Theory-ladenness Of Observation Research Articles

Science Denial, Cognitive Command, and the Theory-Ladenness of Observation: A Postscript for a Time of ‘Post-Truth’

ABSTRACT One worrying aspect of contemporary Western Society is the increasing prevalence of instances of ‘Science Denial’ in popular culture. Examples include both cases where well-attested scientific hypotheses are rejected and conversely, where scientifically discredited ideas are stubbornly retained. The paper raises the question whether the kind of argument for an anti-realist conception of empirical scientific theory considered in my contribution to the inaugural issue of this journal could in principle provide intellectual succour for these trends. The discussion proceeds through an examination of the role of ‘takings for granted’ in all reflective enquiry to the conclusion that a trusting acceptance of the general credibility of informants is a precondition for the exercise of individual epistemic responsibility, and that in that context an acceptance of at least the empirical adequacy, if not the truth, realistically understood, of the teachings of scientists in general is rationally non-optional.

Preliminary Exploration of Hanson’s Idea of “Theory-laden Observation”

According to the traditional view, observation is neutral, unrestricted by theory, and theory depends on observation. However, Hanson's theory-laden observation, his Thematic Framework model, points out that observation depends on theory, that theory infiltrates observation, that theory determines the purpose and object of observation, and that observation must be guided by correct theory. Observation, as Hanson sees it, is a process of brain activity: it is not only the reception of information, but also the action of understanding and categorizing that information. Therefore, observation is naturally related to the observer's background, life experience and psychological set. Different observers may draw different conclusions about the same process by nature of the differences in their life experience.

Seeing and doing are not believing: Investigating when and how conceptual knowledge impinges on observation and recall of physical motion.

One standard pedagogical approach in physical science courses engages students in making predictions about physical phenomena that elicit non-normative expectations, then make observations intended to provide counterevidence that sparks conceptual change. This article presents five experiments investigating conditions where observation and recall are impacted by incorrect expectations and how these theory-laden observational errors might be mitigated. Using the context of balancing, Experiments 1-3 examine how the ambiguity of the stimuli may allow observers to selectively attend to information that is consistent with prior beliefs, while discounting incongruent information. As ambiguity is removed, the biasing effects of conceptual expectations are reduced. Experiments 4 and 5 extend the findings to investigate whether the effect of conceptual expectations also applies to memory of one's own bodily experiences of balancing. The results suggest that the ambiguity-driven, theory-laden observation effects found for visual observation, do not necessarily translate to recall for an embodied action, even though the experience of balancing contained perceptuo-motor ambiguity. Taken altogether, these five experiments show how conceptual knowledge can impinge on accurate recall of observations or embodied experiences and that instruction engaging students with demonstrations or embodied experiences may not necessarily provide intended counterevidence that contradicts prior expectations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Assessing the explanatory power of naturalism in addressing ultimate questions

A typical scientist has no responsibility other than to explain how a natural event occurred. However, when a philosopher asks about the conditions under which a scientist’s explanation is true, he is, in fact, raising an ultimate question, the concept which Karl Popper used for the first time. Answering this question requires that no elements are neglected in the explanation, and no significant factors in the explanation are overlooked. In other words, in explainingphenomenon, at any level of its explanation, there should be no remainder. These requirements can be achieved through the full explanation. In the present article, by drawing on concepts such as theory-ladenness of observation, underdetermination of theory by evidence, and the role of models and metaphors in developing a scientific theory, it is illustrated thatcomplete explanation includes both a scientific explanation and personal explanation. A personal explanation comprises mental properties such as belief, desire, and intention, which are irreducible to physical properties. Therefore, we cannot provide a personal explanation while restricting ourselves to scientific methods. Consequently, it is argued in this article first, the personal explanation is irreducible to a scientific explanation. Second, the personal explanation is inevitable in order to provide a full explanation. Third, (methodological) naturalists claim that the ultimate judgment of what is natural and unnatural is possible only by scientific inquiry. Finally, accepting these three premises entails the inability of a naturalist to answer ultimate questions.

Norwood Russell Hanson’s account of experience: an untimely defense

Experience, it is widely agreed, constrains our thinking and is also thoroughly theory-laden. But how can it constrain our thinking while depending on what it purports to constrain? To address this issue, I revisit and carefully analyze the account of (scientific) observation provided by Norwood Russell Hanson, who introduced the term ‘theory-ladenness of observation’ in the first place. I show that Hanson’s account provides an original and coherent response to the initial question and argue that, if suitably developed, his account provides a distinctive, powerful, and attractive alternative to relationalist and standard representationalist conceptions of experience.

My face is more than me. A Nordic researcher in the South: An autoethnographic retrospective perspective

A white person from the Global North, referred to in Kiswahili as a mzungu, can hardly conduct research anonymously, observe unnoticed or merge with staff and students in the context of African university classrooms. This article builds on the author’s six years of research at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) in Tanzania, examining staff and students’ everyday practices in terms of how they are characterised by linguistic constraints. Using an autoethnographic, self-reflective and retrospective approach, the author discloses some of her experience during fieldwork as a researcher on the university campus. Through this form of qualitative research, she connects her personal experience to the discourse on the language of instruction policy and practices in higher education in Tanzania. The aim of her self-reflection is to understand the wider meanings of how cultural, political and social language practices unfold in staff and students’ daily lives. Using the concepts of insider and outsider, preconception, and theory-ladenness of observation, the author aims to depict the challenges and limits of being a researcher in a totally unfamiliar context. During her fieldwork, using a mixed-methods approach of questionnaires, interviews and participating observation, the author also kept a notebook with her. She made field notes of self-observation, reflecting on her reactions to what she encountered in the research process. While making these notes was not deliberately a part of the data collection, it was an important way of talking to herself. In retrospect, a few years after submitting her doctoral thesis, these notes have become more important to her. The purpose of this article is twofold: on the one hand, the author reveals some of her own experience as a researcher in unaccustomed surroundings, on the other hand, she uses her personal experience to describe, question and shed light on the discrepancies caused by language practices in Tanzanian higher education.

Theoricity, observation and homology: a response to Pearson.

An interesting metatheoretical controversy took place during the 1980's and 1990's between pattern and phylogenetic cladists. What was always at stake in the discussion was not how work in systematics should be carried out, but rather how this practice should be metatheoretically interpreted. In this article, we criticize Pearson's account of the metatheoretical factors at play in this discussion. Following him, we focus on the issue of circularity, and on the role that phylogenetic hypotheses play in the determination of "primary homologies". Pearson argues that the recognition of primary homologies cannot be achieved without recourse to previous phylogenetic knowledge, and that to claim otherwise is to state that primary homologies are observable. To show why that view would be inadequate, he appeals to Hanson's views about theory-laden observation, alongside with a specific case study, which allegedly illustrates the more complex relation between observation and theory. We will argue that the pattern cladists' point (at least regarding the issue of homology) is better addressed by taking a quite different approach: instead of thinking in terms of observability, the topic can be tackled by paying attention to the way in which concepts are determined. We will take the notion of T-theoricity from metatheoretical structuralism and show that, once the issue is discussed with the appropriate metatheoretical framework, the alleged counterexample brought up by Pearson is not problematic at all for pattern cladism.

Знание о прошлом и проблема теоретической нагруженности наблюдений. Рец. на кн.: Kosso P. Knowing the Past. Philosophical Issues of History and Archaeology. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2001

Знание о прошлом и проблема теоретической нагруженности наблюдений. Рец. на кн.: Kosso P. Knowing the Past. Philosophical Issues of History and Archaeology. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2001

Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in the Age of Prediction: Predictive Systems are Penetrable Systems

The goal of perceptual systems is to allow organisms to adaptively respond to ecologically relevant stimuli. Because all perceptual inputs are ambiguous, perception needs to rely on prior knowledge accumulated over evolutionary and developmental time to turn sensory energy into information useful for guiding behavior. It remains controversial whether the guidance of perception extends to cognitive states or is locked up in a “cognitively impenetrable” part of perception. I argue that expectations, knowledge, and task demands can shape perception at multiple levels, leaving no part untouched. The position advocated here is broadly consistent with the notion that perceptual systems strive to minimize prediction error en route to globally optimal solutions (Clark Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(3):181–204, 2013). On this view, penetrability should be expected whenever constraining lower-level processes by higher level knowledge is minimizes global prediction error. Just as Fodor feared (e.g., Fodor Philosophy of Science 51:23–43, 1984, Philosophy of Science 51:23–43, 1988) cognitive penetration of perception threatens theory-neutral observation and the distinction between observation and inference. However, because theories themselves are constrained by the task of minimizing prediction error, theory-laden observation turns out to be superior to theory-free observation in turning sensory energy into useful information.

Tesis de la carga teórica de la observación y constructivismo

The Thesis of Theory-Laden [TTL] holds that is not possible a neutral observation. From this thesis, some philosophers have inferred that the facts, i.e., the subject’s independent reality, do not exist or that they are social constructions only. The aim of this paper is assess if TTL necessarily implies a constructivist point of view or if, conversely, we can still speak about the reality. In order to do this, we will clarify these terms: “the theoryladenness of observation” and “constructivism”. Then, we will argue that although TTL is possible, we are not committed to constructivism, and on the contrary, TTL can be an interesting frame to the realistic thesis. Finally, we will point out the impact this had has when evaluating many epistemological proposals.

Carnap and Kuhn on linguistic frameworks and scientific revolutions

Several recent works in history and philosophy of science have re-evaluated the alleged opposition between the theses put forth by logical empiricists such as Carnap and the so-called "post-positivists", such as Kuhn. Although the latter came to be viewed as having seriously challenged the logical positivist views of science, recent authors (e.g., Friedman, Reisch, Earman, Irzik and Grünberg) maintain that some of the most notable theses of the Kuhnian view of science have striking similarities with some aspects of Carnap's philosophy. Against that reading, Oliveira and Psillos argue that within Carnap's philosophy there is no place for the Kuhnian theses of incommensurability, holism, and theory-ladenness of observations. This paper presents each of those readings and argues that Carnap and Kuhn have non-opposing views on holism, incommensurability, the theory-ladenness of observations, and scientific revolutions. We note at the very end - without dwelling on the point, however - that they come apart on other matters, such as their views on metaphysics and on the context of discovery/justification distinction.

Teaching About Theory-Laden Observation to Secondary Students Through Manipulated Lab Inquiry Experience

This study seeks to develop and evaluate a modified lab inquiry approach to teaching about nature of science (NOS) to secondary students. Different from the extended, open-ended inquiry, this approach makes use of shorter lab inquiry activities in which one or several specific NOS aspects are manipulated deliberately so that students are compelled to experience and then reflect on these NOS aspects. In this study, to let students experience theory-laden observation, they were provided with different “theories” in order to bias their observations in the lab inquiry. Then, in the post-lab discussion, the teacher guided students to reflect on their own experience and explicitly taught about theory-ladenness. This study employs a quasi-experimental pretest–posttest design using the historical approach as the control group. The results show that the manipulated lab inquiry approach was much more effective than the historical approach in fostering students’ theory-laden views, and it was even more effective when the two approaches were combined. Besides, the study also sought to examine the practical epistemological beliefs of students concerning theory-ladenness, but limited evidence could be found.

Ludwik Fleck a současná filosofie vědy

The present paper aims at describing systematically the theory of thought-styles and thought-collectives of Polish microbiologist, Ludwik Fleck. The paper describes its starting point: case study of so-called Wasserman test. In what follows, Fleck’s theory is presented at first in the light of Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. Some similarities between the two thinkers are pointed out (e. g. use of incommensurability concept, reference to gestalt psychology, theory-ladenness of observation, view on scientific literature). Yet Fleck’s views differs from Kuhn’s in some important respects (e. g. views on stabilisation, absence of counterpart of scientific revolutions in Fleck’s theory). Contrary to the prevailing view, these differences preclude consideration of Fleck as a forerunner of Kuhn. For this reason, the present paper mentions also possibility of presentation of Fleck’s views in another context which is deemed more helpful: French epistemology (e. g. Canguilhem, Hacking).

Perception: Mirror-Image or Action?

In the article two viewpoints on the mind’s influence on perception are considered. One of them was developed on the assumption that perception is a nonproblematic source of knowledge about the world, which is free from mind’s influence—perception as a mirror-image. Another viewpoint is perception as action, i.e. active search and gathering the relevant information, its processing and evaluation. First viewpoint has dominated in philosophy for a long time, the second one has been developing in psychology from the 80th of the 20th century. The aim of the paper is to examine some philosophically significant corollaries from both positions concerning objectiveness, epistemological status of an observation, truth, meaning of name. Analysis showed that perception as action is non-compatible with many traditional concepts, and it goes both against empiricism and against realism as it involves some critical arguments, e.g. theory ladenness of observations, underdetermination of theory by facts, the historical development of a scientific fact.

Turning Crisis into Opportunity: Nature of Science and Scientific Inquiry as Illustrated in the Scientific Research on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome.

Interviews with key scientists who had conducted research on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), together with analysis of media reports, documentaries and other literature published during and after the SARS epidemic, revealed many interesting aspects of the nature of science (NOS) and scientific inquiry in contemporary scientific research in the rapidly growing field of molecular biology. The story of SARS illustrates vividly some NOS features advocated in the school science curriculum, including the tentative nature of scientific knowledge, theory-laden observation and interpretation, multiplicity of approaches adopted in scientific inquiry, the inter-relationship between science and technology, and the nexus of science, politics, social and cultural practices. The story also provided some insights into a number of NOS features less emphasised in the school curriculum—for example, the need to combine and coordinate expertise in a number of scientific fields, the intense competition between research groups (suspended during the SARS crisis), the significance of affective issues relating to intellectual honesty and the courage to challenge authority, the pressure of funding issues on the conduct of research and the ‘peace of mind’ of researchers, These less emphasised elements provided empirical evidence that NOS knowledge, like scientific knowledge itself, changes over time. They reflected the need for teachers and curriculum planners to revisit and reconsider whether the features of NOS currently included in the school science curriculum are fully reflective of the practice of science in the 21st century. In this paper, we also report on how we made use of extracts from the news reports and documentaries on SARS, together with episodes from the scientists’ interviews, to develop a multimedia instructional package for explicitly teaching the prominent features of NOS and scientific inquiry identified in the SARS research.

Critical Constructivism for Teaching and Learning in a Democratic Society

Practice is never simple application of general rules to concrete situations ... (Bettancourt, 1993) We begin with caveat: We do not believe it is possible to derive any straightforward recipe for teaching practice from constructivism, or any other general theory. Attempts to make recipes out of educational theories tend to make them rigid, languid, and unable to motivate teachers or students. Such has been the fate of As an educational reform, constructivism has become inert, merely another detachable means to whatever curriculum ends politicians or educational authorities prescribe. Since our first introduction to it over twenty years ago, we have been generally enthusiastic about the constructivist view of meaning and knowledge creation. Understanding both that knowledge is constructed and how it is constructed serves to reveal the contingency and contextuality as well as theory- and value-ladenness inherent in knowledge. Theory-ladenness of observation, for example, is phenomenon that one's observations are influenced in various ways by one's background. In other words, observations and experiences have to be interpreted to be meaningful and it is this unavoidable association of theoretical dimension that represents theory-ladenness. Awareness of these characteristics more readily renders all knowledge claims subject to deconstruction and reconstruction, an important basis for more critical, creative, and mindful approaches to teaching and learning. Excited by the pedagogical possibilities of constructivist perspective, group of us worked together to develop what we call constructivism. (1) This expanded idea of constructivism emphasizes understanding the contingent nature of knowledge to induce more critical reflection about various educational institutions and practices. Thus, despite the nearly wholesale acceptance of trivialized version of constructivism by mainstream educators, we believe that the ideas of constructivism remain viable and vibrant tool of responsible critique for teaching and learning in democratic society. In what follows we take look at school-based education, and particularly curriculum and instruction in the sciences and social studies, through critical constructivist lens. Sadly, the school curriculum often unwittingly presents content in the humanities, social sciences, and sciences as objective and beyond question. The decontextualization of this content conceals any of the contingent circumstances of its construction or curricular representation, as well as the larger sociopolitical and economic conditions upon which it depends. In the process, school knowledge loses contact with the context of the student's everyday life; its reification leads the learner to think that knowledge is simply the property of the sages, rather than revisable social product of humankind. Thus reification and decontextualization are two undesirable outcomes of education addressed by critical constructivism, third being technocratization, process we see in the high-stakes testing movement, by which knowledge is used to serve bureaucratization and results in the deskilling of teachers. Looking at schooling through critical constructivism we seek to deflate the pretensions of content in the curriculum by exposing it as contingently constructed, contextualized, and value-oriented. This exposure occurs by involving students in examining the processes that originally led to its as well as to the processes by which it is reproduced via curriculum. We are particularly interested in what we have referred to as the students' rapport au savoir (Desautels, Garrison, & Fleury, 1998), that is best understood as a relation of meaning, and thus of value, between an individual (or group) and the processes and products of knowledge production (Charlot, Bautier, and Rochex, 1992, p. 29). Most importantly, we think that attending to these critical aspects of constructivism serves as constitutive means to the democratic ends of teaching and learning. …

Apuntes sobre la formación epistemológica de los profesores de ciencias naturales

En este trabajo se presentan someramente algunas ideas teóricas para contribuir a transformar la epistemología en un componente curricular de la formación inicial y continuada del profesorado de ciencias naturales. Luego se ejemplifican estas ideas en una actividad didáctica diseñada para acercar a los profesores de ciencias a la noción epistemológica de "carga teórica de la observación”.

Lives of the cell.

What is the relation between things and theories, the material world and its scientific representations? This is a staple philosophical problem that rarely counts as historically legitimate or fruitful. In the following dialogue, the interlocutors do not argue for or against realism. Instead, they explore changing relations between theories and things, between contested objects of knowledge (like the cell) and less contested, more everyday things (like frog eggs scooped from a pond). Widely seen as the life sciences' first general theory, the cell theory underwent dramatic changes during the nineteenth century. The dialogue established that each successive version of the cell theory was formulated - each identity of the object cell was formed - around a different material: cork, cartilage, eggs in cleavage, muscle. Such things thus serve as exemplary materials, in ways not described by standard concepts like induction, theory-testing, theory-laden observation, and construction. Still, how can theories and perspective possibly be honed on things if these are apprehended differently by different observers according to their interests, training, culture, or indeed theories? The second part of the dialogue addresses this problem, partly through the verbal and visual schemata that were used by nineteenth-century microscopists and that are comparable to schemata in the visual arts. The third part of the dialogue considers the exemplary materials as a historical sequence, itself needing explanation. Theoretical change devolved partly from wider histories and geographies of the prevalence, availability, or scientific and cultural status of materials such as plants, animals, and muscle.

The Thesis of Theory-Laden Observation in the Light of Cognitive Psychology

The aim of this paper is to analyze a philosophical question (neutrality vs. theoryladenness of observation) taking into consideration the empirical results of Cognitive Psychology (theories of perception). This is an important debate because the objectivity of science is at stake. In the Philosophy of Science there are two main positions with regard to observation, those of C. Hempel and N. R. Hanson. In the Philosophy of Mind there are also two important contrasting positions, those of J. Fodor and Paul M. Churchland. I will analyze the consequences of recent theories of perception and vision developed within Cognitive Science for classical epistemological theses about observation.

The Theory-Ladenness of Observation and the Theory-Ladenness of the Rest of the Scientific Process

We use evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science to examine the issue of the theory-ladenness of perceptual observation. This evidence shows that perception is theory-laden, but that it is only strongly theory-laden when the perceptual evidence is ambiguous or degraded, or when it requires a difficult perceptual judgment. We argue that debates about the theory-ladenness issue have focused too narrowly on the issue of perceptual experience, and that a full account of the scientific process requires an examination of theory-ladenness in attention, perception, data interpretation, data production, memory, and scientific communication. We conclude that the evidence for theory-ladenness does not lead to a relativist account of scientific knowledge.