On Democratization and Peacebuilding

Abstract

The two subfields addressed in this article did not exist twenty years ago. Scholars had only begun to analyze the beginnings of the third wave of democratization in the early 1980s, and the term peacebuilding only gained currency in the 1990s. By the early twenty-first century, the study of democracy and democratization had firmly become a subfield of political and sociological inquiry, as evidenced by the emergence of research centers and journals on the subject. Peacebuilding enjoyed a rapid rise, especially in policy circles, without the same degree of institutionalization. Nevertheless, it is surprising that international relations specialists only recently began to pay more rigorous attention to the relationship between peacebuilding and political governance and, more specifically, the extensive research on democratization. In this article, we analyze the relationship between these two growing subfields. (1) We highlight a central dilemma facing actors seeking to establish or improve postconflict governance. On the one hand, both the concepts and policies associated with international postwar political reconstruction have become broader, more sweeping, and more intrusive in recent years. The concept of peacebuilding now means not only keeping former enemies from going back to war, but also addressing the root causes of conflict and even fostering development in non-postwar societies. In practice, the international community is more bound and determined to create political regimes in postwar settings, recreating the core institutions of state and society largely along Western lines of thought. The largest donors and international organizations have coalesced around a standard postwar political package that Marina Ottaway calls the democratic reconstruction involving constitution making, elections within two ye ars of the end of hostilities, funding for civil society, and extensive state institution building. (2) The postconflict political agenda has very positive elements, especially as it signifies a departure from the great powers' persistent tendency to embrace dictators for strategic reasons. On the other hand, implementation of the prevailing democratic reconstruction has proven problematic. Of the eighteen single countries that experienced UN peacekeeping missions with a political institution-building component between 1988 and 2002, thirteen (72 percent) were classified as some form of authoritarian regime as of 2002.(3) The majority of these regimes represented clear improvements over their immediate predecessors but failed to meet the high expectations of international observers or local populations. The difficulties of postconflict democratization pose a number of questions. Do they signify a failure of the international community because of either insufficient resources or poor choices? Or are Western models of liberal democracy simply an inappropriate model? Conversely, should partial success be emphasized, recognizing that many years are required for consolidation and that expectations should be lowered? Some research shows that the international community appears unwilling to commit the economic, political, and military resources necessary to implement the model in any given society. Indeed, important research shows that applying the model, or misapplying it, can fuel setbacks to pluralism, such as armed conflict and even genocide.4 In this article we consider the implications of literature on democratization and peacebuilding for these questions. We argue that not only do peacebuilding and democratization specialists need to better learn from one another, but that improved outcomes are possible with greater resources, longer time horizons, and careful consideration of governance models in each case. The shortcomings of the reconstruction model require that more attention be paid to specific and local context and to integration of appropriate external governance models with local, legitimate practices in war-torn societies. …