Abstract
The Thesis of Theory-Laden [TTL] holds that is not possible a neutral observation. From this thesis, some philosophers have inferred that the facts, i.e., the subject’s independent reality, do not exist or that they are social constructions only. The aim of this paper is assess if TTL necessarily implies a constructivist point of view or if, conversely, we can still speak about the reality. In order to do this, we will clarify these terms: “the theoryladenness of observation” and “constructivism”. Then, we will argue that although TTL is possible, we are not committed to constructivism, and on the contrary, TTL can be an interesting frame to the realistic thesis. Finally, we will point out the impact this had has when evaluating many epistemological proposals.
Highlights
La tesis de la carga teórica de la observación [CTO] sostiene que no es posible una observación neutral
some philosophers have inferred that the facts
assess if TTL necessarily implies a constructivist point of view
Summary
La tesis de la carga teórica de la observación [CTO] sostiene que no es posible una observación neutral. Se señalarán dos objeciones a la doctrina de la carga teórica de la observación: el mecanismo de percepción “modular” de Fodor (1984) y la teoría del ver no-conceptual de los objetos expuesta por Dretske, pero para la presente exposición nos remitimos a la reconstrucción que de ella hace Nola (2003).
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