Transcendental Idealism Research Articles

Autoposição e autodestruição na filosofia de Schelling

Talking about the possibility or impossibility annihilation of nature by man, is in the end an endless polemic for the unsustainable use of natural resources implies the annihilation of humanity itself, and also, insofar every individual imaginary, as an ideal, contains the notion of self-preservation. However, the fact is that in our day such possibility achieved a high degree of probability. Therefore, we ask ourselves: how did that happen? In this work, we shall discuss this problem through Schelling’s notion of self-positing of the Geist as uncon ditional freedom. Firstly seeking to clarify the reasons why we have come to an impasse in our day, we will present the difficulty Schelling faced in considering the I as the principle in the System of Transcendental Idealism. Then we show the passage to his philosophy of identity as an attempt to show how the individual of empirical consciousness can be free and at the same time establishes an universal-historical relationship, valid for the whole diversity of finite consciousnesses. In a third moment, we will present his notion of Abfall (“Philosophy and Religion”) through which the author demonstrates how the particular intuits the universal. Finally, taking into account the dialectic of the imagination implicit in the notion of Abfall, we will attempt to point a guiding direction on the issue of preservation of nature and therefore of man.

IX—Closing the Gap: A New Answer to an Old Objection against Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism

In this paper I present a new solution to the so-called ‘neglected alternative’ objection against Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism. According to this objection, Kant does not give sufficient justification for his claim that not only are space and time forms of our intuition but they also fail to be things in themselves or properties thereof. I first discuss a proposal by Willaschek and Allais, who try to defend Kant against this charge by building on his account of a priori intuition, and argue that it is insufficient to meet the objection in its full force. I then present my own solution to the problem. It is based on a reconstruction of Kant’s account of properties of appearances, and tries to show that this account implies that spatio-temporal properties could in principle not pertain both to appearances and to things in themselves.

THE RECEPTION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION AS A WAY OF FORMING AMERICAN PERSONALISM: THE POST-SECULAR VIEW

The aim of the article is to define the way of expounding the authenticity of the experience of self-cognition opened by the personalist philosophy of the USA on the horizon of receiving the philosophical tradition established by B. P. Bowne to lay the epistemological foundations for overcoming the impersonalist modes of thought in the philosophical-humanitarian space of North America. At the emergent stage of the historical-philosophical process defined as its post-secular period the topicality of studying American personalism in the indicated aspect of its genesis is predetermined by developing the personalistic inspiration of post-non-classical philosophy into renewing the interaction of philosophical and theological discourses initial for the personalist thought and intended to reunite rationality with its spiritual sources in the course of reflecting the personal mode of being realized on the ground of theism. The further reflection of the meta-ontology of the personhood uncovered by the Scripture and expounded by patristic trinitology presupposes the retrospection of the trajectory of moving towards the Supernatural Revelation paved in the late nineteenth and the first half of twentieth centuries by the attempts of personalizing the ontology, in particular by the “personalized” ontological constructions made in the USA. The methodology of the research is based upon realizing the meta-ontological character of the problem of the personality revealed in the midst of the twentieth century by the prominent Orthodox theologian and philosopher-personalist V. N. Lossky. Taking into consideration the Biblical background of American personalism and its genetic connections with the denominations of Protestantism developed on the North American continent and the branching Protestant theology, the author focuses on both proper philosophical and theological reference points of this personalistic current of philosophizing in the historical-philosophical reconstruction of its genesis oriented towards the meta-ontological dimension of the personality. The scientific novelty of the study consists in initiating the reflection of the way of defining the inner experience of the self as the all-sufficient criterion of cognition which was paved by the personalist thought of the USA in the course of revising the classical rationalist models of the subjectivity and broke the ground for constructing “the personal world” in the space of rational consciousness formed in North America. On the base of analyzing Bowne's revision of Kant's transcendental idealism aimed at the explication of the immediacy of self-experience the author reveals that such argumentation for its cognitive primacy transforms into affirming the mediation of the inner appeal of the human personality to living God by the outer interpersonal experience of rational cognition. The revealed regression to the rationally mediated relationship of the created person with Creator is connected with the restriction of the research for “personal beginning of all speculation” which resulted in the personal metaphysics of B. P. Bowne by the rationalistic tools of the personal self-reflection. The study proves that it was predetermined by the philosopher's confessional belonging to the Methodist Church detached from patristic Trinitology and Christology forming the arsenal of trinitarian meta-logic intended to expound the personhood as the ultimate principle of being. Conclusions define the resource of Bowne's idea of the “personal interpretation of experience” which inspired the subsequent “personalized” ontological constructions in the personalistic domain established on the North American continent. They form the dialogic space of the personalist philosophy of the USA predetermining the accumulation of its potential in the interaction with other philosophical currents. Manifesting itself as the personalistic inspiration of the emerging trends of thought this tendency predicts the focus of the further historical-philosophical research of American personalism.

Стросон і Кант: дескриптивна метафізика як концептуальна передумова аналізу «Критики чистого розуму»

The article reveals peculiarities of conceptual analysis of the “Critique of Pure Reason» by British philosopher Peter Strawson. The author claims that this analysis depends on the methodological assumptions and conceptual language of Strawson’s previously published large-scale study (“Individuals…”, 1959). The author confirms Barry Straud`s point that Strawson`s project depends, to some extent, on the descriptive metaphysics of “Critique of Pure Reason”. Strawson`s metaphysical doctrine is based not only on the Kant`s doctrine of subjective forms of space-time (this thesis, in fact, is the limit of Stroud’s approach), but also on some subjects of Kant`s transcendental logic. In particular, it relates to Strawson`s analysis of: (a) the intellectual structures, that actively shape our understanding of the world; (b) the functioning of logic-grammatical forms that provide predication of experience; (c) the transcendental unity of “I” and of the difference between personal and formally-analytical aspects of “I”. Based on “The Bounds of Sense...” (1966) and later Strawson’s articles dealing with the philosophy of Kant, the author proves that: (1) Strawson’s «analytical model» of transcendental argument is based on Kant's transcendental psychology; (2) the modalities of understanding of the transcendental idealism depend on understanding of relation between things in themselves and phenomena i.e. depend on the empirical realism according to Kant; (3) Kant’s sensual intuition suggests, as Strawson has shown, the possibility of other spatial-temporal forms of subjective intuition, which are constitutive for another kinds of experience.

Husserl’s Transcendental-Phenomenological Idealism

This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky’s “Tpaнcцeндeнтaльнo-фeнoмeнoлoгичecкiй идeaлизмъ Гyccepля” (Husserl’s Transcendental-Phenomenological Idealism), published in the emigre journal Пyть (The Way) in 1939. In this article, Lossky presents and criticizes Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Like many successors of Husserl’s “Gottingen School,” Lossky interprets Husserl’s transcendental idealism as a Neo-Kantian idealism and he criticizes it on the ground that it leads to a form of solipsism. In light of his own epistemology (intuitivism) and his metaphysical system (ideal-realism), he also claims that, although Husserl is more radical than Descartes in his methodological doubt, he is not radical enough, because his abstention from existential judgment with regard to the external world is itself an existential judgment. In this regard, Lossky affirms that his own critically-informed defense of naive realism is in fact more radical than Husserl’s transcendental idealism. (Frederic Tremblay)

Relationalism about Perception vs. Relationalism about Perceptuals

AbstractThere is a tension at the heart of Lucy Allais’s new account of Kant’s transcendental idealism. The problem arises from her use of two incompatible theories in contemporary philosophy – relationalism about perception, or naïve realism, and relationalism about colour, or more generally relationalism about any such perceptual property. The problem is that the former requires a more robust form of realism about the properties of the objects of perception than can be accommodated in the partially idealistic framework of the latter. On Allais’s interpretation, Kant’s notorious attempt to balance realism and idealism remains unstable.

Arguing for Transcendental Idealism: Lucy Allais on Manifest Reality

AbstractI endorse Allais’s ‘moderate metaphysical’ approach to transcendental idealism, but find tension between her concept of ‘manifest reality’ and her relational interpretation of the doctrine. And I think her reconstruction of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism fails to block the famous ‘missing alternative’ objection, although in my view Kant’s fundamental argument for the position was intended precisely to block such an objection.

Appearances and Things in Themselves: Actuality and Identity

AbstractLucy Allais’s anti-phenomenalist interpretation of transcendental idealism is incomplete in two ways. First of all, like some phenomenalists, she is committed to denying the coherence of claims of numerical identity of appearances and things in themselves. Secondly, she fails to explain adequately what grounds the actuality of appearances. This opens the door to a phenomenalist understanding of appearances.

The Antinomy of Practical Reason as absurdum practicum

The antinomies of pure reason play a significant role in Kant’s critical system. The conflict of reason with itself woke Kant up from his dogmatic slumber and led him to the construction of his transcendental idealism. However, the antinomies of practical reason have not occupied the same place as those of reason in its speculative use. Actually, many commentators of Kant’s critical philosophy consider that there is no antinomy of practical reason at all. The aim of this article is to show that there is an antinomy of practical reason. Particularly, we will show why the antinomy of practical reason should be understood under the light of the Kantian concept of absurdum practicum . Keywords: Kant, practical antinomy, absurdum practicum.

A Tale of Two Schisms: Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s Move into Transcendental Idealism

The history of the early phenomenological movement involves a tale of two schisms. The Great Phenomenological Schism originated between 1905 and 1913, as many of his contemporaries, for example, Pfänder, Scheler, Reinach, Stein, and Ingarden, rejected Husserl’s transformation of phenomenology from the descriptive psychology of his Logical Investigations (1900/19011) into the transcendental idealism of his Ideas I (1913). The Phenomenological-Existential Schism started between 1927 and 1933, as with Being and Time (1927) Heidegger moved away from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of consciousness toward an ontological analytic of existence. Yet these schisms were not unrelated developments. Closely following the documentary evidence to determine the exemplary nature of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s move into transcendental idealism, this essay establishes the inextricable linkage between the Great Phenomenological Schism and the Phenomenological-Existential Schism.

Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom, Transcendental Idealism, and the Third-Person

Kant wants to show that freedom is possible in the face of natural necessity. Transcendental idealism is his solution, which locates freedom outside of nature. I accept that this makes freedom possible, but object that it precludes the recognition of other rational agents. In making this case, I trace some of the history of Kant’s thoughts on freedom. In several of his earlier works, he argues that we are aware of our own activity. He later abandons this approach, as he worries that any awareness of our activity involves access to the noumenal, and thereby conflicts with the epistemic limits of transcendental idealism. In its place, from the second Critique onwards, Kant argues that we are conscious of the moral law, which tells me that I ought to do something, thus revealing that I can. This is the only proof of freedom consistent with transcendental idealism, but I argue that such an exclusively first-personal approach precludes the (third-personal) recognition of other rational agents. I conclude that transcendental idealism thus fails to provide an adequate account of freedom. In its place, I sketch an alternative picture of how freedom is possible, one that locates freedom within, rather than outside of nature.

Fichte and Gentile - Notes about the relationship between Transcendental Idealism and Actual Idealism

This essay is to express some considerations about the theoretical relation which bonds the Actual Idealism of Giovanni Gentile to the "system of freedom" concerning the Wissenschaftslehre or 'Doctrine of Science' of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. The Doctrine seems to have rightful claim to be the philosophical system nearest to the Actualistic code, which was to be openly developed by Gentile in the early years of twentieth century, and the seeds of which had already been sewn by the monographic studies dedicated to Rosmini and Gioberti, from one side, and to Marx, from another. The essay discusses the conceptual lineage of Actual Idealism, it's specific links to Doctrine of Science as a critique of Kant and Hegel, and possible reasons for the widely perceived lack of acknowledgement perceptible in the Italian thinker's work.

Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz on transcendental idealism from a semantic point of view

In a paper entitled A Semantical Version of the Problem of Transcendental Idealism, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz gives a very impressive analysis of transcendental idealism. He approaches the matter using the tools of formal semantics developed by Alfred Tarski and draws a rather surprising conclusion. According to Ajdukiewicz, the idealist position, claiming that the world around us is ontologically dependent on our cognitive activity can be shown to be implausible on purely logical grounds. It is worth taking a closer look at this insightful argument, since Ajdukiewicz’s analysis, if sound, has a relevance reaching far beyond purely historical questions concerning the right interpretation and proper assessment of past idealist doctrines. These days various species of (mostly local) idealism are thriving under such labels as ‘anti realism’ or ‘pragmatism’. Ajdukiewicz’s venerable paper goes to the very core of many contemporary metaphysical discussions.

Fichte and Gentile - Notes about the relationship between Transcendental Idealism and Actual Idealism

Fichte and Gentile - Notes about the relationship between Transcendental Idealism and Actual Idealism

The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic Philosophy, 1795–1804 by Dalia Nassar (review)

Reviewed by: The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic Philosophy, 1795–1804 by Dalia Nassar Leif Weatherby Dalia Nassar, The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic Philosophy, 1795–1804 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). Pp. 360. $50.00. Dalia Nassar’s The Romantic Absolute proposes a major shift in the way we view the movement known as Early German Romanticism, a shift contained in the book’s title: the conception of the “absolute” is at the center of the widely varying strands of metaphysical, epistemological, and literary work of the central figures in Jena. Nassar is seeking to overcome a division between those who emphasize epistemology (especially Manfred Frank) and those who emphasize ontology (especially Frederick Beiser). The claim, reinforced with compelling evidence throughout this finely argued book, is that the “absolute” is conceived as both, and that this combination of being and thinking instantiates itself in such a way that the cognizer participates in, and can even change, the nature she cognizes. The “absolute” is therefore a singular contribution of what Nassar classes as “Romantic”—it differs from the theories of Kant and Fichte, but also, pace Beiser, significantly from that of Hegel. In a sense, this Romanticism is Spinozan, but that is only one of the surprising and fascinating results of this study. The three parts of the book address Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), Friedrich Schlegel, and Friedrich Schelling. The latter is often counted as an “Idealist,” but Nassar makes a strong case for his inclusion in the project of Romantic philosophy. All three fashion the absolute as beyond the distinction between thought and being, and yet immanent to the world. And all three share an interest in the figure of “intellectual intuition,” as well as a strong relationship to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Intellectual intuition [intellektuelle Anschauung] was formulated by Kant as an impossible kind of infinite knowing that displays a necessary relation between the sensible contents of perception and the intellectual forms of cognition. As Nassar details, Fichte used this figure to describe the basis of self-identification. But the Romantics took it in a different direction, starting with Hölderlin (whose work is not explored here) and Novalis. Nassar explores their varied takes on this figure, which threatens to reawaken metaphysics after Kant’s proscriptions, in what is probably the most detailed and illuminating investigation of this topic to date. The book consistently sets this Idealist figure into dialogue with Goethe’s natural-scientific methods, as well as with recent work (especially that of Eckart Förster) on this topic. What emerges is a deep historical account of the emergence of Romantic metaphysics, juxtaposing Goethe and Idealism and finding between them a Romantic philosophical voice all its own. The “absolute” is both intellectual intuition and metamorphosis, a combination of being and knowing in expressive development. The chapters on Novalis reconstruct the development of his philosophical thought beyond the early Fichte Studies, which have received much attention. Nassar points to the centrality of Novalis’s 1798 turn to Hemsterhuis and Kant, during which he conceives of the crux of his later thought, an absolute that transcends antinomies and is immanent to the world. Novalis’s concern for building a “moral organ” and his attempt to write a Romantic encyclopedia find their complement in the section on Friedrich Schlegel, a truly interdisciplinary study in which we find Nassar deftly moving between Schlegel’s understudied and extraordinarily hermetic philosophical writings (her account of the Lectures on Transcendental Idealism of 1800 is a major contribution to English-language scholarship on Schlegel) and his [End Page 316] genre-projects (not only an encyclopedia, but also the “new Bible”). The suggestion that the famous “Wechselerweis” is not only an epistemological tool but also an ontological structure (122) will surely provoke debate. The section ends in one of the highlights of the book, a reading of Schlegel’s Lucinde that explores the complexity of his notion of the novel as a “plant” that remains true to the conception of the absolute. This reading will surely be of great interest to literary scholars. In the masterful Schelling chapters, Nassar succeeds in showing that Schelling’s systems...

Nikolai Lossky’s Reception and Criticism of Husserl

Nikolai Lossky is key to the history of the Husserl-Rezeption in Russia. He was the first to publish a review of the Russian translation of Husserl’s first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen that appeared in 1909. He also published a presentation and criticism of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in 1939. An English translation of both of Lossky’s publications is offered in this volume for the first time. The present paper, which is intended as an introduction to these documents, situates Lossky within the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl in Russia and explains why he is central to it. It also explains what Lossky principally found in Husserl: he saw in the latter’s critique of psychologism support for his own ontology, epistemology, and axiology. Lossky characterizes his ontology as an ideal-realism. According to ideal-realism, both the realm of ideal beings (in Plato’s sense) and the realm of real beings (i.e., the world of becoming) are mind-independent. Per his epistemology, which he calls “intuitivism,” real beings are intuited by sensual intuition and ideal beings by intellectual intuition. The realm of ideal beings includes the subrealm of values, which is intuited by axiological intuition. This thoroughly realist conception contrasted sharply with the subjectivist tendencies of the time. So, when Lossky took cognizance of Husserl’s critique of psychologism, he thereupon found an ally in his battle against the various subjectivisms. But, when Husserl took the transcendental idealist turn, Lossky was at the forefront of the backlash against the new direction Husserl wanted to give to phenomenology.

Letters for the Blind

Letters for the Blind1 Robert S. Lehman (bio) Nowhere do things flourish which are not a combination of inert elements, and nowhere can we perceive matter as other than that constant nourishment which thought directs, regulates, and controls, but on which it is dependent. —Ferdinand de Saussure, Words upon Words In the autumn of 1798, Immanuel Kant published what was (excluding lecture notes) his final work, The Conflict of the Faculties. The latter comprises three essays, which ostensibly address the conflicts between the lower faculty of philosophy and the higher faculties of, respectively, theology, law, and medicine. Each of the three essays was written for a different purpose and at a different time (CF 7:11; 243):2 the first, completed in 1794, deals with the relationship between theology and philosophy in the modern German university; the second, probably written in 1795, addresses the progress of the human race and the possibility that this progress is visible in the positive responses of uninvolved spectators to the French Revolution; the third and final essay, written in 1796, is Kant’s philosophical reply to a recent book on The Art of Prolonging Human Life (1796) by the physician C. W. Hufeland. Kant acknowledges in his prefatory remarks that The Conflict of the Faculties was not initially conceived as a cohesive work, that only upon returning to the three essays did he recognize “their systematic unity” and the need to publish them together in a single volume “in order to prevent their being scattered” [um der Zerstreuung vorzubeugen] (7:11; 243). The systematic unity that Kant recognized has, however, seemed less certain to The Conflict’s readers. Ernst Cassirer, for example, in his 1921 study of Kant’s Life and Thought, notes that the third essay, at least, “is only superficially hooked on” (407–08). More recently, Manfred Kuehn has described the composition of The Conflict as Kant’s last attempt at “tying the bundle” of his occasional writings before age—Kant was seventy-three at the time—and illness made this project impossible (393). The result, Kuehn concludes, is a “mixed bag” (404).3 Most commentators would probably agree with Kuehn’s assessment, as evidenced by the fact that a number of the best readings of The Conflict begin by disintegrating it, ignoring its putative unity and focusing instead on one of the essays in isolation from the other two—so, we have Jacques Derrida’s “Mochlos; or, The Conflict of the Faculties,” which addresses only the first essay; and we have Jean-François Lyotard’s Enthusiasm: The Kantian [End Page 81] Critique of History, which addresses only the second. In what follows, I shall, to some extent, cleave to this disintegrative approach to Kant’s text. I am interested in the third essay: “The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Medicine,” also titled “On the Power of the Mind to Master its Morbid Feelings by Sheer Resolution.” And I am most interested in this essay’s Postscript, which finds Kant turning from the prolongation of human life and the resistance to hypochondria—the essay’s professed foci—to the more particular matter of prolonging “literary life” by protecting the eyes of readers from blindness and other afflictions. So I want to focus on the third essay. By doing so, however, I hope to show that this essay and, more specifically, this essay’s appended insights on literary life, open not only onto the question of the systematic unity or disunity of The Conflict of the Faculties—a text that is, within the Kantian corpus, admittedly peripheral—but also onto a question of unity at the very center of Kant’s critical system: the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. The latter, Kant writes, is “that highest point to which one must affix all use of the understanding, even the whole of logic and, after it, transcendental philosophy” (CPR B134; 247). My claim is that through his reflections on reading and on literary life, Kant rehearses a conflict between the transcendental idealism that he explicitly endorses and a materialism—in this case, a kind of linguistic or literary materialism—that he rejects but never really puts to rest...

Space, language, and the limits of knowledge

William Thomas Beckford’s Vathek chronicles the eponymous Caliph’s struggle and ultimate fall into hell as a divine punishment for his unre­strained desire for knowledge. Around the time Beckford wrote Vathek, Immanuel Kant released the Critique of Pure Reason, whose central implication is that human knowledge is restricted to appearances. Drawing on textual evidence from Vathek’s first three editions and from Kant’s Critique, I explore ways in which knowledge is negotiated and mediated by the limits of human intellect and sensory perception as they intersect with the protean boundary between reality and appearance, and suggest that Beckford’s Vathek may be viewed as a literary instantiation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, as they both - albeit in different ways - impose severe limits on man’s epistemic ability.

Space, Geometry and Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories by Thomas C. Vinci (review)

Reviewed by: Space, Geometry and Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories by Thomas C. Vinci Mary Domski Thomas C. Vinci. Space, Geometry and Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. xii + 251. Cloth, $74.00. Those familiar with the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) will not at all be surprised that Thomas C. Vinci has found it fitting to dedicate an entire book to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories (TD), a chapter of the CPR that is as important to Kant’s argument for Transcendental Idealism as it is difficult to decipher. The purpose of that section is to establish the objective validity of the categories—to show, that is, that the pure concepts of the understanding apply to all objects of human experience. While the general goal of the TD may be easy enough to state, the argument strategy that Kant uses to establish the objective validity of the categories is hardly easy to understand. Vinci focuses on the argument strategy of the second (1787) edition TD, standardly referred to as the B-Deduction. This portion of the text replaced key sections of the first (1781) edition TD, and quite famously, Kant offers in the B-Deduction a two-part argument for the objective validity of the categories, the first of which concludes in section 20, and the second of which concludes in section 26. Based on Kant’s explicit remarks in sections 21 and 26, it has become standard practice to read the first part of the argument as establishing that the categories are objectively valid for all intuitions in general, and the second part as establishing that they are objectively valid for all empirical intuitions in [End Page 174] particular. Here, Vinci sees a problem. If Kant has already shown in sections 15–20 that the categories apply to all intuitions in general, then showing in sections 22–26 that they also apply to empirical intuitions is trivial: it merely establishes what immediately follows from the first part (196–200). Vinci offers a reading of the two-part argument that is intended to circumvent this so-called Triviality Problem, and it is a reading that rests on a novel distinction between the “sensible intuitions” mentioned in the first part of Kant’s B-Deduction argument and the “empirical intuitions” referred to in the second part. According to Vinci, “sensible intuitions” refer to all human sensible intuitions in general, that is, to all intuitions that are presented in the pure forms of human intuition: space and time. “Empirical intuitions,” in contrast, refer to all spatio-temporally ordered intuitions that result from sensation. On this reading, the empirical intuitions of the second part of the argument are not a subset of the intuitions treated in the first part. Rather, they are sensible intuitions in a more narrow sense: they are the spatio-temporal intuitions peculiar to human sensory experience (200–202). Therefore, in going from the first part to the second part of his argument in the TD, Kant proceeds from a general notion of sensible intuitions to a more specific one, not from the genus “intuition” to a particular species. Vinci thereby gives us a way of seeing how the two parts of the B-Deduction argument are related, and a way of understanding why both parts are necessary for Kant to establish that the categories are objectively valid for all human experience. Like any good provocative interpretation, Vinci’s is sure to raise questions, especially from scholars familiar with the B-Deduction. Such questions will likely come as no surprise to Vinci, who admits that his reading of the two-part argument rests on taking some creative license with the text and, specifically, on reading the notion of “sensible intuitions” in a way that runs “contrary to some of Kant’s official pronouncements” (202). This sort of creative license is not unique to the arguments of chapter 7. Earlier in the book, Vinci deploys distinctions—such as between pure and applied geometry, and logical and aesthetic unity—that are not explicitly made by Kant; and Vinci does so to make sense of some of the more puzzling claims that...

El “gran cisma fenomenológico” y el “cisma fenomenológico-existencial”. Sobre la continuidad en la crítica contemporánea respecto del tránsito de Husserl hacia el idealismo trascendental

Se reconoce generalmente que hay dos cismas en la historia temprana delmovimiento fenomenológico. El primero, el “gran cisma fenomenológico”, comenzó entre los años 1905 y 1913 y, como muchos de sus jóvenes contemporáneos, por ejemplo Pfänder, Scheler, Reinach, Stein e Ingarden, rechazó la transformación husserliana de la fenomenología de las Investigaciones lógicas (1900/1901) –esto es, de la fenomenología como psicología descriptiva– a la fenomenología de Ideas 1 (1913) –esto es, lafenomenología como idealismo trascendental. El segundo, el “cisma fenomenológicoexistencial”, tuvo lugar entre 1927 y 1933, desde que en Ser y tiempo (1927) la filosofía heideggeriana se apartó de la fenomenología transcendental husserliana de la conciencia y se encaminó hacia una analítica ontológica de la existencia humana como la vía hacia una interpretación de la pregunta por el sentido del Ser. Este ensayo no gira en torno ni al primero ni al segundo cisma per se, sino que trata de la relación entre los dos. Se sugiere que el primer cisma anticipa al segundo y que el segundo recapitula al primero,de manera que, aunque el primero pudiera haber ocurrido sin el segundo, el segundo no habría ocurrido, como fue el caso, sin el primero. Se indica que el segundo cisma yace temporalmente de manera más próxima al primero de lo que hasta la actualidad se ha apreciado. Con todo, el ensayo busca responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿cómo es que el “gran cisma fenomenológico” y el “cisma fenomenológico-existencial” se iluminan el uno al otro filosóficamente?