Habermas’s translation proviso, consideration is given to the thought of Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI and Alasdair MacIntyre on these themes. What is demonstrated is that Habermas’s translation is, in essence, assimilation and re-appropriation. In practice, it manifests itself as the truncation of Christian metaphysics, in which the divine Logos is replaced by or collapsed into the logos of intersubjective human language. The relational image of humanity as a creature distinct from the Creator, in which human reason is analogous to divine reason, is erased, leaving autonomous human beings, from which human reason emerges out of the discursive communication of the logos of intersubjective human language. The conclusion is that the translation proviso fails in its objective. An alternative to Habermas’s translation proviso, the presupposition proviso, is presented as a more apt approach to addressing the underlying issues involved: facilitating human flourishing in an orderly, free, and just society.

The Habermasian Translation Proviso of Religious Content

Habermas’s translation proviso aims to legitimize religious argumentation in the informal part of the public sphere while requiring religious citizens to express their arguments in the formal part of the public sphere using a universal (secular) language. By considering secular scholars Gonzalo Scivoletto’s and Javier Aguirre’s critiques of the meaning of “translation,” this article highlights the inconsistency of the proviso as manifested in its application to the religious concept of tzimtzum (“divine contraction”), from which Habermas attempts to extract a secular worldview and moral intuitions that contradict the beliefs of religious citizens, thus undermining the reassessment of religion in the public sphere.

Rethinking Public Religion in Korea: The Role of Religions in the Era of Climate Crisis

This paper attempts to explore the public dimension of religion in Korea. First, it examines the Western and East Asian contexts on the concept of ’public’, noting that the gap in notions of public is large between East Asian and Western traditions. The following section discusses Habermas’ ‘institutional translation proviso’ in relation to the notion ‘public’. The institutional translation proviso serves as the basis for further discussion on rethinking the public role of religion in Korea in the era of climate crisis. We argue that ‘secular’ translations of religious convictions can help religious citizens and communities engage in public discourses on ecological challenges. We then consider major limitations of Habermas’ understanding of religion. In the following section, we move on to discuss Albert Schweitzer and process theology in order to demonstrate how religious languages can be reinterpreted on the basis of modern experiences of ecological challenges. We then consider Buddhist alternatives for overcoming the climate crisis. The final section introduces José Casanova’s account of public religions and discusses its implication for envisioning the public role of religious organizations in ecological efforts. Reviewing the contributions made by religious organizations to the Korean society, we suggest that ‘ecological publicness’ of religion can be obtained.

Islamic feminism and the renegotiation of new knowledge through translation

ABSTRACT Despite the fact that Islamic feminism is still a contested area, many studies have been conducted under its name. The Qur’an and Prophetic traditions being at the core of feminists’ work discussing gender inequalities from a faith-oriented position entails an inevitable process of translation, between Arabic and other languages, of works dealing with gender injustices. The article draws on the Habermasian concept of the “translation proviso” addressing the interaction in the public sphere between those who invoke religion and those who do not; and on Jakobson’s concepts of interlingual and intralingual translation. By examining works in English by Islamic feminists, such concepts are employed to show that language, meaning and translation must be considered in discussing their debates on establishing gender equity. Thus, language could indeed be an important starting point for dismantling misconceptions about feminism and the potential mutual learning process achieved when feminism is practiced from a faith-based perspective.

Moderate Inclusivism and the Conversational Translation Proviso: Revising Habermas' Ethics of Citizenship

Habermas’ ‘ethics of citizenship’ raises a number of relevant concerns about the dangers of a secularistic exclusion of religious contributions to public deliberation, on the one hand, and the dangers of religious conflict and sectarianism in politics, on the other. Agreeing largely with these concerns, the paper identities four problems with Habermas’ approach, and attempts to overcome them: (a) the full exclusion of religious reasons from parliamentary debate; (b) the full inclusion of religious reasons in the informal public sphere; (c) the philosophical distinction between secular and religious reasons; and (d) the sociological distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ religions. The result is a revised version of the ethics of citizenship, which I call moderate inclusivism. Most notably, moderate inclusivism implies a replacement of Habermas’ ‘institutional translation proviso’ with a more flexible ‘conversational translation proviso’.

Habermas, Taylor, and Connolly on Secularism, Pluralism, and the Post-Secular Public Sphere

The main purpose of this paper is to explore and understand the relationships between secularism, pluralism, and the post-secular public sphere in the thought of Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, and William Connolly. The three authors develop a thorough critique of secularism which implies a radical break with the dogmatic idea of removing religion from the public sphere. My main objective is to show that this critique is related to a normative understanding of our post-secular situation and requires a rethinking of the boundaries of the public sphere in relation to the predicament of pluralism. Arguing against the post-metaphysical conception of secularism, Taylor develops a critique of Habermas’s “institutional translation proviso”, and Connolly stresses the agonistic dimension of the post-secular public sphere. I take these criticisms into account, while arguing that Taylor and Connolly are unable to provide a sound basis for the legitimacy of our institutional settings. In contrast to Taylor and Connolly, I propose a reading of Habermas’s theory based on the internal relationship between universal justification and the everyday contexts of pre-political solidarity. I conclude with a focus on the need to take into account the agonistic dimension of the post-secular public sphere.

In Defense of Moderate Inclusivism: Revisiting Rawls and Habermas on Religion in the Public Sphere

The paper discusses Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories of deliberative democracy, focusing on the question of religious reasons in political discourse. Whereas Rawls as well as Habermas defend a fully inclusivist position on the use of religious reasons in the ‘background culture’ (Rawls) or ‘informal public sphere’ (Habermas), we defend a moderately inclusivist position. Moderate inclusivism welcomes religiously inspired contributions to public debate, but it also makes normative demands on public argumentation beyond the ‘public forum’ (Rawls) or ‘formal public sphere’ (Habermas). In particular, moderate inclusivism implies what we call a ‘conversational translation proviso’ according to which citizens have a duty to supplement religious with proper political arguments if – but only if – they are asked to do so by their co-discussants. This position, we argue, is more in line with the deeper intuitions behind Rawls’ political liberalism and Habermas’ deliberative model than is the fully inclusivist alternative. 
 Keywords: conversational translation proviso, deliberative democracy, ethics of citizenship, Habermas, moderate inclusivism, public reason, Rawls

No proviso: Habermas on Rawls, religion and public reason

In this article, I argue that a common view of Habermas’s theory of public reason, which takes it to be similar to Rawls’s ‘proviso’, is mistaken. I explain why that mistake arises, and show that those who have made it have thus overlooked the distinctiveness of Habermas’s theory and approach. Consequently, I argue, they tend to wrongly infer that objections directed at Rawls’s ‘proviso’ apply also to Habermas’s ‘institutional translation proviso’. Ironically, Habermas’s attempt to rebut those objections leads him to advance a peculiar, and ultimately indefensible, thesis about the cognitive requirements of democratic citizenship for secular citizens. I argue that the underlying problem that Habermas takes the peculiar thesis to solve is not that the public reason requirements of the secular state are unfair towards religious citizens, or biased towards secular views of the world, but that the nature of religious arguments, and of scientism, as Habermas understands these, prevents citizens who adhere to them from participating in discourse. I end by suggesting a simpler, less controversial solution to that problem.

The Reciprocal Translation Proviso: An Alternative Approach to Public Reason

AbstractThe role of religion in politics is problematic for liberal legitimacy. Religion is often restrained by a public reason requirement, but this creates cognitive burdens that asymmetrically impact religious citizens creating unequal barriers to accessing the political system, which is itself problematic for liberal legitimacy. Habermas’ institutional translation proviso balances the competing concerns of liberal legitimacy, which aims to offset the asymmetry disadvantaging religious citizens. This paper analyzes the problem and Habermas’ solution. It concludes that Habermas does not alleviate the asymmetry created by the public reason requirement to the greatest extent possible and so does not equalize the barriers to accessing the political system as much as he might. The reciprocal translation proviso provides an alternative that balances the competing components of liberal legitimacy more fully and alleviates the asymmetry and inequality of barriers to political access to the greatest extent possible while preserving the public reason requirement.

Secularism vs. Post-Secularism: A Critical Examination of Cooke’s Post-Secular Alternative

ABSTRACTIn recent work, Maeve Cooke has criticised Jürgen Habermas’s post-metaphysical model in order to motivate an alternative “post-secular” conception of the state, which involves the replacement of the “institutional translation proviso” with the “nonauthoritarian reasoning requirement”. I provide a qualified defence of the Habermasian model by arguing that it does not lead to the kind of negative consequences regarding legitimacy and solidarity Cooke attributes to it. This, in turn, means that Cooke’s proposal for the secular foundation of political authority on a post-secular basis is insufficiently motivated. In the process, I argue that the point of departure for the debate about religion in the public sphere shared by both Habermas and Cooke – the picture of the “total” religious citizen – should be rejected because it presupposes an overly simplistic view of religions and religious identities.

Habermas and Religious Communication: The Insufficiency of the Translation Proviso

Much has been debated and written about the translation proviso, its implications, and its rationality. At its core, it is about communication and a transition in religious communication that means it can become secularly engaged. This paper argues that the theory of the translation proviso is insufficient to accommodate religious communication and, in order to support the arguments made, considers associated aspects of the work of Habermas, such as solidarity, tolerance and universalism, as well, of course, as communication. Considerations in this wider context lead to a growing awareness that the translation proviso and its prescriptive tendencies may be seen as being an ominous contradiction of much of the other work of Habermas and that, far from being postmetaphysical and postmodern, it may have elements of being a ‘big idea’.

Found in Translation: Habermas and Anthropotechnics

In his recent work on postsecular societies Jürgen Habermas has stressed the need for a dialogue between religious and nonreligious citizens aimed at strengthening social integration and rejuvenating the moral bases of modern political and juridical institutions. This dialogue should focus on the translation of religious traditions into rational, secular forms. In his more recent work on the social function of rituals, however, he rejected the Durkheimian view of public secular rituals as mechanisms for fostering social integration. In this article I discuss Habermas’s early reflections on postsecularism and assess his interpretation of public religious rituals as sources of social integration. I then propose an alternative to his translation proviso whereby religious symbolic content would be translated into behavior-regulating technologies aimed at developing the dispositional resources needed for a continuous postsecular dialogue between religious and nonreligious citizens.

Habermas and Taylor on Religious Reasoning in a Liberal Democracy

This article compares Habermas’s and Taylor’s approach to the role of religious language in a liberal democracy. It shows that the difference in their approach is not simply in their theories of religious language. The contrast lies deeper, in their incompatible moral theories: Habermas’s universal discourse ethics vs Taylor’s communitarian substantive ethics. I also explore William Rehg’s defence of discourse ethics by conceding that it is based on a metavalue of rational consensus. However, I argue that Habermas’s and Rehg’s discourse ethics and translation proviso are untenable. While Taylor rightly argues that there is no reason to exclude religious reason from the formal political sphere, his proposed fusion of horizons to generate a new hybrid framework is also problematic. I suggest that Taylor’s historical hermeneutics should be extended to include the narrative approach to ethical deliberation as conducive to mutual experiential understanding, and hence to achieving a fusion of horizons of the diverse worlds of citizens in a liberal democracy.

Islamic thought and the public sphere

For the purpose of clarity I offer an operational definition of Islamic thought which is Sunni-based. The public sphere is placed in the context of deliberative politics as an ethical frame in which the following elements are assumed: freedom, equality, reciprocity, reasoning, choice, fraternity and solidarity. Three Islamic models are identified: model (A), the Sufi/individualist model; model (B), shariah-legal-religious nationalism; and model (C), the ethical model. Model (C) is taken to be the most relevant to the notion of deliberative politics. The implications of model (C) for the idea of individual, society and political authority are examined. The issue of translation proviso is then introduced in the context of examining the feasibility or otherwise for model (C) to become a dominant Islamic discourse. Finally, I introduce the notion of ‘silence’ as potentially useful for the idea of religion and deliberative politics.

Behind the Mask of the Secular

Jürgen Habermas, who popularized the concept of the “post-secular,” advocates that all citizens should be free to decide whether they want to use religious language in the public sphere. However, he adds the proviso that citizens who do so must accept that religious utterances ought to be translated into generally accessible language. Habermas presents this concept of “translation”—or the institutional translation proviso—as a way of bringing religious citizens into the public sphere. In his opinion, the public sphere and/or public institutions should not be open to any movement that tries to legitimize the nation on religious grounds. This paper shows that we can find logic and rhetoric that correspond to Habermas’s proviso in courtroom arguments over religion in Japan after World War II. By surveying these disputes, this paper examines whether or not the intended aims of the institutional translation proviso are achieved.

The Reconciliation of Religious and Secular Reasons as a Form of Epistemic Openness: Insights From Examples in the Philippines

Addressing the debate inspired by John Rawls's restrictive idea of the political role of religion, Jürgen Habermas proposes the institutional translation proviso as an alternative that corrects an overly secularist notion of the state. Maeve Cooke has suggested that religious arguments can be allowed without translation in the institutional level as long as they are non‐authoritarian. However, her definition of non‐authoritarianism requires an acceptance of the fallibility of the truths acquired by faith, which I argue is unnecessary. Instead, I propose that non‐authoritarianism is realized in the recognition of the reconcilability of religious and secular reasons. I demonstrate the viability of this form of non‐authoritarianism using particular examples from the Philippine context. I conclude that these attempts constitute an alternative form of epistemic openness to the more stringent forms that Habermas and Cooke have proposed.

An Inquiry into Habermas’ Institutional Translation Proviso

The task of this paper is to argue against the opponents of Habermas’ institutional translation proviso. The opponents argue against Habermas on the grounds that 1) religious utterances are like cultural differences, ethnic differences and philosophical differences, 2) there are numerous cultures with their distinct religious potential truth contents that are not scientifically demonstrable. The latter argument is based on Occult/Paranormal experiences which are realities of life, hence should be allowed into the public sphere. However, this paper argues that religious utterances as Habermas articulates them are not equiparable to cultural, ethnic and philosophical differences and also that, Occult/Paranormal experiences are restricted to few adepts in it, hence, lacking general accessibility. In mind of our increasingly pluralistic society, there is need for common understanding of religious potential truth contents for general agreement and unity of purpose. Hence, we say that anyone who wants to bring religious potential truth contents into the public sphere seems to have no option other than to translate them into secular language for common understanding. It is based on common understanding that participants in the public sphere enter into a meaningful rational-critical debate resulting in mutual agreement.

Habermas and the aporia of translating religion in democracy

In his recent attempt to make democracy more politically hospitable to religion, Habermas calls for the potential contributions of religion to democratic politics not to be neglected. He simultaneously calls for translating religious meanings into neutral reasons as a way of including them at the level of formal politics and for maintaining the necessity of an institutional translational proviso to immunize the neutral character of the state. This article presents three arguments. First, what Habermas effectively calls for is not conventional translation in which meaning is transferred from one language (signification system) into another. Rather, his call is for an anasemic translation which is an operation of de-signification of the truth contents of religious contributions and then a re-signification. Second, because Habermas calls for translation, he necessarily runs into the aporia of translation in the sense that certain aspects of religion are untranslatable into his generally acceptable language. Therefore, Habermas’ translation proviso creates an asymmetry between religious and non-religious citizens, which is detrimental to the conditions of political legitimacy. Third, it is suggested that to address this problem the citizens must adopt an ethos of hospitality toward the untranslatable of religion as part of the conditions of political legitimacy.

Habermas, religion and the ethics of citizenship

A recent essay by Jürgen Habermas revisits political liberalism and takes up the question of the extent to which democratic citizens and officials should rely on their religious convictions in publicly deliberating about and deciding political issues. With his institutional translation proviso, a proposed alternative to Rawls' idea of public reason, Habermas hopes to dodge familiar (and often overstated) criticisms that liberal requirements of citizenship are unfair or disproportionately burdensome to religious believers. I argue that, due in part to its sharp contrast between the obligations attributed to political officials and those attributed to ordinary citizens, Habermas' position is beset by additional, quite considerable difficulties. I conclude that Habermas' account of religion in the public sphere does not present a genuine alternative to the leading liberal theory of citizenship and public reasoning.