Transcendental Principles Research Articles

On the Theoretical Reconstruction of Durkheim’s Interpretation of Morality

This article offers the theoretical reconstruction of the treatment of morality by the classic of French and world sociology Emile Durkheim (1858–1917). Based on Durkheim’s texts, the author strives to show that, contrary to some modern interpretations, he was neither an anti-Kantian nor an anti-utilitarian. He constantly criticized both Kant and utilitarianism, but was strongly influenced by both theoretical positions. This influence was both “negative,” as an opposition to these positions, and “positive,” as a sort of their reproduction, continuation and development. Durkheim did not reject Kant’s views and utilitarianism (especially, in its eudemonist version), but relied on them seeking to realize their theoretical synthesis. The means of such a synthesis was a sociological approach to morality, in which society is treated as an entity that combines duty and good, immanent and transcendent principles in morality. The evolution of Durkheim’s interpretation of the elements, or characteristics of morality, as well as the connection of morality with religion and other social institutions, are considered. The author have analyzed Durkheim’s idea of the autonomy of sacredness in morality, of its irreducibility to the religious sacredness; hence the principal possibility of secular morality. According to Durkheim, morality is of a fundamental importance for society, it underlies all social institutions and social transformations

Transzendentale Prinzipien in Fichtes WL 1804-II: Eine Interpretationsskizze zur systematischen Rolle von ‚Licht‘ und ‚Bilden‘

The goal of this paper is to interpret Fichte’s terminology of ‚light‘ and ‚imaging‘ in the WL-1804-ii as a rendition of transcendental principles. This analysis is intended as a contribution to the discussion concerning the theoretical status and methodology of the later doctrines of science. i begin with an exposition of four criteria for transcendentally constitutive principles: 1. presuppositional character, 2. constitutivity, 3. categorial difference between conditions and conditioned, 4. immanent justification. The systematic function of ‘light’ is exemplarily reconstructed according to these criteria. The focus of analysis lies on the fourth criterion, which is framed as the philosophical problem which Fichte’s conception of a ‘law of imaging’ in the 24th and 25th lectures answers to. The ‘law of imaging’ is reconstructed as a special form of performative self-validation which is intended to satisfy the criterion of immanent justification. A further upshot of this reading is a reappraisal of Fichte’s treatment of light’s perpetual ‘objectivization’.

A new method for establishing motion equations in nonholonomic systems

In this paper, we present a new method of establishing the fundamental motion equations of nonholonomic systems without using any variational principles. According to the invariance of motion equations under the generalized coordinates transformation and the nonholonomic constraint function groups transformation, the double index tensor analysis method is proposed cooperating with the product rules of matrix. Then we let first integrals equivalent to the corresponding nonholonomic constraints imposed upon the system to explain the self consistency of nonholonomic systems, it is shown that the self consistency is the core of nonholonomic mechanics and can verify which model is appropriate for describing nonholonomic systems. Therefore, the form of nonholonomic constraint force is determined only by three qualities: the invariance of the motion equations under the constraint of first integrals, the invariance of nonholonomic constraint force under the generalized coordinates transformation and the nonholonomic constraint function groups transformation, to establish the fundamental motion equation of nonholonomic systems. Using the double index tensor analysis method, the three qualities and the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of matrix theory, the equation of motion of nonholonomic systems are derived. Some classical equations in nonholonomic systems, such as the Routh equation, the Nielsen equation and the Chaplygin equation are also derived to prove our method. The method is totally based on the self consistency of nonholonomic systems and the covariation of motion equations, these two characters are naturally derived from mathematical and mechanical requirements of nonholonomic systems. Not only does not use any transcendental variational principles, such as D’Alembert-Lagrange principle, Gauss principle or Jourdian principle, but also illustrate that the validity of the three principles are attributed to the two characters. Further more, this method even provides a reasonable explanation for Chetaev conditions in nonholonomic systems, and shows that the vakonomic mechanics derived by Hamilton’s principle is not an appropriate model for nonholonomic systems.

Prinsip Transendental dalam Seni Visual Islam

T his paper tries to explain the principles of visual art in Islam. It is because study of art in Islam is almost forgetten. Furthermore, there are several people who declare that Islam goes against art and does not accept it. Whereas, the fact is not so. This research has revealed that Islam greatly appreciate s art . Even more, ethics and aesthetics are discussed interestingly in the Islamic civilization. This is proved by availibility of transcendental principles in Islamic visual arts. Therefore, this paper is written to focus on arts including Islamic art definition and how the transcendental principles are reflected in Islamic visual art.

The problem of grounding natural modality in Kant's account of empirical laws of nature

One of the central problems of Kant's account of the empirical laws of nature is: What grounds their necessity? In this article I discuss the three most important lines of interpretation and suggest a novel version of one of them. While the first interpretation takes the transcendental principles as the only sources of the empirical laws' necessity, the second interpretation takes the systematicity of the laws to guarantee their necessity. It is shown that both views involve serious problems. The third interpretation, the “causal powers interpretation”, locates the source of the laws' necessity in the properties of natural objects. Although the second and third interpretations seem incompatible, I analyse why Kant held both views and I argue that they can be reconciled, because the metaphysical grounding project of the laws' necessity is accounted for by Kant's causal powers account, while his best system account explains our epistemic access to the empirical laws. If, however, causal powers are supposed to fulfil the grounding function for the laws' natural modality, then I suggest that a novel reading of the causal powers interpretation should be formulated along the lines of a genuine dispositionalist conception of the laws of nature.

Is there a place for faith in anthropology? Religion, reason, and the ethnographer’s divine revelation

Anthropological insights are not produced or constructed through reasoned discourse alone. Often they appear to be given in “leaps of faith” as the anthropologist’s conceptual grasp upon the world is lost. To understand these peculiar moments, we adopt the Kierkegaardian concept of religious faith, not as certitude in some transcendental principle, but as a deeply paradoxical mode of knowing, whose paths bend and twist through glimpses of understanding, doubt, and existential resignation. Pointing to the ways in which such revelatory and disruptive experiences have influenced the work of many anthropologists, we argue that anthropology is not simply a social science, but also a theology of sorts, whose ultimate foundation might not simply be reason but faith.

Técnica y conformidad a fin en la estética kantiana

El presente artículo se orienta a explicar la función de los conceptos de conformidad a fin y técnica en el conjunto de una filosofía estética en la obra de Kant. A partir de la función de estos conceptos se establece la relación con los conceptos de perfección y verdad, constitutivos de la Lógica en su relación estética. En la “Crítica de la facultad teleológica”, el hombre toma conciencia de ser un organismo vivo autoformante que deviene, talento, habilidad, cultura y humanidad. Conceptos reguladores de una razón que se proyecta u orienta hacia los límites de una finalidad sin fin de su propia naturaleza. Por esta razón se puede expresar el siguiente principio trascendental: el hombre es, entre todos los objetos del mundo, el único capaz del ideal de belleza. Ideal que es la representación de un ser singular en cuanto adecuado a una idea estética y que sintetiza a la humanidad en la persona de aquel hombre que “en cuanto inteligencia es del ideal de la perfección”, en cuanto idea o concepto regulador se orienta hacia la representación del límite de la conformidad a fin de su naturaleza en sus productos.

Unbound: The Speculative Mythology of the Death Drive

As a drive to the inorganic, the death drive is fundamentally opposed to sensuality and, specifically, to pleasure and pain. This is why Gilles Deleuze understands Freud’s account of the death drive as the “beyond of the pleasure principle” not in terms of the transgression of a boundary or limit (going beyond pleasure into something painful or traumatic), but rather as a foray into speculative philosophy, an attempt to identify the transcendent principle or higher law of the pleasure principle, the supersensual law of its sensual manifestations. This paper explores the construction of the supersensual reality of the death drive in masochistic fantasy and in fetishistic disavowal, exploring their affinity not only with art and aesthetics but with mathematical and formal constructions. Both help to elucidate Freud’s early insight that the death drive is more mathematical than physical, a purely immanent energy with no sensual manifestation.

ABOUT PRINCIPLES OF PRECEDENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE IN ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT (SOCIO-ECONOMIC-ECONOMIC CONTEXT)

The paper discusses the methodological aspects of the principles of adaptive management for socio-economic, economic-ecological and other systems. Adaptive management includes a set of methods that allow to change the parameters of the regulating system depending on management actions and outcomes and external impacts. Adaptive management is based inter alia on the principles of �precedence� (past experience) and �transcendence� (beyond experience). The principle of precedence includes past experience in decision making (study the problem "from the bottom"). Based on the definition of transcendence (something that is fundamentally unavailable to experiential knowledge or not based on experience), transcendental analysis is considered as analysis of complex nonlinear phenomena and processes with a high degree of uncertainty (study the problem �from the top�). The paper presents a conceptual model of adaptive management based on the principles of precedence and transcendence. This model includes the next steps: definition and general description of the object of adaptive management; study of the object "from the bottom", based on past experience; study the object of adaptive management "from the top", taking into account a kind of "absolute", which goes beyond the existing experience; vision of the system based on the incidence matrix, ranking of interests and threats; decision making taking into account improvement of previous decisions and implementation of idealized transcendental model. The concept of the principles of precedence and transcendence in adaptive management is considered in the paper in the context of incident theory in order to form the system vision and rank the system from the point of view of interests (as a resource of development) or threats (as an anti-resource of development)

Absolute Signification and Ontological Inconsistency in E. T. A. Hoffmann's Der Sandmann

Absolute Signification and Ontological Inconsistency in E. T. A. Hoffmann's Der Sandmann Gabriel Trop "Der ächte philosophische Akt ist Selbsttödtung, dies ist der reale Anfang aller Philosophie, dahin geht alles Bedürfniß des philosophischen Jüngers, und nur dieser Akt entspricht allen Bedingungen und Merkmalen der transcendendalen Handlung."1 [The true philosophical act is the putting to death of the self, this is the real beginning of all philosophy, and every need of the philosophical disciple goes in this direction, and only this act corresponds to all the conditions and characteristics of the transcendental attitude.] These words, written by Novalis, declare that philosophy begins in an act of self-destruction, or more precisely formulated: all properly philosophical acts aim to destroy the self. This demand is not as mysterious as it might seem. A self, by definition, is differentiated and limited, and thus represents one of the most palpable impediments to that which romantic philosophy seeks, namely, the absolute, das Unbedingte, that which is without condition and without limit. A truly philosophical act must efface the horizon of limitations and differences that constitutes self-hood: Selbsttödtung, self-annihilation. The proper name for this act is not suicide, but transcendence. And yet: what is suicide other than the most extreme and literal form of self-extinction? E. T. A. Hoffmann would have been able to read the fragment cited above in Schlegel and Tieck's edition of Novalis's collected works.2 In light of this fragment, it is worth considering whether or not Hoffmann's most celebrated Nachtstück (Night Piece), Der Sandmann—which culminates in a spectacular act of self-destruction, Selbsttödtung—is much more than a story about childhood trauma, abuse, irony, or the tragic frustrations of a mediocre poet. Rather, Der Sandmann, as an aesthetic document, indexes a distinctly philosophical problem, namely, the phenomenal movements and operations associated with a conception of the absolute that exists beyond all instances of differential signification attached to a limited self. Seen from this perspective, the central problem of Der Sandmann is less psychological than ontological: it concerns not the pathological psyche of a problematic individual, but the order of beings as a whole. [End Page 221] At the center of this philosophical problem—which is in turn a representational problem: how does that which is outside representation and differentiation as such, the absolute as unconditioned and unlimited, announce itself in the field of beings and world of differences—lies the figure of the Sandman himself. As a textual presence, the Sandman cannot be reduced to the indexical sign of a primordial psychological trauma. Such a simplification overlooks the fact that the Sandman functions as a generative presence at the very source and origin of aesthetic representations, a figure beyond all figuration whose central impulse manifests itself in a drive to self-reproduction.3 The Sandman stands as the executor of an imaginative operation that does not simply block the successful formation of an ego identity; on the contrary, the Sandman gives form to the very transcendental principle of the absolute as articulated in the philosophical discourse of romanticism. The attempt to produce the absolute discursively generates a specific form of romantic semiosis that I shall call absolute signification, and a close examination of E. T. A. Hoffmann's narrative reveals a distinct engagement with and repurposing of this form of signification. First, I will define absolute signification more precisely within the specific ontology of romantic science and romantic philosophical inquiry, for which Schelling's philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) and Johann Wilhelm Ritter's Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse eines jungen Physikers (Fragments from the Estate of a Young Physicist 1810) may serve as models. Then, I will examine in what way the various operations and functions of absolute signification animate Hoffmann's text. Reading the text ontologically as opposed to psychologically encourages us to rethink the central value of the Sandman: the Sandman enables a pervasive and wandering mode of signification predicated upon an internal contradiction in the world of appearances that in turn propels the differential system to self-reproduce. To be sure, the textual and imaginative operations associated with the Sandman represent a dangerous and...

The limits of justification: Critique, disclosure and reflexivity

I argue that Forst’s justification paradigm is less radical than claimed in that it fails to establish an immanent connection between the role of justification as a transcendental principle and as a tool of disclosing, reflexive critique. I maintain that the construal of justification as a trans-historical principle, by definition, shields it from systematic criticism and consequently constrains critique’s capacity for reflexive self-scrutiny. Reflexivity is ignited by disclosure to the degree that it is reflection on the non-identical elements of social life that may prompt critical re-evaluation of a theory’s conceptual framework. Justification critique’s capacity for disclosure, and hence reflexivity, is crucially limited, however, by Forst’s reliance on a tendentious concept of noumenal power, which does not satisfactorily explain the complex, material dynamics through which structural inequalities are reproduced. It is further stymied by a disregard of the latent power dynamics often at work in actual conversations about justice that subvert formally equal relations of justification. In short, the lack of reflexivity is evident in Forst’s failure to adequately consider how entrenched asymmetries of power may require him to advance beyond an abstract, one-dimensional account of mutually owed justifications.

Un estudio sobre la premisa mayor del silogismo cosmológico kantiano

<p class='p1'>La relación entre máxima lógica y principio sintético de la razón pura (A 307–308/B 364–365) ocupa un lugar fundamental en la “Dialéctica trascendental”. Esto se nota en la formulación de los problemas que la Dialéctica se propone abordar, pues hace una referencia explícita al pasaje de la máxima al principio mencionado (A 308–309/B 365–366); sin embargo, Kant no explica cómo se haría tal pasaje. Aquí se propone una explicación de dicho pasaje a través de un estudio pormenorizado de la premisa mayor del silogismo cosmológico, donde éste ocupa un lugar fundamental. Se sostendrá que tal pasaje sólo es comprensible suponiendo una máxima lógica restringida que permita deducir legítimamente, para el caso de la lógica general, lo incondicionado dado a partir de lo condicionado dado. El principio trascendente será una pretendida extensión de esta máxima a las cosas en sí.</p>

Moralinės legitimacijos reikšmė kritinės teorijos požiūriu

Straipsnis nagrinėja moralinės legitimacijos teorijų sąveiką su komunikacinio veiksmo, poelgio ir derybų koncepcijomis, atsižvelgiant į klasikinių racionalumo idealų kritiką ir Habermaso silpnąją transcendentalinės pragmatikos nuostatą. Straipsnio tikslas yra parodyti moralinės legitimacijos, jos procedūrų epistemologinės apklausos svarbą šiuolaikinei įvairovės visuomenei. Legitimacijos tema nagrinėjama atsižvelgiant į Weberio, Arendt ir Habermaso samprotavimus. Straipsnis papildo moralinio komunikacinio veiksmo ir normatyvumo teorijas moralinio laikiškumo, pasaulio įvykio ir poelgio sampratomis ir teigia: kritinės teorijos požiūriu moralinė legitimacija remiasi galimai universaliomis komunikacinio veiksmo, derybų ir pakankamumo idėjomis, kurios priklauso nuo politinio daugialypumų proceso. Straipsnyje pateikiami argumentai, susiję komunikacine kritika: autoriteto ir statuso, institucinės subordinacijos, klasikinių racionalumo idealų, etinio reliatyvizmo, bei kalbama apie pasitikėjimo kaupimą, vertybių derinimą ir konkurenciją. Straipsnio argumentai dėstomi atsižvelgiant į daugialypumų vienovės dinamiką, į pasaulio civilizacinės ir kultūrinės įvairovės plėtrą ir augančią asmens ir grupių dinamikos reikšmę. Nuosekliai atsisakoma pamatiškumo idėjos ją pakeičiant pakankamos legitimacijos, atviros politikos ir derybų statuso sampratomis bei jas aiškinant.

Aristotelian Phronêsis, the Discourse of Human Rights, and Contemporary Global Practice

This essay outlines some fundamental differences between the evaluative and explanatory language of Aristotelian practical reason based on his empirical psychological theory of human development, on the one hand, and the late 20th and 21st century discourse of human rights based on a NeoKantian transcendent principle of universal human dignity on the other. To what extent are these two types of political discourse compatible in today’s globalizing world? To the extent that they are not compatible, which should be preferred? My answer is that they are compatible and even complementary, but only if the Aristotelian framework is treated as more fundamental, and the rights-and-dignity perspective is understood as a potentially good political solution, for the time being, in the contemporary context of global politics.

Philosophie als Weltoffenheit

Abstract The posthumously published text was presented by Laszlo Tengelyi on July 11th 2014 in the context of a conference dedicated to him on his 60th birthday. He died on July 19th 2014. The essay proposes that modern philosophy does not necessarily lead to a metaphysics of subjectivity but can be developed as a thinking of the world. Tengelyi defines philosophy as such as a thinking of the world in the sense of a science of „beings in a whole“. The whole of the world differentiates itself today into nature and history and is, furthermore, marked by openness towards the infinite. Following Kant’s notion of the world, Rickert’s heterological principle, Duns Scotus’ disjunctive transcendentals, Heidegger’s transcendental principle of world-openness and especially Schelling’s philosophy of the Ages of the World, Tengelyi sketches the philosophical task of a scientific thinking of the world, which takes its starting point in freedom as a capacity of transcendence and determines nature as the past, history as the present, and the infinite as the openness of the world towards the future.

The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law

Although tensions between universality and exceptionalism apply throughout law, they are particularly pronounced in patent law, a field that deals with highly technical subject matter. Focusing on this tension, this Article explores an underappreciated descriptive theory of recent Supreme Court patent jurisprudence. Commentators observe that the Court has reined in expansive Federal Circuit patent doctrine and established holistic standards to replace bright-line rules. This Article augments these prevailing interpretations by exploring another. Building upon and significantly extending previous scholarship, it argues that the Supreme Court’s recent patent jurisprudence reflects a project of eliminating “patent exceptionalism” and assimilating patent doctrine to general legal principles. In a variety of areas including appellate review of lower courts and agencies, jurisdiction, remedies, and the award of attorney’s fees, the Federal Circuit has developed rather exceptional doctrine for patent cases. However, the Supreme Court has consistently eliminated such exceptionalism, bringing patent law in conformity with general legal standards. Among other observations, the Supreme Court’s intervention reveals its holistic outlook as a generalist court concerned with broad legal consistency, concerns which are less pertinent to the quasi-specialized Federal Circuit. The Article concludes by arguing in favor of selective, refined exceptionalism for patent law. Although the Supreme Court should strive for broad consistency, this Article argues that unique features of patent law — particularly the role and expertise of the Federal Circuit — justify some departure from general legal norms. Finally, this Article turns to tensions between legal universality and exceptionalism more broadly, articulating principles to guide the deviation of specialized areas of law from transcendent principles.

Metafísica e ciência: A vontade e a analogia em Schopenhauer

Este artigo investiga a resolução de Schopenhauer para o problema da unidade entre micro e macrocosmo que, segundo o filósofo, é o maior enigma da filosofia. Nossa atenção se volta para a modificação da doutrina kantiana da coisa-em-si e para o método analógico contidos naquela resolução. A tese da vontade como essência do mundo foi elaborada entre 1809 e 1814, período de formação científica do filósofo. Isso permitiu pensar a importância das ciências naturais no desenvolvimento do argumento analógico schopenhaueriano. A motivação maior no texto que se segue consiste em compreender o conceito de Vontade como coisa-em-si. A hipótese condutora afirma que o referido conceito foi elaborado a partir de um método de reflexão por analogia inspirado nos estudos científicos de Schopenhauer e, enquanto tal, é parte de uma visão analógica da realidade que exclui o discurso sobre qualquer princípio ontológico transcendente.

Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy

Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy

Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy

Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy

Le Refus Lévinassien de la Mystique

Despite recognizing the Other, particularly the needy person, as a prime location for a meaningful experience of God and the metaphysical nature of his interpretation of the fundamental ethical experience, a careful reading of Levinas’ corpus reveals the modulations of his rejection of the mystical phenomenon. This paper analyzes the main arguments that justify his « Lithuanian » distrust of mysticism and the consequent reduction of religion as ethics in his thought, as a result of forgetting that the perception of and adherence to the same transcendent principle present in the deep consciousness –conversio cordis – that directs one’s gaze towards the need and suffering of others –conversio morum – is common to the mystical experience, faith – as core of religious experience to Jewish-Christian tradition –, and ethical commitment.