Forgiveness and Identification.

Geoffrey Scarre

doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9688-9

Abstract

Philosophical discussion of forgiveness has mainly focused on cases in which victims and offenders are known to each other. But it commonly happens that a victim brings an offender under a definite description (e.g. ‘the boy who kicked his football through my window’) but does not know to which individual this applies. I explore some of the conceptual and moral issues raised by the phenomenon of forgiveness in circumstances in which identification is incomplete, tentative or even mistaken. Among the conclusions reached are that correct and precise identification of the offending individual is not essential for forgiveness to take place; that an offender can, under certain strict conditions, be said to be forgiven by proxy where the victim has misidentified the offender and ‘forgiven’ the wrong person; and that proxy forgiveness of this sort is not subject to the objections commonly levelled against ‘proxy’ or ‘third-party forgiveness.’

Highlights

Philosophical discussion of forgiveness has mainly focused on cases in which victims and offenders are known to each other
You wonder angrily, who scraped your car in the parking lot, or sent that slanderous tale about you to the local press, or maliciously reported you to your boss for being ten minutes late to work? What, if any, form can or should forgiveness take when the victim does not know who the wrongdoer is? In this paper I explore some of the conceptual and moral issues for forgiveness that arise in circumstances in which identification of the offender is incomplete, tentative or even incorrect: a topic of some importance that has not so far received much philosophical attention
A victim of wrongdoing might not know the name of her offender or to which individual the definite description under which she identifies him applies, yet still know enough about him to be able to consider forgiveness

Summary

Introduction

Philosophical discussion of forgiveness has mainly focused on cases in which victims and offenders are known to each other. Much of the philosophical discussion of forgiveness has focused, for understandable reasons, on cases where a victim offers or refuses forgiveness to an offender whose identity she knows.

Results

Conclusion