Recent changes in global petroleum markets have driven the debate regarding the use of strategic petroleum reserves (SPRs) as a price management tool during periods marked by extreme price volatility. We examine the price management role of the U.S. SPR under typical market conditions and in extreme emergencies. Furthermore, we discuss the White House's hypotheses that (a) boosted Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) production and releases from the U.S. SPR result in a negative pressure on U.S. gasoline inflation, and (b) crude oil releases from the U.S. SPR helps balance the global oil market. The threshold cointegration results indicate that U.S. SPR releases impact neither OPEC production nor imported input prices. We apply a hybrid open-economy Phillips curve to model gasoline inflation, accounting for backward- and forward-looking price settings, domestic and global slackness, and energy security. We distinguish between normal-, super-, and hyper-backwardation and -contango oil markets using threshold cointegration and regression techniques. Our results demonstrate that SPR releases and OPEC output increases generally decrease inflation, with a crucial exception being the hyper-backwardation market, as seen in 2021–2022. This period was characterized by severely constrained global supply buffers, including OPEC's spare capacity, exacerbated by the Russia–Ukraine conflict. For this period, we conclude that (1) the impact of OPEC production changes on gasoline inflation would be negligible, (2) excess domestic demand relative to domestic supply raises concerns about domestic energy security, and (3) the unprecedentedly large SPR drawdowns are likely to have caused the market to panic and contributed to gasoline price increases, contrary to arguments suggesting that the 2022 releases eased domestic gasoline prices. We conclude that the SPR is an ineffective price control mechanism during crises and may not have the strategic value previously thought in an extremely tight oil market.