Altruistic Punishment Research Articles

Assured Rewards Facilitate Non-Intervention in Unfair Situations by High Psychopathy Individuals

Although third-party punishment plays a crucial role in the maintenance of reciprocal cooperative relationships in human society, for various reasons such punishment is not consistently levied even when it may be appropriate to do so. The present study investigated the effects of external incentives and psychopathy on non-intervention in a situation where third-party punishment would be warranted. Forty participants who completed a measure to assess psychopathy participated in an experiment in which they had to choose either to punish social norm violators as third-parties, to help victims, or to refrain from correcting the unfair outcomes, under conditions where non-intervention was either rewarded or punished. Results showed that frequency of non-intervention decreased in a condition where there were assured punishments with non-intervention, with participants more likely to intervene in the unfair situation as a third-party. On the other hand, frequency of non-intervention increased when there was assured rewards for non-intervention, with many participants failing to correct the unfair outcomes. Additionally, this tendency was accentuated in high psychopathy individuals. The implications of these results for future research on the cultivation and continuation of reciprocal human relationship is discussed.

Punishment as a Mechanism to Maintain Bilateral Cooperation: A Social Behavior Experiment

We designed 3 social behavior experiments involving compensation for real estate expropriation. We recruited 88 students at a university in China as our participants, and investigated the impact of third-party punishment on bilateral cooperation in a laboratory setting. The results showed the heterogeneity of human behavior in the different experiment types. In addition, results showed that the potential impact of punishment became more powerful by adding a third party. Finally, a third party had low punishment costs and a significantly higher probability of actually imposing punishment than did a second party. Results showed that, compared with second-party punishment, third-party punishment is more conducive to the maintenance of bilateral cooperation.

Costly third-party punishment in young children

Human adults engage in costly third-party punishment of unfair behavior, but the developmental origins of this behavior are unknown. Here we investigate costly third-party punishment in 5- and 6-year-old children. Participants were asked to accept (enact) or reject (punish) proposed allocations of resources between a pair of absent, anonymous children. In addition, we manipulated whether subjects had to pay a cost to punish proposed allocations. Experiment 1 showed that 6-year-olds (but not 5-year-olds) punished unfair proposals more than fair proposals. However, children punished less when doing so was personally costly. Thus, while sensitive to cost, they were willing to sacrifice resources to intervene against unfairness. Experiment 2 showed that 6-year-olds were less sensitive to unequal allocations when they resulted from selfishness than generosity. These findings show that costly third-party punishment of unfair behavior is present in young children, suggesting that from early in development children show a sophisticated capacity to promote fair behavior.

Social-economical decision making in current and remitted major depression.

Prosocial emotions related to self-blame are important in guiding human altruistic decisions. These emotions are elevated in major depressive disorder (MDD), such that MDD has been associated with guilt-driven pathological hyper-altruism. However, the impact of such emotional impairments in MDD on different types of social decision-making is unknown. In order to address this issue, we investigated different kinds of altruistic behaviour (interpersonal cooperation and fund allocation, altruistic punishment and charitable donation) in 33 healthy subjects, 35 patients in full remission (unmedicated) and 24 currently depressed patients (11 on medication) using behavioural-economical paradigms. We show a significant main effect of clinical status on altruistic decisions (p=0.04) and a significant interaction between clinical status and type of altruistic decisions (p=0.03). More specifically, symptomatic patients defected significantly more in the Prisoner's Dilemma game (p<0.05) and made significantly lower charitable donations, whether or not these incurred a personal cost (p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively). Currently depressed patients also reported significantly higher guilt elicited by receiving unfair financial offers in the Ultimatum Game (p<0.05). Currently depressed individuals were less altruistic in both a charitable donation and an interpersonal cooperation task. Taken together, our results challenge the guilt-driven pathological hyper-altruism hypothesis in depression. There were also differences in both current and remitted patients in the relationship between altruistic behaviour and pathological self-blaming, suggesting an important role for these emotions in moral and social decision-making abnormalities in depression.

Competition and strong reciprocity. The alternatives of altruistic punishment in competitive situations

Mind a valós életbeli szituációkban, mind kísérleti játékhelyzetekben hatékonyan mozdítja elő a kooperációt az ún. erős negatív reciprocitás vagy altruista büntetés, ahol is a személy saját költségére is szankciókat ró a normaszegőkre. Ugyanakkor valószínű, hogy a szociális kontextus és a résztvevők személyiségének függvényében a büntetés alternatív szerepekre tehet szert. A büntető viselkedés megjelenését vizsgáltuk 80 fő részvételével, erősen versengő jellegű Közjavak játék keretein belül. A közjóhoz való hozzájárulások mértéke a játék alatt a büntetési lehetőség ellenére folyamatosan csökkent. A hozzájárulások mértéke nem gyakorolt szignifikáns hatást sem a kapott, sem pedig a kiosztott büntetésekre. Az eredmények arra utalnak, hogy bizonyos szociális kontextusok (jelen esetben az intenzív versengés) módosító hatással lehetnek a büntetés által játszott szerepre. A résztvevők a magasabb helyezés és az anyagilag eredményesebb végkifejlet elérése érdekében büntették egymást. A büntetés ahelyett, hogy az erős reciprocitás elméletének megfelelően másodlagos kooperációként működött volna, a rivalizálás eszközévé vált. Ezek az eredmények a szükséges módosítások lehetőségét vetik fel a büntető mechanizmusok azon szociális feltételeiben, melyeket az erős reciprocitás elmélete az emberi együttműködés evolúciós magyarázataként határoz meg.

Development of in-group favoritism in children’s third-party punishment of selfishness

When enforcing norms for cooperative behavior, human adults sometimes exhibit in-group bias. For example, third-party observers punish selfish behaviors committed by out-group members more harshly than similar behaviors committed by in-group members. Although evidence suggests that children begin to systematically punish selfish behavior around the age of 6 y, the development of in-group bias in their punishment remains unknown. Do children start off enforcing fairness norms impartially, or is norm enforcement biased from its emergence? How does bias change over development? Here, we created novel social groups in the laboratory and gave 6- and 8-year-olds the opportunity to engage in costly third-party punishment of selfish sharing behavior. We found that by age 6, punishment was already biased: Selfish resource allocations received more punishment when they were proposed by out-group members and when they disadvantaged in-group members. We also found that although costly punishment increased between ages 6 and 8, bias in punishment partially decreased. Although 8-y-olds also punished selfish out-group members more harshly, they were equally likely to punish on behalf of disadvantaged in-group and out-group members, perhaps reflecting efforts to enforce norms impartially. Taken together, our results suggest that norm enforcement is biased from its emergence, but that this bias can be partially overcome through developmental change.

Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment

Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers—those that cooperate and punish—are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondoʼs paradox.

Does competition really bring out the worst? Testosterone, social distance and inter-male competition shape parochial altruism in human males.

Parochial altruism, defined as increased ingroup favoritism and heightened outgroup hostility, is a widespread feature of human societies that affects altruistic cooperation and punishment behavior, particularly in intergroup conflicts. Humans tend to protect fellow group members and fight against outsiders, even at substantial costs for themselves. Testosterone modulates responses to competition and social threat, but its exact role in the context of parochial altruism remains controversial. Here, we investigated how testosterone influences altruistic punishment tendencies in the presence of an intergroup competition. Fifty male soccer fans played an ultimatum game (UG), in which they faced anonymous proposers that could either be a fan of the same soccer team (ingroup) or were fans of other teams (outgroups) that differed in the degree of social distance and enmity to the ingroup. The UG was played in two contexts with varying degrees of intergroup rivalry. Our data show that unfair offers were rejected more frequently than fair proposals and the frequency of altruistic punishment increased with increasing social distance to the outgroups. Adding an intergroup competition led to a further escalation of outgroup hostility and reduced punishment of unfair ingroup members. High testosterone levels were associated with a relatively increased ingroup favoritism and also a change towards enhanced outgroup hostility in the intergroup competition. High testosterone concentrations further predicted increased proposer generosity in interactions with the ingroup. Altogether, a significant relation between testosterone and parochial altruism could be demonstrated, but only in the presence of an intergroup competition. In human males, testosterone may promote group coherence in the face of external threat, even against the urge to selfishly maximize personal reward. In that way, our observation refutes the view that testosterone generally promotes antisocial behaviors and aggressive responses, but underlines its rather specific role in the fine-tuning of male social cognition.

Does attachment to money affect reciprocity behaviour?

In this study, we test experimentally how a player who must decide how much money to transfer back in a trust game is affected by the experiment’s monetary incentive. We find that positive reciprocity or altruism in a trust game is affected by the player’s attachment to the money he received. We also argue that in a trust game played with virtual money, the players are affected by their willingness to punish the other player, consistent with the ‘altruistic punishment’ hypothesis.

The processing course of conflicts in third-party punishment: An event-related potential study.

In social decision-making games, uninvolved third parties usually severely punish norm violators, even though the punishment is costly for them. For this irrational behavior, the conflict caused by punishment satisfaction and monetary loss is obvious. In the present study, 18 participants observed a Dictator Game and were asked about their willingness to incur some cost to change the offers by reducing the dictator's money. A response-locked event-related potential (ERP) component, the error negativity or error-related negativity (Ne/ERN), which is evoked by error or conflict, was analyzed to investigate whether a trade-off between irrational punishment and rational private benefit occurred in the brain responses of third parties. We examined the effect of the choice type ("to change the offer" or "not to change the offer") and levels of unfairness (90:10 and 70:30) on Ne/ERN amplitudes. The results indicated that there was an ERN effect for unfair offers as Ne/ERN amplitudes were more negative for not to change the offer choices than for to change the offer choices, which suggested that participants encountered more conflict when they did not change unfair offers. Furthermore, it was implied that altruistic punishment, rather than rational utilitarianism, might be the prepotent tendency for humans that is involved in the early stage of decision-making.

Outcomes and intentions in children’s, adolescents’, and adults’ second- and third-party punishment behavior

Theories of morality maintain that punishment supports the emergence and maintenance of moral behavior. This study investigated developmental differences in the role of outcomes and the violator’s intentions in second-party punishment (where punishers are victims of a violation) and third-party punishment (where punishers are unaffected observers of a violation). Four hundred and forty-three adults and 8-, 12-, and 15-year-olds made choices in mini-ultimatum games and newly-developed mini-third-party punishment games, which involved actual incentives rather than hypothetical decisions. Adults integrated outcomes and intentions in their second- and third-party punishment, whereas 8-year-olds consistently based their punishment on the outcome of the violation. Adolescents integrated outcomes and intentions in second- but not third-party punishment.

Animal Behavioral Economicss: Lessons Learnt from Primate Research

The paper gives an overview of primate research and the economic-ethical lessons we can derive from it. In particular, it examines the complex, multi-faceted, and partially conflicting nature of (non-)human primates. Our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees and bonobos, are apparently walking on two legs: a selfish and a groupish leg. Given evolutionary continuity and gradualism between monkeys, apes and humans, human primates seem to be also bipolar apes. They, too, tend to display a dual structure: there seems to be a pro-social and a self-interested side to our species; a bipolar tension seems to exist between competition and cooperation respectively between self-interest and the common good. We are apparently at the same time Homines oeconomici and Homines culturali. Our inner ape tries to combine self-interested and common good motives. Based on de Waal’s Russian doll model, the essay investigates the evolutionary origins of morality and eusociality. With the help of selected case studies stemming from behavioral sciences/economics, the paper illustrates examples of empathy, altruism, reciprocal fairness, pro-social and other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion, and altruistic punishment in (non-)human primates. Beside this selfless and groupish side, the paper also reflects on the self-interest and egoistic nature of (non-)human primates and the behavioral and cognitive differences between monkeys, apes and humans.

Local norms of cheating and the cultural evolution of crime and punishment: a study of two urban neighborhoods.

The prevalence of antisocial behavior varies across time and place. The likelihood of committing such behavior is affected by, and also affects, the local social environment. To further our understanding of this dynamic process, we conducted two studies of antisocial behavior, punishment, and social norms. These studies took place in two neighborhoods in Newcastle Upon Tyne, England. According to a previous study, Neighborhood A enjoys relatively low frequencies of antisocial behavior and crime and high levels of social capital. In contrast, Neighborhood B is characterized by relatively high frequencies of antisocial behavior and crime and low levels of social capital. In Study 1, we used an economic game to assess neighborhood differences in theft, third-party punishment (3PP) of theft, and expectation of 3PP. Participants also reported their perceived neighborhood frequency of cooperative norm violation (“cheating”). Participants in Neighborhood B thought that their neighbors commonly cheat but did not condone cheating. They stole more money from their neighbors in the game, and were less punitive of those who did, than the residents of Neighborhood A. Perceived cheating was positively associated with theft, negatively associated with the expectation of 3PP, and central to the neighborhood difference. Lower trust in one’s neighbors and a greater subjective value of the monetary cost of punishment contributed to the reduced punishment observed in Neighborhood B. In Study 2, we examined the causality of cooperative norm violation on expectation of 3PP with a norms manipulation. Residents in Neighborhood B who were informed that cheating is locally uncommon were more expectant of 3PP. In sum, our results provide support for three potentially simultaneous positive feedback mechanisms by which the perception that others are behaving antisocially can lead to further antisocial behavior: (1) motivation to avoid being suckered, (2) decreased punishment of antisocial behavior, and (3) decreased expectation of punishment of antisocial behavior. Consideration of these mechanisms and of norm psychology will help us to understand how neighborhoods can descend into an antisocial culture and get stuck there.

Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties.

Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour deviates from the social norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate explanation is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. However, an alternative possibility exists: individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour, because the cost of punishment generally increases with the number of individuals that are punished. We used a public goods game with third-party punishment to test whether punishment of defectors was reduced when defecting was typical, as predicted if punishment is responsive to norm violation. The cost of punishment was fixed, regardless of the number of players punished, meaning that it was not more costly to punish typical, relative to atypical, behaviour. Under these conditions, atypical behaviour was not punished more often than typical behaviour. In fact, most punishment was targeted at defectors, irrespective of whether defecting was typical or atypical. We suggest that the reduced punishment of defectors when they are common might often be explained in terms of the costs to the punisher, rather than responses to norm violators.

Power to the People? An Experimental Analysis of Bottom-Up Accountability of Third-Party Institutions

This article provides an experimental investigation of third parties’ sanctioning behavior, in order to understand whether public officials (e.g., judges, politicians, or regulators), when deciding about top-down interventions aimed at punishing wrongdoers, are sensitive to bottom-up pressure on the part of ordinary citizens, who are the major victims of wrongdoers’ behavior. We set up a novel five-treatment design and compare situations where a wrongdoer acts under: (1) no third-party punishment; (2) nonaccountable third-party punishment; and (3) accountable third-party punishment. We show that when citizens are active and make their voice heard, public officials sanction wrongdoing significantly more. Our experimental finding complements previous empirical work based on field data and suggests that when third-party institutions are held accountable, their propensity to fight misconduct is higher, other things equal. We view this result as good news with regard to domains where it implies that pro-consumer policies will be more likely (e.g., regulatory policies). The risk of pandering by elected officials and the danger of poorly informed decisions by the citizens are the flip side of the argument. (JEL C91, D02, D63, D72, K00)

Third-party punishment increases cooperation in children through (misaligned) expectations and conditional cooperation.

The human ability to establish cooperation, even in large groups of genetically unrelated strangers, depends upon the enforcement of cooperation norms. Third-party punishment is one important factor to explain high levels of cooperation among humans, although it is still somewhat disputed whether other animal species also use this mechanism for promoting cooperation. We study the effectiveness of third-party punishment to increase children's cooperative behavior in a large-scale cooperation game. Based on an experiment with 1,120 children, aged 7 to 11 y, we find that the threat of third-party punishment more than doubles cooperation rates, despite the fact that children are rarely willing to execute costly punishment. We can show that the higher cooperation levels with third-party punishment are driven by two components. First, cooperation is a rational (expected payoff-maximizing) response to incorrect beliefs about the punishment behavior of third parties. Second, cooperation is a conditionally cooperative reaction to correct beliefs that third party punishment will increase a partner's level of cooperation.

Third-Party Punishment is Motivated by Anger and is not an Artifact of Self-Focused Envy or the Strategy Method

Numerous experiments have shown that people often engage in third-party punishment (3PP) of selfish behavior. This evidence has been used to argue that people respond to selfishness with anger, and get utility from punishing those who mistreat others. Elements of the standard 3PP experimental design, however, allow alternative explanations: it has been argued that 3PP could be motivated by envy (as selfish dictators earn high payoffs), or could be influenced by the use of the strategy method (which is known to influence second-party punishment). Here we test these alternatives by varying the third party’s endowment and the use of the strategy method, and measuring punishment. We find that while third parties do report more envy when they have lower endowments, neither manipulation significantly affects punishment. We also show that punishment is associated with ratings of anger but not of envy. Thus, our results suggest that 3PP is not an artifact of self-focused envy or use of the strategy method. Instead, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 3PP is motivated by anger.

Sex, Attractiveness, and Third-Party Punishment in Fairness Consideration

Social evaluation of others is often influenced by the physical attractiveness of the person being judged, leading to either a beauty premium or penalty depending on the circumstances. Here we asked Chinese participants to act as an interest-free third party in a dictator game and to evaluate the fairness level of monetary allocation by attractive and less attractive proposers of the same or opposite sex. We also instructed participants to express their willingness to punish the proposers by using a visual analogue scale. Results confirmed that the reasonableness evaluation was mainly affected by the reasonableness of offers. However, participants' intention to punish the proposers was affected by the level of reasonableness in the asset distribution and by both the sex and attractiveness of the proposers. Overall, male proposers were punished more severely than female proposers. Moreover, the same-sex proposers were punished more severely than opposite-sex proposers when they were physically attractive; this pattern was reversed when the proposers were less physically attractive. These results demonstrate social responses following an individual's unfair asset distribution can be affected by both social norms and the personal characteristics of the individual.

Emotions, Sanctions, and Cooperation

We use skin conductance responses and self‐reported hedonic valence to study the emotional basis of cooperation and punishment in a social dilemma. We argue that the availability of sanctions sets in motion a “virtuous emotional circle” that accompanies cooperation. Emotional reaction to free riding leads cooperators to apply sanctions. In response, and in addition to the monetary consequences of receiving sanctions, the negative emotions experienced by the free‐riders when punished lead them to increase their subsequent level of cooperation. The outcome is an increased level of cooperation that becomes a new norm. Therefore, emotions sustain both the use of altruistic punishment and cooperation.

High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment.

As punishment can be essential to cooperation and norm maintenance but costly to the punisher, many evolutionary game-theoretic studies have explored how direct punishment can evolve in populations. Compared to direct punishment, in which an agent acts to punish another for an interaction in which both parties were involved, the evolution of third-party punishment (3PP) is even more puzzling, because the punishing agent itself was not involved in the original interaction. Despite significant empirical studies of 3PP, little is known about the conditions under which it can evolve. We find that punishment reputation is not, by itself, sufficient for the evolution of 3PP. Drawing on research streams in sociology and psychology, we implement a structured population model and show that high strength-of-ties and low mobility are critical for the evolution of responsible 3PP. Only in such settings of high social-structural constraint are punishers able to induce self-interested agents toward cooperation, making responsible 3PP ultimately beneficial to individuals as well as the collective. Our results illuminate the conditions under which 3PP is evolutionarily adaptive in populations. Responsible 3PP can evolve and induce cooperation in cases where other mechanisms alone fail to do so.