Third-party Forgiveness Research Articles

‘Who Can Forgive Sins but God Alone?’ Third-Party Forgiveness and Christian Practice

‘Who Can Forgive Sins but God Alone?’ Third-Party Forgiveness and Christian Practice

Forgiveness and Negative Partiality

Forgiveness has traditionally been characterized an affective response to a wrongdoing, i.e. a psychological process that involves ridding oneself of resentment or other negative reactive attitudes. In contrast to the prevailing model, this paper advocates for the emerging position that forgiveness should be understood as a normative power akin to a promise. In particular, I argue that forgiveness involves surrendering the right to discount the interests of a perpetrator (a special permission the victim acquires in virtue of having been wronged). I argue that this model fits and/or explains important features of forgiveness, such as the idea that forgiveness is a personal response to a blameworthy wrong, that forgiveness re-establishes a relation of equality, and that forgiveness is ‘normatively significant’. I further develop the position by showing how it can provide a unified case of paradigmatic forgiveness, self-forgiveness, and third-party forgiveness—this explanatory power distinguishes the view from previous articulations of the idea that forgiveness is a normative power. The final section further explores these distinctions by delimiting the scope of forgiveness to exclude powers related to apologies, compensation, or ‘redemption’.

What Third-Party Forgiveness Has to Offer

AbstractThere are strong moral reasons to acknowledge that third parties can have the standing to forgive. Third-party refusals to forgive can reinforce the moral agency and value of women and disrupt the gendering of forgiveness. Third-party forgiveness can also be crucial for restorative justice aims, like recognizing the value of wrongdoers. Lastly, many victim-only accounts of forgiveness are problematic and utilize an individualistic conception of the self that reinforces the logic of misogyny. Victim-only accounts of forgiveness can also restrict focus to the victim's suffering, thereby neglecting the importance of healing and the relevance of third-party forgiveness for facilitating healing.

Third-party Forgiveness in Organizations

Third-party Forgiveness in Organizations

Bright side of the MAOA-uVNTR on trait and situational forgiveness

The stress-and-coping theory of forgiveness posits that forgiveness and aggression are alternative ways of coping with stress of interpersonal offences. Inspired by the link between aggression and MAOA-uVNTR (a genetic variant involving in catabolism of monoamines), we investigated the relationship between this variant and forgiveness with two studies. Study 1 examined the relationship between the MAOA-uVNTR and trait forgiveness in students, and study 2 examined the effect of this variant on third-party forgiveness in response to situational offences in male inmates. The results showed that the MAOA-H (a high activity allele) was associated with higher trait forgiveness in male students and greater third-party forgiveness to accidentally committed harm and attempted but failed harm in male inmates than the MAOA-L. These findings highlight the bright side of MAOA-uVNTR on trait and situational forgiveness.

Development of the Collectivist-Sensitive Trait Forgivingness Scale.

Mounting evidence suggests that experiences of forgiveness vary across cultures. However, culturally sensitive conceptualizations of forgiveness lack empirical support, in part because psychometrically sound instruments designed to capture unique aspects of forgiveness in non-Western cultures are rare. For this reason, we developed the Collectivist-Sensitive Trait Forgivingness Scale (TFS-CS), which is designed to measure trait forgivingness within societies characterized by a blend of individualistic and collectivistic worldviews. In Study 1 (N=597), exploratory factor analysis revealed a 16-item three-factor structure of third-party forgiveness, collectivistic forgiveness, and interpersonal resentment among South Africans. In Study 2 (N=897), the three-factor model replicated in an independent South African sample. Findings also offered preliminary evidence supporting the construct validity of the TFS-CS. Overall, these studies support a conceptualization of trait forgivingness with similarities and differences relative to Western models and highlight the importance of appreciating the influence of culture when measuring forgiveness.

Investigating the relationships between unfaithful parent’s apologies, adult children’s third-party forgiveness, and communication of forgiveness following parental infidelity

Guided by theorizing on forgiveness, this study examined the impact of communication on the third-party forgiveness process for adult children following the discovery of their parents’ infidelity. Results from a series of parallel mediated regression and partial correlation analyses advance theorizing on parental infidelity and third-party forgiveness, such that they inform readers that adult children are generally more likely to forgive their unfaithful parent for engaging in infidelity when unfaithful parents offer a sincere apology to them for engaging in this transgression. Two variables—empathy and attributions—were identified as significant mediators of the third-party forgiveness process. Last, the relationships between third-party forgiveness and communicative forgiveness granting tactics were examined. These findings provide a greater understanding of the impact of communication on the forgiveness process, the communication surrounding parental infidelity, and third-party forgiveness.

Forgiveness and Identification.

Philosophical discussion of forgiveness has mainly focused on cases in which victims and offenders are known to each other. But it commonly happens that a victim brings an offender under a definite description (e.g. ‘the boy who kicked his football through my window’) but does not know to which individual this applies. I explore some of the conceptual and moral issues raised by the phenomenon of forgiveness in circumstances in which identification is incomplete, tentative or even mistaken. Among the conclusions reached are that correct and precise identification of the offending individual is not essential for forgiveness to take place; that an offender can, under certain strict conditions, be said to be forgiven by proxy where the victim has misidentified the offender and ‘forgiven’ the wrong person; and that proxy forgiveness of this sort is not subject to the objections commonly levelled against ‘proxy’ or ‘third-party forgiveness.’

Third Parties and the Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness

AbstractIt is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third‐party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third‐party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb severe and inescapable costs of distinctive kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive.

The Standing to Forgive

In the philosophical literature on forgiveness it is almost universally assumed that only the victim of a wrong has the standing to forgive. This paper challenges that assumption and argues for the possibility of meaningful second- and third-party forgiveness.

Third-Party Forgiveness: (Not) Forgiving Your Close Other's Betrayer

Building on attribution and interdependence theories, two experiments tested the hypothesis that close friends of victims (third parties) are less forgiving than the victims themselves (first parties). In Experiment 1, individuals imagined a scenario in which either their romantic partner or the romantic partner of a close friend committed the identical relationship offense. Third parties were less forgiving than first parties, a phenomenon we termed the third-party forgiveness effect. This effect was mediated by attributions about the perpetrator's intentions and responsibility for the offense. In Experiment 2, first and third parties reported an actual offense and their subsequent unforgiving motivations. The third-party forgiveness effect was replicated and was mediated by commitment to the perpetrator. Perpetrator apology or amends to the victim increased third-party forgiveness. Future third-party research can expand interpersonal forgiveness research beyond the victim-perpetrator dyad.