Abstract
The blockchain is the core mechanism of Bitcoin, which is mainly enabled by a distributed consensus mechanism. Essentially, in Proof-of-Work-based consensus protocol, the miners generate a series of blocks to realize decentralization practical. Miners receive two types of revenue: block rewards and transaction fees, in which the reward of block drops off as time goes on. Carlsten et al. defined a mining gap and then Tsabary et al. analyzed the gap game exploring how mining gaps form. In this paper, we analyze the other implications of the gap game. First, it is well known that the security of Bitcoin decentralized consensus protocol relies on miners behaving correctly. The security of the blockchain system will be threatened in case of the consensus mechanism is breached. Therefore, we also described how the gap game impacts the decentralization of Bitcoin and the stability of blockchain. Second, to confirm the implication, we discuss what aspects of decentralization can be impacted by the gap game; then we defined a new decentralization model and listed its main features. In the end, we analyze the block reward capacity in the blockchain and consider the impact on the existing two common block reward systems when the gap game was formed.
Highlights
The Bitcoin, proposed by Nakamoto et al [1], realized a monetary system without relying on any third trusted central authority, has been obtaining increasing popularity and acceptance by a wider community
In [11], they defined and analyzed the gap game exploring how mining gaps form as a function of subsidy and fees, they use EBRR denote the ratio of the expected base reward and the expected accumulated fees, and show that EBRR ≈ 6 is sufficient to avoid mining gaps in presented scenarios, they show that gaps form well before fees are the only incentive
Because kbt ≥ m2 that means current rig cost is larger than the block reward, so the miners have to wait for t2 time units until kbt ≤ m2 + rt2, this is the reason why the gap game formalized
Summary
The Bitcoin, proposed by Nakamoto et al [1], realized a monetary system without relying on any third trusted central authority, has been obtaining increasing popularity and acceptance by a wider community. There has been an implied belief that whether miners are paid by block rewards or transaction fees does not affect the security of the blockchain. In [11], they defined and analyzed the gap game exploring how mining gaps form as a function of subsidy and fees, they use EBRR denote the ratio of the expected base reward and the expected accumulated fees, and show that EBRR ≈ 6 is sufficient to avoid mining gaps in presented scenarios, they show that gaps form well before fees are the only incentive We analyzed the impact of the formation of gap game on the security of the Bitcoin system and the stability of the blockchain structure. 3) In the end, we analyze the block reward capacity in the blockchain and consider the impact on the existing two common block reward systems when the gap game was formed. We come to some conclusions (Section 8)
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