In this well-conceived collection of original papers, the editors aim provide a showcase of the many exciting and innovative developments that are currently taking place in imagery (xii). With one exception, the 14 chapters are written by members of the European scientific community, and the set reveals trends in recent research interests there. Beyond a sampling of transatlantic fare, however, the book has a broader theoretical point. The backdrop against which these papers are presented is a rejection of earlier debates, which originated largely in the United States and Canada, about the status of imagery as a form of mental representation. The implication is that these papers represent new and interesting lines of inquiry, more fertile than those pursued in the past and more-or-less unfettered by previously dominant concerns. A hint at the general slant of the new angles taken here is given at the outset by coeditor Marks: None of the current cognitive systems for handling imagery has succeeded in coping with both the physical and the mental requirements of a general (pp. 1-2). Though the point is preliminary to Marks's own work, the book as a whole can be read as a response to the failure he notes. In broad terms, three points bind together the mental and physical requirements of imagery theory: (a) the relevance of brain studies to psychological theory; (b) the functional identity of all images as internal states connected causally and conceptually to action and emotion, as well as to perception; and (c) the addition of motor encoding of information to sensory encoding. The effort to account for these points leads to no simple result, but it helps to clarify the current willingness to fragment and redefine old psychological categories. Thus, in the final chapter, coeditor Richardson draws this conclusion (citing brain studies in support): Mental imagery is not a general, undifferentiated ability so much as a collection of relatively independent components to be drawn upon according to the demands of the current (p. 368). This claim of task relativity, which is reiterated by a number of contributors, establishes the major challenge posed by this work: to understand the diverse functions of imagery and the relations among the tasks that draw upon them. The resulting effort involves theorizing about psychological complexity, similarity, and difference in some new ways. To that extent, the book makes good on its claim to innovation. Marks sounds the first general theme that suggests novelty. He argues that the basic function of imagery is to provide views of mental models which, along with schemata, are said to be the essential building blocks of physical and mental activity. Similar constructs are used by Peter Hampson and Peter Morris, in developing a theory of consciousness and control, and by Geir Kaufman, whose treatment of problem solving is critical of the role assigned to imagery by Hampson and Morris. There's nothing new in mental models, of course, and certainly not in schemata. What's new (or what has, at any 146 BOOK REVIEWS