Abstract

In a paper entitled A Semantical Version of the Problem of Transcendental Idealism, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz gives a very impressive analysis of transcendental idealism. He approaches the matter using the tools of formal semantics developed by Alfred Tarski and draws a rather surprising conclusion. According to Ajdukiewicz, the idealist position, claiming that the world around us is ontologically dependent on our cognitive activity can be shown to be implausible on purely logical grounds. It is worth taking a closer look at this insightful argument, since Ajdukiewicz’s analysis, if sound, has a relevance reaching far beyond purely historical questions concerning the right interpretation and proper assessment of past idealist doctrines. These days various species of (mostly local) idealism are thriving under such labels as ‘anti realism’ or ‘pragmatism’. Ajdukiewicz’s venerable paper goes to the very core of many contemporary metaphysical discussions.

Highlights

  • In a paper entitled A Semantical Version of the Problem of Transcendental Idealism, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz gives a very impressive analysis of transcendental idealism

  • Let me begin with an outline of the idealist position Ajdukiewicz targets in his paper

  • Recalling the three parts that have to be contained in Tarski’s meta-language, namely (i) a ‘syntactic’ part referring to the expressions of the object-language L, (ii) a part by means of which we can speak about the objects belonging to L’s universe of discourse, and (iii) the semantic vocabulary expressing concepts like truth, reference, etc., we see that Berkeley’s conceptual resources are clearly restricted to (i)

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Summary

What is idealism

Let me begin with an outline of the idealist position Ajdukiewicz targets in his paper. Recalling the three parts that have to be contained in Tarski’s meta-language, namely (i) a ‘syntactic’ part referring to the expressions of the object-language L, (ii) a part by means of which we can speak about the objects belonging to L’s universe of discourse, and (iii) the semantic vocabulary expressing concepts like truth, reference, etc., we see that Berkeley’s conceptual resources are clearly restricted to (i). The outcome of this analysis is similar to the conclusion of Ajdukiewicz’s earlier paper.

Epistemic theory of truth and conceptual empiricism
Tarski and Kant
Full Text
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