Block Transactions Research Articles

Survey of Online Identity Management Techniques on Blockchain

Secure identity management is one of the controversial topics in the cybersecurity landscape. The user needs to rely on third-party providers for managing their personal information, which is a big security concern. Traditional identity systems typically suffer from single points of failure, lack of interoperability, and privacy issues such as encouraging mass data collection and user tracking. Blockchain technology has the potential to support novel data ownership and governance models with built-in control and consent mechanisms, which may benefit both users and businesses by alleviating these concerns. Blockchain-based systems provide the possibility for their users to insert their data in this distributed ledger. Users can trust the blockchain as it is leveraging consensus mechanisms to validate and gather the transactions in immutable blocks. The transparent and decentralized nature of the blockchain network enables the development of a non-refutable and unbreakable record of data, which is the fundamental feature of many applications, such as identity management.

Synthesis of Blockchain, Artificial Intelligence and Internet of Things

This paper is an exploration of several theories on the synthesis of the Blockchain(BC), the Internet of Things (IoT), and Artificial Intelligence(AI) through a literature review. Blockchain technology is a decentralized peer-to-peer network that stores records and transactions in immutable blocks secured by cryptography. The decentralization aspect of blockchain eliminates the need for trusted third party interceder. Internet of Things(IoT) is an interrelated computer system that makes a connection between computers and humans to communicate in several areas; smart devices like homes, cars, radio are just a few examples. IoT challenges are security, connectivity, issues with the analysis of big data, centralization, and vulnerability to attacks. Artificial Intelligence(AI) machine learning technology is the advanced decision-making process that influences daily routines such as banking, healthcare, gaming, transportation, and space exploration, among others. AI’s challenges are; security, centralized architecture, and resource limitations. The methodology will be a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the existing research and how these technologies can be a transformative impact on how information is accessed through enterprise and society. The convergence of BC, AI, and IoT will provide scalable, secure high-level intellectual functioning that will be the new paradigm of digital information.

The Synthesis of Blockchain, Artificial Intelligence and Internet of Things

This paper is an exploration of several theories on the synthesis of the Blockchain(BC), the Internet of Things (IoT), and Artificial Intelligence(AI) through a literature review. Blockchain technology is a decentralized peer-to-peer network that stores records and transactions in immutable blocks secured by cryptography. The decentralization aspect of blockchain eliminates the need for trusted third party interceder. Internet of Things(IoT) is an interrelated computer system that makes a connection between computers and humans to communicate in several areas; smart devices like homes, cars, radio are just a few examples. IoT challenges are security, connectivity, issues with the analysis of big data, centralization, and vulnerability to attacks. Artificial Intelligence(AI) machine learning technology is the advanced decision-making process that influences daily routines such as banking, healthcare, gaming, transportation, and space exploration, among others. AI’s challenges are; security, centralized architecture, and resource limitations. The methodology will be a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the existing research and how these technologies can be a transformative impact on how information is accessed through enterprise and society. The convergence of BC, AI, and IoT will provide scalable, secure high-level intellectual functioning that will be the new paradigm of digital information.

Everyone Loves File

Oracle File Storage Service (FSS) is an elastic filesystem provided as a managed NFS service. A pipelined Paxos implementation underpins a scalable block store that provides linearizable multipage limited-size transactions. Above the block store, a scalable B-tree holds filesystem metadata and provides linearizable multikey limited-size transactions. Self-validating B-tree nodes and housekeeping operations performed as separate transactions allow each key in a B-tree transaction to require only one page in the underlying block transaction. The filesystem provides snapshots by using versioned key-value pairs. The system is programmed using a nonblocking lock-free programming style. Presentation servers maintain no persistent local state making them scalable and easy to failover. A non-scalable Paxos-replicated hash table holds configuration information required to bootstrap the system. An additional B-tree provides conversational multi-key minitransactions for control-plane information. The system throughput can be predicted by comparing an estimate of the network bandwidth needed for replication to the network bandwidth provided by the hardware. Latency on an unloaded system is about 4 times higher than a Linux NFS server backed by NVMe, reflecting the cost of replication. FSS has been in production since January 2018 and holds tens of thousands of customer file systems comprising many petabytes of data.

The price effect of block trades: evidence from the Tunisian Stock Exchange

This paper analyses the impact of block trades (upstairs market) on the Tunisian Stock Exchange from January 2, 2008 to December 31, 2017. We find that the buyer-initiated trades in upstairs market have a positive temporary impact on the main market which confirms the liquidity hypotheses. The Tunisian market is found to react positively after the block initiated by a seller, which is not unexpected. This reaction can be explained by the visibility hypothesis initially developed by Miller (1977) who argues that a volume shock increases the probability that an investor is interested in buying this stock especially when short selling is limited or prohibited. We also think that some Tunisian investors (individual small shareholders) react regardless of the direction of the block transaction, showing a naive behaviour. Our results reject the information hypothesis suggesting that the upstairs brokers have the informational advantage about unexpressed demand and thus the market can absorb large block trades (Grossman, 1992). Then, we highlight the information leakage dealing with block trades according to the position of block brokers (application negotiation or construction pools of counterparts).

Blockchain-based Electronic Voting System with Special Ballot and Block Structures that Complies with Indonesian Principle of Voting

Blockchain technology could be implemented not only in digital currency, but also in other fields. One such implementation is in democratic life, namely voting. This research focuses on designing a blockchain-based electronic voting system for medium to large-scale usage that complies with law, specifically voting principles in Indonesia. In this research, we proposed the following: a ballot design as block transaction employing UUID version 4, a modified block structure using SHA3-256 hash algorithm, and a voting protocol. The minimum length of a ballot is 43 bytes (excluding ECDSA signature) if one character is used as candidate’s identifier and timestamp is stored as integer. We built a simulation program using Python-based Django web framework to cast 10,000 votes and mine them into blocks. Tampered transactions in each block could be detected and restored by synchronizing data with another node. We also evaluated the proposed system. By using this system, voters can exercise voting principles in Indonesia: direct, public, free, confidential, honest, and fair.

The price effect of block trades: evidence from the Tunisian Stock Exchange

This paper analyses the impact of block trades (upstairs market) on the Tunisian Stock Exchange from January 2, 2008 to December 31, 2017. We find that the buyer-initiated trades in upstairs market have a positive temporary impact on the main market which confirms the liquidity hypotheses. The Tunisian market is found to react positively after the block initiated by a seller, which is not unexpected. This reaction can be explained by the visibility hypothesis initially developed by Miller (1977) who argues that a volume shock increases the probability that an investor is interested in buying this stock especially when short selling is limited or prohibited. We also think that some Tunisian investors (individual small shareholders) react regardless of the direction of the block transaction, showing a naive behaviour. Our results reject the information hypothesis suggesting that the upstairs brokers have the informational advantage about unexpressed demand and thus the market can absorb large block trades (Grossman, 1992). Then, we highlight the information leakage dealing with block trades according to the position of block brokers (application negotiation or construction pools of counterparts).

Automation of voting processes for joint-stock companies using a homomorphic cryptosystem and block-chain technology

In the article is proposed a method for conducting a safe voting among shareholders with the preservation of the secrecy of each vote and obtaining a trusted result on the basis of the use of the Paillier cryptographic system, which implements the additive property of ciphertexts. On the basis of the proposed method, the voting protocol using the blockchain technology was implemented. This technology provides a trusted transaction processing environment. The theoretical concepts of technology of the block transaction chain, the mechanism of homomorphic encryption, distributed key generation are briefly outlined. The step-by-step algorithm of operation of the system is given, the main technical aspects and advantages of using decentralized technologies for data storage and processing are described. Existing decisions in the area of voting systems were investigated and a comparative analysis was made. On the basis of the analysis, the main criteria for holding a safe voting process were formed. The method of distributed key generation among participants of the system is briefly described taking into account the differences between the keys of the Paillier cryptosystem from the standard RSA keys. The paper describes in detail the algorithm of the hierarchical generation of shareholder keys. Using this algorithm allows to optimize the process of storing and processing cryptographic materials on a client application. The feasibility of using smart contract technology, which is a decentralized application with a shared data storage environment and consensus algorithm, was also disclosed and substantiated. Contracts represent an algorithm for processing transaction data in the network, allowing to check the rules of operation of the system and conduct logical operations on the data in a secure way. This method can be used to conduct voting in consortia, joint stock companies and private networks, to be integrated into decentralized data storage systems to provide a secure decision mechanism.

Decentralization is Vulnerable Under the Gap Game

The blockchain is the core mechanism of Bitcoin, which is mainly enabled by a distributed consensus mechanism. Essentially, in Proof-of-Work-based consensus protocol, the miners generate a series of blocks to realize decentralization practical. Miners receive two types of revenue: block rewards and transaction fees, in which the reward of block drops off as time goes on. Carlsten et al. defined a mining gap and then Tsabary et al. analyzed the gap game exploring how mining gaps form. In this paper, we analyze the other implications of the gap game. First, it is well known that the security of Bitcoin decentralized consensus protocol relies on miners behaving correctly. The security of the blockchain system will be threatened in case of the consensus mechanism is breached. Therefore, we also described how the gap game impacts the decentralization of Bitcoin and the stability of blockchain. Second, to confirm the implication, we discuss what aspects of decentralization can be impacted by the gap game; then we defined a new decentralization model and listed its main features. In the end, we analyze the block reward capacity in the blockchain and consider the impact on the existing two common block reward systems when the gap game was formed.

The Impact of Profit Uncertainty on Miner Decisions in Blockchain Systems

In blockchain systems, miners execute transactions in blocks. Since each block has a limit on the number of transactions, miners usually prioritise transactions by selecting the most profitable ones. However, miners are uncertain about the exact income and the exact cost of executing transactions. Thus, they are not able to make informed decisions of which transactions to select and execute in order to maximise their profits. The main aim of this paper is to investigate the uncertainty that miners perceive about the income and the cost of executing transactions and the impact of this uncertainty on the profit miners can gain. To achieve this aim, we design a simulation model, collect the input data for the model, implement the model and run an experiment on the model. Our simulation results show that the uncertainty miners perceive about the cost of executing transactions has a significant impact on the block profit. On the contrary, our results do not show a significant impact of the income uncertainty on the block profit.

Does Trade Reporting Improve Market Quality in an Institutional Market? Evidence from 144a Corporate Bonds

We study the effect of public transaction reporting on trading activity, trade execution costs, and dealer behavior for Rule 144A corporate bonds that are primarily traded by institutional investors. TRACE reporting had no measurable impact on bond turnover, or the dealers’ willingness to hold inventory positions, participate in interdealer trades, or facilitate block transactions. Transaction costs decrease following trade reporting by approximately 10% with large reductions observed for block transactions and bonds with lower dealer competition. Small dealers gain market share and close the trading cost advantage enjoyed by large dealers. Our evidence suggests that even institutional traders benefit from improved transparency, particularly when competition among dealers is weak.

Further empirical evidence on block transactions below the MBR: the Spanish market

ABSTRACTThere is a relatively unknown market for partial control or corporate influence in Spanish listed firms, where the control transaction size is below the legal threshold that triggers a mandatory tender offer, as this kind of deal looks for exercising some degree of control, but not a full control. The goal of this paper is to go further in its empirical analysis by exploring its distinguishing features, using as the criterion to define its transactions obtaining a seat in the board of directors. We find that these deals are mainly located in the segment of the market of large trades where the rules for private negotiations are easier to implement; the size of the block is relatively large and it is negotiated as a whole block. Besides, the most common buyer has no previous stake in the firm. We find no evidence that the buyers pay, in median, for a seat on the board of directors, but the variability of the premiums for those blocks is higher and shows that buyers that had no control position in the target firm pay more for being among largest shareholders (partial control) and less for not being among them (influence).

The price impact of block transactions in the Netherlands

In this paper, the authors analyse the stock price effects of block transactions and the disclosure thereof for Dutch firms. The authors measure a significant positive price effect for block purchases directly around the transaction date, but not for block sales. The authors do not measure a significant price effect for the disclosures of block transactions. The authors find two opposing effects about the agency role of large shareholders. In particular, while the authors find that the market reacts positively to the entrance of a new block holder, the authors also measure a negative reaction to the purchase of large blocks.

Risk Decision Analysis on the Electricity Transaction of Power Enterprises in Electricity and Derivative Transactions

In the environment of electricity and derivative transaction, the risk hedging and metastasis of power right transaction in China are needed to establish the risk decision-making for the generated energy/right on electricity generation side. And it will be the key point focused by decision-makers in power enterprises. The planning management of two-stage market transaction risk was conducted with the hedging function of generation rights transaction to establish a risk decision model of comprehensive electricity transaction. The relationship between the electricity price of two-stage market and the identity parameters of transaction participants was given for solving the model. The whole transaction process of generating companies was divided into two stages. The risk decision framework of block transaction was established for the independent transaction decision-making of each segment and the overall optimization. The results of example simulation verified the effectiveness and feasibility of the decisions.

Private benefits of control in the banking industry: A cross-country analysis

The study explores the existence and magnitude of private benefits of control in the banking industry around the world. By analyzing 157 control-transfer transactions for banks in 40 countries, we are able to detect the existence of an average 3.3% block transaction premium as a measure of private benefits of control. Consistent with the legal origin theory about the protection of minority shareholders, we find that banks operating in French civil law regimes show on average higher premiums than the banks operating in other legal frameworks. The paper also investigates to what extent regulation and public policies can curb those benefits thus enhancing bank governance. While bank-specific regulation generally does not seem to have a substantial impact on private benefits of control, the regulation on entry appears to play a moderate role in curbing those benefits

Chinese block transactions and the market reaction

Abstract This paper examines block transactions in the Chinese equity market. We find that most of the block transactions are traded at prices at or below the closing price of the regular continuous auction market, and more than half are traded at or below the lowest price of the day. Consistent with the price pattern indicating that the block transactions are seller-initiated, the overall market reaction is negative. However, we find a different market reaction to block transactions when the buyer is represented by China International Capital Corporation (CICC), the number one investment bank in China which counts many foreign institutional investors as its clients. The positive reaction is consistent with the buyer-certification hypothesis, that is, the fact that some smart institutional buyers enter block trade indicates the buyers' assessment of undervaluation.

Private benefits in corporate control transactions

This paper presents an analytical framework from which it can be inferred whether sellers or buyers in block transactions value private benefits highest. I am thus able to suggest an answer to the question: Are blocks of shares traded because the buyer has high security benefits, or because the buyer has high private benefits from the control rights that come with the shares? Using voting rights as the vehicle for private benefits, I find that the selling shareholders in block transactions attaches more value to private benefits than the buyers and that toeholds are insignificant for the premium paid.

Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades

We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (2000) explicitly accounting for both block premiums and block discounts in the data. The evidence suggests that the occurrence of a block premium or discount depends on the controlling block holder's ability to fight a potential tender offer for the target's stock. We find evidence of large private benefits of control and of associated deadweight losses, but also of value creation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis.

Quantifying Private Benefits of Control from a Structural Model of Block Trades

We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) explicitly accounting for both block premia and block discounts in the data. The evidence suggests that the occurrence of a block premium or discount depends on the controlling block holder's ability to fight a potential tender offer for the target's stock. We find evidence of large private benefits of control and of associated deadweight losses, but also of value creation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis.

The Determinants of the Block Premium and of Private Benefits of Control

We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) explicitly dealing with the existence of both block premia and block discounts in the data. We find evidence that the occurrence of block premia and block discounts depends on the controlling block holder's ability to fight a potential tender offer for the target's stock. Private benefits represent 3% of the target firm's stock market value. Private benefits increase with the target's cash holdings and decrease with its short term debt providing evidence in favor of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis. A counterfactual policy evaluation of the Mandatory Bid Rule suggests that it fails to add value to shareholders because it fails to prevent welfare decreasing transactions and, by forcing inefficient tender offers, it deters welfare increasing transactions.