Abstract
This article explores two contrasting theories of virtue ethics, namely the unity theory of virtue and the disunity theory of virtue. The unity thesis asserts that virtues are unified in some sense, or that possession of one virtue is inextricably related to the possession of all others. Meanwhile, the disunity thesis argues that virtues are disunited, or that there is a lack of unity among the virtues. But still, there are many empirical observations that seem to contradict these two theses at every turn. Thus, this article offers a moral-psychological analysis of the plausibility of the unity of virtues, and argues that the unity among the virtues is possible only if we seriously consider the integration of moral and intellectual virtues as a condition of unification. In conclusion, it suggests a way of unification which is in accord with Aristotle’s moral psychological interpretation of the division of the soul and practical wisdom, or phronesis, which is often overlooked in virtue epistemology.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have