Theory Of Civil-Military Relations Research Articles

The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems

This article is an effort to establish a comparative theoretical framework for the study of civil-military relations in communist political systems. Although the literature on civil-military relations in polyarchic and praetorian polities is theoretically as well as empirically rich, theories of civil-military relations in the field of comparative communism are still at the preliminary stage of development. It is argued that civil-military relations, like all the fundamental dynamics of communist political systems, derive from the structural relationship between a hegemonic Leninist party and the other institutions of the polity. Although the party directs and supervises all other institutions, its political supremacy is necessarily limited by the division of labor among various institutions. The relative autonomy of the military and its relations with the party vary from one country to another and can be described as coalitional, symbiotic, or fused. These relations are dynamic, changing over time in each country in response to contextual circumstances. The role of the military in politics is complex and variegated: on ideological issues, there is usually little conflict between party and army; on issues of “normal politics,” the military acts as a functionally specific elite engaged in bargaining to defend its perceived institutional interests; and in crisis politics, the military is a political resource that various party factions seek to enlist against their opponents.

The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems

This article is an effort to establish a comparative theoretical framework for the study of civil-military relations in communist political systems. Although the literature on civil-military relations in polyarchic and praetorian polities is theoretically as well as empirically rich, theories of civil-military relations in the field of comparative communism are still at the preliminary stage of development. It is argued that civil-military relations, like all the fundamental dynamics of communist political systems, derive from the structural relationship between a hegemonic Leninist party and the other institutions of the polity. Although the party directs and supervises all other institutions, its political supremacy is necessarily limited by the division of labor among various institutions. The relative autonomy of the military and its relations with the party vary from one country to another and can be described as coalitional, symbiotic, or fused. These relations are dynamic, changing over time in each country in response to contextual circumstances. The role of the military in politics is complex and variegated: on ideological issues, there is usually little conflict between party and army; on issues of “normal politics,” the military acts as a functionally specific elite engaged in bargaining to defend its perceived institutional interests; and in crisis politics, the military is a political resource that various party factions seek to enlist against their opponents.

The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations

The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations

The Soldier and the State. — The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations

The Soldier and the State. — The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations

Book Review: The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Defence and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations

Book Review: The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Defence and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.Samuel P. Huntington

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsThe Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Samuel P. Huntington John C. WahlkeJohn C. Wahlke Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 20, Number 2May, 1958 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2127050 Views: 12Total views on this site Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Vasabjit Banerjee, Sean P. Webeck Civil–Military Relations: Through a Perilous Lens, Armed Forces & Society 22 (Jul 2022): 0095327X2211081.https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221108198Risa Brooks Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States, International Security 44, no.44 (Apr 2020): 7–44.https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00374

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.

Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy. By John W. Masland and Laurance I. Radway. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. xx, 530. $7.50.) - The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. By Samuel P. Huntington. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 534. $7.50.)

Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy. By John W. Masland and Laurance I. Radway. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. xx, 530. $7.50.) - The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. By Samuel P. Huntington. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 534. $7.50.)

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, by Samuel P. Huntington

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, <i>by Samuel P. Huntington</i>

The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.

Introduction: National Security and Civil-Military Relations PART I MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND THE STATE: THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1. Officership as a Profession Professionalism and the Military The Concept of Profession The Military Profession 2. The Rise of the Military Profession in Western Society A New Social Type Mercenary and Aristocratic Officership Eighteenth-Century Aristocratic Institutions Preprofessional Meals: The Military Craft and the Natural Genius The Origins of Professionalism The Emergence of Professional Institutions, 1800-1875 European Professionalism: General Upton's Summary, 1875 Formulation of the Professional Ethic: The Autonomy and Sub-Ordination of War In Clausewitz's Vom Kriege 3. The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic The Meaning of the Military Mind The Professional Military Ethic 4. Power, Professionalism, and Ideology: Civil-Military Relations In Theory The Varieties of Civilian Control The Two Levels of Civil-Military Relations The Equilibrium of Objective Civilian Control The Patterns of Civil-Military Relations 5. Germany and Japan: Civil-Military Relations In Practice The German and Japanese Patterns Germany: The Tragedy of Professional Militarism Japan: The Continuity of Political Militarism PART II MILITARY POWER IN AMERICA: THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, 1789-1940 6. The Ideological Constant: The Liberal Society Versus Military Professionalism The Historical Constants of American Civil-Military Relations The Prevalence of Liberalism in the United States The Liberal Approach to Military Affairs The Military Hero in Liberal Politics 7. The Structural Constant: The Conservative Constitution Versus Civilian Control The Constitutional Absence of Objective Civilian Control The Framers and Civilian Control The Militia Clauses and Military Federalism: The Empire Within an Empire The Separation of Powers: Dual Control Over the National Forces The Commander in Chief Clause: The Political-Military Hierarchy Civilian Control and Constitutional Government 8. The Roots of the American Military Tradition Before the Civil War The Three Strands of American Militarism The Failure of Federalism: Hamilton's Abortive Professionalism Technicism Popularism Professionalism 9. The Creation of the American Military Profession The Dominance of Business Pacifism: Industrialism Versus Militarism Years of Isolation: The Dark and the Bright The Creative Core: Sherman, Upton, Luce The Institutions of Professionalism The Making of the American Military Mind 10. The Failure of the Neo-Hamiltonian Compromise, 1890-1920 The Nature of Neo-Hamiltonianism Mahan And Wood: The Tragedy of the Military Publicist The Abortive Identification With Society, 1918-1925 11. The Constancy of Interwar Civil-Military Relations Business-Reform Hostility and Military Professionalism Reform Liberalism: The Pragmatic Usages of Militarism Military Institutions The American Military Ethic, 1920-1941 PART III THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, 1940-1955 12. World War II: The Alchemy of Power Civil-Military Relations in Total War Military Authority and Influence in Grand Strategy The Military Adjustment to Wartime Power Civil-Military Relations in Economic Mobilization The Fruits of Harmony and Acrimony 13. Civil-Military Relations in the Postwar Decade The Alternatives of Civil-Military Relations Postwar Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations Military Influence in American Society 14. The Political Roles of the Joint Chiefs Political Roles: Substantive and Advocatory The Joint Chiefs in the Truman Administration The Korean War: the Generals, the Troops, and the Public The Joint Chiefs in the First Two Years of the Eisenhower Administration Conclusion 15. The Separation of Powers and Cold War Defense The Impact of the Separation of Powers The Separation of Powers Versus the Separation of Functions The Separation of Powers Versus Military Professionalism The Separation of Powers Versus Strategic Monism 16. Departmental Structure of Civil-Military Relations The Organization Problems of the Postwar Decade The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Legal Form and Political Reality The Comptroller: Superego of the Department of Defense The Role of the Secretary The Needs of the Office 17. Toward a New Equilibrium The Requisite For Security Changes in the Ideological Environment Conservatism and Security The Worth of the Military Ideal Notes Index