Third Wave Of Democratization Research Articles

The Impact of Democratic Transition on Elections and Parties in South Korea

With the 'third wave of democratization', South Korea joined the democracy club in the late 1980s. Although electoral performance and the party system have changed since the transition to democracy, there has been little systematic examination of the changes. In this article, we conduct an empirical test after developing a theoretical argument about why democratization leads to change. Before democratization, the manipulation of electoral laws and the urban–rural cleavage dominated Korean elections. After democratization, the electoral rules stabilized and opposition parties were given a fair chance to win the election. However, the average life of political parties shortened because of regionalism and personalism. There is now reason to believe that personalism may be set to diminish, thus encouraging authentic structural cleavages to emerge and shape Korean party politics in the coming years.

05/01373 Structural break, unit root, and the causality between energy consumption and GDP in Turkey

We identify permanent democratic transitions during the Third Wave of Democratization and the nineties, when many former socialist countries moved towards representative rule. Using political freedom indicators, electoral archives, and historical resources in 174 countries in the period 1960–2005, we identify 63 democratic transitions, 3 reverse transitions from relatively stable democracy to autocracy and 6 episodes of small improvements in representative institutions. We also classify non-reforming countries to stable autocracies and always democratic. We then use the data set to test theories on the prerequisites for democracy in these countries that enter the Third Wave as non-democracies. Examining initially autocratic countries enables us to address issues of sample selection (in the beginning of the sample most developed countries were already democratic) and reverse causality (democracy can be both a cause and a consequence of wealth, for example). Our estimates reveal that democratization is more likely to emerge in affluent and especially educated societies. Economic development and education are also key factors determining the intensity of democratic reforms and how quickly democratic transitions will occur. These results appear robust to controls like the social environment (religion and fractionalization), natural resources, trade openness and proxies of early institutions. Journal of Comparative Economics 36 (3) (2008) 365–387.

Do Springs of Democracy lead to Falls of Justice? State–Civil Contests for Political Accountability in South Korea

In the “third wave of democratization,” postauthoritarian states have addressed human rights injustices and civil strife through a process of political accountability. These practices in accountability (public trials, reparations, memorials), however, have not achieved their stated goals of social justice and national reconciliation. I argue postauthoritarian administrations privatize state violence and thereby diffuse public mobilizations for social justice while effacing the legacy of human rights struggles by reframing public narratives in mnemonic sites. This paper provides two South Korean case studies of state violence and political accountability: the April 19 Student Revolution of 1960 and the May 18 Kwangju Massacre of 1980. In both cases, the state used its military force to impose public order, resulting in civilian deaths. In postauthoritarian periods (1960–1961, 1994–1995), civilian administrations revisited these injustices to exemplify political accountability and the reconstitution of human rights. However, I argue that without popular mobilization to pressure the new state, postauthoritarian regimes would not have risked destabilizing the conditions of new governance.

Political parties, electoral systems and democracy: A cross‐national analysis

Abstract. The number of political parties and the type of electoral system may impact the level of democratic functioning within a government. Models are used to explore whether the number of political parties increases a country's democracy score on the POLITY IV measure of democracy, and whether countries with proportional representation electoral systems have higher democracy scores than those without. Multiple regression analysis reveals that countries with proportional electoral systems have higher democracy scores. Countries involved in the Third Wave of democracy may find the choice of an electoral system among the most important issues in structuring a democratic government.

The Demise of One-Party Politics in Mexican Municipal Elections

The third wave of democratization has profoundly affected national political institutions and procedures throughout the developing world. In many nations, however, local political institutions and actors also hold considerable power. Democratic reforms at the national level are not necessarily replicated at the local level, yet democratization is inherently incomplete if a nation is speckled with scores of authoritarian local political enclaves. It follows that the process of subnational political change is of vital importance. In this article this process is examined, focusing on Mexico. The question is what dynamic has led to the erosion of the PRI's dominance at the municipal level since the mid-1980s. Two theoretical models, a diffusion model and a realignment model, are proposed. Empirical tests centre on data from municipal elections in four states for the period 1985 to 1998. Using event history analysis, substantial support for the diffusion model is discovered. In contrast, evidence consistent with the realignment model emerges in only one context – a state in which a new opposition party enjoyed unusual strength.

Feeding the Hand that Bit You: Voting for Ex-authoritarian Rulers in Russia and Bolivia

Abstract: What could be motivating voters in transition countries to vote for leaders who have proven themselves to be skilled at violating human rights, repressing civil liberties, and ruling without democratic institutions? We test hypotheses related to this question by using a least-similar-systems design in which we search for common predictors of vote choice in presidential elections from two countries that differ in their past and present political and economic situations: Bolivia and Russia. We find consistent patterns in these two very different countries, which leads to the conclusion that voters for ex-authoritarian candidates or parties are not merely motivated by considerations that typically shape vote choice in long-standing democracies, but are also distinguished by a preference for non-democratic political systems. Key words: authoritarianism, Bolivia, elections, Russia ********** The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed an almost unprecedented spread of democracy across the globe, resulting in what Samuel Huntington calls the third wave of democratization. At the time, the joy with which citizens greeted the downfall of authoritarianism and tyranny made the march towards freedom seem unstoppable and irreversible. Who can forget the scene of Alexander Dubcek, the tragic hero of the 1968 Prague spring, returning to Prague in the fall of 1989 to the roar of the crowds in Wenceslas Square? Or the utter triumph of the Solidarity movement in Poland's first competitive election of the postcommunist era, in which the ruling communist party lost practically every seat that was subject to legitimate competition? (1) Or the crowds that flowed into the streets of Santiago, Chile, upon the news that General Pinochet had lost his plebiscite to extend his personal rule? A decade and a half later, this inevitable march of democratization seems under attack from multiple fronts. Although most attention has been focused on topics such as international terrorism, ethnic and religious conflict, and the dangers of failed states, it is important to remember that even in the 1990s voters in transition countries around the world chose to cast their ballots for the very leaders and parties that had previously repressed their countries. Long before Russian President Vladimir Putin's most recent moves to restrict the franchise in Russia, substantial portions of the Russian electorate were already casting votes for the remnants of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (2) Outside of Russia, the election of ex-communists and members of communist successor parties has been a prevalent trend in many former communist countries? Similarly, voters in Latin America have cast their ballots for former dictators, military governors, coup-plotters, and torturers. (4) In Africa former dictators have also been voted into office in competitive elections. (5) These elections have come at a time in which, despite the proliferation of electoral democracy, the quality of many new democracies seems to be deteriorating (Diamond 2002, 22; Rose and Shin 2001, 331). (6) Although questions about the quality of democracy have received attention in political science literature, the topic of why people vote for former authoritarian rulers in free elections has been analyzed less frequently (although see Azpuru 2001; Canache 2002a; and Carrion 2001), and especially not in a cross-regional framework. We believe that the question deserves more focused consideration. To date, most analyses of why voters support parties and candidates from the pre-democratic era have largely been contained in studies focused on providing explanations of countrywide voting patterns for multiple types of parties and candidates. As a result, hypotheses are not particularly focused on the phenomenon of supporting ex-authoritarian leaders, but rather on voting behavior more generally. In this article, we put the question of why citizens might choose to cast votes in free elections for parties or candidates that ruled in the pre-democratic era at the center of the analysis, testing hypotheses that specifically address this question. …

Ethics and the business of bioscience

Table of Contents for Politics Beyond the Capital List of Tables Acknowledgments Part One: Introduction 1. Explaining Decentralization of Re-centralization 2. Definitions, Cases, Patterns Part Two: Nineteenth-Century Origins, Twentieth-Century Trajectories 3. Decentralization from Below: Argentina before 1966, Brazil before 1964 4. Decentralization from Above: Chile and Uruguay before 1973 Part Three: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism Beyond the Capital 5. Subnational Reforms by Military Governments Part Four: Subnational Institutions in the Third Wave of Democracy 6. Reemergence of the Governors in Argentina and Brazil 7. National Engineering of Subnational Institutions in Chile and Uruguay Part Five: Conclusion 8.A Comparing Waves and Approaches Notes Works Cited Index

Introduction

Introduction

Economic and Social Factors Driving the Third Wave of Democratization

We identify permanent democratic transitions during the Third Wave of Democratization and the nineties, when many former socialist countries moved towards representative rule. Using political freedom indicators, electoral archives, and historical resources in 174 countries in the period 1960-2005, we identify 63 democratic transitions, 3 reverse transitions from relatively stable democracy to autocracy and 6 episodes of small improvements in representative institutions. We also classify non-reforming countries to stable autocracies and always democratic. We then use the dataset to test theories on the prerequisites for democracy in these countries that enter the Third Wave as non-democracies. Examining initially autocratic countries enables us to address issues of sample selection (in the beginning of the sample most developed countries were already democratic) and reverse causality (democracy can be both a cause and a consequence of wealth, for example). Our estimates reveal that democratization is more likely to emerge in affluent and especially educated societies. Economic development and education are also key factors determining the intensity of democratic reforms and how quickly democratic transitions will occur. These results appear robust to controls like the social environment (religion and fractionalization), natural resources, trade openness and proxies of early institutions.

Political Parties in Ghana through Four Republics: A Path to Democratic Consolidation

Ghana has had four democratic experiments since 1957, the last starting in 1993. All have revolved around two relatively stable political parties, a continuity perhaps auguring success within the third wave of democratization.1 Party development and its contribution to consolidation are the subjects of this assessment. The factors of recruitment, elections, socialization, interest aggregation, and organizational capacity will be considered. How effective are the party organizations in identifying and developing leadership? How do they organize and compete in elections and subsequently govern? How effectively do they develop a knowledge base for citizens, narrow conflicting interests, and structure policy options? And are their resources sufficient to sustain organizational permanence and stability? Ghanaian parties are important because they have remained stable through four republics, mediating a range of changes in political liberalization, economic status, state-society relations, ethnoregional conflict, and international issues. Meanwhile, leaders and citizens find them useful for engaging contingent processes of democratic government. The parties are vehicles that express and aggregate the diverse ideals of citizens in a competitive process.

Healing Relationships in Society: the Struggle for Citizenship in Brazil

AbstractThe article describes the transition to democracy in Brazil and the churches ‘role in what is generally called democratic consolidation, in and after this transition. The key term is “cidadania” (citizenship), which is the real participation of citizens in democracy, in which they are conscious of their citizenship and strive to exercise their rights and duties. Today, this participation is being complicated by continuously strong social and economic disparities, as well as by an ambiguous cultural model that runs contrary to the equality of all and a positive notion of law.During the military regime (1964‐85), the Roman Catholic Church took a very critical dance over against the state and provided, especially through the famous Base Ecclesial Communities (CEBs), the most important space for opposition. The Evangelical Church of the Lutheran Confession in Brazil (IECLB) made a significant move towards a more critical accompaniment of the state's policies following the transfer of the 5th general assembly of the Lutheran World Federation from Porto Alegre to Evian, France, in 1970.After the transition to democracy, the impact of CEBs declined and the Roman Catholic hierarchy tended to return to more spiritual tasks. Even so, the National Bishops' Conference continues to be an important organ commenting frequently on public issues, as does the IECLB leadership. The IECLB is especially strong in providing an ecclesial model that fosters democracy and approximates ecclesial and secular citizenship. The biggest Pentecostal church in Brazil, the Assemblies of God, contributes more indirectly to citizenship by restoring the lives of marginalized people who become “decent and honourable”.The final part of the article reflects on theological challenges, the concretisation of liberation, a vision for the whole of society, congruence between ecclesial and secular citizenship and the relationship between society and the image of God. If churches would cooperate more ecumenically, they could make an even stronger contribution to cidadania in Brazil, and live out their mid/urn to the world as citizens of both the heavenly and the earthly kingdoms.

Christianity and Democracy: The Catholic Wave

Abstract: Catholicism played an important role in bringing about the third wave of democratization. This was due to a long historical rapprochement through which both church and the democratic state came to tolerate the other. The Church then exercised a direct influence upon democratization in many countries—strongly in Poland, Lithuania, Spain, the Philippines, and Brazil, but weakly in other places, like Argentina. The Church was most likely to exercise a strong influence when it was differentiated from the state—in its governance, in its transnational links, in its domestic alliances, and in its identification with national identity.

Generals and Presidents: Establishing Civilian and Democratic Control in South Korea

Many have regarded the establishment of civilian and democratic control over the military as a necessary condition for the consolidation of a nascent democracy. Experience from third-wave democracies such as Chile and the Philippines shows us that, in order for democratic consolidation to be achieved, democratic control of the armed forces must be firmly established. Often these nascent democracies face the problem of how to deal with the legacy of the military and security service’s role in authoritarian rule. This article analyses the establishment of civilian control in South Korea and argues that, although semicivilian control was established during the only post-transition presidency, it was with the inauguration of Kim Young-sam in 1993 that firm civilian control was achieved. However, the way this control was achieved raises important questions about the rule of law in South Korea. Finally, the article asserts that due to the continuing dominance of national security and defense policy by the executive, the comprehensive oversight by the legislature needed for true democratic control has yet to be fully achieved.

“The Third Wave” and Non-Liberal Democracies

The purpose of this article is to understand the reality of the third wave of democratization, distinguishing characteristics of the third wave movements in different regions in the world, and to review findings and implications of the world's experiences during the last three decades of the third wave of democratization. The third wave of democratization that initially started in Southern Europe during the 1970s has been diffused all over the world except the Middle Eastern Islamic countries. During the 1980s, Latin America, Asia, and later Central and Eastern Europe joined the tide of democracy, followed by the former Soviet countries and sub-Saharan states during the 1990s. The movements in various areas have similarities and differences. Regarding the similarities, the first one is that those areas commonly show diversities in each of them. Second, countries under the third wave are facing political, social, and economic difficulties that hinder their transitions to democracy. Third, non-liberal democracy is widely observed among these countries. As to differences, Latin America is far more democratized compared to the past, while militarized politics still restrain political freedom and threaten democratic institutions. Under the movements, Asian countries have a wider spectrum of political regimes, from liberal to totalitarian rules, than Latin American countries. Among the former totalitarian regimes in Europe and the post-Soviet bloc, there is a certain division. In Central Europe the transition is relatively smooth and successful, while the Balkans and the post-Soviet states are facing more difficult obstacles during the transitions. Democracy in Africa, the latest joiner in the wave, has experienced many difficulties because of manipulations of elections, weakness of the opposition, and the severe ethnic cleavages. Finally, the following can be summarized. First, it is impossible to generalize the movement due to its diversity from area to area. Second, the possibility of returning to the previous regimes is very low in most of cases of the transition, though there's always an exception. Third, one very interesting common aspect in the third wave is the rise and expansion of “non-liberal democracies” in different regions.

Counting parties and identifying dominant party systems in Africa

Abstract. By most definitions, the third wave of democratisation has given rise to dominant parties and dominant party systems in Africa. The effective number of parties, the most widely used method to count parties, does not adequately capture this fact. An analysis of 59 election results in 18 sub‐Saharan African countries shows that classifications of party systems on the basis of the effective number of parties are problematic and often flawed. Some of these problems are well known, but the African evidence brings them out with unusual clarity and force. It is found that Sartori's counting rules, party system typology and definition of a dominant party are still the most helpful analytical tools to arrive at an accurate classification of party systems and their dynamics in general, and of dominant party systems in particular.

Electoral choices for divided societies: Multi-ethnic parties and constituency pooling in Africa

The third wave of democratisation has given new impetus to the debate about the choice of electoral system in divided societies. The growing preference for proportional representation has been dented by Horowitz's advocacy of 'vote pooling' through the alternative vote. However, the conditions in most African polities are unfavourable to the working of the alternative vote. This article seeks to reveal the hidden potential in Horowitz's analysis by focusing on 'constituency pooling' as a related but distinct way of promoting cross-cutting cleavages in the party system. The principle is illustrated with the unique Ugandan electoral law for the 1971 parliamentary elections and its possible application is examined with the help of the case of contemporary Nigeria. Constituency pooling may have special relevance for new democracies in Africa, because it is expected to work best under conditions of non-fragmented party systems and geographically concentrated ethnic groups.

On Democratization and Peacebuilding

The two subfields addressed in this article did not exist twenty years ago. Scholars had only begun to analyze the beginnings of the third wave of democratization in the early 1980s, and the term peacebuilding only gained currency in the 1990s. By the early twenty-first century, the study of democracy and democratization had firmly become a subfield of political and sociological inquiry, as evidenced by the emergence of research centers and journals on the subject. Peacebuilding enjoyed a rapid rise, especially in policy circles, without the same degree of institutionalization. Nevertheless, it is surprising that international relations specialists only recently began to pay more rigorous attention to the relationship between peacebuilding and political governance and, more specifically, the extensive research on democratization. In this article, we analyze the relationship between these two growing subfields. (1) We highlight a central dilemma facing actors seeking to establish or improve postconflict governance. On the one hand, both the concepts and policies associated with international postwar political reconstruction have become broader, more sweeping, and more intrusive in recent years. The concept of peacebuilding now means not only keeping former enemies from going back to war, but also addressing the root causes of conflict and even fostering development in non-postwar societies. In practice, the international community is more bound and determined to create political regimes in postwar settings, recreating the core institutions of state and society largely along Western lines of thought. The largest donors and international organizations have coalesced around a standard postwar political package that Marina Ottaway calls the democratic reconstruction involving constitution making, elections within two ye ars of the end of hostilities, funding for civil society, and extensive state institution building. (2) The postconflict political agenda has very positive elements, especially as it signifies a departure from the great powers' persistent tendency to embrace dictators for strategic reasons. On the other hand, implementation of the prevailing democratic reconstruction has proven problematic. Of the eighteen single countries that experienced UN peacekeeping missions with a political institution-building component between 1988 and 2002, thirteen (72 percent) were classified as some form of authoritarian regime as of 2002.(3) The majority of these regimes represented clear improvements over their immediate predecessors but failed to meet the high expectations of international observers or local populations. The difficulties of postconflict democratization pose a number of questions. Do they signify a failure of the international community because of either insufficient resources or poor choices? Or are Western models of liberal democracy simply an inappropriate model? Conversely, should partial success be emphasized, recognizing that many years are required for consolidation and that expectations should be lowered? Some research shows that the international community appears unwilling to commit the economic, political, and military resources necessary to implement the model in any given society. Indeed, important research shows that applying the model, or misapplying it, can fuel setbacks to pluralism, such as armed conflict and even genocide.4 In this article we consider the implications of literature on democratization and peacebuilding for these questions. We argue that not only do peacebuilding and democratization specialists need to better learn from one another, but that improved outcomes are possible with greater resources, longer time horizons, and careful consideration of governance models in each case. The shortcomings of the reconstruction model require that more attention be paid to specific and local context and to integration of appropriate external governance models with local, legitimate practices in war-torn societies. …

Evaluations, Referents of Support, and Political Action in New Democracies

Discussions of political participation originally centered on cultural explanation, thus emphasizing the dynamics between cognitive and affective orientations of mass populations toward their polities and the role of the self in the political system (Gamson 1968; Easton 1965; Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1961; Campbell et al. 1960). Positive evaluations induce involvement, while negative attitudes hinder it. Despite “institutional” criticism, contemporary studies provide ample evidence for the validity of cultural explanations in comprehending protest behavior in post-industrial societies (Dalton 2001; Norris 1999; Klingemann 1999; Inglehart 1997; Jennings 1990). To understand involvement in elite-challenging activities in new democracies, however, the cultural premises should be re-specified. Not only the types, but also the referents of support, have had differentiated effects in citizens’ propensity to participate during the third wave of democratization. Specifically, I claim that support for the new political institutions positively affected participation, while assessments of incumbent authorities negatively impacted engagement after regime change in Latin American and Eastern and Central European nations. Probit estimations using data from the 1995-2001 World Values Surveys support this proposition while they also suggest that participation was mainly influenced by the strength of their orientations toward democracy at similar levels of governmental discontent between two individuals.

Studying Democracy and Teaching Classics: What Is Happening in the Field of Comparative Politics?

n this essay, I assess how comparative politics is taught at the undergraduate and graduate levels and what our approach to teaching says about the state of the subfield. What do practitioners emphasize in a comparative politics course in light of the enormous global changes of the past decade? Which topics are included and which ignored? What should be included that is now missing, even at the cost of excluding something else? I found that many undergraduate syllabi take as their starting point the triumph of the third wave of democratization. Instructors use democracy and democratization as their organizing principle; this is reflected in the case studies covered in the courses. This choice comes at the cost of not studying countries or regions where democracy is underdeveloped or stunted. Many courses thus highlight a limited range of countries and conceptual themes while ignoring critical issues that dominate the headlines, such as the politics of nondemocracies and current U.S. national security preoccupations with rebuilding demolished states, containing Islamic fundamentalism, and disarming rogue states. In the not so distant past, national security concerns heavily influenced the structure and content of lower-level comparative politics courses, since instructors felt compelled to familiarize students with totalitarian, or Soviet-style, regimes. Perhaps our excitement with the spread of democratic ideals and institutions has obscured the fact that numerous parts of the world are still governed by autocracies. Graduate courses also emphasize institutional developments and democratic structures at the expense of new topics (such as ideas, culture, norms, and values), as well as older themes (such as welfare state policy, social and political mobilization, gender, the impact of international trade, and state capacity). Field seminars have become more narrowly focused than they used to be, aiming primarily to summarize the endeavors of earlier generations of scholars, assess knowledge, and advance theory related to state-society relations first laid out by the founders of the social sciences: Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michels.

Political Institutions and the Malaise of East Asian New Democracies

Although quite a few third-wave democracies in Southern and Central Europe became consolidated within a decade of their origin, all of those in East Asia are still fragile and fledgling. Ever since South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines embarked on democratic transition or restoration more than a decade ago, elections have been regularly held, and democratic competition is widely considered the only path to power. Rough edges remain, however. Rules are stretched, even bent. Political stalemate tends to delay, if not prevent, timely policy action. And public cynicism toward underperforming, if not malfunctioning, democracy in these four polities is so pervasive and unnerving that pundits warn against a crisis of governance in East Asia's new democracies.