Virtue Ethics Research Articles

Technology and the Situationist Challenge to Virtue Ethics

In this paper, I introduce a “promises and perils” framework for understanding the “soft” impacts of emerging technology, and argue for a eudaimonic conception of well-being. This eudaimonic conception of well-being, however, presupposes that we have something like stable character traits. I therefore defend this view from the “situationist challenge” and show that instead of viewing this challenge as a threat to well-being, we can incorporate it into how we think about living well with technology. Human beings are susceptible to situational influences and are often unaware of the ways that their social and technological environment influence not only their ability to do well, but even their ability to know whether they are doing well. Any theory that attempts to describe what it means for us to be doing well, then, needs to take these contextual features into account and bake them into a theory of human flourishing. By paying careful attention to these contextual factors, we can design systems that promote human flourishing.

Leibniz as a virtue ethicist

AbstractIn this paper I argue that Leibniz's ethics is a kind of virtue ethics where virtues of the agent are explanatorily primary. I first examine how Leibniz obtained his conception of justice as a kind of love in an early text, Elements of Natural Law. I show that in this text Leibniz's goal was to find a satisfactory definition of justice that could reconcile egoism with altruism, and that this was achieved through the Aristotelian virtue of friendship where friends treat each other as “other selves.” Following this decisive moment, Leibniz adopted an Aristotle‐inspired ethical framework where the virtuous agent is central for moral evaluations. I then show that, despite certain developments, Leibniz's ethics retained this essential feature throughout his career. In Leibniz's later writings, God constitutes the foundation of the moral realm, and the fundamental moral endeavor of human beings consists in the imitation of God.

The Homo Economicus as a Prototype of a Psychopath? A Conceptual Analysis and Implications for Business Research and Teaching

AbstractSince the beginning of business research and teaching, the basic assumptions of the discipline have been intensely debated. One of these basic assumptions concerns the behavioral aspects of human beings, which are traditionally represented in the construct of homo economicus. These assumptions have been increasingly challenged in light of findings from social, ethnological, psychological, and ethical research. Some publications from an integrative perspective have suggested that homo economicus embodies to a high degree dark character traits, particularly related to the construct of psychopathy, representing individuals who are extremely self-centered and ruthless, without feelings of remorse or compassion. While a growing body of research notes such a similarity on a more or less anecdotal basis, this article aims to explore this connection from a more rigorous perspective, bridging insights from psychological, economic, and business research to better understand the potentially dark traits of homo economicus. The analysis shows that homo economicus is not simply some kind of psychopath, but specifically a so-called subclinical or Factor 1 psychopath, who is also referred to as a “corporate psychopath” in business research. With such an analysis, the paper adds an additional perspective and a deeper psychological level of understanding as to why homo economicus is often controversially debated. Based on these insights, several implications for academic research and teaching are discussed and reflected upon in light of an ethics of virtue and care.

The Role of Games in the Moral Education of Children from an Islamic Perspective

In this article, we will examine moral education through games from an Islamic perspective. To this end, we will first present a discussion of virtue ethics as the theoretical framework of our discussion since a major part of Islamic moral education can be explained through it. As we will explain, virtue ethics emphasizes the effect of following moral patterns in character formation. Then, we will discuss the place of games in the moral education method of the Prophet of Islam and the Shia Imams and show how they paid attention to the moral education of children through games. We will then look at some new games designed by Islamic education experts for this purpose. Finally, we will discuss some theoretical mechanisms to explain the efficacy of these games and examine an empirical case study conducted in this field. Research Objectives: To explore the role of games in the moral education method of the Prophet of Islam and the Shia Imams. Research Methods: A qualitative documentary method to study the place of games in Islamic moral teachings and methods. Research Results: A major part of Islamic moral education can be explained through the virtue ethics framework, which emphasizes the effect of following moral patterns in character formation.

The ethical wisdom of AI developers

AbstractThis paper explores ethical wisdom in the artificial intelligence (AI) developer community. Despite robust literature about the need for virtue ethics approaches in AI development, little research has directly engaged with the developer community about their progress in this regard. We have thus conducted semi-structured interviews with a worldwide cohort of 40 developers, which focused on their awareness of ethics issues, how they navigate ethical challenges, and the barriers they encounter in developing ethical wisdom. We find developers are largely aware of the ethical territories they must navigate and the moral dilemmas they personally encounter, but they face limited and inconsistent resources for ethical guidance or training. Furthermore, there are significant barriers inhibiting the development of ethical wisdom in the AI developer community, including the industry’s fixation on innovation, the narrow scope of technical practice, limited provisions for reflection and dialogue, and incentive structures that prioritize profits and prestige. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need to address the gap in domain-specific ethical skill and provides recommendations for organizations, educators, and the AI developer community.

Why Aristotle Isn’t a Virtue Ethicist. Living Well and Virtuously in Aristotelian and Contemporary Aretaic Ethics

Drawing on Anscombe, in this essay I argue that we should not take Aristotle to be a moral philosopher, nor a virtue ethicist. This is because contemporary virtue ethics has little to do with Aristotelian ethics. While contemporary virtue ethics (or aretaic moral theory, as one may call it) operates on the level of moral and thus categorical norms, Aristotelian ethics—an aretaic life ethics—is primarily concerned with pragmatic norms. The main question for Aristotle is what a good general conduct of life is. The major concern of aretaic moral theory, on the other hand, is to provide a criterion of morally right action and hence to define the concepts of the morally right, the impermissible and moral duty in aretaic terms. This shows that contemporary authors assume a primacy of virtue, while Aristotle assumes a primacy of eudaimonia. I illustrate this distinction by addressing the question of how the virtues benefit their possessor.

Why Practical Wisdom Cannot be Eliminated

Practical wisdom eliminativism has recently been proposed in both philosophy and psychology, on the grounds of the alleged redundancy of practical wisdom (Miller 2021) and its purported developmental/psychological implausibility (Lapsley 2021). Here we respond to these challenges by drawing on an improved version of a view of practical wisdom, the “Aretai model”, that we have presented elsewhere (De Caro et al. 2021; Vaccarezza et al. 2023; De Caro et al. forthcoming). According to this model, practical wisdom is conceptualized: (i) as virtuousness tout court, i.e., as the ratio essendi of the virtues, and (ii) as a form of ethical expertise. By appealing to the first thesis, we counter the charge of psychological implausibility, while we rely on the second thesis to address the accusation of redundancy. In conclusion we argue that the Aretai model implies a significant paradigm shift in virtue ethics. Practical wisdom emerges as both necessary and sufficient for virtuousness, thereby downsizing – without eliminating entirely – the role that individual virtues play in our ethical lives.

Public Opinion Through Art: Exploring Chinese University Students' Perspectives on COVID-19 Mass Nucleic Acid Testing.

In the context of the global COVID-19 pandemic, this study focuses on Chinese university students, employing graphic elicitation as a qualitative research method to analyze their hand-drawn paintings and related descriptions. Augmented by A/r/tography and metacognitive methods, the research aims to unveil the participants' collective memory, as well as the perspectives and responses of these students to policies related to the pandemic. By specifically examining this particular demographic, the study incorporates Fairclough's ethical theory, applying deontological ethics, consequentialist ethics, and virtue ethics to establish a comprehensive framework for evaluating adjustments to pandemic response policies. This research not only enhances our understanding of how these university students perceive and adapt to COVID-19 policies but also provides valuable insights for decision-makers. The particular methodology, combining graphic elicitation and metacognitive research, contributes to policy assessment and ethical analysis, offering a nuanced perspective on the interplay between individual perceptions, policy responses, and ethical considerations amid the complexities of a public health crisis.

Virtue Ethics in a Value-driven World: How to Ethically Support the Healthcare Autonomy of Adolescent Patients.

Virtue Ethics in a Value-driven World: How to Ethically Support the Healthcare Autonomy of Adolescent Patients.

Balancing self-interest and public interest: Virtues and the pandemic context

This article explores how the external conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic have affected individuals’ moral psychology. We will argue that challenging contexts like the pandemic are external conditions that shape human moral behavior. Supported by Adam Smith’s theory of virtues, it is argued that individuals can balance self-interest with concern for others, even in challenging circumstances, through the virtues of justice, benevolence, prudence, and, most importantly, self-control. We will conclude by stating that, even in challenging contexts, individuals need to balance private and public interests to develop appropriate moral action.

Mimetic desire in Augustine’s Confessiones as a model for natural theology and virtue ethics

This article examined the concept and notability of mimetic desire in Augustine’s autobiographical work Confessiones. Mimetic desire is based primarily on the knowledge that there is a Perfect Being, viz. God, ideal forms (in Platonic idiom), which may be known and imitated by humans. Mimesis demonstrates that humans have a natural capacity and tendency to imitate and possess what others have. Despite this, in popular culture, mimesis has the connotation of feyness and is discouraged in place of inventiveness. The culture and spirit of our day promote originality and inventiveness without an understanding of the human nature and its inherent mimetic desires. The concept of mimetic desire is rooted in Rene Girard’s theory of anthropology but can be traced back as far as Plato’s Republic. Therefore, this interdisciplinary concept has been explored through Augustine’s narratological composition of Confessiones. The introspective tone and cultural forming narratives that make up Confessiones were succinctly examined in the context of mimetic theory. The triangular structure of mimetic desire was further explored to gain a better understanding of how Augustine relied on mimesis in his conversion to Christianity. The choice of imitating authentic models led to Augustine’s moral renewal, and likewise such implications are relevant to modern-day Christians. Moreover, this article aims to promote the concept of mimesis as an ideal practise concerning human nature and conditioning, towards a virtuous and morally acceptable society. The results of this article underline the importance of narrative theory and friendship in developing positive cultures through mimesis. Through contrasting Augustine’s earlier Manichaean life and his later Christian life, an illustration of mimetic desire can be drawn, and for Augustine, this could only mean Christ.Contribution: This article contributes to the ongoing interdisciplinary studies of ontology, anthropology, theology, and sociology. By interpreting or reading Augustine’s Confessiones through the lens of mimetic desire, this article offers an alternative perspective on Augustine’s natural theology and virtue ethics. It further presents the conceptual framework of mimesis on Christian and Platonist praxis of the ideal forms. Moreover, the article of the narratological composition of Confessiones expounds the importance of interpersonal relationships in our spiritual growth. The triangular structure of mimesis was further expounded in the context of interior life, viz. interior homo [inner man] as the ultimate model.

Can virtue be unified? An Aristotelian justification on “unity of virtue”

This article explores two contrasting theories of virtue ethics, namely the unity theory of virtue and the disunity theory of virtue. The unity thesis asserts that virtues are unified in some sense, or that possession of one virtue is inextricably related to the possession of all others. Meanwhile, the disunity thesis argues that virtues are disunited, or that there is a lack of unity among the virtues. But still, there are many empirical observations that seem to contradict these two theses at every turn. Thus, this article offers a moral-psychological analysis of the plausibility of the unity of virtues, and argues that the unity among the virtues is possible only if we seriously consider the integration of moral and intellectual virtues as a condition of unification. In conclusion, it suggests a way of unification which is in accord with Aristotle’s moral psychological interpretation of the division of the soul and practical wisdom, or phronesis, which is often overlooked in virtue epistemology.

Incentivised dishonesty: Moral frameworks underlying fake online reviews

AbstractFeedback mechanisms, such as customer reviews and ratings, are essential for making informed decisions on online platforms, particularly in the presence of asymmetric information. However, the practice of reward‐based reviews is on the rise in online platforms, where sellers incentivise buyers to give biased feedback (e.g., 5‐star ratings) regardless of the quality of the products. This study intends to determine whether financial incentives motivate people to award dishonest ratings and explore the moral heuristics underlying this motivation. Using a hypothetical purchase scenario, responses were elicited from 411 participants and the Philosophical Moral Framework Measure (PMFM) was used to identify the moral frameworks that underlie the reported self‐interested behaviour. The findings reveal that the likelihood of giving fake reviews increases with an increase in financial incentives. The dominant moral framework of those who accepted the cashback offer is utilitarianism and egoism, whereas those who declined the offer primarily have deontology and virtue theory as dominant frameworks. The results also indicate that men and young individuals are more likely to give dishonest feedback. These findings not only advance the understanding of the interplay between financial incentives and self‐interested behaviour but also aid in identifying the moral frameworks underlying self‐interested behaviour.

Virtue Ethics for the Real World: Improving Character without Idealization by Howard J. Curzer (review)

Virtue Ethics for the Real World: Improving Character without Idealization by Howard J. Curzer (review)

“MLK's functional philosophy of non‐violence”

AbstractThe fact that Martin Luther King, Jr. held a moral philosophy of non‐violence is well known. What is less familiar is that he made various exceptions to his prohibitions on violence. Given the absolute language he often used in condemning violent acts, he can give the impression of inconsistency in his ethics. The reality, however, is that his moral framework possesses both consistency and functionality. That is, it holds together logically and has practical usefulness. The key to understanding King is to view his moral philosophy through the lens of Virtue Ethics, not rule‐based ethics. This approach to a philosophy of non‐violence provides value and utility to adherents of both pacifism and Just War Theory, a difficult feat.

The Utilitarian's Global Warming Problem (Why Utilitarians Should Be Social Identity Theorists)

ABSTRACTGlobal warming presents challenges to utilitarianism. Its structural features seem to suggest that individuals have no moral obligations to take steps to reduce their carbon footprints. For those who find this to be an unacceptable result, Jamieson proposes an alternative. He argues that utilitarians should embrace a version of virtue ethics. They should embrace what he calls ‘green virtues’. In this article, I argue that Jamieson's proposal does not adequately address the ethical challenges that global warming poses for utilitarianism. I propose an alternative. Rather than aiming to inculcate green virtues, we should be aiming to inculcate a certain social identity: a green identity. Not only is this approach more in keeping with utilitarianism, but recent research in the social sciences also suggests that it is much more likely to result in an impactful reduction in global emissions.

Living well with AI: Virtue, education, and artificial intelligence

Artificial intelligence technologies have become a ubiquitous part of human life. This prompts us to ask, ‘how should we live well with artificial intelligence?’ Currently, the most prominent candidate answers to this question are principlist. According to these approaches, if you teach people some finite set of principles or convince them to adopt the right rules, people will be able to live and act well with artificial intelligence, even in an evolving and opaque moral world. We find the dominant principlist approaches to be ill-suited to providing forward-looking moral guidance regarding living well with artificial intelligence. We analyze some of the proposed principles to show that they oscillate between being too vague and too specific. We also argue that such rules are unlikely to be flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. By contrast, we argue for an Aristotelian virtue ethics approach to artificial intelligence ethics. Aristotelian virtue ethics provides a concrete and actionable guidance that is also flexible; thus, it is uniquely well placed to deal with the forward-looking and rapidly changing landscape of life with artificial intelligence. However, virtue ethics is agent-based rather than action-based. Using virtue ethics as a basis for living well with artificial intelligence requires ensuring that at least some virtuous agents also possess the relevant scientific and technical expertise. Since virtue ethics does not prescribe a set of rules, it requires exemplars who can serve as a model for those learning to be virtuous. Cultivating virtue is challenging, especially in the absence of moral sages. Despite this difficulty, we think the best option is to attempt what virtue ethics requires, even though no system of training can guarantee the production of virtuous agents. We end with two alternative visions – one from each of the two authors – about the practicality of such an approach.

The Contribution of Scholarship of Teaching and Learning through Self-reflection and Knowledge Sharing

A people-centred approach placing value on humanity is at the core of numerous democratic-led governments, and educational institutions to solve socio-economic and environmental challenges facing civilisation. This paper explored the contribution of Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (SoTL) in emphasising reflection and theories to enable people to improve teaching and learning and to reinforce the application of logic when addressing barriers confronting humanity. The purpose of this study was to examine the relevance of SoTL platforms using reflection and theories to improve the quality of teaching and learning by promoting intellectual and ethical virtues in human interactions. Qualitative data was generated from literature and a purposively sampled respondent group of twelve lecturers in one of the South African universities. Interviews were conducted by using an interview schedule questionnaire whilst data collected was categorised and analysed into themes. The findings revealed that SoTL encourages knowledge sharing and inspires academics to reflect on their practice by answering some of the questions that hinder effective teaching and learning and its snowball effect on improved human interactions in general. Answering complex questions relating to teaching and learning requires all parties beyond borders to share ideas, reflect, think critically, engage in research, and apply relevant theories that embed values that inform human interactions. The implication is that SoTL discourse can eliminate the silo and irrational ways of solving problems by employing inquiry and critical reflective strategies to stimulate reasoning and restore values that position humanity at the centre of governments and all human interactions. Therefore, SoTL approaches can foster intellectual decisions that can sustain the upholding of ethics and intellectual virtues and advance human dignity. Keywords: Humanity, Reflection, Scholarship of Teaching and Learning, Theories

The Cautionary Account of Supererogation

Abstract The problem of supererogation has attracted significant attention from contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we show that this problem was outlined in different terms in the work of the 11th century Persian philosopher Abū Alī Miskawayh. As well as identifying this problem, Miskawayh also developed a unique solution cashed out in terms of virtue ethics that has not yet been considered in the contemporary literature. We will argue that this solution, which is in its general form independent of virtue ethics, provides a plausible explanation of what makes some acts supererogatory and faces two important advantages over the most popular response to the problem of supererogation, The Sacrifice View. Unlike The Sacrifice View, The Cautionary Account can class acts of benevolence that advance the agent's own interests as supererogatory and easily explain why certain acts of sacrifice are neither permissible nor praiseworthy.

A qualitative study of social accountability translation: from mission to living it

BackgroundMedical schools are increasingly adopting socially accountable mission and curricula, the realisation of which are dependent on engaging individuals to embody the mission’s principles in their everyday activities as doctors. However, little is known about how graduates perceive the efforts taken by their medical school to sensitise them to social accountability values, and how they translate this into their working lives. Our aim was to explore and understand graduate perceptions of how their medical school influenced them to embody a social accountability mission in their working lives.MethodsThis was a qualitative interview study carried out with graduates/alumni [n = 51] of Christian Medical College, Vellore [CMCV], India, a school with a long-established and explicit social-accountability mission. Data coding and analysis were initially inductive and thematic using Braun and Clarke’s six step framework. MacIntyre’s virtue ethics theory framed secondary analysis, allowing us to consider the relationships between individual and contextual factors.ResultsOur participants perceived that CMCV invested heavily in selecting personal qualities aligned with the CMCV mission. They saw that these qualities were reinforced through various practices: [e.g., placements in resource limited and/or remote and rural settings]; community engagement and expectations [e.g., student self-governance]; role modelling [staff and more senior students]. Much emphasis was placed on sustaining these traditions and practices over time, creating a strong sense of identity and belonging among participants, traditions which were fostered further by the alumni network and continued engagement with CMCV post-graduation.ConclusionsEnsuring social accountable medical education depends on alignment and interactions over time between context and structures, systems and human agents. Further studies are needed to extend understanding of how students from diverse contexts experience socially accountable medical education and translate their educational experience into their thinking and practice after graduation.