Today's Army Research Articles

Rightsizing the Army in Austere Times

ABSTRACT: Force reductions resulting from the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review significantly compromise the US Army's ability to maintain the global commitments and positioning necessary for managing strategic risks arising from multiple, unforeseen sources. In this article, the authors discuss how active duty Army capacity affects America's strategic risk. ********** During the upcoming decade, the United States will be challenged by a new strategic threat or worse, multiple strategic threats. How will the US Army respond if sequestration cuts continue? The near-future Army--for better or worse--will originate in this decade. The size and readiness of the near-future Army will offer one of two options, either reducing America's strategic or increasing it. So what would be the right size of the Army if we want to reduce America's strategic risk? The results of 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) led to reducing the size of the Army to levels unseen since before World War II. Unfortunately, the current force reduction can only produce one result, the weakening of the joint force's ability to deter conflict, which accordingly increases America's strategic risk. Since the publication of the 2014 QDR, numerous new threats have emerged to challenge the Army's reductions. Daesh captured large parts of Iraq and Syria. The Syrian Civil War escalated, causing a Middle East and European refugee crisis. Russia annexed Crimea, invaded Ukraine, and intervened alongside the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to maintain the Assad regime in Syria. North Korea remained bellicose, testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. China continued its territorial expansion in the South China Sea, and the Taliban continued to intensify offensive operations in Afghanistan. All of these events occurred in just the last several years; what might the next few years bring? While acknowledging the indispensable roles of both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as strategic reserves, their roles, missions, and sizing are beyond the scope and length of this article, which focuses on the size of the active duty Army. This discussion considers what the Army brings to the fight in relation to forward presence and deployable capabilities, the current and future demand on land forces, and examines two options for rightsizing the Army to reduce strategic risk. To set the stage for Army force sizing, we discuss the definition of strategic and five troubling assumptions about future war. Strategic Risk How does strategic relate to the size of the current and future US Army? Strategic is the probability of failure to achieve a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. The smaller the army, the higher the of failure to obtain a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. (1) Senior US Army leaders view today's Army at high risk in regards to the emerging threats and potential for future great-power conflict. High is the rating in which the Army would not be able to accomplish all its assigned tasks in the allotted time and level of casualties. (2) Five Faulty Assumptions While assessments of strategic risk, acceptable cost, and the size of the Army are complex, several false assumptions about future war and landpower have gained currency in defense circles. These assumptions increase national strategic by failing to appreciate Army capacity-capability with sufficient scale and endurance--as an essential element of national security. The is troubling because it threatens to consign the US military to a repetition of the mistakes of recent wars and the development of joint forces ill-prepared for future threats. Forward-positioned land forces do not prevent conflict. Deterrence depends on the demonstrated ability to prevent the enemy from accomplishing its objectives, and deterrence theory states deterring aggression is most likely to succeed when the potential aggressor believes the threats will be enacted. …

Implementing outcome measures—The military physical therapist’s perspective

Outcome measures are a necessary part of rehabilitation. Various methods and measures have been used to assess patient progress and as criteria for discharge from inpatient care, routine outpatient care, and long-term rehabilitation in a variety of patient populations for many years. In the sports medicine setting, outcome measures become especially important in determining when injured athletes are able to return to the playing field. In a military setting, similar to sports medicine, the use of outcome measures is necessary to help determine when the patient is able to return to duty or deploy. In the case of servicemembers with traumatic limb loss, the ultimate goal for many is to return to Active Duty as a tactical athlete and member of today's Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. Determining the functional level and ability to meet the demands they may face is a challenge for the military healthcare system (MHCS) and more specifically for the providers rehabilitating servicemembers with major limb loss. The Armed Forces Amputee Patient Care Program is composed of three distinct centers: the Military Advanced Training Center (MATC) located at Walter Reed National Medical Center, the Center for the Intrepid (CFI) at Brooke Army Medical Center, and the Comprehensive Combat and Complex Casualty Care (C5) program center at the Naval Medical Center San Diego. Physical therapists caring for servicemembers with amputation at all three centers are particularly invested in making sure that the outcome measures we use systematically are appropriate. One of the challenges we faced early on was that most of the outcome measures used for people with amputation did not adequately measure the higher level of that servicemembers with amputation need to return to duty. The majority of combat-related amputations occur in relatively healthy males under the age of 35, a very different population from the civilian population with amputation, in which the vast majority are older and have comorbidities such as diabetes mellitus, peripheral vascular disease, and cardiovascular conditions. The outcome measures used in the civilian amputee population suffer from a ceiling effect when used to assess the typical young, physically active servicemember with amputation. A new paradigm and approach to testing high-level in people with amputation was needed for use in the military environment. In practice, there are already many sophisticated and instrumented outcome measures in use in the Armed Forces Amputee Patient Care Program. These measures include those obtained in the motion analysis/gait laboratories and the Computer Assisted Rehabilitation Environment virtual reality (VR) systems. Motion analysis is a proven technology, and the use of VR with patients with amputation appears to be useful in both patient treatment and research activities. The benefit to the patients in both of these systems is the real-time feedback they receive relative to weight bearing, lateral weight shifting, agility, pelvic obliquity, and shoulder symmetry. The learning that occurs with regard to agility, base of support, center of gravity, and proprioception is hidden underneath the facade of a video game. Biomechanical testing provides very detailed information on kinetics and kinematics of motion, but requires sophisticated equipment and expertise. These systems do not provide a relatively easy-to-administer test that culminates in a usable summary of abilities similar to the Amputee Mobility Predictor. Self-report measures can be used and are easier to administer than either biomechanical testing or performance-based tests. However, self-report measures, while they can be useful, are generally not strongly associated with actual performance-based measures. Many researchers feel that self-report measures alone do not adequately assess the broad concept of function and that performance-based measures are needed to capture the whole picture. …

The Evolution of Dependent Medical Care in the U.S. Army

There is great focus within the military medical community regarding the ever growing cost of medical care overall and dependent care specifically. A great deal of discussion relates to the delivery of care through a growing military-civilian partnership, where an increased amount of health care will be referred to an ever growing network of civilian providers. The U.S. military establishment now stands at an important crossroad leading into the future of dependent care. However, the special concerns, which arise from the responsibility of caring for military dependents, are not a solely recent phenomenon. Ever since the establishment of a permanent standing U.S. Army in the late 1700s, there have been families in need of medical treatment. Although changes occurred continuously, the development and evolution of policies regulating the delivery of medical care to dependants can be divided into three periods. The first is the longest and ranges from the establishment of the Army until the year 1900. The second period spans from 1900 to the post-Korean War year of 1956. The third and final period is from 1956 to 1975. Special changes and advances in each of these periods have served to shape the face of dependent care in today's Army Medical Department.

Proposal of a concept of the land brigade C4ISR system

This paper describes the structure of a concept of the land brigade command information system that is a product of the research work of numerous experts throughout the years done in the then-Yugoslav Army, Army of Serbia and Montenegro and today's Army of the Republic of Serbia. The institution formed for this purpose is the Centre for Command Information Systems and Information Support where command information systems are studied continuously and systematically. Today the KIS represents a primary source needed to obtain an efficient military command management system and an instrument for multiplying combat power without increasing the number of units and combat resources. The KIS is a complex multidisciplinary system requiring the implementation of prototype evolution methodology. Due to its complexity, importance end sensitivity, the KIS has to be realized in one's own military R&D institutions belonging to the Ministry of defense, because only these institutions have adequate knowledge and facilities. Fast and ad-hoc solutions in this area are unacceptable from the military, specialized and economic point of view. The primary KIS br KoV structure concept relies on six types of KIS, five technical subsystems and a number of adequate information systems. The key segment are technical systems that represent one open technical and technological (hardware and software) platform in the realization of any KIS type. The KIS is a dynamic permanent system following the users' needs and technical technology changes. It is not, therefore, a closed and finally defined system, it is the system in continuous evolution, under construction and implementations. Introduction The concept described in this paper is the result of work of numerous people, authors included, engaged in the last twenty years of KIS research. The real balance of forces in combat does not depend so much on the potentials of warring parties but rather on the efficiency of command of combat units as well as of the speed of collecting, analyzing and using information with the main goal to make the optimal decision and make the most of one's own potentials, terrain features and enemy's weaknesses. Command and information systems A general definition of command and information systems is that they are the collection of hardware and software solutions used for real-time integration of all organizational structures, military doctrines, technical and technology systems, information flows and processes aiming at the realization of efficient and rational functioning of the military (units, headquarters, etc.). Basic elements in analyzing command management and command information systems A command information system is an element of the land brigade command system intended for the support of command management in securing and leading complex combat operations. The basic principles of the KIS architecture evolution The key factor is the fact that the KIS is a very complex multidisciplinary system requiring the application of the methodology of prototype evolution together with encompassing human and material resources for better effectiveness. Concept of the land brigade command information system On the basis of long-term research and the obtained experiences with practical solutions, the concept of the KIS br KoV is based on the decomposition model of the military command management system which is decomposed onto functional parts (macro-functions) and command unit operations in real time during combat. Conclusion Command information systems (KIS) today represent the basic instrument for efficient military command management systems rather than an instrument for the multiplication of combat power without increasing the number of units and combat resources. The KIS is a complex multidisciplinary system requiring the application of the prototype evolution methodology.

Why Black Officers Still Fail

Abstract : Over the past two decades U.S. War College students have written several papers touching on the experiences of black officers as they relate to representation, promotions, influence, and culture. Interestingly, only Remo Butler's paper (1996), which was one of the first to be written, has received any widespread attention. Butler found that officers are falling behind their white counterparts in promotions at and above the rank of lieutenant colonel at a disconcerting rate. Specifically, Remo Butler suggested that Black officers were failing in two areas: (1) promotion to the ranks of lieutenant colonel and higher, and (2) selection for battalion and brigade command. This paper is an extension of Butler's paper in that it seeks to determine what, if anything, has changed in the 14 years since Butler published his paper in 1996, using Butler's original research methods. The author's working hypothesis for the paper is that little has changed and that African Americans are still failing in today's Army. The findings overall suggest that today Black officers are getting promoted to the ranks of lieutenant colonel and colonel at higher levels than in 1996. Furthermore, Blacks are being selected for both battalion and brigade levels command at higher rates than 1996. However, Blacks are stilling failing to rise to the strategic decision making levels of the Army. In trying to come to grips with this, the author has found that there are some limitations to this paper. The first is that this study does not employ a rigorous methodological approach to understanding senior officer perceptions. Instead it relies on anecdotal evidence, like Butler's thesis, to support the contentions herein. Also, like Butler's paper, this paper takes a myopic black-white approach to understanding why black officers fail. The growth of the Asian and Hispanic officer populations have to be factored into the equation.

Loyalty and Creativity in a Disciplinary Organization

The relationship between loyalty to rules and the creativity that attempts to improve those same rules was examined among Norwegian army officers deployed in international operations. Today's army officers are faced with rapidly changing work conditions and unpredictable enemies, both of which challenge and outdate rules and routines. They thus may experience that they are either guided by too few or inadequate rules, or by many rules that need to be constantly updated. Assuming that following rules is advantageous to officers, then, contrary to classical theory, it was hypothesized that officers scoring both low and high on loyalty to rules would score high on creativity. Hierarchical regression analyses revealed a significant U‐shaped relationship between loyalty to rules and creativity.

Officer. Nurse. Woman. Army Nurse Corps Recruitment for the Vietnam War

In April 1969, the American Journal of Nursing (AJN) ran U.S. Army advertisement featuring the headline Officer. Nurse. Woman. In it stood young, smiling, attractive nurse wearing combat fatigues and carrying surgical scissors in her pocket. This confident and determined officer, nurse, and woman appealed to other women to join her in the Army Nurse Corps (ANC), where she was Heading up her own staff and Making her own decisions. Working where it counts. She called women like her to be Army nurses, emphasizing that Today's Army Nurse can do because Army Nurses were not just nurses-they were also officers and women1 (Figure 1). The advertisement in Figure 1 was of many tactics used by the ANC in its efforts to recruit nurses during the Vietnam era. As the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam increased, the ANC needed larger numbers of nurses for the hospitals in Vietnam, along the chain of evacuation, and to continue staffing Army hospitals in the United States. The first Army nurses in Vietnam had actually arrived in 1956, when three female nurses were assigned to help train Vietnamese nurses at military hospital in Saigon.2 The first U.S. military hospital, the 8th Field Hospital, arrived on 6 April 1962, and the Army began regularly assigning nurses to the Republic of Vietnam with its arrival, but until the call-up of troops in 1965, die number remained relatively low. By 1966, however, there were approximately 333 Army nurses stationed in Vietnam, number that rose to approximately 640 in 1967, more than 800 in 1968, and peak of 916 in January 1969. Thereafter, the numbers declined with the removal of U.S. troops until the last Army nurses left on 29 March 1973.3 In all, more than five thousand Army nurses served in Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and thousands more served in other locations during the era.4 Recruiting these nurses was major focus of the ANC throughout the Vietnam War. Compounding the immediate need for nurses brought on by the war was an already problematic national nursing shortage that had begun in the early post-World War II period.5 This overall shortage was the result not of fewer nurses but of greater demand due to larger population seeking medical care, longer life expectancies, expansion of medical insurance programs, and shifting of particular facets of health care from home to hospital.6 In addition, in the 1960s and early 1970s nursing was predominantly woman's occupation, and as many women began to move to occupations previously closed to them where they could find higher pay and more advancement potential, the pool of potential nurses decreased. Moreover, as an occupation historically linked to traditional femininity, some factions of the growing women's movement criticized nursing as one of the ultimate female ghettos from which women should be encouraged to escape.7 Regardless of women's positions on feminism, however, as socially acceptable careers for women changed, nursing became of many career options for women instead of of few. In the ANC, the retirements of thousands of World War II era nurses in the late 1950s and early 1960s further compounded this shortage. The number of Army nurses fell from wartime peak of 57,000 in 1945 to 2,961 in 1963, far below the authorized strength of 5,000.'' Until the Vietnam War, the ANC managed its nurse shortage by using corpsmen for clerical and supply duties and hiring civilian nurses to work in stateside hospitals.10 However, the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that this solution was not completely effectual because civilian nurses could not be assigned overseas. As active duty nurses were sent to four field hospitals and two hospital trains during the crisis, base hospitals were left short-staffed and the Army realized that the low numbers of Army nurses posed a hazardous situation in the event of national emergency.11 The following year, the ANC stated that recruiting enough young women to be Army nurses is the most serious personnel procurement problem the Army faces today. …

Tread-Heads or Technophiles? Army Officer Attitudes Toward Transformation

The Army has committed itself to the most dramatic change of any of the US military services. In October 1999 General Eric K. Shinseki, then the Army Chief of Staff, announced a goal of reconfiguring the Army from a force mainly composed of heavy formations into a medium-weight force capable of deploying a 5,000-soldier brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours. The Army is replacing some heavy armored and mechanized units with a force of six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams equipped with light wheeled armored vehicles. By 2010, it will field a networked Future Force equipped with the Future Combat System. (1) This shift away from heavy armor as the main combat element of the Army portends change not only to the Army's organization and systems, but also to its hierarchy, career paths, and organizational culture. The officer corps will play a key role in determining the success or failure of Army transformation. Enthusiastic officers will work hard to make new concepts and organizations a reality. Skeptical officers, by contrast, could undermine such efforts. Unfortunately, to date leaders have had little reliable data upon which to gauge the attitudes of Army officers toward the new combat methods. On the one hand, the Army leadership asserts that the service embraces innovation. As the Army Trans formation Roadmap puts it: The Army recognizes the need to create a culture of innovation, and we are beginning to address this need through the officer professional development system. Initiatives to nurture innovation are emerging from the top down and the bottom up. These provide evidence not only of the Army's commitment to this endeavor, but also of the favorable climate within today's Army towards innovation. (2) On the other hand, in the wake of General Shinseki's initiative there were numerous reports of opposition to transformation from within the ranks of the service. (3) Nearly all such reports, however, are anecdotal, consisting of scattered quotes from unnamed sources. This article presents selected results of the first systematic effort to understand officer attitudes toward transformation in recent years. It is based upon surveys conducted in 2000 and 2002 of more than 4,500 officers--including nearly 1,900 Army officers. It reveals a dramatic shift in Army attitudes toward transformation during that period. In 2000, Army officers as a group were among the more skeptical of the need for change; in late 2002, they were among the most supportive. In 2002 they shared a belief that the spread of long-range precision-strike capabilities would require the Army to become lighter and more capable of dispersing on the battlefield. However, they were uncertain that the Army was on the right path in seeking to replace heavy armored vehicles with formations reliant upon robust information networks. Moreover, many felt that elements of the Army's organizational culture inhibited innovation. Why Study Officer Attitudes? There are four compelling reasons why it is important to understand officer attitudes toward transformation. First, the military services will be the ultimate practitioners of the new ways of war. The extent to which their members are enthusiastic about change may help determine the success or failure of new technologies, operational concepts, and organizations. Second, although very few officers will likely emerge as true innovators, the existence of a climate conducive to innovation within the officer corps may encourage individuals both to generate new ideas and to remain in the service to bring them to fruition. Third, a large percentage of career officers will rise to senior leadership positions within their services in the next 10 to 20 years. In those roles, they will establish command climates that will either support or inhibit risk-taking and innovation. Past research has demonstrated the importance to innovation of senior officers who protect and nurture the careers of young innovators under their command who are willing to take risks: Finally, officers are the recognized experts in military affairs in the United States. …

Security duties in Northern Ireland and the mental health of soldiers: prospective study

The psychological effects of conflict in wartime have attracted much interest,1 2 but today's army is more commonly employed to maintain internal security and as international peacekeeping forces. Such duties...

Green, Red and White: The problems of Muslim soldiers in today's Russian army

Muslims in the Russian Army today face systematic institutional discrimination in relation to their ethnic Russian counterparts. This ethnically‐based subjugation of Muslims in the Russian Army is a continuation of discrimination that existed in the Soviet and Tsarist eras. It is kept alive today through lingering attitudes and prejudices among the Russian military leadership, almost all of whom served alongside Muslims in Soviet times, particularly in Afghanistan. In the search for a post‐Soviet ideology, the Russian Army was subjected to both official and unofficial attempts to give it a Russian‐Christian character. Though reconciliation attempts continue, Muslims are greatly underrepresented in the Russian Army, and this poses a larger risk to the welfare of the Russian state as a whole.

The Road to Mentoring: Paved with Good Intentions

Mentorship is a hot topic in academia, business, and the military. Recently, Chronicle of Higher Education, Robert Gross said it was evident from the Educational Resources Information Center's annual list of publications that virtually nobody was writing about and in the 1970s, as only 33 articles appeared for that entire decade. He adds, however, Then the topic took off: 230 pieces in 1980-84; 597 in 1985-89; 1,051 in 1990-94; l,524 in 1995-99. (1) In February 2002, a subject keyword search (using the term mentor) of Wilson Omnifile, an academic database of articles and publications, resulted in over 2,000 hits. Reflecting this trend, new web pages are being born across the internet. (2) Consultants have sprung up, promising that if only managers were better their profitability and retention of precious human capital would improve dramatically. A survey of Fortune 500 executives indicated that 96 percent of them saw mentoring as an important influence in their prof essional development. (3) In some organizations, coaches and mentors are assigned and duties are formally outlined. Young professionals are encouraged to actively seek out people they admire to be their mentors, as a way to accelerate their learning, development, and career progression. Despite the widespread interest in mentoring and hopes that it presents potential for addressing a myriad of problems, the concept is not well understood within the Army. The term mentorship has different connotations and currently is used so loosely in describing such an array of leadership and human behaviors that well-meaning, intelligent people often talk past each other when trying to discuss it. The term elicits a wide range of responses, from enthusiastic endorsement to adamant cynicism, with confusion in between. In a recent Army War College strategy research project, Merrill Anderson-Ashcraft conducted a content analysis of 64 essays on mentoring submitted by members of the USAWC Class of 2002. Although most essays included positive and negative comments, she observed that 71 percent of the statements in the papers addressed negative aspects of mentoring. Further analysis indicated that misunderstandings regarding mentoring goals, strategies, and implementation methods are a core problem contributi ng to confusion and cynicism. (4) The purpose of this article is to help inform the developing dialog by assessing the current treatment of the mentoring concept in today's Army and then highlighting the issues, implications, and alternatives relative to a formal Army Mentorship Program. We believe that unless the concept and implications of a program are carefully reevaluated, this potentially useful leadership concept may remain a confusing cliche--or worse, a euphemism for favoritism--causing it to actually undermine the desired leadership environment. Defining the Problem Informal mentoring relationships have long existed in the Army, although they lacked definition as such until the 1980s when the term entered the business and academic lexicon. Recently, as part of a comprehensive description of future and ongoing actions to improve training and leader development, General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, announced that the Army has developed the framework for the Army Mentorship Program. (5) Citing survey results that found disconnects between what we as an Army believe and what we do in practice, General Shinseki articulated that we need to adjust our culture, get back to our roots in training, improve officer leader development and management, and establish healthy feedback to inform the force and make adjustments where necessary. (6) In an Army Times interview, General John Keane, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, stated that the quality of leadership--as reflected in the mentoring process--has fallen off. …

The Federal Nursing Service Award

Combat hospitals in today's Army demand nurses with critical care nursing "8A" additional skills identifiers. The intensity of future wars and operations other than war, together with highly technological weapons, forecast a large number of casualties evacuated rapidly from combat with wounds that require skillful and intensive nursing care. Many of the critical care nurses providing future care are positioned in the reserve components and require creative approaches to education and training concentrated into one weekend per month. An Army Reserve critical care nursing residency program was designed in one midwestern combat support hospital. The didactic course, phase I, was evaluated for effectiveness in achieving outcomes of increased knowledge attainment, enhanced perceptions of critical care nursing, and higher degrees of professionalism. Twenty-seven registered nurses completed the course, and 30 nurses from the same hospital served as controls. A repeated-measures analysis examined outcomes before intervention (time 1), at course completion (time 2), and at a 6-month follow-up (time 3). The course was effective at increasing scores on knowledge attainment and perceptions of critical care nursing; however; professionalism scores were initially high and remained so throughout the study. This research extends information about critical care nursing education and evaluates a training mechanism for meeting the unique requirements and time constraints of nurses in the reserve components who need to provide a high level of skill to soldiers in combat.

Article doesn't reflect today's Army field healthcare system

Article doesn't reflect today's Army field healthcare system

The hollow army: how the U.S. Army is oversold and undermanned

Foreword by Charles Moskos Preface Introduction: Selling a Mythical Army The Army Mission: A Mismatch for Today's Army Army Manpower: An Issue with No Constituency Training on a Treadmill Personnel Turbulence Small Unit Leaders Should Be War Winners Why Can't the American Army Create Cohesive Units? The Broken Backbone It's Broke and Needs to Be Fixed Bibliography Index

DEFINING THE AMERICAN WARRIOR LEADER

Abstract : purpose of this article is to examine the origins of the American and provide some insight on what it should mean to the officer in today's Army. Army defines the warrior spirit in The Professional Development of Officers Study. Many young officers read this document and orient almost exclusively on the images of superb physical readiness, outstanding tactical and technical competence, and extraordinary courage. These are the basic attributes that allow the warrior to lead by example from the front. Although these critical attributes are an absolutely essential foundation, they alone do not compose the total makeup of the American warrior leader. complete of the American warrior leader must be fleshed out with deeper but less glamorous qualities. Although not as colorful, these qualities distinguish the unique heritage of American arms. first is a sincere recognition of the privilege of special trust and confidence accorded those whose responsibility is to defend our democracy. second less glamorous but no less vital component of the warrior spirit is readiness. Mental readiness goes beyond simple mental toughness by insisting on a mastery of doctrine combined with the ability to think, analyze, and develop a vision for success. warrior leader must also possess the and moral character to always do what is right for the Army and the nation. This may sometimes mean taking unpopular or controversial stands that result in damage to one's own career. Some of the very best careers are short but outstanding -- marked by integrity and honor and shortened by casualty or a stand of conscience. final element is inspiring leadership. Soldiers desire to follow the warrior leader because they are confident of his abilities and trusting in his judgment. essence of this style of leadership is found in mutual trust and respect between leader and follower.

Professionalism of army public affairs personnel

Among the ranks of soldiers in “Today's Army” are hundreds of public affairs officers whose duty is to foster understanding of and support for the Army's role in national defense. Their mission is important, but very little is known about their professional preparation and orientation, says the author of this article. His survey of Army PAOs attempts to broaden the knowledge of this specialized public relations field.

Today's Army: Drafted or Professional?

Today's Army: Drafted or Professional?

Today's Army: Drafted or Professional?

Today's Army: Drafted or Professional?

Today's Army: Drafted or Professional?

Today's Army: Drafted or Professional?

Response : Today's Army: Drafted or Professional?

<i>Response</i> : Today's Army: Drafted or Professional?