Theory Of Bureaucracy Research Articles

When it comes to product innovation, what is so bad about bureaucracy?

In theory, bureaucracy is said to be “bad” for innovation. Yet large bureaucratic organizations often need to be both adept at innovation and capable of ongoing routinized production. Unfortunately, little is actually known about how bureaucracy hinders innovation, since research on the relationship of structural characteristics of organization and innovation is ambiguous. This study attempts to illuminate the specific relationship between bureaucracy and innovation so as to permit progress beyond the innovation-bureaucracy stalemate. Building on an interpretive rather than structure perspective, we analyzed 134 people's experiences with product innovation in 15 large bureaucracies. We found four patterns of bureaucratic thinking and acting that systematically inhibited effective action in defining, organizing, evaluating, and staffing the innovation effort. These patterns are described and illustrated at some length. Then, drawing on Weber's original theory of bureaucracy and other classics of innovation, we theorize that it is an interpretive system of instrumental rationality, not only a bureaucratic structure, that creates and maintains these patterns. From this insight we speculate on how large bureaucracies can become more innovative without losing their efficiency.

Organizational Environments and Organizational Discourse: Bureaucracy between Two Worlds

The controversy around Weber's theory of bureaucracy that occupied post-war American organization theorists serves as a backdrop to consider differences in the institutional and cultural environments of American and continental European, notably German, organizations. I suggest that formal organizations in the United States emerged under institutional and cultural conditions sufficiently different from those Weber witnessed as to account for the differences in the European and American organizational discourses. European institutional-cultural conditions favored a centralized, hierarchical, obedience-based organizational form with little uncertainty tolerance emphasizing loyalty. In the US, by contrast, the primacy of the large business organization which operated in volatile markets under the cultural imperative of equality favored flatter, less hierarchical, and more nearly decomposable organizations in which compliance was based on a temporary contract. Indifference vis-à-vis the national and cultural particulars of formal organizations may have led early organization research to prematurely close off a potentially fruitful line of inquiry in the field of comparative organization.

Organization HRD and technology: towards a bureaucratic theory of strategic control

In this study, an investigation is conducted of the relationships between technology and training as attributes of strategic control. It is argued that, when the means of production become more technology oriented, smaller firms will be more ready to train and develop existing workers. Larger firms, by contrast, may tend to emphasize training but more of a generic type rather than ‘tailor made’.

Typology of Modern-rational Bureaucracy

I will develop a typology of modern-rational bureaucracy by means of reconstruction of the theory of bureaucracy presented by Max Weber. Varieties of bureaucracy are emphasized in order to break down the uniformity of bureaucracy-image. We give following nine propositions. (1) Modern bureaucracy is defined by the combination of legal domination and monocracy. (2) Legal domination contains a positive-law oriented/discipline oriented contrast about the mode of legitimacy. (3) Monocracy contains a sovereign/discret contrast about the way of decision-making., (4) We cross these two axes of legal domination and monocracy, and get four types of modern-rational bureaucracy. (5) We name “positive-law oriented sovereign” type office-bureaucracy (Continental type). (6) discipline oriented +discret type→profession-bureaucracy (Anglo-Saxon type). (7) discipline oriented+sovereign type→calling-bureaucracy (Fuehrer-Democracy). (8) positive-law oriented+discret type→competence-bureaucracy (Japanese type). (9) The typical type of bureaucracy is not office-bureaucracy, but profession-bureaucracy, because we can fit better the image of bureaucracy for the M. Weber's theory of socialist economic system and highly differentiated modernity. Critical assessments against the socialist type of bureaucracy in Soviet Union and East-central Euprope during the revolutionary age of 1980 s confirm this conclusion.

Emergent Organization as a Practical Strategy: Executing Trustee Functions in Alcoholics Anonymous

Trusteeship functions in nonprofit organizations are most often analyzed by drawing on ideas from the world of proprietary firms and organizational theories that have their roots in the theory of bureaucracy. Recent theories of nonprofit organizations have explored alternative organizational visions, emphasizing that nonprofits often are embedded in larger communities and that their organizational styles are embedded in distinctive cultures of voluntarism. Such perspectives, however, suffer because they tell us little about how to understand notions such as accountability and trusteeship. This article, a case study of Alcoholics Anonymous, offers a theory of how accountability and trusteeship functions may be effectively performed in an organization that is guided by a distinctive culture and idiosyncratic organizational practices that differ sharply from the bureaucratic, corporate model of organization.

Migu� and B�langer on managerial discretion: A note

In Public Choice 17, Spring 1974, Jean Luc Migu6 and Gerard B61anger published 'Toward a general theory of managerial discretion'. The gist of their contribution is that the single target utility function of neoclassical theory (profit maximization) and Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy (output maximization) can be captured in a general utility function which contains two variables: the external or formal goal of the organization as well as its internal or informal objective. Neoclassical theory and the theory of bureaucracy can be analyzed then as special cases of a general theory of managerial discretion. This fruitful idea had been developed ten years earlier by Williamson (1963) and was applied by him to the for profit firm and public utility. Migu6 and B61anger have been the first to apply it to non profit organizations and government bureaus. Unfortunately, they have jumped to a conclusion that can not be derived from the assumptions of their model. Using the notation of M & B the essence of the theory of managerial discretion is captured by the following model. Mazimize the utility function

The political economy of monetary policy

Understanding the political economy of monetary policy has progressed in recent years because of advances in three areas: the application of rational expectations perspectives to monetary policy, the extension of the economic theory of bureaucracy and public choice insights to monetary policy institutions, and statistical research regarding political influences on monetary policy and related inflation performance. This paper first discusses how Keynesian, game theoretic and partisan modeling of monetary policy have actually inhibited a realistic political economy understanding. It then reviews developments in each of the three areas of progress. It also shows how these recent advances provide insights into the costs of monetary policy as well as into the economics of optimal monetary reform — specifically, the optimal restructuring of central banks.

WOMEN'S ACCESS TO FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE MANAGEMENT POSITIONS: THE ISSUE OF VETERANS‘ PREFERENCE

Within the framework of affirmative action and the theory of representative bureaucracy with a focus on organizational barriers, this paper demonstrates the lack of significant success of women in attaining positions of authority (executive, administrative, managerial) in the federal civil service. The role of veterans' preference policies in limiting the access of women to federal public service management positions is shown. Assuming the continuation of a strong lobbying effect in support of the continuation of veterans' preference policies, recommendations are made to rectify the organizational barrier to women posed by veterans' preference policies through the adoption of a point system which would assign to qualified non‐veterans additional points based upon qualifications which exceed the minimum.

Technical progress in bureaucracies

In this paper we raise the question whether in bureaucracies incentives are existing to implement technical progress into public goods production as it may be observed in the private sector. Therefore the well-known models of the theory of bureaucracy will be enhanced by technical progress modelled as process innovations. Depending on bureaucrats' preferences two results can be obtained: (a) If bureaucrats maximize their budget or if output or the classical production factors enter their utility function, RD (b) if bureaucrats prefer R&D as an end itself, they will use this factor like other factors by more than the efficient amount. In both cases an allocative inefficient output of the public good is produced. As a consequence society cannot benefit from gains by technical progress since net social welfare is appropriated totally by bureaucrats, even if it is increased by R&D-efforts.

The Changing Organizational Parent

This article describes the evolution of the capitalist economic system and five organizational theories associated with it–the scientific, bureaucratic, human relations, systems, and contingency theories. Tenets of each are related to the transactional analysis concept of the Parent ego state, with occasional reference to the Adult and Child ego states. The mechanism for their relationship with TA is the definition of their policies, values, and behavioral rules as the Organizational Parent.

The Politics of U.S. Antitrust Regulation

The purpose of antitrust regulation is to promote and maintain fair competition in the U.S. economy. Yet economists and political scientists have long been unable to identify economic determinants of antitrust activity. Recent studies have turned toward bureaucratic theory for explaining antitrust enforcement. However, we argue that both economic and bureaucratic theories of antitrust regulation fail because they ignore the overarching institutional framework within which regulation occurs. We use the theory of overhead democracy to formulate a political explanation for antitrust regulation. Drawing upon data for the Antitrust Division's resources and enforcement activity from 1970 to 1989, we show that Antitrust Division behavior is strongly affected by the major U.S. political actors, including the president, Congress, and courts. We conclude by discussing the normative implications of political, rather than market-based, antitrust regulation.

Power and money: a Marxist theory of bureaucracy

Power and money: a Marxist theory of bureaucracy

What Do We Do With Applied Research?

One of the most persistent criticisms of the behavioral sciences is that academics are only interested in developing theory for its own sake (e.g., see Ricci 1984). According to this argument, the development of social science theory provides society with few practical benefits. It survives only because it serves the needs of the academic community, providing fertile publishing ground for scholars to formulate, criticize, revise, reformulate, and debunk various theories. Critics view theory building as comparable to a dog chasing its tail. One can identify a great deal of activity, but there is little practical pay off. We believe that this pernicious view of theory building has evolved because applied proposals for policy change that would demonstrate the value of social science theory are not generally published in mainstream journals. Mainstream journals identify theories about the nature of important governmental and societal problems. Often these theories provide the basis for remedial solutions that can be formulated as policy proposals. However, once theory is framed in an applied form, scholars generally consider it as inappropriate for publication in mainstream social science journals. Social scientists themselves have created the impression that theory is only formulated for its own sake. In this article we ask what we believe is a fundamental question for the political science discipline: What does one do with applied research? A satisfactory answer to this question would demonstrate the practical utility of social science theory-or what Lindblom and Cohen (1979) have called usable knowledge. We illustrate our argument by presenting an example of an applied policy proposal that flows naturally from the last 40 years of the development of bureaucratic theory. The Accountability Problem and Bureaucratic Theory

The Secondary School Principal and Teachers' Quality of work Life

The author is Professor of Educational Administration at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. In this article he draws upon case studies of the school principal and other senior administrators, in eight 'ordinary' metropolitan secondary schools in the upper midwest of the United States, to describe how the actions of school-level administrators affect the quality of work life of teachers in schools. In interpreting the data Richard Rossmiller draws upon both rational bureaucratic and loose-coupling theory.

Hegel's Theory of Modern Bureaucracy

I make three contentions. First, Hegel's theory of bureaucracy is as comprehensive as Weber's ideal type of bureaucratic organization. I argue this by making a sociological reformulation of Hegel's model and comparing it with the Weberian paradigm. Second, Hegel adapts the Aristotelian category of practical judgment in characterizing the bureaucratic activity assubsumption. This characterization is contrary to the dominant view that bureaucracy embodies mere instrumental rationality and solves some difficulties in Hegel's political thought. Third, Hegel's conceptualization can contribute to a liberal theory of bureaucracy that apprehends modern political reality more adequately than the skepticism of classical liberals and contemporary libertarians about bureaucratic organization.

Bureaucratization of non‐governmental organizations: An analysis of employees' perceptions and attitudes

AbstractThe key concern of the following article is to measure empirically the extent to which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are bureaucratized. The perceptions of the employees of the NGOs were elicited about the characteristics of bureaucracy. Interval scale data on respondent perceptions were analysed through step‐wide regression. The statistical analysis does not reveal any specific directionality. Instead, it shows a complicated set of relationships between each of eight characteristics of bureaucracy (dependent variables) on the one hand and the multitude of independent variables on the other. It can be inferred from the data and regression results that the bureaucratic characteristics of NGOs have not crystallized, as in the case of many governmental organizations. Only some postulates of bureaucratic theory, as propounded by Max Weber, are prevalent in the NGOs.

Feminism and Bureaucracy: The Minimum Wage Experiment in the District of Columbia

Bureaucrats, female or male, have never been popular, a fact which may, in part, explain neglect of their role by the growing band of students of women and politics. Theories of bureaucracy predict that this will be the least promising of settings for the empowerment of women. Max Weber's classic account depicts bureaucratic activity as a routinized and sterile process of technical determinations and rules of procedure. Some feminists argue that such modes of action epitomize the masculine. Each model portrays a rational, depersonalized, technocratic sphere of activity, hierarchical in structure, rule-bound both in what is done and how. In addition, the state itself has sometimes been presented as wholly oppressive to women, adding public power to private power to create a comprehensive system of male domination.

Principle versus Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory

Principle versus Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory

Viability: what quality management lacks

The paper argues that quality and viability in management imply each other. Quality principles are interpreted using the traditional mechanical-coercive vision of organisations held in early scientific management and bureaucracy theory. The interpretation contradicts the intent of quality principles - viability was missing. The quality principles are re-interpreted using a viable-system vision of organisations, highlighting the synergy between viability and quality.

The Role of Hispanic Public Administrators: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

Empirical data on the experiences of Hispanic administrators operating in governmental bureaucracies are reported in this study. Based on role-analysis methodology and representative bureaucracy theory, a survey research instrument is generated to measure role consensus between Hispanic and white administrators of the state of California in regard to administrative responsibility. Role conflict, as perceived by Hispanic administrators, and strategies for conflict resolution also are explored. The study serves to document specific areas of consensus and conflict between Hispanic and institutional role expectations. The findings have implications for the study of minorities in government, administrative role analysis, and representative bureaucracy in democratic societies.