We study a portfolio management problem featuring many-player and mean-field competition, investment and consumption, and relative performance concerns under the forward performance processes (FPP) framework. We focus on agents using power (CRRA) type FPPs for their investment-consumption optimization problem an under common noise Merton model and we solve both the many-player and mean-field game providing closed-form expressions for the solutions where the limit of the former yields the latter. In our case, the FPP framework yields a continuum of solutions for the consumption component as indexed to a parameter we coin market consumption The parameter permits the agent to set a preference for their consumption going forward in time that, in the competition case, reflects a common behaviour. We show the FPP framework, under both competition and no-competition, allows the agent to disentangle his risk-tolerance and of intertemporal (EIS) just like Epstein-Zin preferences under recursive utility framework and unlike the classical utility theory one. This, in turn, allows a finer analysis on the agent's consumption income and substitution regimes, and, of independent interest, motivates a new strand of economics research on EIS under the FPP framework. We find that competition rescales the agent's perception of consumption in a non-trivial manner in addition to a time-dependent elasticity of conformity of the agent to the market's consumption intensity.
Read full abstract