THERE ARE TWO IMPORTANT facets to the firm's balance sheet decisions: their contribution to profits and their effect on the firm's soundness or risk of insolvency. A sophisticated portfolio theory literature exists that deals with the pricing of assets and explicitly recognizes the relationship between risk and rate of return. However, the portfolio literature generally assumes the firm to have unlimited, riskless ability to borrow and leverage. For commercial banks, the liability side of the balance sheet must be given at least as much attention as the asset side, especially in view of banks' role as financial intermediaries. Furthermore, traditional portfolio theory typically depends on the assumption of perfect financial markets-a peculiar assumption in the analysis of any intermediary (see Pringle, 1974). Regulators, in their efforts to prevent bank failure, underscore the risk-return nature of both assets and liabilities. Whether regulators are effective in controlling risk in other than very general ways is debatable [see e.g. Mayne, Peltzman, and Mingo]. However, viewing a bank, analytically, in much the same way as a bank examiner, can prove instructive, especially since this orientation is not reflected in the theoretical banking literature. Existent analytical approaches to commercial banking can be generally divided into two categories. There are a group of models that examine the relationship, if any, between asset mix and liability management (see e.g. Klein, and Pringle). These micro models provide a useful framework for analyzing the interrelationships inherent in commercial banking with particular emphasis on maturity structure and asset choice. Another focus has been on how factors external to the bank influence its behavior. In particular, emphasis has been on how monetary policy influences credit availability (see e.g. Jaffee and Modigliani, and Kane and Malkiel). But, by largely ignoring the soundness requirements regulators attempt to impose, the literature has passed up a potentially useful way of viewing a banking firm; that is as a firm attempting to maximize profit while recognizing limitations imposed by regulatory standards of bank soundness. Only Dudley Luckett's (1970) model of bank behavior explicitly incorporates the regulator's soundness constraint. In this paper we present a model with strong neoclassical microeconomic roots. Profit maximization is assumed to be management's goal with the primary external
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