Transcendental Account Research Articles

The Challenge of Scientific Revolutions: Van Fraassen's and Friedman's Responses

This article criticizes the attempts by Bas van Fraassen and Michael Friedman to address the challenge to rationality posed by the Kuhnian analysis of scientific revolutions. In the paper, I argue that van Fraassen's solution, which invokes a Sartrean theory of emotions to account for radical change, does not amount to justifying rationally the advancement of science but, rather, despite his protestations to the contrary, is an explanation of how change is effected. Friedman's approach, which appeals to philosophical developments at a meta-theoretical level, does not really address the problem of rationality as posed by Kuhn's work. Instead of showing how, despite revolutions, scientific development is, indeed, rational, he gives a transcendental account of rational scientific progress.

What's Formal about Formal Indication? Heidegger's Method in Sein und Zeit 1

Against the background of a recent exchange between Cristina Lafont and Hubert Dreyfus, I argue that Heidegger's method of “formal indication” is at the heart of his attempt in Sein und Zeit to answer “the ontological question of the being of the ‘sum’” (SZ, p. 46). This method works reflexively, by picking out certain essential features of one's first-person singular being at the outset of its investigation that are implicit in the question “what is it to be the entity I am?” On the basis of these features, various further a priori, ontological structures (care and temporality) that constitute one as a first-person singular entity then become accessible. Formal indication is thus formal in two senses: it officially designates or signals certain first-person singular phenomena as the topic of investigation, and it picks out features which define the ontological form of the entity in question. It is thereby the method by which a legitimately transcendental account of our being may be begun to be generated by each of us from out of our factical, immanent existence.

¿Qué podemos pedir a una teoría de la justicia? Algunas consideraciones acerca de un debate entre Amartya Sen y John Rawls

In this paper I try to revise Sen’s thesis about the «transcendental» nature of Rawls’ theory of justice. According to Sen transcendental theories of justice are unnecessary. What we aim at is to justify a series of comparative judgements about two or more states of affairs.We do not strive, unlike Rawls, to form a complete system of moral principles that backs an «ideal just society». I try to show that Sen’s «comparative» account is weak. First of all, Sen does not offer a fair interpretation of Rawls’ theory. In particular, he is wrong when he depicts Rawls’ justice as fairness as a complete and transcendental moral doctrine. Secondly, Sen overlooks the fact that in order to justify comparative evaluations of states of affairs we must assume as valid a particular moral doctrine. Finally I try to solve the problem about the contrast between transcendental and comparative account by offering a transcendental outlook to questions of justice that is, at the same time, pluralist and incomplete.

How is Philosophy Possible? Blanchot on Secrecy, Ambiguity and the Care for Death

I examine the contribution that the first part of Maurice Blancot’s recit Death Sentence makes to his understanding of the relationship between philosophy and literature. I use a reading of the Kantian, transcendental account of literature in “How is Literature Possible” as the starting point for an analysis of the way in which Blanchot uses secrets in describing J.’s death in Death Sentence, linking secrecy up with the imaginary, ambiguity and dissimulation. The purpose for this refinement is to challenge the philosophical tradition’s self‐understanding, particularly as exhibited in Hegel. This challenge is seen by reading the account of grief in the first part of Death Sentence as a parody of Hegel’s interpretation of Antigone.

The Primacy of Disruption in Levinas’ Account of Transcendence

AbstractI present ‘disruption’ as what is most fundamental to Levinas’ account of transcendence. I argue that one should read his treatment of the Other as a modulation of transcendence, and prioritize the structures of positionality and solitude as the conditions that make transcendence possible. Hence, Being is transcended insofar as these structures have ‘always already’ articulated the rupturing of the subject, which, for Levinas, constitutes her transcending. Included in my argument is a critique of reading Levinas’ project as undermining the fundamentally solitary nature of human existence because of his focus on alterity. Such a reading reduces Levinas’ account of alterity, instead of maintaining its signification as that which is ‘never there.’ It is the solitary existent who is vulnerable before an ‘already gone by’ alterity, such that her subjectivity is radically disrupted. For Levinas, an encounter with alterity is the agony of finding no one, or having nowhere, from which I can be granted wholeness or justification. It follows that transcendence is fundamentally concretized in a positioned solitude, and not in some inter-subjective space.

Nietzsche’s Daybreak

Any interpretation of Nietzsche's criticisms of morality must show whether or not Nietzsche is entitled both to deny free will and to be concerned with furthering human freedom. Here I will show that Nietzsche is entitled to both claims if his theory of freedom is set in the context of a naturalistic drive-psychology. The drive-psychology allows Nietzsche to develop a modified but recognizable account of freedom as autonomy. I situate this development in Nietzsche's thought through a close reading of Daybreak (Morgenrote). In conclusion I contrast Nietzsche's naturalistic account of autonomy with the transcendental account developed by Kant.

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

ABSTRACTThis article analyses and evaluates the uses of the concept of causal power in the critical realist tradition, which is based on Roy Bhaskar's philosophy of science. The concept of causal power that appears in the early works of Rom Harré and his associates is compared to Bhaskar's account of this concept and its uses in the critical realist social ontology. It is argued that the concept of emergence should be incorporated to any adequate notion of causal power. The concept of emergence used in Bhaskar and other critical realists’ works is shown to be ambiguous. It is also pointed out that the concept of causal power should be analysed in an anti‐essentialist way. Ontological and methodological problems that vitiate Bhaskar's transcendental account of the concept of causal power are examined. Moreover, it is argued that the applications of the concept of causal power to mental powers, reasons, and social structures in the critical realist social ontology are problematic. The paper shows how these problems might be avoided without giving up the concept of causal power and the notion of structural social causation.

Accommodation to What? Univocity of Being, Pure Nature, and the Anthropology of St Irenaeus

Abstract: This article, the author's inaugural lecture for the J.I. Packer chair at Regent College, Vancouver, takes as its starting‐point Karl Barth's penetrating question, ‘Accommodation to what?’ Suggesting that recent evangelical theologies have been too ready to accommodate to the immanentism inherent in postmodern culture, the article traces the roots of that immanentism to Scotus's teaching concerning the univocity of being, and suggests that in St Irenaeus's christologically shaped account of the nature and destiny of human life there is a theologically satisfying preservation of a proper account of transcendence.

The Enigma of the Cartesian Infinite

In Levinas' hands, the problematic of transcendence challenges phenomenological description by positing, as primary, that which is outside intentionality. How, then, to think about this transcendence outside intentionality? This essay explores the possibilities of a description of transcendence through Levinas' and Marion's readings of the Cartesian idea of the Infinite. What emerges from these readings of Descartes' idea of the Infinite is a sense of indication that is fundamentally elliptical, pointing beyond what it can render to presence, but pointing nonetheless. Thinking through this problem of elliptical indication, I argue, is central to generating a phenomenological account of transcendence.

Stiegler Reading Derrida: The Prosthesis of Deconstruction in Technics

In his massive multi-volume work Technics and Time Bernard Stiegler explores a history of technics as epiphylogenesis—the preservation in technical objects of epigenetic experience. Epiphylogenesis for Stiegler marks a break with genetic evolution (which cannot preserve the lessons of experience), a break which also constitutes the “invention” of the human. As Stiegler puts it in the general introduction to Technics and Time: “As a‘process of exteriorisation,’ technics is the pursuit of life by means other than life.” (Technics and Time 17) Since the “human” is constituted through its exteriorisation into tools, its origin is neither biological (a particular arrangement of cells) nor transcendental (to be found in something like consciousness). The origin of the human as the prosthesis of the living is therefore fundamentally aporetic: one should speak, for Stiegler, of a non-origin or default of origin. Stiegler develops these arguments through a reading of Rousseau and Leroi-Gourhan, showing on the one hand how the the empirical approach of the palaeo-anthropologist cannot avoid the transcendental question of origin and, on the other, how Rousseau’s transcendental account of the question of origin inscribes inside its account, despite itself, the thought of the human as contingent or accidental (Technics and Time 82-133). I will not expand on Stiegler’s reading of Leroi-Gourhan and Rousseau here. What I intend to discuss is rather the relationship between Stiegler’s work and that of Jacques Derrida. In particular we will examine Stiegler’s discussion of Derrida in the latter half of the first volume of Technics and Time and then move on to discuss some other points from the interviews between the two men gathered in the Echographies collection. The context of Stiegler’s disagreement with Derrida in the first volume of Technics and Time is the discussion in chapter 3 of the palaeo-anthropologist Leroi-Gourhan and the “invention of the human”. At the opening of the chapter Stiegler argues:

On the development of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of imagination and its use for interdisciplinary research

In this paper I trace Husserl’s transformation of his notion of phantasy from its strong leanings towards empiricism into a transcendental phenomenology of imagination. Rejecting the view that this account is only more incompatible with contemporary neuroscientific research, I instead claim that the transcendental suspension of naturalistic (or scientific) pretensions precisely enables cooperation between the two distinct realms of phenomenology and science. In particular, a transcendental account of phantasy can disclose the specific accomplishments of imagination without prematurely deciding upon a particular scientific paradigm for its experimental investigation; a decision that is best left to the sciences themselves.

No Exit: Levinas' Aporetic Account of Transcendence

AbstractIn this paper I present Levinas' account of excendence in On Escape and Existence and Existents and show its continuity with his subsequent discussions of transcendence in Time and the Other, Totality and Infinity, and Otherwise than Being. I argue that Levinas' critique of the traditional idea of identity plays a decisive role in establishing the continuity between these various accounts as it provides the key to unlocking his account of transcendence as a formal structure. However, the meaning of trascendence lies not in the structure but in its concretization. Although Levinas initially presents fecundity as the concretization of transcendence, he ultimately identifies it as ethics. This development explains why Levinas himself preferred to think of himself as a thinker of transcendence or the holy rather than to be identified with ethics.

Between Sense and Thought

Focusing on the account of synthesis in Kant's Transcendental Deduction allows us to see a greater degree of compatibility between the two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason than is sometimes thought. The first Deduction shows that while it emphasizes an account of empirical synthesis it also includes a more properly transcendental account of the synthetic unity required for cognition. The second edition simply focuses on this feature of synthesis to the exclusion of the empirical. The result: a complete account of synthesis with the A-edition starting bottom up from sense and the B-edition working top-down from thought.

Divine Transcendence, Religious Pluralism and Barth's Doctrine of God

Abstract: Pluralists such as John Hick frequently argue that the transcendence, mystery and ineffability of ‘God’ provide the grounds on which a pluralistic interpretation of religion should be embraced. In this article the author explores the possibility that certain contemporary accounts of divine transcendence, consciously indebted to Karl Barth, may implicitly open the door to Hick's line of argument. After identifying four reasons why Barth's own account of transcendence (Church Dogmatics II/1) resists a pluralist appropriation, the author examines two contemporary proposals: William Placher's The Domestication of Transcendence and Stacy Johnson's The Mystery of God. He contends that, unlike Barth, the accounts of God's transcendence proposed by these two theologians implicitly open the door to Hick's line of argument.

Judaism and Theology In Martha Nussbaum's Ethics

The writings of Martha Nussbaum broadly defend an account of transcendence as internal, always rooted in the human context. Her account implies that any and all projects of normative theological ethics are superfluous, since they transcend the natural bounds of human experience and reason. This essay points toward a space for theology, specifically Jewish theology, in Nussbaum's work, through an analysis of her recent philosophical and autobiographical writings on Judaism. Nussbaum's account in Upheavals of Thought associates Judaism with carnality and vulnerability; this essay supplements her account by pointing to a non‐natural origin of emotional judgments in some of the texts Nussbaum treats. This move serves to temper the emphasis on autonomy in liberal Jewish thought, and provides an account of transcendence which can serve as the basis of a more traditional Jewish theological ethics.

Karl Barth's ‘Dialectical Catholicity’: Sic et Non

This essay attempts to achieve three things. First, it brings to the foreground an important but largely forgotten conversation partner of Karl Barth's theology: Roman Catholicism, and sketches Barth's critical and constructive engagement of it from his teaching at the University of Muenster (1925–1930) to his late booklet “Ad Limina Apostolorum”. Second, it argues that Barth's engagement of Roman Catholicism functions as a crucial moment of his “dialectical catholicity”, through which he discursively applies his critical, reflexive principle of “genuine Protestantism”. Third, the essay puts forth a critique of Barth's transcendental account of “genuine Protestantism” by drawing on Martin Luther's concrete, ecclesially embodied pneumatology.

The structure, Basic Contents, and Dynamics of the Unconscious in Analytical (Jungian) Psychology and Husserlian Phenomenology: Part Ii

AbstractThis paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and a phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion was published in the previous volume of this journal as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion is published here as Part II. Part I first clarified the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification it showed that, in marked contrast to the prevailing approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors (rooted in Freud's theory of repression) in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors (rooted in Jung's theory of apperception) that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concluded with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II shows how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, i. e., the so-called "collective unconscious," can be phenomenologically accounted for if: (1) Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative (hermeneutically phenomenological) approaches to the unconscious is attended to and; (2) such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious.

A CRITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF PAUL TILLICH'S EPISTEMOLOGY

It is contended that Falk Wagner's famous charge that Tillich just posits the existence of the Unconditional without further argument overlooks the transcendental character of Tillich's early writings from the nineteen twenties. There the transcendental is utilized for legitimating the transcendent. Tillich's transcendental account resembles the ontological argument in that the question of the transcendent's existence is affirmed via an inquiry into the conceptual implications its concept harbours. In his later writings, Tillich's abandons this transcendentalism in favour of his 'critical phenomenology'. The weaknesses of this version of phenomenology are brought out in a comparison with Husserlian phenomenology. Finally, a remedy for the weaknesses of Tillich's approach is suggested by drawing on current antifoundationalist thought.

The Structure, Basic Contents and Dynamics of the Unconscious in Analytical (Jungian) Psychology and Husserlian Phenomenology: Part I1

AbstractThis paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion is published here as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion will be published in the next volume of this journal as Part II. Part I first clarifies the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification I show that, in marked contrast to the prevailing approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors (rooted in Freud's theory of repression) in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors (rooted in Jung's theory of apperception) that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concludes with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II will show how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, that is, the "collective unconscious, " can be phenomenologically accounted for if (1) Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative (hermeneutically phenomenological) approaches to the unconscious is attended to and (2) such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious.