Abstract
Much has been debated and written about the translation proviso, its implications, and its rationality. At its core, it is about communication and a transition in religious communication that means it can become secularly engaged. This paper argues that the theory of the translation proviso is insufficient to accommodate religious communication and, in order to support the arguments made, considers associated aspects of the work of Habermas, such as solidarity, tolerance and universalism, as well, of course, as communication. Considerations in this wider context lead to a growing awareness that the translation proviso and its prescriptive tendencies may be seen as being an ominous contradiction of much of the other work of Habermas and that, far from being postmetaphysical and postmodern, it may have elements of being a ‘big idea’.
Highlights
Perhaps reflecting a world that was fundamentally changing, the thoughts and writings of Jürgen Habermas have evolved and developed over a period of decades
Regardless of the rejection of a morality requirement by Habermas, and regardless of whether communication is held as being solidarity, and regardless of whether his more recent writings may align his definition more closely with economic self-interest, the translation proviso is insufficiently inclusive of religious communication for the concept to be upheld by it
It is important to reiterate the invaluable contributions made by Jürgen Habermas over a long and highly prestigious career, contributions that have evolved, developed and even changed over time as societies and perceptions of them have changed
Summary
Perhaps reflecting a world that was fundamentally changing, the thoughts and writings of Jürgen Habermas have evolved and developed over a period of decades. The problem for Habermas is that the postmodern world has shown that such an accommodation is not realistic; while the expression of religious beliefs can be made in the public sphere, they can only be considered institutionally if they are first translated into acceptable secular language Habermas argues that such a proviso protects the necessary (negative) liberty of being free from religious coercion, while at the same time upholding the principle that all citizens in democratic societies “are obliged to provide reasons for one another, as only can political power shed its repressive character” It is insufficiently accountable in a number of critical areas and these are considered in this paper
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